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Abstract	
	After	 30	 years	 of	 development	 since	 the	 late	 1970s,	 China’s	 State-owned	Enterprise	 reform	 has	 performed	 very	 well.	 However,	 it	 has	 also	 faced	 many	problems,	 such	 as	 administrative	 monopoly,	 the	 inappropriate	 income	distribution	 system,	 and	 inappropriate	 property	 structure.	 The	 problems	 of	administrative	monopoly	and	income	distribution	were	caused	by	inappropriate	property	 structure	 of	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise,	 which	 not	 only	 affect	China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 reform,	 but	 also	 affect	 the	 development	 of	private	 sectors.	 Therefore,	 State-owned	 enterprises	 should	 have	 a	 rather	 clear	boundary	that	they	are	suitable	for	production	of	public	goods	and	quasi	public	goods	 in	 which	 market	 mechanism	 could	 not	 be	 brought	 into	 full	 play.	 The	overall	 purpose	 of	 this	 thesis	 is	 to	 provide	 a	 systematic	 reform	 manner	 for	China’s	State-owned	enterprises.	 		By	 reviewing	 and	 studying	 the	 history	 and	 process	 of	 China’s	 State-owned	enterprise	 legal	 system	 reform,	 and	 evaluating	 the	 its	 current	 situation,	 this	thesis	 concludes	 that	 the	current	 reform	approach	no	 longer	benefit	 to	China’s	economy,	even	became	to	the	block	of	the	further	and	healthier	development	to	some	 degree,	 and	 the	 most	 serious	 problems	 are	 property	 structure,	administrative	monopoly,	and	income	distribution.	 		Due	 to	 the	misunderstanding	 about	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 status,	 the	government	and	state-owned	assets	supervision	and	management	departments	have	 motivations	 and	 excuses	 to	 give	 preferential	 policies	 and	 privileges	 to	State-owned	enterprise.	Which	 lead	 to	 the	administrative	monopoly	 issues	and	income	distribution	issues,	and	seriously	impedes	economic	development.	These	three	issues	must	be	dealt	with	at	the	same	time	because	they	complement	each	other.	Neglecting	any	 issue	of	 these	 three	would	cause	 the	 failure	of	other	 two	reforms	inevitably.	This	thesis	will	provide	a	new	reform	manner	that	deal	with	these	three	issues	systematically,	to	improve	State-owned	enterprise	system.	
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CHAPTER	ONE:	INTRODUCTION		
1. The	Reasons	for	Conducting	this	Research		After	 30	 years	 of	 development	 since	 the	 late	 1970s,	 China’s	 State-owned	Enterprise	 reform	 has	 performed	 very	 well.	 The	 statistics	 showed	 that	 from	2001	to	2009,	the	State-owned	and	State-holding	industrial	enterprises	made	a	total	profit	of	5,846	billion	Yuan,	with	the	total	book	profit	of	2009	increased	by	about	four	times	over	that	of	2001;	the	total	net	profit	amounted	to	4,051	billion	Yuan,	with	the	total	book	net	profit	of	2009	increased	by	4.37	times	over	that	of	20011.	 		However,	it	has	also	faced	many	problems,	such	as	administrative	monopoly,	the	inappropriate	income	distribution	system,	and	inappropriate	property	structure.	How	 to	 solve	 these	 problems?	 Where	 should	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	reform	 go	 further?	 In	 order	 to	 solve	 these	 problems,	 the	 current	 State-owned	enterprise	 reform	 approach,	 which	 actually	 is	 capitalization	 of	 State-owned	assets,	 should	 be	 abandoned,	 and	 a	 new	 systematic	 manner	 that	 focuses	 on	solving	 the	 problems	 of	 property	 structure,	 administrative	 monopoly	 and	income	distribution	system	should	be	introduced.	 		In	 terms	 of	 administrative	 monopoly,	 the	 total	 profit	 of	 central	 enterprises	reached	1341.5	billion	Yuan	in	2010,	accounting	for	67.5%	of	the	total	profit	of	state-owned	enterprises.	The	profits	of	 ten	enterprises	occupied	70%	of	all	net	profits	made	by	central	enterprises	 in	2009,	namely,	China	National	Petroleum	Corporation,	 China	 Mobile	 Limited,	 China	 Telecommunications	 Corporation,	China	 United	 Network	 Communications	 Group	 Co.,	 Ltd.,	 China	 Petroleum	 &	Chemical	 Corporation.	 Hereinto,	 China	 National	 Petroleum	 Corporation	 and	China	Mobile	 Limited	made	 a	 profit	 of	 128.56	 billion	 Yuan	 and	 148.47	 billion	Yuan	respectively,	the	total	of	which	exceeds	one	third	of	the	total	profit	made	by	central	 enterprises2.	 It	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 profits	 of	 central	 enterprises	 were	
																																								 																				 	
1	 See	China	Statistic	Yearbook	2001	to	2009.	 	
2	 See	the	Report	of	State-owned	Assets	Supervision	and	Administration	Commission	of	China.	 	
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mainly	realized	by	monopoly	enterprises.		In	 terms	 of	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 efficiency,	 from	 2001	 to	 2009,	 the	average	return	on	equity	of	State-owned	and	State-holding	industrial	enterprises	was	8.16%,	while	that	of	industrial	enterprises	above	designated	size	was	12.9%.	2009	that	of	the	former	is	8.18%,	while	that	of	the	latter	is	15.59%3.	Therefore,	the	nominal	performance	of	state-owned	and	state-holding	enterprises	was	not	high	enough.	Even	the	performance	of	state-owned	enterprises	is	not	their	real	performance,	but	one	after	enjoying	various	preferential	policies	and	under	such	a	management	environment	that	is	unfair	to	non-stated-owned	enterprises.	The	unfairness	 is	 mainly	 embodied	 in	 fiscal	 subsidy	 by	 the	 government,	 financing	cost,	 and	 land	 and	 resource	 rent,	 and	 so	 on.	 The	 real	 interest	 rate	 for	State-owned	 and	 State-holding	 enterprises	 is	 1.6%,	while	 that	market	 interest	rate	is	4.68%4.	If	we	recount	the	interests	which	should	paid	by	State-owned	and	State-holding	 industrial	 enterprises	 with	 the	 market	 interest	 rate,	 the	 total	interest	difference	will	be	2296.7	billion	Yuan	from	2001	to	2008,	accounting	for	47%	 of	 the	 total	 nominal	 profits	 made	 by	 state-owned	 and	 state-holding	enterprises5.	 The	 resource	 tax	 of	 oil	 is	 average	 only	 26	 Yuan	 per	 ton.	 The	resource	 compensation	 fee	 is	merely	 1%	 of	 sales	 revenue.	 Therefore,	 the	 real	royalty	of	oil	 in	China	 is	 less	 than	2%	of	 its	price,	 far	below	the	ratio	of	12.5%	that	 is	 imposed	on	the	capital	venture	in	China6.	Even	collection	proportion	for	special	oil	 gain	 levy	below	40	US	Dollars	 is	 too	 low	 to	 fully	 realize	 interests	of	resource	 owners.	 From	 2001	 to	 2009,	 the	 state-owned	 and	 state-holding	industrial	enterprises	lack	to	pay	243.7	billion	Yuan	of	the	oil	royalty.	Together	with	those	of	coal	and	natural	gas,	the	state-owned	and	state-holding	industrial	enterprises	lack	to	pay	497.7	billion	Yuan	of	royalty	of	resources7.	 		In	terms	of	 income	distribution,	 from	1994	to	2006,	 the	state	 fiscal	subsidy	 for	
																																								 																				 	
3	 See	China	Statistic	Yearbook	2001	to	2009.	
4	 Ibid.	 	
5	 Ibid.	 	
6	 Ibid.	 	
7	 Ibid.	 	
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the	 losses	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 accumulated	 to	 365.3	 billion	 Yuan8.	According	 to	 incomplete	 data,	 from	 2007	 to	 2009,	 the	 State-owned	 and	State-holding	industrial	enterprises	received	fiscal	subsidy	is	about	194.3	billion	Yuan9.	 The	 real	 performance	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 can	 be	 estimated	through	 deducting	 those	 costs	 without	 paid	 but	 should	 be	 paid	 and	governmental	 subsidies,	 together	 achieving	 about	 7491.4	 billion	 Yuan,	 from	nominal	 profit	 of	 the	 State-owned	 enterprises.	 According	 to	 estimation,	 the	average	real	return	on	equity	of	state-owned	and	state-holding	enterprises	from	2001	 to	 2009	 is	 -6.29%.	 In	 2008,	 the	 average	 staff	 wage	 of	 state-owned	enterprises	 was	 17	 %	 higher	 than	 that	 of	 other	 organizations,	 their	 average	labour	 income	 is	 63%	higher	 than	 that	 of	 private	 enterprises	 and	 36%	higher	than	that	of	non-state-owned	enterprises10.	There	is	a	big	difference	between	the	industries.	 2008,	 the	 average	 income	 per	 year	 of	 employees	 in	 monopolistic	industries	 reached	128.5	 thousand	Yuan,	which	 is	 about	7	 times	 as	 that	 of	 the	employees	in	the	whole	country11.	The	ratio	of	the	state-owned	enterprises	in	5	industries	with	highest	income	is	highest,	while	that	in	5	industries	with	lowest	income	is	 lowest12.	According	to	regulations	of	existing	housing	provident	 fund	system,	 the	 housing	 provident	 fund	 deposit	 ratio	 paid	 and	 deposited	 by	 staff	themselves	as	well	as	that	paid	and	deposited	by	units	should	be	no	less	than	5%	of	the	staff’s	average	monthly	salary	of	the	previous	year,	and	no	more	than	12%	in	 principle13.	 A	 large	 number	 of	 State-owned	 enterprises	 and	 institutions	 of	monopoly	 industries,	 however,	 raise	 this	 ratio	 to	 20% 14 .	 China	 Netcom	Operations	Limited	once	accrued	4.142	billion	Yuan	at	total	amount	as	lump-sum	cash	 housing	 allowance15.	 State-owned	 enterprises	 also	 conduct	 residential	building	construction	with	raised	funds	on	gratis	land	from	free	allocation	by	the	state.	 In	 addition,	 some	 enterprises	 purchase	 commercial	 residential	 buildings	
																																								 																				 	
8	 Hong	Sheng.	2012.	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises:	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform,	World	
Science	Publishing	Company.	pp.	50.	 	
9	 Ibid.	 	
10	 See	China	Statistic	Yearbook	2001	to	2009.	 	
11	 Ibid.	 	
12	 Ibid.	 	
13	 Ibid.	 	
14	 Hong	Sheng.	2012.	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises:	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform,	World	
Science	Publishing	Company.	pp.	87.	
15	 Ibid,	pp.	91.	 	
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and	sell	 them	to	 their	own	staff	and	workers	at	 low	price.	From	2007	to	2009,	the	average	 tax	burden	of	992	state-owned	enterprises	was	10%,	while	 that	of	private	 enterprises	was	 as	 high	 as	 24%.	 State-owned	 enterprises	 did	 not	 turn	over	 any	 profits	 from	 1994	 to	 200716.	 In	 2009,	 only	 6%	 of	 state-owned	enterprises’	 profits	 were	 turned	 over,	 and	 the	 rest	 was	 all	 distributed	 within	enterprises.	 In	 2010,	 it	 decreases	 to	 2.2%.	 Moreover,	 dividend	 turnover	 by	central	enterprises	mainly	transfers	within	the	central	enterprise	system17.	Their	significance	in	benefiting	the	common	people	has	not	been	embodied	yet.		The	problems	of	administrative	monopoly	and	income	distribution	were	caused	by	 inappropriate	 property	 structure	 of	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise,	 which	not	 only	 affect	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 reform,	 but	 also	 affect	 the	development	 of	 private	 sectors.	 For	 instance,	 the	 structural	 “Guo	 Jin	Min	 Tui”	phenomenon	 currently	 exists	 in	 China.	 In	 terms	 of	 capital,	 the	 proportion	 of	State-owned	enterprises	in	electric	power,	steam,	and	hot	water	production	and	supply	industries	rose	from	85.8%	in	2005	to	88.2%	in	200818.	In	terms	of	gross	industrial	 output	 value,	 the	 proportion	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 in	 electric	power,	 steam,	 and	hot	water	 production	 and	 supply	 industries	 increased	 from	90.5%	in	2005	to	98.9%	in	200819.	The	quantitive	analysis	with	the	term,	market	power,	 on	 the	 monopolistic	 levels	 of	 industries	 shows	 that	 colored	 metal	smelting	and	pressing	industry,	tobacco	industry,	oil	processing	industry,	coking	industry,	nuclear	 fuel	 industry,	 and	electric	machinery	 industry,	 and	so	on,	 the	monopolistic	 level	 in	 2007	 is	 higher	 than	 that	 in	 200220.	 These	 industries	 are	overlapped	 very	 much	 with	 those	 with	 higher	 ratio	 of	 the	 state-owned	enterprises.		Therefore,	 State-owned	 enterprises	 should	 have	 a	 rather	 clear	 boundary	 that	they	are	suitable	for	production	of	public	goods	and	quasi	public	goods	in	which	market	 mechanism	 could	 not	 be	 brought	 into	 full	 play.	 Products	 which	 are	
																																								 																				 	
16	 Ibid,	pp.	40.	 	
17	 Ibid.	 	
18	 See	China	Statistic	Yearbook	2001	to	2009.	
19	 Ibid.	 	
20	 Ibid.	 	
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purchased	 solely	 by	 governments	 or	 which	 should	 be	 stringently	 controlled	during	 production	 progress	 should	 be	 supplied	 by	 State-owned	 enterprises,	while	other	products	should	be	supplied	by	private	economy.	The	condition	for	existence	of	State-owned	enterprises	 is	when	they	supply	public	goods	and	the	financing	 stage	 and	 cannot	 be	 separated	 from	 the	 production	 stage.	 The	state-owned	 enterprise	 is	 a	 public	 organization	 different	 from	 ordinary	governments	or	enterprises,	whose	aim	is	to	realize	public	good	of	society	rather	than	to	make	profits.	 		The	nature	of	China’s	current	State-owned	enterprise	reform	is	capitalization	of	State-owned	assets,	that	is,	making	profits	through	management	of	state-owned	assets.	 Therefore,	 the	 government	 gradually	 turns	 into	 personalized	 or	institutionalized	capital	when	state-owned	assets	constantly	show	the	attributes	of	 capital.	 As	 the	main	 content	 of	 China’s	 market-oriented	 reform,	 the	 reform	orientation	 choice	 of	 state-owned	 assets	 capitalization	 had	 both	 logical	inevitability	 and	 historical	 progressiveness	 especially	 at	 the	 primary	 stage	 of	China’s	 economic	 transition.	 However,	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 market	economy	in	our	country,	the	historical	mission	of	state-owned	enterprise	reform	characterized	by	state-owned	assets	capitalization	is	about	to	come	to	an	end.		A	 short-term	 reform	 plan	 for	 state-owned	 enterprises	 based	 on	 two	 major	objectives	should	be	designed,	namely,	breaking	the	administrative	monopoly	by	State-owned	 enterprises,	 and	 regulating	 State-owned	 enterprises’	 income	distribution	 system.	 The	 significance	 lies	 in	 that	 this	 will	 promote	 different	economic	main	bodies	to	carry	out	adequate	and	fair	economic	competition,	thus	better	realizing	social	justice	and	improving	economic	efficiency.		State-owned	enterprise	reform	has	two	ultimate	goals.	The	first	goal	is	to	change	State-owned	enterprises	 into	non-profit	public	 law	enterprises,	and	 the	second	one	 is	 to	 build	 up	 the	 constitutional	 governance	 framework	 for	 State-owned	assets.	To	 realize	 the	ultimate	 goal	 of	 reform,	 State-owned	enterprises	have	 to	gradually	 retreat	 from	 the	 profit-making	 fields	 (rather	 than	 merely	 the	competitive	fields).	
	 35	
	
2. Research	Aims		The	overall	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	provide	a	systematic	reform	manner	for	China’s	State-owned	enterprises.	Accordingly,	this	thesis	will	argue	for	amending	the	 current	 approach	which	nature	 is	 capitalization	of	 State-owned	 assets	 to	 a	more	pragmatic	one.	The	main	research	aims	of	this	thesis	are	as	follows:		First,	to	evaluate	the	current	China’s	State-owned	enterprise	system,	and	find	out	shortcomings	of	it.	This	thesis	attempts	to	identify	the	bottleneck	in	the	current	China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 reform,	 and	 thus	 to	 modify	 it	 and	 promote	further	 reform.	 The	 current	 reform	 approach	 is	 to	 make	 profits	 through	management	 of	 State-owned	 assets,	 which	 had	 both	 logical	 inevitability	 and	historical	 progressiveness	 especially	 at	 the	 primary	 stage	 of	 China’s	 economic	transition.	However,	with	the	establishment	of	market	economy	in	China,	current	state-owned	 enterprise	 system	 no	 longer	 benefit	 to	 economy,	 even	 became	 to	the	block	of	the	further	and	healthier	development	to	some	degree.	Therefore,	to	evaluate	 and	 find	 out	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 current	 China’s	 State-owned	enterprise	system	is	the	primary	task	of	this	thesis.	 		Second,	 to	 analyse	 and	 examine	 three	 main	 problems	 in	 current	 China’s	State-owned	 enterprise	 system.	 Nowadays,	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	system	 faces	many	 problems,	 such	 as	 the	management	 of	 State-owned	 assets,	corporate	 governance	 issue,	 and	 efficiency	 issues	 etc..	 Among	 these	 problems,	three	 issues,	 namely	 the	 property	 structure,	 administrative	 monopoly,	 and	income	 distribution	 are	 the	 core	 issues.	 Due	 to	 the	 misunderstanding	 about	China’s	 State-owned	enterprise	 status,	 the	 government	 and	 state-owned	assets	supervision	and	management	departments	have	motivations	and	excuses	to	give	preferential	policies	and	privileges	to	State-owned	enterprise.	Which	lead	to	the	administrative	 monopoly	 issues	 and	 income	 distribution	 issues,	 and	 seriously	impedes	economic	development.	 		Third,	 to	 improve	China’s	State-owned	enterprise	system.	As	mentioned	above,	
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property	structure	issue,	administrative	monopoly	issue	and	income	distribution	issue	 are	 the	 key	 to	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 system,	 and	 they	must	 be	dealt	with	at	the	same	time	because	they	complement	each	other.	Neglecting	any	issue	of	these	three	would	cause	the	failure	of	other	two	reforms	inevitably.	This	thesis	 will	 provide	 a	 new	 reform	 manner	 that	 deal	 with	 these	 three	 issues	systematically,	to	improve	State-owned	enterprise	system.	 		
3. Research	Questions		This	 research	 based	 on	 the	 recognition	 that	 the	 current	 China’s	 State-owned	enterprise	reform	approach	could	not	solve	existing	problems	and	had	negative	impacts	on	economic	development.	This	recognition	is	widely	acknowledged	by	academic	area	and	supported	by	statistics21.	 	 		This	 thesis	 addresses	 a	 primary	 research	 question:	 how	 should	 China’s	State-owned	enterprise	system	be	 improved?	 In	order	 to	answer	 this	question,	this	 thesis	 will	 look	 at	 approaches	 to	 reform	 current	 China’s	 State-owned	enterprise	 system	 by	 addressing	 following	 questions:	 what	 are	 the	 main	problems	 in	 current	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 system?	 How	 did	 these	problems	emerge?	What	are	the	negative	impacts	of	these	problems	on	economic	development?	How	to	solve	 these	problems?	To	 three	specific	 issues	(property	structure,	 administrative	 monopoly,	 and	 income	 distribution	 system),	 the	following	 questions	 will	 be	 addressed	 in	 separate	 chapters:	 What	 are	 the	limitations	 of	 current	 approach	 on	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise’s	 property	structure,	and	what	 is	 the	alternative	approach?	How	administrative	monopoly	affect	legal	and	economic	reform	of	State-owned	enterprise	reform,	and	how	to	further	 reform	 it?	 How	 does	 the	 income	 distribution	 system	 in	 the	 past	 and	present	 disproportionately	 benefit	 employees	 of	 State-owned	 enterprise,	what	the	pitfall	of	current	 legal	 regime,	and	how	to	 improve	 the	 income	distribution	system	in	the	future	reform?		
																																								 																				 	
21	 See	statistics	in	section	1	of	this	chapter.	 	
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4. Methodology		In	 order	 to	 test	 the	 hypothesis	 of	 the	 study	 and	 examine	 the	 main	 research	questions	raised	 in	the	process	of	research,	 this	 thesis	adopts	a	combination	of	qualitative	 legal	 research	 methodologies,	 which	 includes	 literature	 review,	synthesized	 comparison	 and	 analysis,	 case	 study,	 fieldwork	 and	 comparative	methodologies.		
4.1 Doctrinal	Research		To	understand	the	background	of	 the	relevant	 issues	and	set	 the	 foundation	of	this	 research,	 an	 in-depth	 review	 of	 literature	 in	 the	 form	 of	 government	statistics,	 annual	 legal	 and	 economic	 reports,	 legislation,	 text	 books,	 journal	articles	and	newspaper	articles	have	been	undertaken.	This	research	mainly	uses	secondary	 sources	 and	 these	 data	 have	 been	 examined	 and	 distinguished	 by	their	 publication	 date,	 reliability,	 professional	 level	 and	 reputation	 of	 their	sources.	 In	addition,	primary	sources	have	been	considered,	 for	example,	 some	interviews	with	 scholars	 and	government	officers	have	been	 taken	 to	get	 their	opinions	 about	 China’s	 economic	 and	 legal	 reform,	 and	 which	 issues	 they	consider	 to	 be	 fundamental.	 Although	 this	 research	 is	 about	 China’s	 economic	law,	as	well	as	collecting	data	in	China’s	legal	area,	data	in	economics,	historical	and	sociological	areas	also	are	concerned	because	the	problems	in	China’s	legal	system	did	not	come	from	legal	area	alone.		
4.2 Law	and	History	Approach		Time	is	a	basic	dimension	inherent	in	law.	“History	of	law	as	academic	discipline	must	search	for	methods	to	investigate	the	relationship	between	law	and	time,	as	well	as	contribute	to	historical	research	on	changes	in	the	legal	systems.”22	 Legal	norms,	 legal	 systems	and	 ideas	 are	 continuously	 changing,	 suddenly	or	 slowly,	frequently	or	 rarely.	 Legal	history	 research	 connects	 to	 substantive	 law,	 to	 the	
																																								 																				 	
22	 See	the	University	of	Oslo,	Law	School,	Law,	Society	and	Historical	Change,	
<http://www.jus.uio.no/english/research/areas/law-history/>,	accessed	8	November	2013.	
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sociology	of	 law	and	 to	 theories	of	 law,	 all	 of	which	 relate	 to	 the	dimension	of	time	in	law.	This	method	helps	to	show	how	law	has	evolved	and	why	it	changed.		
4.3 Law	and	Economic	Approach		Law	and	economics,	or	the	economic	analysis	of	law,	is	not	a	subject	explaining	law;	it	looks	at	the	interaction	of	“economic	questions	and	the	legal	rules	which	influence	 the	 economy”23.	 The	 nature	 of	 this	 approach	 has	 been	 described	 by	Posner,	and	cited	by	Coase,	as	follows:	“Economics,	the	science	of	human	choice	in	a	world	in	which	resources	are	limited	in	relation	to	human	wants,	explores,	and	tests	the	implications	of	the	assumption	that	man	is	a	rational	maximizer	of	his	ends	in	life,	his	satisfactions	–	What	we	shall	call	his	‘self-interest’.	By	defining	economics	as	the	“science	of	human	choice,	economics	becomes	the	study	of	all	purposeful	human	behaviour	and	its	scope	is,	therefore,	coterminous	with	all	the	social	sciences	[…]	to	handle	sociological,	political	[and]	legal	[…]	problems.”24		
4.4 Conducted	Fieldwork		This	thesis	bases	on	the	problems	emerged	in	the	process	of	transformation	in	China,	and	typical	issues	in	China	would	reflect	these	problems,	such	as	“house	demolishing	entities”	which	refers	to	property	system,	and	the	competition	between	state-owned	enterprises	and	private	enterprises	refers	to	administrative	monopoly.	Therefore,	Face-to-face	interviews	were	conducted	with	three	groups	of	interviewees.	The	use	of	interviews	has	been	advocated	as	they	provide	detailed	and	insightful	information,	helping	to	uncover	the	meaning	behind	people’s	experience	and	perceptions25.	The	first	group	was	academics	from	Pro.	Yuliang	Chen,	Pro.	Guo	Feng	and	Pro.	Tong	Qi,	who	specialized	in	
																																								 																				 	
23	 Alain	Marciano,	Law	and	Economics:	a	Reader	(Alain	Marciano	(ed),	Routledge,	2009),	3.	See	
American	Law	and	Economics	Association,	<http://www.amlecon.org/index.html>,	accessed	9	
November	2013.	
24	 Ronald	H.	Coase,	‘Economics	and	Contiguous	Disciplines’,	in	Marciano,	Law	and	Economics:	a	
Reader,	11-12.	
25	 Zack,	M.H.	&	McKenney,	J.L.	1995.	“Social	Context	and	Interaction	in	Ongoing	
Computer	Supported	Management	Groups”.	Organization	Science,	6(4),	394-422.	
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Chinese	economic	law.	The	second	group	was	with	employees	from	various	state	enterprises.	The	third	group	was	with	the	people	from	private	sector.	 		Interviews	were	carried	out	in	a	relaxed	and	comfortable	environment,	at	a	time	convenient	 for	 the	 interviewees.	 Interviews	 were	 conducted	 in	 a	 one-to-one	manner,	with	the	interviewer	taking	necessary	notes	in	the	process.	 		The	 questions	 discussed	 differ	 between	 the	 three	 groups	 of	 interviewees	with	the	 first	 group	concentrating	on	 the	academics’	 view	and	opinion	on	economic	law;	the	second	group	focusing	on	state	enterprise	reform	while	the	third	group	were	asked	about	their	opinion	on	competition.	 		The	ethnical	behavior	of	researchers	 is	under	unprecedented	emphasis	as	 they	have	 become	 a	 basis	 for	 conducting	 effective	 and	 meaning	 research26.	 The	interviews	carried	out	in	this	research	strictly	followed	the	SOAS	Research	Ethics	
Policy27	 as	 to	 protect	 participating	 interviewees	 from	 harm	 and	 unnecessary	invasion	of	their	privacy.		
4.5 Limitations		In	 this	 thesis,	 all	 assumptions,	 analysis	 and	arguments	 are	undertaken	only	on	theoretical	level,	without	any	relevant	support	in	practice,	so	research	will	fail	in	persuasiveness	to	some	extent.	 		
5. Contributions	of	This	Thesis	
	This	 thesis	 provides	 a	 new	manner	 for	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 further	reform.	The	former	reform	approach	is	actually	the	capitalization	of	State-owned	assets,	 which	 achieved	 successes	 at	 the	 primary	 stage	 of	 China’s	 economic	reform,	however,	it	became	to	the	obstacle	of	whole	national	economy	with	the	
																																								 																				 	
26 Trimble, J. E., & Fisher, C. B. (Eds.). 2006. The handbook of ethical research with ethnocultural 
populations & communities. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage. 
27 SOAS Research Ethics Policy [Online] Available at: 
<http://www.soas.ac.uk/researchoffice/ethics/file50158.pdf> 
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establishment	of	market	economy	in	China.	 		Under	the	former	reform	approach,	the	government	takes	on	two	roles,	one	as	a	provider	of	public	goods	(revenue	government)	and	another	as	institutionalized	capital	(profit-oriented	government).	Such	a	dual	nature	is	also	reflected	by	the	aims	and	actions	of	State-owned	enterprises.	First,	as	platforms	for	the	operation	of	state-owned	assets,	State-owned	enterprises	need	to	maximize	their	profits	in	the	 form	 of	 independent	 corporations,	 just	 like	 regular	 enterprises.	 Yet	State-owned	enterprises	also	aim	to	address	issues	in	the	interests	of	the	public	such	 as	 employment,	 social	 stability,	 macro-control,	 the	 stability	 of	 the	government	 and	 national	 security	 under	 some	 circumstances.	 Second,	 as	 asset	managers,	 State-owned	enterprises	managers	are	virtually	 the	 same	as	 regular	agents.	At	the	same	time,	as	government	goal	 implementers,	 they	belong	to	the	government	and	can	partake	in	the	revolving	door	between	enterprise	managers	and	government	officials.	Third,	 in	market	operations,	State-owned	enterprises	will	 emphasize	 the	 public	 nature	 of	 State-owned	 enterprises	 and	 obtain	 some	special	 privileges	 through	 “in-house	 lobbying”	 in	 order	 to	 pursue	 illegitimate	interests.		The	 government’s	 aim	 of	 making	 money	 through	 State-owned	 enterprises	 is	delegated	 to	 State-owned	 enterprises	 managers	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 there	 is	 a	principal-agent	 relationship	 between	 the	 government	 and	 State-owned	enterprises	 managers,	 which	 is	 characterized	 by	 asymmetric	 information	whereby	 the	managers	have	more	detailed	and	specialist	knowledge	about	 the	operations	of	 the	 enterprise	 than	government	officials,	whose	duties	 are	much	wider.	 When	 the	 information	 is	 asymmetric,	 interest	 groups	 will	 emerge	consisting	of	State-owned	enterprises	managers	and	some	government	officials	who	 claim	 to	 “make	 money	 for	 the	 public”	 but	 actually	 seek	 personal	 gains	through	state-owned	assets.	Such	interest	groups	will	not	only	make	the	goal	of	“making	money	for	the	public”	come	to	nothing,	but	also	control	important	social	resources	 through	 their	 public	 power	 to	 constitute	 the	 socio-economic	characteristics	of	bureaucratic	capitalism	or	crony	capitalism.	This	is	actually	the	fundamental	 cause	 for	 the	 severe	 problems	 of	 administrative	 monopoly	 and	
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income	distribution	of	China’s	State-owned	enterprise.	 		The	 new	 reform	 manner	 for	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 provided	 by	 this	thesis	 requests	 the	 next	 stage	 reform	 should	 focus	 on	 dealing	 with	 property	structure	issue,	administrative	monopoly	issue	and	income	distribution	issue	at	the	same	time.	In	fact,	the	status	of	SOEs	is	also	the	key	to	solving	the	problems	of	monopoly	and	income	distribution.	The	core	of	these	two	problems	is	actually	the	misunderstanding	 about	 SOE’s	 status.	 Regarding	monopoly	 issues,	 it	 is	 the	strategy	 of	 “making	 profit	 for	 public”	 and	 “making	 SOEs	 bigger	 and	 stronger”	which	 caused	 the	 motivations	 and	 excuses	 of	 government	 and	 state-owned	assets	supervision	and	management	departments	for	giving	preferential	policies	and	privileges	to	SOEs.	In	respect	of	income	distribution	issues,	it	is	the	unclear	status	 of	 SOEs	 which	 resulted	 in	 the	 inappropriate	 income	 distribution	mechanism.	 In	 addition,	 the	 issues	 of	 monopoly	 and	 income	 distribution	 are	complementary	and	linked:	on	the	one	hand,	majority	profits	of	SOEs	result	from	the	monopolistic	behavior	of	SOEs,	and	income	distribution	cannot	be	regulated	properly	 if	 SOEs’	 monopolistic	 behaviors	 still	 persist;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	reform	of	SOEs’	income	distribution	mechanism	would	also	affect	the	regulation	of	administrative	monopoly.	 		Therefore,	this	thesis	proposed	that	the	problems	of	China’s	SOEs	must	be	solved	systematically,	always	neglected	by	the	majority	of	scholars,	who	often	tried	to	solve	 one	 specific	 problem	 by	 using	 one	 method	 within	 one	 area.	 The	fundamental	issue	is	the	status	of	SOE.	All	former	discussions	about	China’s	SOE	reform	are	based	on	the	perspective	of	private	law,	so	a	strategy	of	“hold	on	to	the	 big	 and	 let	 to	 of	 the	 small”	 and	 “building	 SOEs	bigger	 and	 stronger”	 is	 the	inevitable	 results	 of	 the	 property	 approach.	 However,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	public	interests	and	public	functions,	it	is	not	necessarily	so;	it	is	also	essential	to	build	 small	 SOEs	 into	 bigger	 and	 stronger	 ones	 and	 establish	 some	 new	enterprises.	In	contrast,	some	large	and	strong	SOEs	may	need	to	be	downsized	or	even	dissolved.	Therefore,	current	SOE	reform	in	China	should	be	undertaken	from	the	perspective	of	public	 law	whereby	SOEs	are	material	means	by	which	public	functions	are	fulfilled,	instead	of	the	private	law	perspective	of	SOE	assets	
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as	property.	
	
6. Outlines	of	This	Thesis	
	Chapter	 One	 is	 the	 introduction	 chapter.	 The	 fundamental	 background	 of	 the	whole	 study	 is	 introduced	 at	 first,	 and	 then	 the	 research	 aims	 and	 research	questions	are	addressed.	Following	are	the	methodology	and	contribution	of	this	research.		Chapter	 Two	 is	 the	 study	 of	 the	 process	 of	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	reform.	 In	 order	 to	 answer	 the	 question	 of	 what	 are	 the	 existing	 problems	 in	current	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 system	 and	 how	 they	 are	 emerged,	 a	thorough	analysis	on	the	nature,	history,	and	current	condition	is	necessary.	At	the	 beginning,	 the	 tasks	 of	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 reform	 and	achievements	were	introduced,	which	could	be	divided	into	the	reform	aiming	at	enhancing	 State-owned	 enterprise’s	 vitality,	 aiming	 at	 changing	 State-owned	enterprise’s	 operation	 mechanism,	 and	 aiming	 at	 establishing	 a	 modern	enterprise	 system.	 Then	 the	 process	 of	 State-owned	 enterprise	 reform	 are	reviewed	and	examined	into	three	stages,	namely	the	period	of	Fang	Quan	Rang	Li	 (1978-1986),	 the	 period	 of	 Liang	 Quan	 Fen	 Li	 (1987-1992),	 the	 period	 of	Establishing	Modern	Enterprise	System	(1993-Present).	At	last,	some	decisions,	policies,	 laws	 and	 regulations	 made	 by	 the	 government	 institutions	 that	 had	directly	influenced	the	reform	process	are	introduced	and	reviewed.		On	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 historical	 review	 of	 the	 process	 of	 China’s	 State-owned	enterprise	reform,	Chapter	Three	focus	on	the	theoretical	area	of	it.	This	chapter	reviews	 and	 analyzes	 several	 leading	 and	 popular	 theories	 and	 arguments	 in	each	stage	comprehensively,	to	demonstrate	mainstream	points	of	view	on	each	side,	and	to	find	out	how	they	affect	China’s	State-owned	enterprise	reform	and	what	 shortcomings	 they	 have.	 The	 first	 stage	mainly	 focuses	 on	 analyzing	 the	drawbacks	of	 the	 traditional	 enterprise	 system,	 the	 cause	of	 the	 inefficiency	of	State-owned	enterprise	and	the	lack	of	an	incentive	mechanism	in	order	to	find	out	 the	 preferred	 system	 for	 the	 State-owned	 enterprise.	 The	 second	 stage	
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focused	 on	 putting	 forward	 appropriate	 methodologies	 for	 transforming	State-owned	 enterprise	 from	 government	 subordinates	 into	 independent	commodity	 producers.	 The	 third	 stage	 mainly	 focused	 on	 the	 goal	 of	transforming	 the	 operating	 mechanism	 of	 State-owned	 enterprise	 and	establishing	a	modern	enterprise	system,	some	famous	debates	in	this	stage	such	as	the	debate	between	Lin	and	Zhang,	and	the	Debate	between	Lang	and	Gu	are	also	 introduced.	 The	 fourth	 stage	 focuses	 on	 some	 existing	 issues	 in	 current	China’s	State-owned	enterprise	system,	such	as	the	property	structure	issue,	the	administrative	 monopoly	 issue,	 and	 income	 distribution	 issue.	 At	 last,	assessment	 on	 these	 theories	 and	 arguments	 will	 be	 made	 to	 find	 out	 their	advantages	 and	 disadvantages,	 and	 the	 influences	 on	 China’s	 State-owned	enterprise	reform.	 		Chapter	 Four	 focuses	 on	 the	 property	 structure	 issue	 of	 China’s	 State-owned	enterprise,	which	is	the	main	cause	of	the	problems	of	administrative	monopoly	and	income	distribution.	This	chapter	reviews	the	history,	functions	and	role	of	State-owned	enterprise	at	first,	then	introduces	and	analyzes	the	debates	on	the	nature	of	 State-owned	enterprise.	A	 case	 study	of	Guo	 Jin	Min	Tui	 is	discussed	afterward,	to	look	at	how	the	inappropriate	property	structure	affects	the	whole	economy.	At	the	end,	some	proposals	about	further	reform	China’s	State-owned	enterprise	 are	 put	 forward,	 including	 short-term	plan	 and	 the	 ultimate	 task	 of	China’s	State-owned	enterprise	reform.		Chapter	Five	is	about	the	administrative	monopoly	issue	of	China’s	State-owned	enterprise.	 Some	 basic	 theories	 are	 reviewed	 at	 first,	 such	 as	 what	 is	administrative	 monopoly,	 the	 nature	 and	 origin	 of	 it,	 the	 forms	 of	 China’s	administrative	 monopoly,	 and	 the	 causes	 of	 it.	 Then	 the	 anti-administrative	monopoly	 legal	 system	of	China	 is	examined,	 to	 find	out	 its	 characteristics	and	shortcomings.	 The	 solution	 on	 the	 administrative	 monopoly	 issue	 of	 China’s	State-owned	 enterprise	 is	 proposed	 at	 last,	 including	 the	 improvement	approaches	 of	 Constitutional	 level,	 and	 approaches	 reform	 current	anti-monopoly	law.	 		
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Chapter	 Six	 attempts	 to	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	income	distribution	system.	At	the	beginning	of	this	chapter,	the	development	of	China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 income	 distribution	 legal	 system	 is	 reviewed	stage	by	 stage.	And	 then	 the	 current	 condition	 of	 this	 system	 is	 examined	 and	analyzed,	 including	 the	 monetary	 and	 non-monetary	 income,	 comparison	 of	income	of	senior	managers	between	State-owned	enterprise	and	other	types	of	enterprises,	 comparison	 of	 the	 tax	 payment	 between	 State-owned	 enterprises	and	other	types	of	enterprises,	and	the	profit	payment	and	dividend	distribution	of	 State-owned	 enterprises.	 After	 above	 review	 and	 examination,	 the	 basic	characteristic	 of	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 income	 distribution	 system	 is	concluded	afterward.	On	 the	basis	 of	 former	 analysis,	 the	 factors	 contribute	 to	current	 situation	 of	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	 income	 distribution	 legal	system	are	discussed	in	the	following	section.	At	the	end,	this	chapter	proposes	a	reform	 approach	 that	 complete	 and	 perfect	 China’s	 State-owned	 enterprise	income	distribution	by	anti-monopoly	law.	 									 	
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CHAPTER	TWO:	HISTORY	AND	DEVELOPMENT	OF	CHINA’S	SOE	REFORM	
	The	 traditional	 Chinese	 state-owned	 enterprises	 were	 set	 up	 through	 several	movements	such	as	Socialist	Three	Major	Transformation	(She	Hui	Zhu	Yi	San	Da	Gai	 Zaoǁ:Áįɋ),28	 Abolishing	 Private	 Ownership	 (Xiao	 Mie	 Si	 You	Chan	QuanƊƕǈō,œ)29	 and	National	Industrialization	(Guo	Jia	Gong	Ye	Hua
±Ùê)30.	 Before	 reform	 and	 opening	 up,	 these	 traditional	 state-owned	enterprises	 existed	 as	 branches	 of	 government	 department,	 carried	 out	 highly	centralized	planning	management	and	operating	based	on	administrative	orders.	In	 this	 model,	 managers	 are	 only	 the	 executors	 of	 administrative	 authorities’	decisions,	 enterprises	 have	 no	 autonomies	 in	 human	 resources,	 finance,	production	and	distribution,	and	managers	and	workers	have	no	responsibilities	for	profitability,	which	caused	inefficiency	and	high	budget	deficit31.	 		Since	 1978,	 the	 reform	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 began	 with	 Decentralizing	power	and	giving	away	profits	(Fang	Quan	Rang	LiİœȖq)32,	and	experienced	following	two	stages,	separating	control	from	ownership	(Liang	Quan	Fen	Li	
œjǑ)33	 and	establishing	modern	enterprise	system	(Jian	Li	Xian	Dai	Qi	Ye	Zhi	Du ùǑƦ/6s÷ ) 34 .	 After	 30	 years	 development,	 the	 number	 of	state-owned	enterprises	 significantly	 reduced,	 the	property	 right	was	 clarified,	and	 a	 fundamental	 modern	 enterprise	 system	 has	 been	 established	 and	operating	well.	On	the	surface,	it	might	seem	that	the	task	of	reforming	SOEs	has	been	 largely	 completed	 and	 that	 only	 consideration	 and	 improvement	 is	 now	required.	 		In	 fact,	 the	 reform	 of	 SOEs	 is	 far	 from	 over.	 There	 are	 still	 many	 remaining	problems,	 such	 as	 the	 lack	 of	 the	 ownership	 of	 SOEs,	 insufficient	 supervision	
																																								 																				 	
28 ǁ:ÁįɋSocialist Three Major Transformation. 
29 Ɗƕǈō,œAbolishing Private Ownership. 
30 ±ÙêNational Industrialization. 
31 ƓÀJ2004sp7{ŰŷŰŷÁÍiƟǁDuojun Qi. 2004. The Basic Theory of 
Economic Law. Wuhan: Wuhan University Press. 
32 İœȖqDecentralizing powers and giving away profits. 
33 œjǑSeparating control from ownership. 
34 ùǑƦ/6s÷Establishing modern enterprise system. 
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mechanism,	excessive	administrative	intervention,	low	efficiency,	and	imperfect	income	 distribution	 system.	 This	 chapter	 seeks	 to	 explore	 the	motives	 behind	SOE	reform	in	different	stages	through	an	examination	of	the	tasks	and	process	of	China’s	SOE	reform.		
1. The	Tasks	of	China’s	SOE	Reform		The	reform	of	China’s	SOE	has	different	tasks	in	different	stages,	which	could	be	divided	into	the	reform	that	aiming	at	enhancing	SOEs’	vitality,	which	aiming	at	transforming	SOEs’	operating	mechanism,	and	which	aiming	at	establishing	and	improving	modern	enterprise	system.	 		
1.1 The	reform	which	aiming	at	enhancing	SOEs’	vitality.	 		1.1.1 Background		The	period	from	1978	to	1986	is	the	initial	stage	of	China’s	SOE	reform,	and	the	general	 reform	 task	 in	 this	 stage	 is	 to	 enhance	 SOEs’	 vitality	 by	 expanding	enterprises’	 autonomy.	 The	 set	 up	 of	 this	 reform	 task	was	 depended	 on	 social	and	economic	background	and	enterprises’	realities	of	the	day.	 		Under	traditional	planned	economy,	first	of	all,	China’s	SOEs	heavily	dependent	on	 government,	 state-owned	 theoretically	 equivalent	 to	 state-operated,	 and	state-owned	 enterprises	 actually	 existed	 as	 government	 appendage.	 Second,	higher	 administrative	 authorities	 had	 absolute	management	 privilege	 to	 SOEs,	including	 supply,	 production,	 sales,	 even	 dispute	 settlement	 and	 promotion	 of	managers	were	all	decided	by	higher	authorities’	wills.	Which	determined	 that	enterprises’	behaviors	had	clear	political	characteristics.	Third,	SOEs	were	under	the	 administrative	 guidance	 of	 government	 department,	 and	 the	decision-making	 power	 entirely	 belonged	 to	 government.	 It	 was	 the	 higher	administrative	 authorities	 but	 the	 market	 demand	 affected	 SOEs	 behaviors.	Which	lead	to	that	SOEs	behaviors	had	significant	administrative	characteristics.	Fourth,	the	manner	that	the	government	directly	managed	every	aspect	of	SOEs	
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harmed	SOEs	staff’s	democratic	power,	such	as	the	national	unified	wage	system,	all	enterprise	operation	were	decided	by	higher	authorities,	and	managers	were	directly	appointed	and	supervised	by	higher	authorities	but	elected,	supervised,	and	 recalled	 by	whole	 staff.	Which	 lead	 to	 the	 separated	 relationship	 between	SOEs	and	their	staffs.	 		1.1.2 Key	reform	points		Firstly,	 expanding	 power	 and	 giving	 up	 profits.	 In	 July	 1979,	 the	 State	 Council	issued	 several	 documents	 concerned	 about	 expanding	 SOEs’	 autonomy	 and	retained	profits,	and	took	eight	SOEs	as	pilot.	Which	kicked	off	the	SOEs	reform.	In	the	 following	years,	 the	State	Council	successively	published	certain	number	of	 rules	 and	 regulations	 to	 make	 this	 policy	 more	 specific	 and	 detailed	 and	applicable	based	on	pilot	experiences.	 		Secondly,	 expanding	 power	 meant	 increasing	 SOEs	 responsibilities,	 and	 then	economic	responsibility	system	was	introduced	and	applied	gradually.	 In	1981,	the	State	Council	approved	temporary	rule	about	industrial	enterprise	economic	responsibility,	which	required	that	economic	responsibility,	economic	effect	and	economic	interests	should	be	unified,	and	proposed	the	profits	distribution	ratio	among	the	State,	enterprise	and	staff.	 		Thirdly,	 replacing	 profits	 with	 taxes.	 In	 1984,	 the	 State	 Council	 approved	 the	policy	that	replacing	profits	with	taxes,	and	ruled	that	enterprises	could	maintain	certain	profits	after	paying	tax	(55%	of	profit).	Then	the	manner	that	profits	and	taxes	 coexist	 was	 transformed	 to	 entirely	 replacing	 profits	 with	 taxes,	 and	enterprises	could	get	all	profits	after	paying	income	tax.	 		Fourthly,	replacing	financial	allocation	with	loans.	In	1984,	the	National	Planning	Commission,	the	National	Construction	Committee	and	The	Construction	Bank	of	China	 jointly	 issued	the	rule	that	 the	budgetary	construction	 investment	would	apply	 the	 policy	 of	 replacing	 financial	 allocation	 with	 loans.	 Since	 then,	 all	construction	fund	and	floating	capital	for	SOEs’	development	need	to	lend	from	
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banks	on	their	own	behalf.	 		1.1.3 Task	achievements		First,	the	situation	that	government	controlled	all	aspect	and	enterprise	had	no	decision-making	power	at	all	had	been	changed	preliminarily.	Through	reform,	the	government	gave	most	decision-making	powers	back	to	enterprises,	such	as	production	plan,	sales,	price,	human	resource,	use	of	funds,	production	disposal	and	 organization	 setting.	 Which	 turned	 SOE	 to	 a	 business	 entity	 with	 certain	autonomy	and	enhanced	its	vitality.	 		Second,	SOEs	begun	to	know	about	market	and	acquaint	the	functions	of	market	mechanism	and	law	of	value.	After	reform,	SOEs	had	to	face	the	market	directly	and	produce	and	sale	on	 themselves,	 thus	 the	goods	 they	produced	must	be	 in	excellent	quality	and	reasonable	price.	Which	urged	SOEs	to	innovate	technology,	improve	 management,	 and	 recognize	 the	 concept	 of	 market,	 competition	 and	benefit.	 		Third,	 SOEs	 begun	 to	 change	 the	 labor	 system	 and	 distribution	 system,	 and	initially	 established	motivation	 system.	Through	 reform,	SOEs	obtained	 certain	decision-making	power	 on	human	 resource,	which	 enable	 them	 to	decide	 staff	assignment	 within	 limits;	 to	 distribution	 and	 motivation	 system,	 SOEs	 could	deicide	staff’s	salary	and	bonus	based	on	the	principle	of	distribution	according	to	work,	which	aroused	the	enthusiasm	of	staffs	to	some	degree.	 		1.1.4 Problems		First,	 the	 reform	 of	 expanding	 power	 was	 limited.	 The	 administrative	decentralizing	 and	 expanding	 power	was	 undertaken	 under	 planned	 economy,	and	 the	 State	 mandatory	 plan	 was	 still	 the	 foundation	 of	 SOEs	 behaviors.	Although	 the	 government	 gave	 several	 decision-making	 powers	 back	 to	enterprises,	 and	emphasized	outer	 reform	by	 reducing	 tax	and	giving	up	 some	profits,	the	reform	neither	promote	the	enterprise	management	mechanism	nor	
	 49	
establish	unified	 responsibility	 and	 right	mechanism	and	 survival	 of	 the	 fittest	mechanism.	 		Second,	SOEs	did	not	get	rid	of	the	subordination	status.	SOEs	were	still	operated	by	 the	 State,	 and	 the	 government	 still	 controlled	 the	 ownership	 and	 major	management	power	of	enterprises.	In	addition,	due	to	the	absence	of	supporting	policies,	some	reform	could	not	be	implemented	in	practice.	 		Third,	the	efforts	that	giving	up	profits	was	limited,	and	SOEs	could	not	develop	by	 themselves	 alone.	 Although	 replacing	 profits	 with	 taxes	 defined	 the	distribution	 relationship	 between	 government	 and	 enterprises	 and	 create	 an	approximate	fair	tax	environment,	the	problem	of	high	tax	rate	and	excessive	tax	categories	still	could	not	be	solved.	Which	 limited	SOEs	self-development,	even	increased	tax	burden	to	some	enterprises.	 		
1.2 The	reform	which	aiming	at	changing	SOEs’s	operation	mechanism		1.2.1 Background		Through	the	reform	of	expanding	autonomy	and	enhancing	vitality,	SOEs	made	the	 first	 step	 on	 making	 autonomous	 decision	 and	 recognizing	 market	mechanism.	 Generally	 speaking,	 however,	 this	 reform	 did	 not	 find	 an	appropriate	manner	that	deal	with	the	relationship	between	the	government	and	enterprises,	SOEs’	management	power	still	belonged	to	the	State	fundamentally,	and	 all	 business	 behaviors	 had	 to	 obey	 government’s	 instruction.	 In	 fact,	 the	reform	of	 expanding	power	and	giving	up	profits	under	planned	economy	was	limited	and	the	implementation	was	also	lack	of	standardization,	which	could	not	promote	SOEs’	vitality	significantly.	In	addition,	the	real	tax	rate	did	not	reduce	after	 the	reform	of	 replacing	profits	with	 taxes,	 some	enterprises’	burden	even	increased	due	 to	 technology	 improvement	 and	 loan	 repayment.	 In	 a	word,	 the	reform	 before	 did	 not	 transform	 SOEs	 to	 independent	market	 entity	 that	 held	responsibilities	 for	 its	 own	profits	 and	 losses	 successfully.	Therefore,	 a	 further	reform	 focused	 on	 enterprise’s	 management	 mechanism	 based	 on	 expanding	
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enterprise’s	 autonomy	 was	 necessary.	 Form	 1987	 to	 1993,	 the	 SOE	 reform	conducted	 various	 explorations	 concerned	 about	 enterprise’s	 management	mechanism,	 and	 entered	 to	 a	 new	 stage	 which	 aiming	 at	 changing	 SOE’s	management	mechanism.	 		1.2.2 Key	points	of	reform		Firstly,	 further	expanding	SOEs’	autonomy.	In	1987,	the	State	Council	approved	the	 Temporary	 Regulation	 on	 Direct	 State	 Planning	 of	 Large-scared	 Industrial	Enterprises35,	which	gave	large-scared	enterprises	more	autonomy.	In	1991,	the	State	 Council	 issued	 the	 Notice	 on	 Further	 Enhancing	 State-owned	 Large	 and	Medium-scared	 Enterprises’	 vitality,	 which	 decided	 to	 increase	 investment	 on	technology	improvement,	reduce	administrative	instruction,	lower	loan	rate,	and	clear	triangle	debts.	 		Secondly,	 continue	 to	 implement	 contract	 responsibility	 system.	 In	 1986,	 the	State	Council	 issued	the	Several	Regulations	on	Further	Enterprise	Reform	and	Enhancing	Vitality36,	which	emphasized	that	the	further	reform	should	focus	on	exploring	various	types	of	enterprise’s	management	mechanism.	The	exploration	included	 the	 joint-stock	 system,	 the	 leasehold	 system,	 the	 assets	 responsibility	system,	and	contract	responsibility	system.		Third,	 changing	 enterprise	 management	 mechanism.	 In	 1986,	 the	 Central	Committee	 of	 CPC	 and	 the	 State	 Council	 jointly	 issued	 several	 documents	 to	define	 the	 responsibilities	 and	 rights	 of	 enterprise	 administration,	 enterprise	party	 committee,	 and	 the	worker’s	 congress,	 and	 clear	 the	 relationship	 among	them.	 In	 1988,	 the	 Company	 Law 37 	 was	 enacted,	 which	 clearly	 granted	state-owned	 assets	 to	 SOEs	 to	 manage	 in	 legal	 form.	 Then	 the	 State	 Council	issued	 the	 Regulations	 on	 State-owned	 Enterprise	 Changing	 Management	
																																								 																				 	
35	ȓm`Á¹±ōêňȌŖG	The	Temporary	Regulation	on	Direct	State	Planning	of	
Large-scaled	Industrial	Enterprise,	1987.	 	
36	]'ƌ6įɳ½ý6ƅvƱǹîŖG	Several	Regulations	on	Further	Enterprise	Reform	
and	Enhancing	Vitality,	1986.	
37	Yƀ	The	Company	Law,	1988.	 	
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Mechanism	 in	 199238,	 which	 stated	 that	 the	 task	 of	 changing	 enterprise’s	management	mechanism	is	to	let	SOEs	to	become	to	independent	market	entity	that	responsible	for	their	own	profits	and	losses,	and	enjoy	and	bear	civil	rights	and	obligations.	 		Fourth,	enterprise	group	pilot.	The	development	of	production	and	management	and	 the	 police	 encouragement	 speeded	 up	 the	 process	 of	 horizon	 integration	between	SOEs.	The	State	Council	gradually	issued	several	documents	to	promote	SOEs	horizon	integration	based	on	pilot	experiences39.		1.2.3 Task	achievements		First,	arousing	the	enthusiasm	of	SOEs.	Through	applying	contract	responsibility	system	SOEs	obtained	certain	autonomy	without	changing	ownership	type,	and	the	 responsibility	 and	 right	 were	 clearly	 defined	 in	 contract	 form.	 The	distribution	arrangement	of	contract	responsibility	system	not	only	guaranteed	state	 revenue,	 but	 also	 aroused	 the	 enthusiasm	 of	 enterprises	 by	 giving	 them	certain	marginal	retention.	 		Second,	the	management	mechanism	of	SOEs	begun	to	change.	Though	a	serious	of	reforms,	especially	with	the	enact	of	Company	Law,	SOEs	begun	to	participate	in	 the	market	 as	 independent	 entity	with	 certain	 autonomy	 and	 self-interests.	State-operated	 gradually	 became	 to	 self-operated,	 and	 it	 also	 bring	 some	substantial	changes	to	SOEs’	management	mechanism.	 		1.2.4 Problems		There	 were	 still	 problems	 existed.	 The	 purpose	 of	 the	 contract	 responsibility	system	 was	 to	 let	 SOEs	 to	 become	 independent	 market	 entity	 by	 separating	ownership	and	management.	 In	 fact,	 this	attempt	did	not	work	 in	practice.	The	
																																								 																				 	
38	ȼĦ±ō6ǤȃŒsŖG	Regulations	on	State-owned	Enterprise	Changing	Management	
Mechanism,	1992.	
39	 Yingyi	Qian,	2000,	“The	Process	of	China’s	Market	Transition	(1978	–	1998):	The	Evolutionary,	
Historical,	and	Comparative	Perspective”,	Journal	of	Institutional	and	Theoretical	Economics,	Vol.	156.	 	
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contract	 responsibility	 system	 did	 not	 touch	 the	 property	 structure	 issue,	 and	the	ownership	of	assets	still	belonged	to	the	state	to	some	degree	and	SOEs	only	manage	 such	assets	on	behalf	 of	 the	 state.	 SOEs	 could	not	 response	 for	profits	and	 losses	 if	 they	 did	 not	 actually	 own	 such	 assets,	 thus	 SOEs	 were	 still	subordinate	 to	 government	 department,	 and	 they	 could	 not	 became	 to	independent	market	entity	and	bear	civil	obligations.	 		Furthermore,	 to	 obtain	 maximum	 interest,	 some	 SOEs	 always	 bargain	 with	government	on	contract	index	and	reduced	cardinal	number	by	any	means,	and	increased	 current	 income	 by	 transforming	 assets	 to	 profits.	 These	 shrot-term	behaviors	not	only	affected	the	sustainable	development	of	enterprises,	but	also	lead	to	the	losses	of	state-owned	assets.	 	 		
1.3 The	Reform	that	Aiming	at	Establishing	Modern	Enterprise	System		1.3.1 Background		With	the	deepening	of	SOE	reform,	some	apparent	contradictions	had	emerged.	The	 former	 SOE	 reform	 theory	 mainly	 concerned	 about	 expanding	 autonomy	and	giving	up	profits,	which	only	reform	enterprises’	management	and	operation	but	 the	 whole	 SOE	 system,	 and	 it	 could	 not	 achieve	 the	 goal	 that	 let	 SOE	 to	become	 to	 independent	 market	 entity.	 Which	 caused	 the	 long-term	 exited	situation	 that	 unclear	 function	 of	 SOE,	 inappropriate	 property	 structure,	imperfect	 supervision	 system,	 low	 efficiency,	 and	 backward	 business	 concept.	Facts	 have	 proved	 that,	 SOEs	 management	 system	 could	 not	 be	 substantially	changed	 without	 the	 establishment	 of	 an	 appropriate	 property	 structure	 and	modern	enterprise	system.	 		Meanwhile,	 the	 sound	 and	 rapid	 development	 of	 private	 sector	 including	collective	 economy	 in	 both	 urban	 and	 rural	 areas,	 cooperate	 economy,	 and	individual	economy	also	challenged	the	status	of	SOEs,	and	the	SOE	issue	became	to	the	core	of	China’s	economic	system	reform	and	draw	a	lot	of	attentions	from	the	whole	society.	
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	To	 further	and	deepener	 the	 reform,	 the	deep-rooted	problem	must	be	 solved.	And	 the	 reform	 designer	 believed	 that	 the	most	 important	 and	 urgent	 reform	tasks	 in	 this	 stage	were	 to	 establish	modern	 enterprise	 system,	 to	 find	 out	 an	efficient	 approach	 that	 could	 combine	 socialist	 public	 economy	 and	 market	economy.	 Since	 1994,	 the	 SOE	 reform	 has	 transformed	 to	 establish	 modern	enterprise	system	from	interest	stimulation.		1.3.2 Key	points	of	reform		First,	 adjusting	 economic	 structure	 and	 strategic	 reconstructing	SOEs.	 In	1995,	the	Fifth	Plenary	Session	of	the	Fourteenth	Central	Committee	of	CPC	decided	to	adjust	state-owned	economic	structure40.	 In	1997,	the	report	of	CPC’s	Fifteenth	National	Congress	indicated	that	the	basic	economic	system	of	primary	stage	of	socialism	 is	 public	 ownership	 as	 the	 main	 body	 while	 diverse	 ownership	co-existed41 .	 In	 1999,	 the	 Fourth	 Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	 Fifteenth	 Central	Committee	 issued	 the	 Several	 Major	 Issues	 Concerning	 the	 Reform	 and	Development	of	SOEs,	which	required	to	strategic	adjust	state-owned	economic	structure,	and	to	improve	industrial	structure	and	adjust	ownership	structure42.	In	2003,	 the	 State-owned	Assets	 Supervision	 and	Management	Committee	was	established,	which	directly	supervise	and	manage	196	central	SOEs.	In	2006,	the	State-owned	 Assets	 Supervision	 and	 Management	 Committee	 enacted	 the	Guidance	 on	 Promoting	 State-owned	 Assets	 Adjustment	 and	 Reconstruction,	which	 clearly	 defined	 the	 industries	 and	 key	 sectors	 that	 state-owned	 assets	should	be	concentrated43.	In	2007,	the	latest	SOE	reform	requirement	of	the	CPC	was	to	perfect	state-owned	economic	structure,	enhance	the	vitality,	control	and	influence	of	SOEs44.	 		
																																								 																				 	40	 See	the	Report	of	Fifth	Plenary	Session	of	the	Fourteenth	Central	Committee	of	CPC,	1995.	 	41	 See	the	report	of	the	CPC’s	Fifteenth	National	Congress,	1997.	 	42	]'±ō6įɳåƱɘÁɣɺ	Several	Major	Issues	Concerning	the	Reform	and	Development	of	SOEs,	1999.	43	Ī}±ō6ȴ,ȦĴɘǡƱĤÜčȑ	Guidance	on	Promoting	State-owned	Assets	Adjustment	and	Reconstruction,	2006.	44	 See	the	Report	of	the	CPC’s	Fifteenth	National	Congress,	2007.	
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Second,	 reforming	 governmental	 agencies,	 and	 transforming	 government	functions.	 In	 1998,	 the	National	 Congress	 approved	 the	 institutional	 reform	 of	the	 State	 Council,	 to	 strengthen	 macro	 management	 and	 comprehensive	coordination,	 and	 transform	 government	 function	 based	 on	 market	 economy	principle	 and	 reduce	 the	 number	 of	 administrative	 examination	 and	 approval	procedures.	 The	 establishment	 of	 the	 State-owned	 Assets	 Supervision	 and	Management	 Committee	 in	 2003	 actually	 separated	 the	 public	 management	function	and	investor	function	of	the	government.	 		Third,	 establishing	 and	 perfecting	 modern	 enterprise	 system.	 In	 terms	 of	state-owned	 assets	 management,	 the	 State	 Council	 issued	 the	 Regulation	 on	State-owned	 Assets	 Supervision	 and	 Management	 in	 1994;	 the	 National	Systematic	Reform	Committee	issued	the	Guidance	on	the	Pilot	Scheme	of	Urban	State-owned	 Assets	 Operation	 System	 Reform	 in	 1997;	 the	 National	 Congress	enacted	 the	 State-owned	 Assets	 Law	 in	 2007;	 and	 the	 Treasury	 and	 the	State-owned	Assets	Supervision	and	Management	Committee	 jointly	 issued	 the	Management	 Methods	 of	 Collecting	 Central	 SOE	 Capital	 Profits	 in	 200745.	 In	terms	of	 changing	management	system,	 the	Company	Law	was	promulgated	 in	1994,	 and	 was	 amended	 in	 1999;	 the	 State	 Council	 issued	 the	 Temporary	Regulation	 on	 SOEs’	 Board	 of	 Supervisors	 in	 2000,	 and	 send	 the	 board	 of	supervisors	 to	major	and	 large-scared	SOEs	at	 the	 same	year;	 the	State-owned	Assets	 Supervision	 and	 Management	 Committee	 also	 issued	 several	 rules	 and	regulations	on	standardizing	SOEs’	systematic	transformation,	liquidation	assets	and	assignment	of	property46.		Fourth,	 comprehensive	 supporting	 reform.	 In	 terms	 of	 foreign	 trade	management,	 the	Ministry	 of	 Foreign	 Trade	 and	 Economic	 Cooperation	 issued	the	 Notice	 of	 Applying	 the	 Registration	 for	 the	 Record	 to	 Large-scared	Enterprises’	 Import	 and	 Export	 Right	 in	 1999;	 in	 terms	 of	 foreign	 exchange	management,	 the	 People’s	 Bank	 of	 China	 issued	 the	 Announcement	 of	 Further	
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Reforming	 Foreign	 Exchange	 Management	 System	 in	 1993;	 in	 terms	 of	 social	security,	 the	 Department	 of	 Labor	 and	 the	 National	 Economy	 and	 Trading	Committee	 jointly	 issued	 the	 Notice	 on	 Doing	 Proper	Work	 of	 Unemployment	Insurance	 to	 Cooperate	 with	 the	 SOE	 reform	 pilot	 scheme	 in	 1995,	 the	 State	Council	issued	the	Decision	on	Establishing	United	Basic	Endowment	Insurance	System	for	Enterprises’	workers	in	1997,	and	the	Decision	on	Establishing	Basic	Healthcare	Insurance	System	for	Urban	Workers	in	1998.	 		1.3.3 Achievements		First	of	all,	a	basic	modern	enterprise	system	has	been	established.	Based	on	the	Company	Law,	SOEs	has	been	transformed	to	company	form	with	clear	property	structure	 and	 scientific	management	 system	 from	 traditional	 factory	 form,	 the	ownership	 and	 management	 has	 been	 separated,	 and	 SOEs	 became	 to	 real	market	entity	and	independent	legal	person.	Second,	the	strategic	reconstruction	made	remarkable	progress:	state	sector	played	an	important	and	dominant	role	in	 some	 industries	 relating	 to	 national	 security	 and	 economic	 lifeline,	 and	supported	 and	 promoted	 the	 development	 of	 the	 whole	 economy.	 Besides,	several	 large	 internationally	 competitive	 companies	 and	 enterprise	 groups	has	been	formed	through	market	force	and	police	guidance.	Third,	reforms	in	some	other	 areas	 were	 put	 on	 agenda	 to	 support	 and	 promote	 the	 comprehensive	reform	 of	 SOE,	 such	 as	 the	 reforms	 of	 finance,	 tax,	 investment,	 foreign	 trade,	foreign	exchange,	social	security	and	human	resource.	These	reforms	gradually	standardized	the	relationship	between	government	and	SOEs,	and	created	a	fair	and	healthy	environment	for	SOE’s	development.	 		1.3.4 Remaining	problems		In	 terms	 of	 ownership	 relations,	 the	manner	 in	 which	 the	 state-owned	 assets	administration	and	supervision	department	(both	central	and	local	level)	act	as	the	owners	of	state-owned	assets	on	behalf	of	the	state	has	not	really	solved	the	problem	 of	 a	 lack	 of	 ownership	 of	 SOEs.	 Moreover,	 this	 model	 means	 that	because	state	assets	administration	and	supervision	department	lacks	sufficient	
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supervision	and	oversight,	it	is	easy	for	the	organization	to	make	concessions	to	the	 management	 of	 SOEs,	 allowing	 the	 misappropriation	 or	 embezzlement	 of	state-owned	 assets.	 In	 addition,	 SOEs	 also	 benefited	 from	monopolies	 in	 some	key	 industries,	where	 they	have	been	able	 to	 squeeze	out	or	 swallow	up	other	players	 through	 the	power	of	 their	bureaucratic	 connections.	 In	doing	 so,	 they	have	greatly	violated	market	rules	and	have	become	the	most	important	obstacle	to	the	healthy	development	of	China’s	economy.		
2. The	Period	of	“Fang	Quan	Rang	Li”47	 (1978-1986)	
	
2.1 History		The	period	 from	1978	 to	1986	was	 the	exploration	 stage,	 and	 several	 types	of	reform	 were	 implemented	 within	 the	 original	 planning	 economic	 system.	 Its	main	 feature	was	 “Fang	Quan	Rang	Li”	 (decentralizing	power	 and	 giving	 away	profits),	which	is	to	motivate	managers	and	workers	of	enterprises	by	separating	ownership	from	management,	to	increase	production	and	revenue.	The	reform	of	decentralizing	 power	 and	 giving	 away	 profits	 included	 expanding	 enterprises’	autonomy,	paying	 income	 tax	 instead	of	handing	over	profits	 (Li	Gai	 Shuiqį
ǎ)48	 and	charter	business.	 		(1) Expanding	enterprises’	autonomy		In	 November	 1978,	 Sichuan	 Province	 took	 six	 enterprises	 including	 Jiangning	Machine	Tool	Plant	as	reform	pilot	enterprise	to	allow	them	to	keep	some	profits	and	 their	 staff	 would	 get	 bonus	 if	 their	 profits	 increase49.	 In	 May	 1979,	 the	National	Economy	and	Trade	Committee	and	other	six	departments	took	Capital	Steel,	 Tianjing	 Bicycle	 Factory	 and	 Shanghai	 Diesel	 Factory	 as	 reform	 pilot	scheme	 of	 expanding	 autonomy,	 and	 the	 State	 Council	 issued	 five	 papers	concerning	 about	 expanding	 autonomy	 and	 piloted	 in	 local	 level	 in	 September	
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±.ŴiƟǁFuren Dong. 1995. The Research 
on China’s State-owned Enterprises’ Reform. Beijing: China People’s Press. 
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that	year50.	Within	one	year,	16%	of	budget	enterprises	implemented	this	reform,	which	 account	 for	 60%	 of	 output	 value	 of	 whole	 enterprises	 and	 70%	 of	profits51.	 		This	reform	aroused	enterprises’	vitality	and	improved	operating.	However,	due	to	 the	 reason	 that	 these	 measures	 did	 not	 clear	 the	 limit	 of	 rights	 and	 the	influence	 of	 macro-control,	 the	 initial	 reform	 of	 expanding	 autonomy	 did	 not	achieve	the	goal	of	improving	national	revenue,	and	huge	fiscal	deficits	occurred	in	1979	and	1980.	To	implement	revenue	task,	local	authorities	introduced	some	specific	methods	 for	 industrial	enterprises	depend	on	 initial	 reform,	such	as	 to	retain	profits	and	to	bear	responsibility	for	profits	and	loss.		To	 apply	 the	 pilot	 experiences,	 the	 State	 Council	 issued	 several	 documents	 in	1979,	 including	 the	 Several	 Regulations	 on	 Expanding	 State-owned	 Industrial	Enterprises	Management	Autonomy,	 the	Regulation	on	State-owned	Enterprise	Retained	 Profits,	 the	 Temporary	 Regulation	 on	 Increasing	 State-owned	Enterprise	Assets	Depreciation	Rate	and	Improving	the	Usage	of	Depreciations,	and	 the	 Temporary	 Regulation	 on	 Imposing	 Property	 Tax	 on	 State-owned	Industrial	 Enterprise.	 These	 regulations	 clearly	 defined	 the	 responsibilities,	rights	and	interests	of	SOEs	as	relatively	independent	commodity	producers	and	operators.	Which	are	first,	the	production	planning	right;	second,	the	sales	right;	third,	profit	distribution	right;	fourth,	labor	and	employment	right;	fifth,	the	right	to	 use	 funds;	 sixth,	 the	 property	 tax	 was	 imposed;	 seventh,	 the	 right	 to	 keep	foreign	exchange52.	Among	these	reform	measures,	the	most	important	one	was	the	profit	retention	system,	including	the	whole	profit	retention	and	base	profit	retention.	Which	broken	 the	 traditional	 balance	of	 payment	 system	and	would	give	more	 profits	 to	 SOEs	 if	 they	 could	 produce	more.	 To	 solve	 the	 problems	emerged	 in	 pilot	 enterprises,	 the	 State	 Council	 approved	 the	 Temporary	Regulations	 on	 State-owned	 Industrial	 Enterprise	 Profit	 Retention	 that	 was	
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52	 Yongnian	Zheng	and	Minjia	Chen,	2007,	China’s	Recent	State-owned	Enterprise	Reform	and	its	
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amended	by	the	National	Economy	Committee	and	the	Treasury	in	1980,	which	made	 the	 system	 more	 specific	 and	 applicable,	 and	 proposed	 some	 new	measures	to	standard	the	system	to	avoid	state-owned	assets	losses53.	 	 		In	 1980,	 the	 State	 Council	 approved	 and	 forwarded	 the	 Report	 of	 the	
Achievements	and	Suggestions	on	Expanding	Enterprise	Autonomy	Pilot	Scheme54,	which	 concluded	 the	achievements	of	 the	 reform;	 supplemented	and	perfected	some	 measures,	 such	 as	 profit	 retention,	 sales,	 expanding	 export	 and	 foreign	exchange	 distribution,	 usage	 of	 property	 and	 funds,	 assets	 depreciation,	 and	organization	 settlement;	 and	 decided	 to	 apply	 the	 manner	 that	 expanding	enterprise	autonomy	to	the	whole	SOEs55.	 		The	system	of	responsibility	for	profits	and	loss	has	achieved	some	effects	at	first.	By	 the	 end	 of	 1980,	 except	 for	 Tibet,	 there	 were	 over	 6,000	 SOEs	 have	participated	in	pilot	scheme,	15%	of	whole	SOEs,	60%	of	whole	output	value,	and	70%	 of	 whole	 profits.	 According	 to	 statistics,	 in	 1980	 there	 were	 5777	 pilot	enterprises	 got	 165	 billion	 Yuan	 industrial	 output,	 increased	 6.8%;	 taken	 33	billion	Yuan	profit,	increased	11.8%;	and	delivered	29	billion	Yuan	profits	to	the	State,	 increased	 7.4%56.	 In	 terms	 of	 profit	 distribution,	 in	 1980,	 87%	 of	 profit	was	delivered	to	the	State,	enterprises	got	10%,	and	the	rest	3%	was	paid	back	to	bank57.	 		Some	enterprises	increased	production	and	income	over	a	short	period,	but	most	of	 them	did	not	benefit	 from	it58.	The	planned	target	of	enterprises	were	made	depending	on	 their	previous	year’s	performance,	 thus	 this	 system	would	 leave	some	 space	 for	 enterprises	 to	 bargain	 with	 government,	 and	 caused	 unfair	punishment	and	treatment	at	last.	At	the	beginning	of	1983,	this	system	lead	to	
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execution	chaos	and	inflation	of	prices59,	and	the	central	government	decided	to	introduce	the	system	of	paying	tax	instead	of	handing	over	profits.		(2) “	Li	Gai	Shui”60	 (Paying	income	tax	instead	of	handing	over	profit)		By	 introducing	 the	 system	 of	 replacement	 of	 delivering	 of	 profits	 by	 tax,	 the	policy	 designer	 wanted	 to	 standardize	 and	 stabilize	 the	 revenue,	 enhance	enterprises’	economic	obligation	and	balance	 the	competition	condition	among	them.	In	1983,	the	State	Council	 issued	the	Proposed	Methods	of	Replacement	of	
Profit-Delivery	 by	 Tax	 of	 the	 Treasury	 Department61,	 which	 proposed	 that	 this	reform	should	be	undertaken	in	two	steps:	first,	collection	of	income	tax	by	fixed	ratio	and	confirmation	of	the	ratio	of	profit-delivery	after	taxation	by	negotiation;	second,	carrying	on	single	 taxation	system,	adopting	 the	progressive	 tax	rather	than	 proportional	 tax	 as	 income	 tax,	 cancelling	 profit-delivery	 system	 and	collecting	resource	tax,	asset	tax	and	regulation	tax62.		The	first	step	was	undertaken	on	1st	June	1983,	and	the	main	contents	were:	first,	enterprises	 should	 pay	 55%	 of	 profit	 as	 income	 tax,	 deliver	 certain	 ratio	 of	after-tax	profit	and	keep	the	rest	of	them;	second,	to	small-sized	profitable	SOEs,	applying	the	progressive	tax	rate	in	excess	of	specific	amount,	and	left	after-tax	profits	 to	 SOEs;	 third,	 giving	 fixed	 amount	 financial	 subsidies	 to	 those	 SOEs	whose	losses	were	caused	by	policies,	and	asking	those	SOEs	whose	losses	were	caused	by	bad	management	to	 improve	management	within	certain	period	and	stop	 subsidies	 over	 period;	 fourth,	 to	 after-tax	 profit	 retention,	 SOEs	 should	establish	funds	for	new	production	trail,	production	development,	reserve,	staff	welfare	and	staff	bonus,	and	the	total	amount	of	the	first	three	funds	should	no	less	 than	 60%	 of	 the	 whole	 profit	 retention63.	 To	 support	 this	 reform,	 the	manner	of	partly	replacing	financial	allocation	with	loan	was	also	introduced	in	
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1983.	 The	 first	 step	 basically	 achieved	 the	 goal	 of	 stabilizing	 and	 increasing	revenue.	By	the	end	of	1983,	there	were	107,145	SOEs	adopted	the	measure	of	replacing	profits	with	taxes,	92.7%	of	total	profitable	SOEs.	These	SOEs	taken	66	billion	Yuan	profits	in	1983,	increased	11.1%,	and	60%	of	them	was	delivered	to	the	State	and	over	30%	was	left	to	enterprises64.	 	 		The	first	step	of	replacing	profit	with	tax	changed	the	traditional	manner	that	the	State	 only	 collects	 profits	 but	 tax,	 and	 created	 a	 new	 distribution	 relationship	between	 the	State	 and	enterprises.	 It	 overcame	 some	disadvantages	 caused	by	the	 bargaining	 between	 the	 State	 and	 enterprises	 during	 the	 application	 of	contract	 responsibility	 system	 to	 some	 degree,	 and	 made	 valuable	 attempt	 to	standardize	the	distribution	system	between	the	State	and	enterprises.	However,	due	 to	 the	 lack	 of	 support	 reforms	 in	 macro	 systems	 such	 as	 price	 and	investment	system	reforms,	the	tax	rate	was	different	depended	on	enterprises’	real	 condition,	 which	 actually	 exacerbate	 the	 problems	 relating	 to	 the	punishment	of	good	performers	persisted.	Moreover,	 the	system	design	of	 first	step	 reform	 overemphasized	 the	 importance	 of	 increasing	 state	 revenue	 and	ignored	the	enterprises’	development	potential,	which	severely	weakened	SOEs	investment	ability	and	potential	development.	 		To	 overcome	 above	 disadvantages,	 the	 State	 Council	 approved	 the	Report	 and	Measures	 of	 Applying	 the	 Second	 Step	 of	 Replacing	 Profit	 with	 Tax	 of	 the	Treasury	 in	 198465.	 The	main	 contents	were:	 dividing	 tax	 into	 production	 tax,	value	 added	 tax,	 sales	 tax	 and	 salt	 tax	 based	 on	 object	 of	 taxation,	 imposing	income	 tax	 and	 regulation	 tax	 on	 SOEs’	 profits,	 and	 adding	 resource	 tax,	construction	 tax,	 property	 tax	 and	 land	 holding	 tax.	 However,	 the	 ultimate	practice	 deviated	 from	 the	 original	 intention	 of	 the	 reform.	 Many	 enterprises	were	 unable	 to	 pay	 fund	 tax	 concerning	 funds	 rather	 than	 profit	 after	 paying	product	tax	that	had	too	large	proportion	in	this	system.	Therefore,	the	fund	tax	was	 abundant	 at	 last	 and	 started	 to	 collect	 regulation	 tax	 from	 large	 and	
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middle-sized	enterprises	that	have	more	profit.	 	 		This	 reform	 did	 not	 change	 the	 situation	 that	 enterprises	 bear	 heavy	 tax,	 and	unfair	punishment	and	treatment	were	even	more	serious	 than	before	because	of	non-standardized	tax	system.		(3) Charter	business		Since	 the	 pilot	 reform	 of	 Shenyang	 Motor	 Industry	 Company	 that	 was	undertaken	in	1984,	many	small-sized	industrial	enterprises	tried	to	reform	by	charter	method	to	stop	loss.	In	practice,	the	government	department	rented	the	enterprises	to	individuals,	when	lease	expired	the	government	department	could	earn	 arranged	 rents	 and	 individuals	 could	 get	 the	 rest	 of	 profit.	 With	 the	development	 of	 this	 kind	 of	 reform,	 partners	 and	 enterprise	 staff	 as	 a	 whole	replaced	 individual,	 and	 fixed	 rents	 was	 replaced	 by	 sliding	 scales.	 After	 the	contractual	 management	 responsibility	 system	 was	 introduced	 in	 1987,	 the	number	 of	 enterprises	 that	 adopted	 charter	 method	 was	 still	 increasing	continuously.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 1988,	 there	were	 24,660	 enterprises	 that	 adopted	charter	 system,	 which	 accounted	 for	 56.1%	 of	 total	 small-sized	 state-owned	enterprises.66	 		(4) Further	expanding	enterprise’s	autonomy		At	the	same	time	as	applying	the	policy	of	replacing	profit	with	tax,	 in	order	to	fully	 implementation	 of	 reform,	 further	 arouse	 the	 enthusiasm	 of	 enterprises,	and	 improve	 enterprise’s	 vitality	 and	 efficiency,	 the	 State	 Council	 issued	 the	Temporary	Regulations	on	Further	Expanding	State-owned	Industrial	Enterprise	Autonomy	 in	 1984.	 Which	 loosen	 up	 the	 restrictions	 on	 enterprises	 and	expanding	 their	 management	 autonomy.	 The	 main	 contents	 were:	 first,	 the	enterprise	 has	 the	 right	 to	 make	 decisions	 on	 production	 on	 the	 premise	 of	complete	 state	 planning	 and	 supply	 contract;	 second,	 the	 enterprise	 shall	 sale	
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any	product	unless	the	State	prohibited;	third,	the	enterprise	shall	make	decision	on	price;	fourth,	the	enterprise	can	choose	supplier	of	state	unified	distribution;	fifth,	the	enterprise	could	use	profit	retention	to	set	funds	for	development,	new	product	trail,	staff	welfare	and	staff	bonus;	sixth,	the	enterprise	could	lease	and	sell	 unused	 and	 unnecessary	 fixed	 assets;	 seventh,	 the	 enterprise	 can	 make	decision	on	setting	up	organization	and	human	resources;	eighth,	the	enterprise	can	choose	it	own	wage	system	type	on	the	premise	of	charring	out	state	unified	wage	 standard;	 ninth,	 the	 enterprise	 can	 participate	 in	 multi-regional	 and	multi-industrial	 cooperation	 without	 changing	 ownership	 type	 and	administrative	subordination67.	 		
2.2 Theories		In	 practice,	 the	 public	 ownership	 theory	 faced	 a	 challenge	 of	 motivation.	 The	common	 ideas	 of	ɜɾƾ(Tie	 Fan	 Wan)68	 (secured	 job)	 and	Áɟɾ(Da	 Guo	Fan) 69 	 (excessive	 equalitarianism)	 lead	 to	 low	 efficiency	 of	 state-owned	enterprises	and	financial	strain.	The	reform	of	decentralizing	powers	and	giving	up	 profits	 tried	 to	 change	 the	 situation	 that	 lack	 of	 motivation	 under	 public	ownership	 system,	 by	motivating	managers	 and	workers	with	 retained	 partial	profits	to	increase	production	and	revenue.		(1) The	challenges	of	traditional	public	ownership	theory		The	definition	of	public	ownership	means	that	all	members	owned	the	property	and	 they	 exercise	 their	 rights	 together.	 The	 correlation	 between	 individual	activities	 and	 group	 effort	 is	 very	 low,	 and	 each	 member	 would	 get	 benefit	without	paying	the	cost,	which	caused	the	free	rider	problem.	The	extensive	free	rider	activities	would	lead	to	insufficient	group	effort,	and	performed	as	shifting	responsibility,	overstaffing	and	low	efficiency.	Thus,	relevant	agent	organizations	would	 be	 introduced	 to	make	 sure	 the	 public	 ownership	 could	work	well,	 and	
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motivation	 and	 supervision	mechanism	 also	 emerged	 as	 the	 agents	 have	 their	own	interests.		The	 planned	 economy	 system	 corresponds	 to	 the	 public	 ownership.	 Under	planned	 economy,	 state-owned	 enterprises	 as	 the	 secondary	 organization	 of	government	 department,	 had	 the	 obligations	 to	 stabilize	 society,	 provide	 jobs	and	develop	economy.	The	department	 in	charge	could	perform	their	 functions	through	these	enterprises,	but	they	could	not	operate	independently,	which	lead	to	 the	 situation	 that	 there	was	no	 correlation	between	managers	and	workers’	efforts	 and	 their	 benefits.	 Therefore,	 as	 the	 agent	 of	 state-owned	 enterprise,	managers	and	workers	might	hide	potential	productivity	and	reduce	their	effort	by	 using	 information	 advantages.	 The	 state-owned	 economy	 performed	 badly	because	no	one	was	in	charge	of,	and	the	state	had	to	consider	reform	under	the	pressure	of	serious	budget	deficit70.	 		(2) Theoretical	exploration	 		During	this	period,	theoretical	circle	put	forward	several	theories,	and	the	most	important	 one	 of	 them	 is	 Jiang	 Yiwei71’s	 “three	 theories”.	 Jiang	 thought	 that	China’s	 economic	 system	 reform	 should	 start	 from	 the	 reality	 that	 enterprises	lack	of	autonomy,	and	enterprises	should	be	developed	to	become	independent	economic	subject	that	have	self-management.72	 In	this	stage,	scholars	reached	a	consensus	on	the	issue	of	uniting	enterprises’	rights,	obligations	and	benefits73.		Although	 the	 reform	 of	 decentralizing	 powers	 and	 giving	 up	 profits	 neither	touched	state-owned	enterprises’	property	rights,	nor	changed	the	relationship	between	 government	 and	 enterprises,	 it	 made	 breakthrough	 in	 the	 area	 of	benefit	 reallocation.	 However,	 the	 government	 still	 occupied	 a	 command	
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position	under	planned	economy	system,	and	 it	 could	 take	back	powers	at	any	time.	 Therefore,	 to	 both	 government	 and	 enterprises,	 any	 kind	 of	 reform	 of	decentralizing	powers	was	short-term	activities.	 		The	reform	of	decentralizing	powers	and	giving	up	profits	did	not	solve	the	problems	of	“Tie	Fan	Wan”	and	“Da	Guo	Fan”	basically,	on	the	contrary,	it	created	new	unbalance	and	reinforced	unfair	treatment	and	punishment	situations	because	of	the	bargains	that	occurred	frequently	between	government	and	enterprises.	The	efficiency	issues	also	could	not	be	solved	because	department	in	charge	did	not	decentralize	management	to	enterprises.	It	marked	an	end	to	the	failure	attempt	of	reforming	state-owned	enterprises	when	there	was	no	room	for	any	further	compromise	from	the	government	to	benefit	from	operations.		
2.3 Assessments		The	 reform	 in	 this	 period	 achieved	 several	 positive	 results.	 First	 of	 all,	 this	reform	 changed	 the	 situation	 that	 the	 government	 controlled	 every	 aspects	 of	SOEs’	management	and	enterprise	had	no	autonomy	at	all.	Before	reform,	SOEs	were	 only	 the	 subordination	 of	 government	 department,	 and	 all	 business	behaviors	 had	 to	 follow	 government	 direct	 planning	 and	 instruction.	 After	reform,	 SOEs	 gradually	 became	 to	market	 entity	 and	 had	 certain	 autonomy	 to	some	degree.	For	example,	by	the	end	of	1983,	the	proportion	of	SOEs	who	had	decision-making	power	on	output	value	has	increased	from	6.8%	to	25.1%,	from	7.3%	to	26%	on	output	amount,	 from	11.2%	to	31.9%	on	production	planning,	and	from	34.4%	to	44.1%	on	market	sales74.	Second,	through	this	reform,	SOEs	begun	 to	 recognize	 the	 importance	 of	 market,	 paid	 attentions	 on	 market	mechanism	 and	 the	 law	 of	 value,	 and	 attempted	 to	 improve	 management,	production	quality	 and	 efficiency	under	 competitiveness.	 Third,	 SOEs	begun	 to	change	 traditional	 labor	 and	 distribution	 system,	 and	 a	 basic	 motivation	mechanism	 has	 been	 established.	 Fourth,	 expanding	 autonomy	 provided	 the	economic	 condition	 for	 SOEs	 self-development,	 and	 they	 could	 expand	
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production	 and	 became	 to	 self-appreciation	 market	 entity	 based	 on	 profit	retentions.	 		The	problems	also	existed.	First,	 the	reform	approach	 is	 limited.	The	reform	of	expanding	 autonomy	 and	 giving	 up	profits	was	 undertaken	under	 the	 planned	market	 economic	 system,	 and	 it	 only	 emphasized	 on	 the	 relationship	 between	the	State	and	enterprises	 instead	of	 the	 relationship	between	central	 and	 local	government.	 The	 main	 measure	 of	 this	 reform	 was	 to	 replace	 traditional	state-owned	 and	 state-operated	management	 type	with	 state-owned	 and	 state	and	enterprise	co-operated	type,	and	SOEs	could	not	become	to	real	independent	market	 entity	 with	 this	 management	 type.	 Second,	 there	 were	 no	 enough	supporting	reforms	 in	relating	areas,	 such	as	reforms	of	price	system,	 financial	system	and	tax	system.	Third,	the	effect	of	reform	is	limited.	This	reform	did	not	solve	 the	 problem	 of	 SOEs’	 management	 system,	 and	 the	 state	 planning	 and	instructions	still	deeply	influenced	SOEs	business	behaviors;	this	reform	did	not	change	the	situation	that	SOEs	were	subordinations	of	government	departments,	the	government	still	controlled	the	management	and	ownership	of	SOEs,	and	the	integration	of	government	administration	and	enterprise	still	exited;	the	reform	also	could	not	solve	the	problem	of	insider	control	efficiently:	expanding	power	and	 giving	 up	 profit	 did	 not	 change	 the	 basic	 system	 of	 SOEs,	 and	 a	 efficient	supervision	mechanism	has	not	been	established.	 		
3. The	 Period	 of	 “Liang	 Quan	 Fen	 Li” 75 	 (Separating	 Control	 from	
Ownership)	(1987-1992)		“Liang	Quan	Fen	Li”	 (separating	 control	 from	ownership)	 is	 a	milestone	 in	 the	process	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 reform.	 In	 the	 first	 stage,	 the	 reform	 of	decentralizing	powers	and	giving	up	profits	was	 limited	and	undertaken	under	the	planned	economy	only,	and	separating	control	from	ownership	started	to	get	to	 the	 core	 of	 economic	 system	 reform.	 In	 fact,	 separating	 control	 from	ownership	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 ending	 traditional	 planned	 economy	
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system,	but	failed	to	complete	the	mission	of	reform	due	to	its	own	shortcomings.	The	reform	in	this	stage	mainly	included	contract	responsibility	system	and	asset	management	responsibility	system76.		
3.1 The	Contract	Responsibility	System		The	 embryo	 of	 the	 contract	 responsibility	 system	 emerged	 as	 early	 as	 1979.	Under	 this	system,	an	enterprise	was	 leased	to	 its	management	and	a	 fixed	tax	was	 collected	 from	 the	 enterprise,	 allowing	 the	 enterprise	 to	 keep	 all	 the	remaining	 profits.	 Since	 the	 central	 government	 put	 forward	 the	 idea	 of	replacement	 of	 profit-delivery	 by	 tax	 in	 1983,	 most	 enterprises	 suspended	reform	in	contract	responsibility	system	until	1987.	In	the	end	of	1986,	the	State	Council	 issued	 the	 Decisions	 on	 Deepening	 Enterprise	 Reform	 and	 Enhancing	
Enterprise	Vitality,	which	stated	 that	 the	key	of	deepening	enterprise	 reform	 is	the	separation	between	ownership	and	management,	specifically	were:	applying	leasehold	system	to	small-sized	enterprises	and	medium-sized	enterprises	with	minor	losses;	apply	multiple	type	contract	responsibility	systems	to	medium	and	large-sized	enterprise;	and	applying	joint-stock	system	pilot	to	selected	medium	and	 large-sized	enterprises77.	By	 the	end	of	1986,	78%	of	 industrial	enterprise	and	 80%	 of	 medium	 and	 large-sized	 enterprise	 across	 the	 whole	 country	 has	implemented	 the	 contract	 responsibility	 system.	 In	 some	 provinces	 such	 as	Bejing,	Hebei,	Jilin,	Jiangsu,	Henan	and	Sichuan	the	proportion	even	reached	over	85%78.	 		In	 1987,	 the	 National	 Congress	 first	 time	 confirmed	 the	 status	 of	 contract	responsibility	 system	 in	 the	 government	 report,	 which	 stated	 that	 this	 year’s	reform	 should	 focused	 on	 completing	 enterprise	 management	 system,	 and	implementing	multi-type	contract	responsibility	system	based	on	the	principle	of	
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separating	ownership	from	management79.	 		In	February	1988,	with	the	promulgation	of	the	Interim	Regulations	on	Contract	
Responsibility	 System	 of	 Public-owned	 Industrial	 Enterprises 80 ,	 the	 contract	system	became	the	mainstream	of	urban	economy	system	reform	gradually.	This	regulation	 indicated	 that	 the	 contract	 responsibility	 system	 defines	 the	relationship	of	rights	and	obligations	between	the	State	and	enterprise,	based	on	the	principle	of	 separating	ownership	 from	management	and	 insisting	 socialist	public	ownership.	From	1988	to	1990,	90%	of	industrial	enterprises	across	the	whole	country	had	completed	the	first-round	contract.81		In	 1989,	 the	 Fifth	 Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	 Thirteenth	 Central	 Committee	 issued	approved	 the	 Decisions	 on	 Further	 Promoting	 and	 Deepening	 Reform,	 which	stated	 that	 the	 contract	 responsibility	 system	 aroused	 the	 enthusiasm	of	 SOEs	and	 promoted	 their	 development,	 and	 should	 be	 continued;	 at	 the	 same	 time,	should	promote	what	 is	beneficial	and	abolish	what	 is	harmful	 to	continuously	complete	and	perfect	this	system	based	on	former	experiences82.	 		In	1991,	the	Treasury	and	the	State	Systematic	Reform	Committee	jointly	issued	the	Pilot	Measures	of	Separating	Profit	form	Tax,	Paying	Back	Loan	after	Tax	and	
After-taxed	 Contract	 Responsibility	 System.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 1991,	 there	 were	 36	provinces	and	government	departments,	and	over	2000	enterprises	participated	in	this	pilot	scheme83.	These	pilot	schemes	achieved	some	positive	results	such	as	 giving	 stability	 and	 rationalization	 of	 distribution	 relationship	 between	 the	State	and	enterprises,	primarily	achieving	 the	goal	of	 the	State	and	enterprises	share	 the	risks	and	 interests,	and	changing	 the	 traditional	repayment	measure.	However,	the	problems	also	existed,	for	instance,	the	tax	rate	was	still	high	and	
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unfair	for	enterprise	to	bear;	and	the	profits	after	paying	tax	and	paying	back	to	the	back	greatly	reduced,	which	obviously	harmed	enterprises’	vest	interests	and	dispelled	their	enthusiasm	of	participating	in	reform.	 		The	contract	responsibility	system	had	many	specific	forms,	such	as	the	way	in	which	contract	specifies	a	profit	 remittance	quota	and	allows	 the	contractor	 to	retain	all	above-quota	profits,	the	way	in	which	the	contract	retains	profits	at	a	progressive	 rate	 and	 the	 contract	 is	 written	 so	 that	 the	 contractor	 has	 an	incentive	 to	 reduce	 losses.	 This	 simple	 and	 applicable	 system	 had	 won	 wide	acceptance	 among	 enterprises	 and	 government,	 since	 the	 government	 could	secure	 increased	 income	 without	 more	 spending,	 and	 enterprises	 also	 could	benefit	 from	 increased	 production.	 The	 contract	 system	 operated	 well	 in	 the	initial	 year	 of	 the	 first-round	 contract,	 enterprises	 could	 keep	 more	 retained	profit	 after	 delivering	 profits	 and	 tax.	 However,	 the	 benefits	 of	 this	 system	reduced	gradually	due	to	the	change	of	economic	environment,	the	unreasonable	management	of	enterprises	and	changeable	policies.	Enterprises	were	reluctant	to	take	part	in	the	new-round	contract	when	it	started	in	199184.		In	 the	process	of	 the	contract	 system	reform,	 the	situation	of	 short-term	profit	and	long-term	loss	generally	existed.	For	instance,	in	1987	when	the	first	year	of	implementing	 the	 contract	 responsibility	 system,	 the	 total	 output	 of	 industrial	enterprises	across	the	whole	country	increased	11.13%,	sales	increased	17.11%,	tax	 increased	 9.19%,	 loan	 repayment	 increased	 31%,	 and	 profit	 retention	increased	11%.	And	in	1989,	the	profit	reduced	18.18%,	cost	increased	22.14%.	and	losses	even	doubled85.	 		Although	the	contract	system	separated	management	from	ownership	provided	autonomy	 for	enterprises	 in	certain	period	by	 legal	 form,	 it	did	not	change	 the	basic	 relationship	 between	 government	 and	 state-owned	 enterprises.	 The	separating	 ownership	 from	management	 of	 contract	 responsibility	 system	 did	
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	 69	
not	clearly	defined	the	rights	and	obligations	between	the	State	and	enterprises	by	 using	 specific	 standard,	 instead,	 most	 contracts	 were	 signed	 through	negotiation.	Which	would	easily	lead	to	rent-seeking	problem	due	to	the	absence	of	owner	and	moral	 risk.	 In	addition,	 this	system	 is	unstable	and	had	 to	resign	the	 contract	 every	 three	 year,	 which	 caused	 large	 costs	 and	 resources	 were	wasted	during	frequent	negotiations.	 		In	 practice,	 government	 still	 could	 interfere	 with	 enterprises,	 and	 the	management	would	be	taken	back	in	the	case	of	poor	performance	of	enterprises	or	 reduced	profits	by	higher	wages.	On	 the	other	hand,	giving	up	management	and	back	 to	 the	old	 system	would	be	 the	 first	 choice	of	 enterprises	when	 they	could	 not	 fulfil	 the	 contract.	 However,	 the	 government	 had	 to	 decentralize	powers	and	separate	management	from	ownership	again	if	it	were	the	case	that	enterprises	lack	of	energy	and	national	revenue	decline.	Therefore,	the	contract	system	 reform	 got	 stuck	 in	 the	 circle	 of	 decentralization	 –	 centralization	 --	decentralization.		
3.2 The	Asset	Management	Responsibility	System		The	 asset	 management	 responsibility	 system	 attempted	 to	 reconstruct	micro-economic	 base	 by	 absorbing	 other	 reforms’	 experiences.	 This	 system	allowed	the	existence	of	private	economy	in	certain	areas,	and	enterprises	would	get	 rid	 of	 administrative	 subordinating	 relationship	 and	 become	 independent	economic	participant.	The	asset	management	responsibility	system	reform	took	the	 enterprises	management	 issues	 as	 the	 core	 task,	 and	was	 divided	 in	 three	steps:	 first,	 the	department	 in	charge	set	up	the	evaluation	committee	to	select	enterprises	managers	through	open	competition	based	on	assets	in	hand;	second,	the	selected	managers	would	sign	the	contract	with	the	department	as	the	legal	person	 of	 enterprises,	 and	 had	 the	 autonomy	 to	 create	 or	 close	 relevant	organizations	and	internal	distribution;	third,	the	committee	would	reselect	the	next	manager	at	 the	end	of	 the	 term,	and	 the	predecessor	would	be	praised	or	blamed	 according	 to	 their	 performance.	 This	 type	 of	 reform	 draw	 a	 lot	 of	attention	 and	 achieved	 some	 effects	 in	 practice,	 however,	 it	 could	 not	 be	
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accepted	widely	because	by	comparing	with	other	reforms,	the	requirements	for	managers	is	high,	and	they	would	receive	less	benefits	and	more	supervisions86.		
3.3 Changing	Management	System		In	 1991,	 the	 National	 Congress	 approved	 the	 Ten	 Years	 Planning	 of	 National	Economic	 and	 Social	 Development	 and	 the	 Eighth	 Five	 Year	 Planning	 Outline	that	 was	 proposed	 by	 the	 Seventh	 Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	 Thirteenth	 Central	Committee	 of	 the	 CPC.	 This	 outline	 required	 separating	 government	 from	enterprise,	 separating	 ownership	 from	 management,	 making	 most	 SOEs	independent	market	 entity	 with	 self-management	 and	 responsible	 for	 its	 own	profits	 and	 losses,	 exploring	 multi-type	 of	 public	 economy,	 and	 establishing	 a	complete	and	efficient	SOE	management	and	operation	system87.	 		In	 1992,	 the	 State	 Council	 issued	 the	 Regulations	 on	 Changing	 Management	System	 of	 State-owned	 Industrial	 Enterprise.	 This	 regulation	 clearly	 required	guaranteeing	enterprise	autonomy,	 speeding	up	changing	management	 system,	and	 making	 enterprise	 entirely	 independent	 market	 entity.	 Specifically,	 first,	confirmed	 the	 task	 of	 changing	 management	 system;	 second,	 confirmed	 14	management	 autonomy,	 including	 decision-making	 power,	 pricing	 right,	 sales	right,	importing	and	exporting	right,	and	investing	right	etc.;	third,	confirmed	the	obligation	that	enterprise	should	responsible	for	its	own	profits	and	losses;	and	fourth,	 standardized	 the	 structure	 adjustment	 of	 enterprise.	 Besides,	 this	regulation	 also	 proposed	 principle	 requirements	 on	 changing	 government	functions88.	 		According	 to	 statistics,	 there	 were	 766	 pilot	 enterprises	 changed	 their	management	 system	 in	 1991,	 and	 over	 2000	 enterprise	 changed	 their	
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management	system	in	any	means	by	then	end	od	199289.	 		
3.4 Theories		With	 a	 goal	 for	 the	 transition	 to	 the	modern	 enterprise	 system,	 the	 reform	 of	separating	control	 from	ownership	achieved	significant	effects	 in	practice.	This	reform	 confirmed	 the	 relationship	 of	 profits	 distribution	 between	 government	and	 enterprises	 to	 some	 degree,	 generalized	 ideas	 of	 self-management,	responsibility	 for	 profit	 and	 loss	 and	 property	 right.	 Besides,	 some	entrepreneurs	 also	 grew	 up	 with	 market	 and	 modern	 management	acknowledgement	in	this	period.	 		The	 theory	 of	 separating	 control	 from	 ownership	 expected	 that	 enterprises	would	 become	 independent	 market	 participant	 by	 giving	 managers	self-management	 under	 the	 original	 property	 relationship.	 Differed	 from	 the	method	 of	 motivating	 managers	 and	 workers	 by	 benefits	 in	 decentralizing	powers	 and	 giving	 up	 profits	 period,	 the	 reform	 in	 this	 period	 attempted	 to	achieve	management	objectives	by	promoting	managers	status90.	The	rights	and	obligations	 of	 government	 and	 enterprises	 were	 confirmed	 through	 direct	negotiation,	 and	 managers	 could	 obtain	 more	 space	 for	 self-management	without	 excessive	 intervention	 from	 government.	 In	 the	 area	 of	 profit	distribution,	the	department	in	charge	could	collect	shared	revenue	by	giving	up	certain	 degree	 management	 and	 enterprises	 could	 get	 promised	 benefits	 by	increasing	 profits.	 Eventually,	 a	 profit	 distribution	 relationship	 with	 common	risks	and	interests	has	been	established.91	 		The	 theory	of	 property	 right	 reform,	 advocated	by	Hua	 Sheng,	 tried	 to	 rebuild	the	micro	base	of	economy	by	dealing	with	property	right.	Hua	believed	that	the	
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state-owned	 enterprises	 reform	 would	 fail	 without	 breaking	 the	 original	property	right	relationship.92		In	addition,	as	the	most	important	human	resource,	the	entrepreneurs’	talent	has	attracted	 many	 attentions	 as	 well.	 Although	 the	 role	 reversal	 between	government	 officer	 and	 enterprise	 manager	 happened	 frequently	 in	 the	condition	of	 a	 clear	 line	between	 the	 functions	of	 government	and	enterprises,	many	managers	 have	 transformed	 from	 executors	 of	 government	 decisions	 to	professional	 managerial	 staff	 through	 competitive	 selection	 and	 promotion	 of	their	status.		
3.5 Comments		All	of	problems	emerged	during	the	reform	of	separating	control	from	ownership,	such	as	bargain	mechanism,	 soft	 budget	 and	enterprise	 activity	 short-termism,	were	 resulted	 from	 the	property	 right	 relationship	under	pubic	 economy.	This	reform	 was	 limited	 to	 separation	 of	 enterprise	 management	 from	 public	ownership,	 and	 enterprises	 could	 not	 operate	 independently	 and	 response	 for	profit	and	loss	completely.	 		As	 the	 superior	 of	 enterprises,	 the	 government	 has	 the	 power	 of	 examining,	appointing	and	dismissing	managers.	 In	the	practice	of	this	reform,	the	bargain	mechanism	was	used	to	confirm	rights	and	obligations	between	government	and	enterprises.	In	this	condition,	enterprises	would	do	anything	possible	to	realise	that	 their	 operating	 task	 could	 be	 achieved	 easily;	 government	 department	would	 try	 to	 push	 the	 amount	 of	 operating	 task	 up,	 then	 they	would	 form	 an	alliance	 to	 request	 lower	 taxation	 and	 profit-delivery	 from	 tax	 and	 financial	departments.	 The	 operating	 performance	 of	 enterprises	 depends	 on	 other	factors	 rather	 than	 management,	 thus	 the	 unfair	 punishment	 and	 treatment	would	always	exist.	 		
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As	 an	 independent	 stakeholder,	 enterprises	 always	 attempt	 to	 obtain	 more	retained	 profit	 by	 using	 information	 advantages	 actively.	 The	 situation	 of	 high	salary	 but	 low	 profit	would	widely	 occur	 as	managers	 and	workers	 could	 ally	easily.	Besides,	enterprises	would	ask	more	investment	to	produce	more	and	get	more	profit	without	concerning	 loss.	At	 last,	 these	situations	would	cause	both	expansion	 of	 investment	 and	 consumption,	 which	 lead	 to	 failure	 of	macro-control	and	the	government	had	to	innervate	again.	 		The	reform	of	 separating	control	 from	ownership	only	gave	enterprises	partial	management,	which	could	not	change	their	subordinated	status.	The	government	department	 could	 influence	 the	 operating	 of	 enterprises	 directly	 or	 indirectly	according	 to	 their	 own	 needs,	 and	 the	 managers	 of	 enterprises	 only	 keen	 to	emphasize	 on	 short-term	 interest	 rather	 than	 long-term	 development	 and	innovations.	 Therefore,	 not	 surprisingly	 that	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 that	had	large	scale	of	assets	but	low	profitability	failed	to	compete	with	private	and	foreign	enterprises.	 		
4. The	Period	of	Establishing	Modern	Enterprise	System	(1993	–	Present)		
4.1 The	Process		From	“Fang	Quan	Rang	Li”	to	“Liang	Quan	Fen	Li”,	then	to	“establishing	modern	enterprises	 system”,	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 reform	 had	 entered	 the	 core	area	progressively	–	the	property	right	reform.	The	practice	in	separating	control	from	 ownership	 period	 provided	 some	 vital	 conditions	 for	 latter	 reforms,	 for	instance,	 the	 non-public	 sector	 had	 emerged,	 the	 idea	 of	 property	 rights	 had	been	 generalized	 and	 the	 economy	 system	 was	 transferring	 from	 planned	 to	market	 rapidly.	The	 reform	aimed	at	establishing	modern	enterprises	 included	the	 joint-stock	 system,	 strategic	 restructuring	 of	 state-owned	 enterprise	 and	setting	up	the	national	state-owned	assets	management	mechanism.		4.1.1 The	joint-stock	system	reform		
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The	earliest	attempt	to	establish	a	joint-stock	system	began	in	the	form	of	issuing	employee	 shares.	 The	 establishment	 of	 Beijing	 Tianqiao	 and	 Shanghai	 Feili	Acoustics	 issuance	 of	 shares	 in	 1984	 marked	 the	 official	 start	 of	 pilot	 in	 the	joint-stock	system.	After	the	State	began	to	adopt	a	tight	monetary	policy	in	the	latter	half	of	1985,	pilots	 in	 raising	 funds	 through	share	 issuance	began	across	the	 whole	 country	 with	 a	 view	 to	 solve	 the	 problem	 of	 insufficient	 working	capitals	for	enterprises93.	Although	the	reform	of	joint-stock	system	was	already	a	 popular	 concept	 from	 1985	 to	 1986	 and	 pilots	 were	 conducted	 in	 different	places,	 and	 the	 final	 results	were	 unclear	 and	 new	 pilots	were	 not	 carried	 on	until	1987	when	the	Thirteenth	CPC	Congress	was	convened.	The	main	effect	of	early	reform	of	the	joint-stock	system	was	the	establishment	of	new	channels	for	financing.	 Since	 the	 holders	 of	 shared	 issued	 by	most	 of	 the	 enterprises	were	able	to	repay	the	 initial	 loan	and	accrued	interests	outright	when	then	reached	maturity,	 they	seemed	like	hybrids	of	stocks	and	bonds.	Such	a	 fake	 joint-stock	system	 actually	 became	 a	 way	 for	 enterprise	 to	 increase	 the	 incomes	 of	 their	employees.	Moreover,	the	financial	market	then	lacked	the	necessary	conditions,	and	the	early	reform	of	joint-stock	system	became	a	merely	formality	in	the	end.	 		The	establishment	of	Shanghai	and	Shenzhen	Stock	Exchange	in	1990	and	1991	marked	 that	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 reform	 has	 entered	 a	 new	 stage.	 In	1992,	 Deng	 Xiaoping	 approved	 the	 joint-stock	 experiments	 during	 his	 South	Tour,	and	the	National	Structural	Reform	Commission94	 issued	the	Measures	for	
the	 Pilot	 Reform	 of	 Joint-stock	 Enterprises95	 in	 May	 of	 the	 same	 year,	 which	promoted	the	joint-stock	system	reform	actively.	At	the	end	of	1992,	the	number	of	 state-owned	enterprises	 involved	 in	 joint-stock	 system	 reform	developed	 to	about	 3700,	 and	 92	 of	 them	were	 listed	 in	 the	 stock	 exchange96.	 In	 1993,	 The	
Company	Law97	 was	promulgated,	which	provided	legal	foundations	for	further	reforms.	 	
																																								 																				 	
93	 Xiaoming	Zhang,	1988,	 	
94 ±ÙAsįɳÉ£:National Structural Reform Commission. 
95 Ǳ5sįɳȢƙxƀMeasures for the Pilot Reform of joint-stock Enterprises. 
96 ȅȾǀ1995	33^U®~-±.ŴiƟǁFuren Dong. 1995. The Research 
on China’s State-owned Enterprises’ Reform. Beijing: China People’s Press. 
97 YƀCompany Law. 1993. 	
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	In	1993,	 the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	14th	CPC	Congress	 issued	the	Decision	on	
Issues	 Concerning	 the	 Establishment	 of	 a	 Socialist	 Market	 Economic	 System98,	which	 required	 setting	 up	 a	 modern	 enterprise	 system	 with	 its	 corporate	structure,	 governance,	 and	 management	 based	 on	 the	 principle	 of	corporatization,	and	which	provided	provisions	for	full	separation	of	the	state’s	exercise	 of	 ownership	 from	 the	 enterprise’s	 exercise	 of	 legal	 person	 property	rights 99 .	 In	 1994,	 according	 to	 the	 notice,	 there	 were	 100	 large	 and	medium-sized	 enterprises	 were	 selected	 to	 carry	 out	 the	 pilot	 on	 the	establishment	 of	 the	modern	 enterprise	 system.	 Pilots	were	 also	 conducted	 in	over	 2,000	 enterprises	 by	 various	 local	 governments	 and	 departments.	 By	 the	end	of	1997,	93	of	100	enterprises	had	transformed	to	enterprise	form;	and	69	of	them	 were	 proprietorship,	 17	 were	 multi-ownership,	 and	 10	 were	state-controlled.	 In	 terms	 of	 local	 enterprises,	 1989	 enterprise	 had	 completed	enterprise	 form	 transformation.	 Through	 assets	 settlement	 and	 defining	property	 right,	 these	 pilot	 enterprises	 established	 the	 investor	 relationship	between	 the	 government	 and	 enterprises,	 and	 initially	 establishing	 a	 standard	corporate	governance	structure	by	setting	up	the	board	of	shareholders,	board	of	directors,	and	board	of	supervisors.	 		Though	 the	 aim	 of	 the	 joint-stock	 system	 reform	 was	 to	 achieve	 the	 goal	 of	establishing	 the	 modern	 enterprise	 system,	 it	 failed	 to	 solve	 the	 fundamental	problems	such	as	the	mixed	functions	of	the	government	and	enterprises	and	the	absence	 of	 owners	 or	 establish	 an	 efficient	 corporate	 governance	 structure.	Competition	 form	 private	 and	 foreign-funded	 economies	 fully	 revealed	 the	institutional	weak	points	of	SOEs	which	resulted	in	pervasive	poor	performance	and	 losses.	As	 losses	 continued,	 the	State’s	 financial	burden	constantly	became	heavier,	promoting	it	to	put	forward	suggestions	on	the	strategic	restructuring	of	SOEs	aimed	at	resolving	their	various	difficulties.	 		
																																								 																				 	
98 ]'ùǑǁ:ì¶ǤƇǹîɣɺƱeÕDecision on Issues Concerning the Establishment 
of a Socialist Market Economic System. 1993.  
99 Ibid.  
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4.1.2 Strategic	restructuring	of	state-owned	enterprises		Faced	with	continuous	loss	of	uncompetitive	state-owned	enterprises	and	severe	financial	 pressure,	 the	 government	 decided	 to	 bail	 them	 out	 by	 strategic	restructuring.	 Since	 1995,	 the	 state-owned	 enterprise	 reform	 expanded	 to	 the	whole	 state-owned	economy	 from	 the	 initial	 pilot	 scheme.	 In	 September	1995,	the	Fifth	Plenary	Session	of	14th	CPC	Congress	put	forward	the	policy	of	strategic	restructuring	of	 state-owned	enterprises	 and	 the	 strategy	of	ĝÁİÞ100(Zhua	Da	Fang	Xiao)101;	and	the	Fourth	Plenary	Session	of	15th	CPC	Congress	required	strategic	adjusting	of	state-owned	economic	sector	and	structure102.	Due	to	the	general	 problems	 such	 as	 lack	 of	 fund,	 overstaffing	 and	 heavy	 social	 burdens,	some	 enterprises	 adopted	 the	 methods	 of	 seeking	 financing	 by	 listing	 on	 the	stock	 exchange	 and	 restructured	 themselves	 in	 the	 process.	 In	 1997,	 the	government	targeted	to	bail	state-owned	enterprises	out	within	three	years	and	accelerate	 strategic	 restructuring103.	 The	 sector	 of	 state-owned	 economy	 was	narrowed	to	industries	involving	national	security,	natural	monopoly	industries,	industries	providing	public	products	and	services	and	core	enterprises	in	pillar	and	high-technology	industries.		4.1.3 Setting	up	the	national	state-owned	assets	management	mechanism		In	 November	 2002,	 the	 16th	 CPC	 Congress	 proposed	 to	 set	 up	 national	state-owned	 assets	 management	 mechanism	 and	 to	 establish	 relevant	organizations	 in	 both	 central	 and	 local	 level.	 According	 to	 the	 report	 of	 this	congress,	 the	 basic	 system	 are:	 first,	 insisting	 on	 public	 ownership;	 second,	establishing	 both	 central	 and	 local	 state-owned	 enterprise	 supervision	 and	management	 departments;	 third,	 the	 State	 enjoys	 owner’s	 interests	 by	 law	 as	investor;	 fourth,	 to	 industries	 relating	 national	 security	 and	 economic	 lifeline,	the	central	government	plays	the	role	of	investor	on	behalf	of	the	State,	and	local	
																																								 																				 	
100 ĝÁİÞConcentrated on major enterprises and leaves minor ones to fend on themselves. 
101 ±\,V­ä*X:ġ¢The Report of the Fifth Plenary Session of 14th CPC Congress. 
1995.  
102 ±\,V*ä­X:ġ¢The Report of the Fourth Plenary Session of 15th CPC 
Congress. 1999. 
103 The target was put forward in the First Plenary Session of 15th CPC Congress, 1997.  
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government	plays	the	role	of	investor	to	other	State-owned	assets.	 		The	National	 State-owned	Assets	 Supervision	 and	Management	 Commission104	was	 established	 in	 March	 2003,	 which	 supervise	 and	 regulate	 large-scale	state-owned	 enterprises	 involving	 in	 national	 security,	 infrastructures	 and	natural	resources	as	investors.	In	June	2006,	each	province	established	relevant	organizations,	and	this	mechanism	was	applied	to	infrastructure-city	level105	 at	the	end	of	2007.	Until	present,	the	National	State-owned	Assets	Supervision	and	Management	 Commission	 issued	 sixteen	 regulations	 and	 forty	 regulatory	documents	 concerning	 restructuring	 of	 enterprises,	 assignment	 of	 property,	assets	evaluation,	operating	examination	and	financial	supervision,	based	on	The	
Tentative	 Regulations	 of	 State-owned	 Assets	 Supervision	 and	 Management106.	Meanwhile,	 local	 state-owned	 assets	 supervision	 and	 management	 authorities	also	issued	about	1000	relevant	rules	and	regulations	in	succession107.	The	basic	regulatory	system	of	state-owned	assets	supervision	and	management	has	thus	been	established.		4.1.4 Latest	reform	plan	 		In	 November	 2013,	 the	 Third	 Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	 Eighteenth	 Central	Committee	 of	 the	 CPC	 announced	 the	 new	plan	 for	 China’s	 SOEs.	 According	 to	this	plan,	a	series	of	 factor-price	reforms	will	be	undertaken,	the	subsidies	that	SOEs	 have	 enjoyed	 will	 be	 reduced,	 a	 State	 Capital	 Operating	 and	 Investment	Companies	wile	be	established,	 and	 the	partial	privatization	plan,	 called	mixed	ownership	reform	will	be	conducted.	 		The	 idea	of	mixed	ownership	was	popularised	 in	SOEs’	 reform	 in	1990s,	when	many	central	SOEs	listed	a	minority	of	their	shares	on	stock	exchange	to	attract	
																																								 																				 	
104 ±ōȴ,ƴƸǘƧÉ£:National State-owned Assets Supervision and Management 
Commission. 
105 A Chines administrative level which between province and county.   
106 ±ōȴ,ƴƸǘƧňȌŖGTentative Regulations of State-owned Assets Supervision and 
Management. 
107 Unirule Institute of Economics. 2011. The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned 
Enterprises. See link: <	http://www.unirule.org.cn/>. 
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private	capital.	The	new	mixed	ownership	requires	the	withdrawal	of	SOEs	from	sectors	 with	 healthy	 and	 competitive	 environment,	 changing	 governance	structure	of	SOEs,	encouraging	private	 investors	 to	 take	a	controlling	 interests,	and	allowing	employees	to	hold	shares.	At	the	same	time,	SOEs	have	to	maintain	a	controlling	and	influential	role	in	the	overall	economy.	 		In	April	2014,	the	State	Council	listed	80	projects	in	State-dominated	sectors	to	private	 investors,	 including	 transportation	 infrastructure,	 information	infrastructure,	clean	energy	and	traditional	energy	projects.	In	the	same	month,	the	Ministry	of	Finance	announced	plans	to	open	China's	munitions	industry	for	private	 investments.	 Three	 months	 later,	 the	 State-Owned	 Assets	 Supervision	and	 Administration	 Commission	 announced	 to	 implement	 pilot	 scheme	 six	central	SOEs,	two	of	which	—	Sinopharm	and	China	National	Building	Materials	Group	—	will	be	open	to	ownership	diversification.	At	the	provincial	level,	many	local	 governments	 have	 responded	 to	 the	 call	 of	 the	 central	 government.	 By	September	2014,	over	20	provinces,	spanning	most	of	 the	major	municipalities	(including	 Beijing,	 Shanghai,	 Guangdong	 and	 Chongqing),	 had	 announced	concrete	implementation	programs	involving	the	potential	listing	or	selling	off	of	assets	in	up	to	70%	of	the	provincial	SOEs	by	2017108.	 		However,	the	language	of	this	reform	plan	is	vague,	which	leaves	ample	room	for	interpretation	and	more	detailed	implementation.	In	addition,	the	list	of	sectors	that	full	of	healthy	and	competitive	environment	did	not	promulgated,	giving	no	indication	 where	 the	 SOEs	 should	 withdraw.	 Therefore,	 many	 observers	continue	 to	question	 the	 effect	 of	 this	 reform	 in	 the	 face	of	 various	 incumbent	interests,	including	political	connected	elites.	 		
4.2 Theories	and	Arguments		In	this	period,	the	research	in	state-owned	enterprise	area	mainly	focused	on	the	question	 about	 the	 need	 of	 solving	 current	 state-owned	 enterprises’	 problem	
																																								 																				 	
108	 Daniel	Dusek.,	Peter	X.	Huang,	Andre	Zhu.	China	M&A:	Reform	Plan	Promotes	Mixed	Ownership	of	
State-Owned	Enterprises.	Skadden’s	2015	Insights	–	Global	M&A.	January	2015.	 	
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through	property	right	reform,	and	the	question	of	how	to	implement	it.		Some	 scholars	 represented	 by	 Yifu	 Lin	 believed	 in	 the	 importance	 of	 perfect	information	 and	 competition	 mechanism	 of	 market109.	 Since	 the	 asymmetric	information	 and	 responsibility	 between	 managers	 and	 owners,	 a	 relevant	mechanism	should	be	introduced	to	prevent	potential	opportunism	activities	of	agent.	 To	 state-owned	 enterprises,	 the	 managers	 would	 accept	 both	 the	subsequent	supervision	based	on	average	profit,	and	the	antecedent	supervision	by	internal	management	system.	These	scholars	preferred	to	solve	the	problem	of	motivation	and	supervision	of	state-owned	enterprises’	managers,	 to	reform	in	property	right	area.		Weiying	Zhang	thought	that,	the	state-owned	enterprise	reform	should	solve	the	problems	of	selection	and	motivation	of	managers,	and	 the	selection	 is	 the	key	issues	 above	 all.	 To	 solve	 this	 problem,	 the	 residual	 claim	 rights	 should	 be	corresponding	 to	 residual	 control	 rights,	 and	 give	 it	 to	 those	 who	 have	management	talent	and	information	advantages.110		
4.3 Comments		The	 financial	 pressures	 are	 always	 the	 major	 reason	 for	 China’s	 state-owned	enterprises	 reforms.	 The	 initial	 state-owned	 enterprises	 reform	 began	 in	 the	period	 of	 continuous	 deficit	 budget,	 the	 next	 phase	 joint-stock	 system	 reform	aimed	 at	 providing	 funds	 for	 enterprises’	 development,	 and	 the	 strategic	restructuring	 resulted	 from	 central	 finance	 could	 not	 afford	 state-owned	enterprises’	 loss	any	more.	However,	as	the	most	actively	implemented	reform,	establishing	national	 assets	management	mechanism	deviated	 from	 the	 former	path.		
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The	joint-stock	system	reform	expected	that	enterprises	could	transfer	operating	mechanism	 and	 promote	 productivity	 by	 confirming	 the	 property	 right	 and	management	 system	 of	 enterprises. 111 	 Formally	 speaking,	 state-owned	enterprises	could	obtain	self-management	by	avoiding	direct	 intervention	 from	government	 department	 through	 joint-stock	 system	 reform.	 However,	 as	 the	shareholders	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises,	 government	 department	 still	 could	influence	 the	 operating	 by	 all	 means,	 and	 the	 self-management	 could	 not	 be	achieved	 satisfactorily.	 Though	 the	 joint-stock	 system	 reform	 did	 not	 promote	enterprises’	 productivity	 and	 give	 them	 real	 self-management,	 it	 did	 provide	foundations	for	next	stage	reforms	by	clearing	property	right	relationship.		The	 goal	 of	 the	 principle	 of	 strategic	 restructuring	 state-owned	 enterprises	 --	focusing	on	major	enterprises	and	leaves	minor	ones	to	fend	on	themselves,	is	to	ease	 the	burden	and	narrow	 the	 scope	of	 state-owned	enterprises.	 In	practice,	most	 minor	 enterprises	 were	 privatized	 to	 reduce	 financial	 pressures,	 and	performed	well	due	to	both	the	owner	and	manager	understood	relevant	market	comprehensively.	The	scope	of	state-owned	enterprises	was	limited	to	strategic	and	monopolist	industries	as	a	result	of	restructuring	reform.	However,	with	the	rapid	 development	 of	 non-public	 economy,	 state-owned	 enterprises	 still	 faced	challenges	 and	 pressures	 from	 private	 and	 foreign	 enterprises.	 Then	 the	government	put	forward	the	task	of	“bail	out	within	three	years”,	and	the	main	method	 to	 achieve	 it	was	 to	 separate	 good	 assets	 from	 one	 or	many	 different	enterprise,	 then	 form	 a	 new	 enterprise	 with	 those	 assets	 and	 list	 it	 on	 stock	exchange,	 and	 the	 original	 overstaffing	 and	 bad	 assets	 remain	 in	 the	 parent	company.	 This	 reform	was	 just	 simple	 separation	 and	 combination	 of	 original	assets,	which	did	not	promote	enterprises’	profitability	eventually.	 		If	 the	 strategic	 restructuring	 of	 enterprises	 could	 have	 lasted,	 the	 private	economy	 could	 have	 replaced	 state-owned	 economy	 as	mainstream	 of	market	progressively,	 and	 economic	 system	 reform	 would	 have	 been	 basically	completed.	 However,	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 national	 state-owned	 assets	
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management	 mechanism,	 which	 enhanced	 state-owned	 economy	 power,	 has	changed	the	situation.	Form	the	perspective	of	property	right,	the	move	to	take	the	central	and	local	state-owned	assets	management	organizations	as	investors	did	not	clear	the	property	right,	and	the	state-owned	assets	and	its	profits	were	annexed	 without	 supervision	 and	 regulation	 for	 the	 assets	 management	mechanism.	From	the	perspective	of	operating,	 the	profitability	of	 state-owned	enterprises	has	been	promoted	 to	 some	degree,	but	 it	was	no	doubt	 that	most	achievements	of	them	were	based	on	low	price	or	even	free	productive	factors.	From	 the	 perspective	 of	 competition,	 state-owned	 enterprises	 monopolized	some	industries	in	a	 long	term,	and	freeze	out	even	annexed	other	competitors	by	 administrative	 power,	 which	 harmed	 the	 market	 severely	 and	 blocked	 the	development	of	economy.		
5. Policies	that	Drove	the	Reform	of	State-owned	Enterprise		Research	 and	 analysis	 has	 played	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 course	 of	 the	reforming	 SOEs.	 However,	 the	 reform	 process	 as	 a	 whole	 actually	 been	implemented	 by	 the	 government.	 The	 decisions,	 polices,	 laws	 and	 regulations	made	 by	 government	 institutions	 have	 directly	 influenced	 the	 reform	 process,	and	have	determined	the	direction	of	the	reform	of	SOEs	to	a	great	extent.	Form	top	design	to	specific	areas,	all	these	polices	have	played	an	decisive	roles	on	the	modes	of	SOEs	reform.	 In	 the	 following	section,	 some	of	 the	 important	polices,	laws	and	regulations	during	the	reform	of	SOEs	will	be	reviewed	in	order	to	shed	light	on	the	forces	which	drove	the	reform	process.	 		
5.1 Establishment	of	the	basic	State	policy	on	reform	and	opening	up	at	the	
Third	Plenary	Session	of	Eleventh	Central	Committee	of	the	CPC		Under	 traditional	 planned	 economy,	 the	 State	 comprehensively	 controlled	 the	economy	 by	 planning,	 the	 production	 efficiency	 was	 poor,	 and	 lack	 of	 social	goods.	 In	 rural	 areas,	 farmers	had	no	 incentives	 to	work	hard	due	 to	 the	 state	monopolized	on	purchase	and	marketing	through	collective	modes	of	production.	In	urban	area,	as	the	subordination	of	government	departments	SOEs	enjoyed	no	
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management	autonomy	at	all.	Government	departments	controlled	all	aspects	of	enterprises’	 business	 behaviors,	 including	madding	 production	 plan,	 allocating	resources	 needed	 for	 production,	 and	 allocating	 funds	 and	 financial	 resources.	Under	 this	 kind	 of	 planned	 economy,	 the	 producers	 in	 both	 rural	 and	 urban	areas	generally	 lacked	enthusiasm	 for	work.	Resources	were	allocated	 through	plans	 but	 not	 the	 market,	 efficiency	 was	 low,	 and	 the	 price	 mechanism	 was	totally	 distorted.	 On	 the	 eve	 of	 the	 reform,	 the	 national	 economy	was	 close	 to	collapse	 and	 it	 was	 difficult	 to	 maintain	 the	 traditional	 planned	 economy	 any	more.	To	this	severe	situation,	the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	the	Eleventh	Central	Committee	 of	 the	 CPC	 issued	 the	 Bulletin	 of	 the	 Third	 Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	
Eleventh	Central	Committee	of	the	CPC,	which	required	to	establish	a	basic	state	policy	 on	 reform	 and	 opening	 up,	 and	 removed	 the	 political	 barriers	 for	industrial	and	agricultural	reforms112.	 		According	 to	 the	 bulletin,	 the	 main	 goal	 of	 the	 reform	 was	 to	 realize	 Four	Modernizations,	 and	 focused	 on	 agriculture	 and	 the	 reform	 of	 industrial	enterprises	was	 still	 at	 a	pilot	 stage.	Due	 to	 a	 lack	of	piratical	 experiences,	 the	main	reform	approach	at	the	beginning	could	be	described	as	“crossing	the	river	by	touching	the	stone”,	and	the	reform	was	gradually	undertaken	after	a	serious	of	 experiments	 and	 adjustments	 based	 on	 experience.	 In	 terms	 of	 agricultural	reform,	the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	the	Eleventh	Central	Committee	of	the	CPC	decided	to	discuss	and	pilot	the	Decision	of	the	Central	Committee	of	the	CPC	on	
Several	 Issues	 concerning	 Accelerating	 Agricultural	 Development	 (Draft)113	 and	the	Regulations	on	the	Work	of	Rural	People’s	Communes	(Tentative	Draft)114.	 In	terms	of	 industry,	 the	main	reform	approaches	were	decentralizing	power	and	institution,	cutting	tax	and	sharing	profits.	 		With	 sticking	 to	 the	 planned	 economy	 and	 focusing	 on	 the	 reform	 of	
																																								 																				 	
112	äX:YġThe	Bulletin	of	the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	the	Eleventh	Central	
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113	\Å]'zćdåǹîɣɺƱeÕǽǏThe	Decision	of	the	Central	Committee	of	
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decentralizing	 powers	 and	 giving	 up	 profits	 of	 SOEs,	 the	 State	 Council	promulgated	 five	 documents	 including:	 Several	 Provisions	 on	 Expanding	 the	
Management	Authority	of	State-owned	Industrial	Enterprise115	 (the	first	so-called	Ten	Articles	on	Expansion	of	Autonomy),	the	Provisions	on	the	Profit	Retention	of	
SOEs116,	the	Interim	Provisions	on	the	Imposition	of	Fixed	Assets	Tax	of	SOEs117,	the	
Interim	Provisions	on	Elevating	the	Fixed	Assets	Depreciation	Rates	and	Improving	
the	Practices	in	the	Use	of	Depreciation	Costs	of	SOEs118,	and	the	Interim	Provisions	
on	 Acquisition	 of	 All	 Circulating	 Funds	 through	 Credits	 among	 State-owned	
Industrial	 Enterprise119.	 In	 the	 following	 years,	 the	 State	 Council,	 the	 State	Economic	 and	 Trade	 Committee,	 the	 Treasury	 and	 other	 government	departments	successively	 issued	several	policies	and	regulations	 to	expand	the	scope	of	the	reform	pilot	of	decentralizing	power	and	giving	up	profits,	such	as	the	 Tentative	 Measures	 on	 the	 Profit	 Retention	 of	 State-owned	 Industrial	
Enterprises 120 ,	 the	 Notice	 of	 the	 State	 Council	 on	 Implementing	 the	 Fiscal	
Management	 system	 of	 “Dividing	 Revenue	 and	 Expenditure	 between	 the	 Central	
and	 Local	 Governments	 and	 Holding	 Each	 Responsibility	 for	 Balancing	 Their	
Budget”121,	 the	 Interim	 Measures	 on	 Implementing	 Relevant	 Documents	 of	 the	
State	Council	on	Expanding	the	Management	Authority	of	State-owned	Industrial	
Enterprises	and	Consolidating	and	 Improving	 the	Specific	Practices	 in	Expanding	
the	Management	Authority	of	State-owned	Industrial	Enterprises122,	 the	Opinions	
on	 Several	 Issues	 concerning	 the	 Implementation	 of	 the	 Economic	 Responsibility	
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Authority	of	State-owned	Industrial	Enterprises	and	Consolidating	and	Improving	the	Specific	
Practices	in	Expanding	the	Management	Authority	of	State-owned	Industrial	Enterprises,	1982.	
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System	 in	 Industrial	Production123,	 the	 Interim	Provisions	on	 the	 Implementation	
of	 the	 Economic	 Responsibility	 System	 in	 Industrial	 Production124,	 the	 Several	
Provisions	 on	 the	 Measures	 for	 State-owned	 Public	 Transport	 Enterprises	 in	
Implementing	 Profit	 Retention	 and	 Complete	 Responsibility	 for	 Profits	 and	
Losses125,	and	the	Tentative	Measures	on	Replacing	Profits	with	Taxes	of	SOEs126,	etc.	 		Five	years	after	the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	the	Eleventh	Central	Committee	of	the	 CPC,	 the	 reform	 in	 rural	 areas	 has	 made	 tremendous	 achievements.	 The	successful	 experience	 and	 rural	 economic	 development	 provided	 favorable	conditions	for	the	focus	of	reform	to	be	transferred	into	urban	areas.	In	1984,	the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	the	Twelfth	Central	Committee	of	the	CPC	adopted	the	
Decision	 of	 the	 CPC	 Central	 Committee	 on	 Economic	 Restructuring127,	 which	evolution	 of	 reform	 from	 rural	 areas	 to	 urban	 areas	 through	 stressing	 the	necessity	and	urgency	of	accelerating	economic	restructuring.	 		The	 traditional	 theory	 believed	 that	 market	 economy	 is	 something	 unique	 to	capitalism,	and	the	planned	economy	is	the	foundation	of	socialist	economy.	This	theory	 has	 been	 challenged	 by	 China’s	 reform	 experiences.	 The	 Third	 Plenary	Session	of	the	Twelfth	Central	Committee	of	the	CPC	indicated	that	“commodity	economy	 is	 an	 insurmountable	 stage	 in	 social	 economic	 development,	 and	 the	socialist	 economy	 in	 our	 country	 is	 planned	 commodity	 economy	 based	 on	public	 ownership” 128 .	 The	 Third	 Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	 Twelfth	 Central	Committee	 of	 the	 CPC	 indicated	 that	 the	 core	 of	 the	 reform	 is	 to	 enhance	enterprises’	 vitality,	 and	 most	 attentions	 should	 be	 paid	 to	 expanding	
																																								 																				 	
123	êƩ,ÖĺǤƇȬ4sǹîɣɺƱčȑThe	Opinions	on	Several	Issues	concerning	the	
Implementation	of	the	Economic	Responsibility	System	in	Industrial	Production,	1982.	
124	êƩ,ÖĺǤƇȬ4sňȌŖGThe	Interim	Provisions	on	the	Implementation	of	the	
Economic	Responsibility	System	in	Industrial	Production,	1983.	
125	]'±ōɃɀ6ÖĺqƋƯđǵȪƲ(xƀƱǹîȒÕThe	Several	Provisions	on	the	
Measures	for	State-owned	Public	Transport	Enterprises	in	Implementing	Profit	Retention	and	
Complete	Responsibility	for	Profits	and	Losses,	1983.	
126	±ō6qįǎňȌxƀThe	Tentative	Measures	on	Replacing	Profits	with	Taxes	of	SOEs,	
1983.	
127	\Å]'ǤƇɘǡƱčȑThe	Decision	of	the	CPC	Central	Committee	on	Economic	
Restructuring,	1984.	
128	 Ibid.	 	
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enterprises’	autonomy129.	 		From	 1984	 to	 1991,	 the	 reform	 of	 decentralizing	 power	 and	 giving	 up	 profits	was	continued,	and	a	number	of	policies	and	regulations	were	formulated	under	the	 theory	 of	 separating	 ownership	 from	management.	 During	 this	 period,	 the	State	 Council,	 State	 Economic	 and	 Trade	 Committee,	 the	 Treasury	 and	 other	government	departments	 enacted	 following	policies,	 rules	 and	 regulations:	 the	
Tentative	Measures	 on	 the	 Second	 Stage	 of	 Replacing	 Profits	 with	 Taxes	 among	
SOEs130,	 the	 Interim	Provisions	on	Turning	All	 the	State	Budgetary	 Investment	 in	
Capital	 Construction	 from	 Allocated	 Funds	 into	 Loans131,	 the	Accounting	 Law	 of	
the	 PRC132,	 the	 Opinions	 on	 Deepening	 Reforms	 and	 Improving	 the	 Contractual	
Management	 Responsibility	 System133,	 the	 Interim	 Regulations	 on	 the	 Contract	
System	of	Managerial	Responsibility	of	 Industrial	Enterprise	Owned	by	the	Whole	
People134,	the	Law	of	PRC	on	Industrial	Enterprises	Owned	by	the	Whole	People135,	the	 Law	 of	 the	 PRC	 on	 Chinese-foreign	 Contractual	 Joint	 Ventures136,	 and	 the	
Measures	 on	 the	 Pilots	 in	 “Separating	 of	 Taxes	 and	 Profits,	 After-tax	 Loan	
Replacement	and	After-tax	Contract	Execution”	Adopted	by	SOEs137,	etc.	 		
5.2 Recognition	 of	 the	 Socialist	Market	 Economic	 System	 at	 the	 Sixteenth	
Party	Congress	(1992)		The	 reform	 from	 1978	 to	 1991,	 the	 State	 Council	 and	 other	 government	departments	decentralized	as	much	powers	as	possible	 to	 the	enterprise	while	
																																								 																				 	
129	 Ibid.	 	
130	±ō6Ǖ&ɧűqįǎňȌxƀThe	Tentative	Measures	on	the	Second	Stage	of	Replacing	
Profits	with	Taxes	among	SOEs,	1984.	
131	 The	Interim	Provisions	on	Turning	All	the	State	Budgetary	Investment	in	Capital	Construction	from	
Allocated	Funds	into	Loans,	1984.	
132	.Ŵ\¦±:ȓƀThe	Accounting	Law	of	the	PRC,	1984.	
133	]'ƌįɳzćǘƧȬ4sùȝƱčȑThe	Opinions	on	Deepening	Reforms	and	Improving	
the	Contractual	Management	Responsibility	System,	1985.	
134	XŴĕōsê6ěȬ4sňȌŖGThe	Interim	Regulations	on	the	Contract	System	of	
Managerial	Responsibility	of	Industrial	Enterprise	Owned	by	the	Whole	People,	1986.	
135	.Ŵ\¦±XŴĕōsê6ƀThe	Law	of	PRC	on	Industrial	Enterprises	Owned	by	the	
Whole	People,	1988.	
136	.Ŵ\¦±ȴ6ƀThe	Law	of	the	PRC	on	Chinese-foreign	Contractual	Joint	Ventures,	
1989.	
137	 The	Measures	on	the	Pilots	in	“Separating	of	Taxes	and	Profits,	After-tax	Loan	Replacement	and	
After-tax	Contract	Execution”	Adopted	by	SOEs,	1990.	
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sticking	 to	 the	 planned	 economic	 system	 to	 enhance	 enterprises’	 vitality.	However,	this	reform	could	not	solve	the	fundamental	problems	of	SOEs.	On	one	hand,	the	decentralizing	model	characteristics	by	dealing	with	problems	on	an	ad	
hoc	 basis	 has	 put	 SOEs	 into	 a	 vicious	 circle	 of	 either	 too	much	 control	 or	 too	much	chaos.	On	the	other	hand,	most	SOEs	still	felt	they	had	too	little	autonomy	with	 heavy	 social	 burdens	 and	 the	 restriction	 of	 economic	 system.	 Under	 this	situation,	 a	 deeper	 reform	 was	 being	 introduced.	 In	 1992,	 the	 Report	 of	 the	Fourteenth	CPC	Congress	issued	the	Speed	Up	the	Pace	of	Reform	and	Opening	Up	
and	 Modernization	 Construction,	 and	 Achieve	 a	 Bigger	 Victory	 in	 the	 Cause	 of	
Socialist	with	Chinese	Characteristics,	which	officially	pronounced	that	“the	aim	of	China’s	economic	restructuring	is	to	build	a	socialist	market	economic	system”138.	The	concept	of	socialist	market	economic	system	greatly	influenced	the	direction	of	China’s	reform.	 		In	1992,	the	tour	of	Xiaoping	Deng	laid	important	ideological	foundation	for	the	establishment	 of	 the	 legal	 political	 status	 of	 the	 socialist	 market	 economic	system.	In	his	speech,	Deng	held	that	the	standard	on	reform	and	opening	up	is	not	the	distinction	of	what	is	capitalism	and	what	is	socialism	but	“whether	it	is	beneficial	 to	 the	 development	 of	 socialist	 productive	 forces,	 whether	 it	 helps	increase	 the	 overall	 national	 strength	 of	 the	 socialist	 country,	 and	 whether	 it	brings	about	better	living	standards	of	the	people”139.	He	also	indicated	that	the	objective	model	for	reform	was	the	socialist	market	economy.	Later	in	1993,	the	phrase	“socialist	market	economy”	was	written	into	the	Constitution	to	describe	China’s	basic	economic	system.	 		To	speed	up	SOEs	management	system	reform,	accelerate	the	development	and	cultivation	 of	 the	 socialist	 market	 system,	 and	 accelerate	 the	 improvement	macro	 economic	 adjustment	 mechanism,	 the	 State	 Council	 enacted	 the	
Regulation	 on	 the	 Transformation	 of	 the	 Management	 Mechanism	 of	 Industrial	
Enterprises	 Owned	 by	 the	 Whole	 People,	 which	 stated	 that	 “Objectives	 for	 the	
																																								 																				 	
138	 The	Speed	Up	the	Pace	of	Reform	and	Opening	Up	and	Modernization	Construction,	and	Achieve	
a	Bigger	Victory	in	the	Cause	of	Socialist	with	Chinese	Characteristics.	
139	 Xiaoping	Deng,	1992,	The	Speech	of	South	Tour.	 	
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transformation	 of	 the	 management	 mechanism	 of	 enterprises	 are	 to	 make	enterprises	 adapted	 to	 market	 demands,	 change	 enterprise	 into	 commodity	producing	and	managing	entities	that	conduct	independent	business	operations,	assume	 sole	 responsibility	 for	 their	 own	 profits	 and	 losses	 and	 have	self-development	 and	 self-restraint	 abilities,	 and	 also	 turn	 enterprises	 into	enterprises	 legal	persons	 that	 can	 independently	 enjoy	 civil	 rights	 and	assume	civil	obligations.”140		In	1994,	 the	State	Economy	and	Trade	Committee	 issued	 the	Notice	on	Several	
Opinions	 concerning	 the	Transformation	of	Management	System	of	SOEs	and	 the	
Establishment	of	a	Modern	Enterprise	System141,	and	began	pilot	reforms	aimed	at	creating	a	modern	enterprise	system.	By	undertaking	the	reform	of	establishing	a	modern	enterprise	system,	SOEs	have	gradually	become	 independent	market	entities.	 		In	 terms	 of	 property	 structure,	 the	 State	 Council	 issued	 the	 Regulations	 on	
Supervision	and	Management	of	 the	Properties	of	 SOEs	 in	1994,	which	specified	that	the	“property	of	SOEs	belongs	to	the	State	and	that	enterprise	shall	engage	in	 independent	operations	over	the	property	 for	which	the	State	has	granted	 it	rights	 of	 possession,	 use	 and	 lawful	 disposal;	 the	 State	 Council	 shall	 exercise	ownership	 over	 the	 property	 of	 enterprises	 in	 a	 unified	 way	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	State	and	adopt	level-to-level	managements	and	supervision.”142	 		
5.3 Decision	 of	 the	 Fourth	 Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	 Fifteenth	 Central	
Committee	 of	 the	 CPC	 on	 the	 Strategic	 Adjustment	 in	 State-owned	
Economy	(1999)		In	 1999,	 the	 Fourth	 Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	 Fifteenth	 Central	 Committee	 of	 the	
																																								 																				 	
140	XŴĕōsê6ǘƧŒsȼ¹ŖGThe	Regulation	on	the	Transformation	of	the	
Management	Mechanism	of	Industrial	Enterprises	Owned	by	the	Whole	People,	1993.	
141	]'±ō6ǘƧŒsȼ¹ùǑƦ/6s÷ǹîčȑƱɊƹThe	Notice	on	Several	
Opinions	concerning	the	Transformation	of	Management	System	of	SOEs	and	the	Establishment	of	a	
Modern	Enterprise	System,	1994.	
142	±ōȴ,ƴƸǘƧŖGThe	Regulations	on	Supervision	and	Management	of	the	Properties	of	
SOEs,	1994.	
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CPC	adopted	the	Decision	of	the	Central	Committee	of	the	CPC	concerning	Several	
Major	 Issues	 in	 the	 Reform	 and	 Development	 of	 SOEs.	 This	 decision	 set	 out	 the	short-term	and	mil-long	term	objectives	for	SOEs’	reform	and	development.	That	is,	 “it	 is	 proposed	 that	 within	 about	 three	 years,	 most	 of	 the	 large	 and	medium-sized	state-owned	 loss-making	enterprises	should	have	been	removed	from	 their	 predicament,	 and	 a	modern	 enterprise	 system	 for	 the	 bulk	 of	 large	and	 medium-sized	 state-owned	 key	 enterprises	 should	 have	 been	 established	initially	 by	 the	 end	 of	 the	 century…	 By	 2010,	 the	 strategic	 adjustment	 and	reorganization	 should	 be	 largely	 completed	 to	 form	 a	 relatively	 complete	modern	enterprise	system,	…so	that	state-owned	economy	may	play	a	dominant	role	in	the	national	economy	in	a	better	way.”143		In	the	process	of	market-oriented	reform	over	the	past	20	years,	SOEs	have	met	with	more	and	more	competition	in	the	market.	Due	to	the	institutional	burdens	and	 their	 own	 operational	 inefficiencies,	 SOEs	 were	 defeated	 in	 market	competition.	As	a	result,	more	and	more	of	them	became	to	loss	incurring.	With	a	view	to	reversing	the	situation,	the	SOEs	had	to	retreat	from	competitive	sectors	and	fell	back	on	monopoly,	 fundamental	and	resources	sectors.	With	respect	to	institutional	 construction,	 efforts	 were	 made	 to	 further	 improve	 the	 modern	enterprise	system,	explore	patterns	of	state-owned	assets	management,	focus	on	the	 restructuring	 of	 major	 enterprise,	 and	 leave	 minor	 ones	 to	 fend	 for	themselves,	 and	 enliven	 small	 and	 medium-sized	 SOEs.	 In	 1999,	 the	 Opinion	
concerning	Several	Issues	on	the	Selling	of	Small	SOEs144	 issued	by	State	Economy	and	Trade	Committee,	the	Treasury	and	the	People’s	Bank	of	China;	the	Opinions	
concerning	 Several	 Issues	 on	 Debt-for-equity	 Swap145	 issued	 by	 State	 Economy	and	Trade	Committee	and	the	People’s	Bank	of	China;	the	Provisions	on	the	Free	
Transfer	Formalities	of	State-owned	Assets	Completed	by	Enterprises146	 and	other	
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1999.	
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SOEs,	1999.	
145	]'NtȼǱœǹîǹɺƱčȑThe	Opinions	concerning	Several	Issues	on	Debt-for-equity	
Swap,	1999.	
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policies	were	formulated	under	such	a	background.	 		
5.4 Provisions	 of	 the	 Sixteenth	 Party	 Congress	 on	 the	 Reform	 of	 the	
State-owned	Assets	Management	System	(2002)		The	 establishment	 of	 modern	 enterprise	 system	 of	 large	 and	 medium-sized	enterprise	 and	 the	 implementation	 of	 strategically	 adjusting	 state-owned	economy	 provided	 the	 condition	 for	 SOEs	 to	 get	 out	 of	 trouble.	 In	 2002,	 the	state-owned	 economy	 continued	 to	 concentrate	 toward	 to	 large	 and	medium-sized	 enterprise	 and	 made	 remarkable	 achievements	 in	 oil,	petrochemical,	 power,	 telecommunications,	 metallurgy,	 nonferrous	 metal,	railway,	 defense	 and	 other	 key	 major	 sectors.	 Because	 all	 these	 sectors	 had	natural	 monopoly	 features	 and	 political	 protections	 provided	 by	 government	departments,	 SOEs	 soon	 began	 to	 expand	 and	make	 excessive	 profits	 in	 these	sectors.	Quite	a	number	of	SOEs	implemented	enterprise	system	reform	through	listing	 on	 the	 stock	 market,	 setting	 up	 China-foreign	 joint	 ventures,	 mutual	shareholding	and	the	joint-stock	system,	and	got	ready	for	the	establishment	of	the	State-owned	assets	management	system.		In	 2002,	 the	Report	 of	 the	 Sixteenth	 Congress	 of	 the	 CPC	 put	 forward	 the	 new	requirements	for	the	framework	of	the	state-owned	assets	management	system,	which	 indicated	 that	 “on	 the	 precondition	 of	 upholding	 state	 ownership,	 the	state	 should	 establish	 a	 state	 property	 management	 system	 under	 which	 the	central	 government	 and	 local	 governments	 perform	 the	 responsibilities	 of	investor	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 state	 respectively,	 enjoying	 owner’s	 equity,	 combing	rights	with	obligations	and	duties	and	administering	assets,	personnel	and	other	affairs.	 The	 central	 government	 should	 represent	 the	 state	 in	 performing	 the	functions	 as	 investor	 in	 large	 SOEs,	 infrastructure	 and	 important	 natural	resources	 that	have	a	vital	bearing	on	 the	 lifeline	of	 the	national	 economy	and	state	security	while	local	governments	should	represent	the	State	in	performing	the	functions	as	investors	with	regard	to	other	State	property.”147	 However,	this	
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report	 did	 not	 provide	 clear	 provisions	 on	 distinguish	 the	 function	 in	 the	supervision	 of	 State-owned	 assets	 from	 the	 function	 in	 the	 management	 of	State-owned	assets	and	even	mixed	them	up,	it	left	behind	the	hidden	dangers	of	the	 “absence	 of	 a	 clear	 line	 between	 management	 and	 operation”,	 and	 “the	government	serving	as	both	referee	and	athlete”.	 		In	 March	 2002,	 the	 State-owned	 Assets	 Supervision	 and	 Management	Commission	 (SASAC)	 was	 officially	 established	 as	 a	 special	 agency	 under	 the	State	 Council,	 and	 performs	 the	 duty	 of	 investor	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 State.	 In	 the	same	year,	the	State	Council	adopted	the	Interim	Regulations	on	the	Supervision	
and	Management	of	State-owned	Assets148	 to	provide	a	policy	and	legal	basis	for	SASAC	to	supervise	and	manage	SOEs.	The	State-owned	assets	supervision	and	management	mechanism	was	 finally	established	with	 the	successively	 issuance	of	several	documents,	including	the	Notice	on	Issuance	of	the	Name	of	List	of	the	
Enterprises	 under	 the	 State-owned	 Assets	 Supervision	 and	 Administration	
Commission	of	 the	State	Council	which	Perform	the	Functions	of	 Investors149,	 the	
Interim	 Measures	 for	 Assessment	 of	 the	 Operational	 Performance	 of	 Persons	 in	
Charge	of	Central	SOEs150,	the	Notice	concerning	the	Opinions	of	the	State-owned	
Assets	 Supervision	 and	 Administration	 Commission	 about	 Regulating	 the	 Work	
Relating	to	the	Restructuring	of	SOEs151,	the	Interim	Measures	of	the	Management	
of	 the	 Transfer	 of	 the	 State-owned	 Property	 Right	 of	 Enterprises152	 and	 other	policies	and	regulations.	 		The	 original	 purpose	 of	 setting	 up	 of	 SASAC	 was	 to	 equip	 the	 huge	 amount	State-owned	assets	with	an	 investor,	which	could	perform	the	duty	of	 investor	
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and	 enjoy	 the	 rights	 and	 interests	 of	 owner	 on	 behalf	 on	 the	 State	 under	 the	authorization	of	 the	central	government	and	 local	governments.	From	the	 legal	perspective,	as	the	investor,	the	SASAC	should	be	a	civil	entity	and	have	the	same	legal	status	as	SOEs	and	other	civil	subjects.	However,	the	facts	showed	that	the	SASAC	 is	 a	 typical	 administrative	 subject	 and	 its	 scope	 far	 beyond	 that	 of	 civil	entity.	 Although	 SOEs	 could	 avoid	 most	 administrative	 interventions	 from	government	departments,	obtain	more	administrative	protections,	and	get	out	of	trouble	by	using	monopolistic	privilege,	the	problems	of	long-term	absence	of	a	clear	 line	 between	 then	 functions	 of	 the	 government	 and	 enterprise,	 and	 low	production	 efficiency	 still	 could	 not	 be	 solved.	 In	 2008,	 the	 Law	 of	 the	
State-owned	Assets	of	the	PRC153	 was	approved	the	National	Congress,	it	not	only	standardized	 the	 state-owned	 assets	 supervision	 and	management	mechanism	to	some	degree,	but	also	solidified	the	existing	irrational	mechanisms	which	have	become	obstacles	to	further	reform	in	the	future.	 		 	
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CHAPTER	THREE:	THE	THEORIES	AND	ARGUMENTS	ABOUT	CHINA’S	
STATE-OWNED	ENTERPRISES	REFORM		The	reform	of	China’s	SOEs	is	not	only	one	of	the	most	important	but	also	most	difficult	one	within	China’s	whole	economic	system	reform,	and	attracted	many	attentions	from	both	public	and	academic	areas	from	the	very	beginning.	There	have	been	various	theories	and	arguments	about	the	reform,	from	the	structure	design	and	strategy	of	reform	to	some	specific	corporate	governance	 issues,	all	caused	heated	debates,	such	as	the	property	structure	of	SOEs	reform,	whether	the	 reform	 should	 be	 undertaken	 progressively	 or	 radically,	 and	 how	 to	 deal	with	the	monopoly	issues	of	SOEs154.	Briefly,	 the	theories	and	arguments	about	SOEs	reform	gone	through	three	stages.		This	chapter	will	 review	and	analysis	several	 leading	and	popular	 theories	and	arguments	in	each	stage	comprehensively,	to	demonstrate	mainstream	points	of	view	on	each	side,	and	to	find	out	how	they	affect	China’s	SOEs	reform	and	what	shortcomings	they	have.	 		
1. The	First	Stage	
	The	first	stage,	which	from	late	1970s	to	early	1980s,	mainly	focus	on	analyzing	the	drawbacks	of	the	traditional	enterprise	system,	the	cause	of	the	inefficiency	of	SOEs	and	the	 lack	of	 incentive	mechanism	in	order	 to	 find	out	 the	preferred	system	for	the	SOEs.	During	this	period,	most	scholars155	 agreed	that	the	reform	of	China’s	SOEs	was	inevitable,	and	the	task	of	the	reform	was	to	transform	SOEs	from	 subordinate	 entities	 under	 total	 government	 control	 into	 autonomous	economic	entities.	 		For	instance,	Muqiao	Xue	indicated	that	the	SOEs	reform	was	the	highest	priority	among	 all	 other	 reforms	 that	 require	 urgent	 solutions.	 According	 to	 Xue,	 the	
																																								 																				 	
154	 See	Yifu	Lin.	2001.	State-owned	enterprises	reform	in	China.	Hong	Kong:	China	University	Press.	 	
155	 Yifu	Lin.	2001.	State-owned	enterprises	reform	in	China.	Hong	Kong:	China	University	Press.	P.	7.	
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objective	 of	 the	 reform	was	 to	 turn	 SOEs	 into	 grass-roots	 level	 operation	 and	management	 units	with	 genuine	 economic	dynamism156.	 Yiwei	 Jiang	 suggested	that	 the	 core	 of	 the	 economic	 system	 reform	 required	 a	 change	 in	 the	state-centered	 system,	 and	 that	 should	 be	 a	 goal	 of	 the	 economic	 reform.	 This	was	 characterized	 by	 the	 role	 of	 the	 state	 as	 the	 basic	 unit	 of	 economic	organization	responsible	for	unified	management	and	accounting.	However,	the	reforms	did	not	seek	to	turn	the	system	into	a	local	government-centered	system,	where	 local	 governments	 acted	 as	 the	 basic	 unit	 of	 economic	 organization	responsible	 for	 unified	 management	 and	 accounting.	 Instead,	 the	 goal	 was	 to	make	 the	 enterprise	 become	 the	 basic	 economic	 entity,	 which	 can	 carry	 out	independent	 business	 and	 accounting	 under	 the	 unified	 leadership	 and	supervision	 of	 the	 state	 and	 establish	 the	 enterprise-centered	 management	system157.	In	addition,	Furen	Dong	added	that	the	reform	should	aim	at	changing	the	 status	 of	 SOEs	 from	 being	 subordinate	 grass-root	 organizations	 of	 state	administration	into	relatively	independent	commodity	producers158.	 		
2. The	Second	Stage		The	second	stage,	which	is	in	the	late	half	of	1980s,	focused	on	putting	forward	appropriate	 methodologies	 for	 transforming	 SOEs	 from	 government	subordinates	 with	 no	 managerial	 discretion	 into	 independent	 commodity	producers	 that	 could	 enjoy	 a	 higher	 degree	 of	 autonomy.	 The	 task	 included	finding	 specific	 measures	 to	 improve	 the	 newly	 introduced	 experimental	institutions,	 and	 one	 of	 the	 most	 important	 one	 is	 the	 enterprise	 contracting	system.	The	theories	and	arguments	in	this	stage	concentrated	on	how	to	reform	the	SOEs’	micro-level	operating	mechanism,	that	is,	 focused	on	the	measures	to	be	 adopted	 in	 order	 to	 encourage	 SOEs	 to	 become	 independent	 commodity	producers,	which	 could	 enjoy	 enterprise	 autonomy,	 assumed	 responsibility	 for	profits	and	losses,	and	exercised	self-restraint.	 	
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	These	theories	and	arguments	could	be	divided	into	two	parts,	and	each	of	them	was	 represented	 respectively	 by	 Jinglian	 Wu,	 who	 raised	 the	 marketization	theory,	and	Yijing	Li,	who	raised	the	theory	of	stock.	This	was	called	the	“Debates	between	Wu	and	Li”.	 		According	 to	 Jinglian	Wu,	 the	 reason	why	 SOEs	practiced	 low	efficiency	 lies	 in	the	 insufficient	 growth	 of	 the	market	 and	 lacks	 of	 the	 necessary	market	 price	mechanism.	 In	order	 to	 reverse	 this	negative	 situation,	price	 reform	should	be	carried	out	firstly.	Shulian	Zhou,	Jinglian	Wu	and	Haibo	Huang	thought	the	way	to	 improve	 the	 system	 of	 the	 whole	 people’s	 ownership	 was	 to	 carry	 on	 the	systematical	 reform.	 Systematical	 reform	 should	 both	 maintain	 the	 state	ownership	 and	 make	 the	 enterprise	 become	 the	 relatively	 independent	management	 body.	 The	 current	 reform	 must	 be	 carried	 on	 according	 to	 the	adjustment	and	improve	the	adjustment.	In	the	current	situation,	the	ownership	could	 not	 be	 reformed	 radically,	 so	we	must	 pay	 attention	 to	 fully	 display	 the	potential	of	the	state-owned	economy159.	Wu	also	indicated	that	only	the	market,	price	 fluctuation	and	benefit	 changed	by	 it	 could	 guide	 the	 enterprise	 to	make	decisions	that	ensure	the	social	resources	effective	use160.	 		Yining	Li	and	some	other	scholars	raised	the	theory	that	the	reason	why	showed	a	low	efficiency	was	that	SOEs	hadn’t	been	taken	as	an	independent	individual	in	the	market.	Only	 if	 the	enterprises	purse	 the	profit	maximization	and	the	SOEs	become	 an	 independent	 enterprise	 genuinely,	 the	 SOEs	 could	 achieve	 overall	efficiency	 enhancement.	 These	 scholars	 emulated	 and	 adopted	 the	 developed	market	 mechanism	 of	 the	 Western	 countries,	 and	 believed	 that	 SOEs	 should	adopt	a	shareholding	system	so	that	the	ownership	of	the	production	materrials	could	 be	 diversified.	 This	 would	 require	 a	 fundamental	 separation	 of	 the	government	 from	business	operations,	and	promote	 the	rational	allocation	and	
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organization	of	production	factors161.	For	instance,	Li	thought	that	the	reform	of	SOEs	 was	 the	 key	 to	 establish	 the	 market	 economy	 in	 China.	 China	 must	 put	reform	 on	 the	 traditional	 system	 of	 the	 whole	 people’s	 ownership	 and	 the	traditional	 collective	 ownership;	 adjust	 the	 ownership	 that	 did	 not	 suit	 the	socialism	 commodity	 economy	 development.	 In	 a	 part	 of	 the	 whole	 people	owned	 enterprises	 (generally	 large	 and	 medium-sized	 enterprises	 in	 their	industries),	 a	 stock	 system	 of	 ownership	 substitute	 for	 the	 traditional	 whole	people	ownership	should	be	introduced	and	adopted,	and	then	formed	the	joint	pattern	ownership	composed	by	the	state,	the	enterprises	and	the	workers.	This	procedure	would	not	change	the	nature	of	the	ownership	in	the	socialist	system,	but	 it	 aimed	 at	 the	 establishment	 of	 new	 enterprises	with	 the	 stock	 system	of	ownership162.	 This	 reform	 strategy	 suggested	 that	 the	 shareholding	 system	 be	characterized	 by	 a	 set	 of	 economic	 mechanism	 built	 upon	 the	 separation	 of	ownership	and	control.	The	mechanism,	centering	on	capital	markets,	have	taken	shape	 through	 200	 years	 of	 development	 in	 advanced	 market	 economies.	Nevertheless,	 the	 mechanism	 underpinning	 the	 shareholding	 system	 could	 be	make	compatible	with	socialist	public	ownership.	 		The	debates	between	Wu	and	Li	are	actually	the	confrontation	of	Chinese	reform	mentality.	Wu	 and	 Li	 argued	 on	 the	 sequence	 of	 the	 two	 aspects	 of	 the	 same	question,	 essentially	 the	 argument	 is	 the	 exploration	 of	 the	 way	 of	 Chinese	economic	 reform.	 China’s	 SOE	 reform	 has	 enforced	 gradually	 in	 this	 kind	 of	argument.	 In	 practice,	 the	 reform	 in	 the	 premise	 of	 following	 the	 market	economy	has	enforced	the	stock	system	transformation	in	a	suitable	opportunity,	thus	has	accelerated	the	establishment	of	China’s	market	economy	system.	Yifu	Lin	 and	Minggao	Shen	 raised	 a	 viewpoint	 that	may	give	 the	 above	 argument	 a	good	summary,	they	believed	that	from	the	aspect	of	institution	design,	the	joint	stock	system	as	if	had	possessed	the	function	that	stimulated	the	state-operated	large	 and	 medium-sized	 enterprises,	 and	 it	 was	 a	 pattern	 of	 independent	enterprise	organization	of	commodity	producer's163.	But	if	we	took	a	look	at	joint	
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stock	 system's	 external	 condition,	 the	 external	 environment	 and	 the	 system	foundation	of	 the	 reform	was	actually	 far	 from	 the	Western	 joint	 stock	 system	innovation	 and	 macroscopic	 system	 environment.	 Chinese	 market	 mechanism	was	imperfect,	so	the	effect	of	the	joint	stock	system	reform	would	be	difficulty	to	 totally	display.	However,	 if	we	waited	 for	all	conditions	 to	be	satisfied,	SOEs	reform	would	be	lagged	seriously.	That	contradictory	displayed	the	focal	point	of	Debates	 between	Wu	 and	 Li,	 simultaneously,	 also	 reflected	 what	 impede	 that	kind	of	spanning	type	reform	of	China	essentially.	 		Except	 for	Wu	and	Li’s	theories,	 there	was	another	theory	existed	in	this	stage,	which	 suggested	 that	 the	 operating	 mechanism	 of	 the	 SOEs	 should	 be	transformed	 through	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 enterprise	 contracting	 system164.	This	 was	 a	 type	 of	 operation	 and	 management	 system	 that	 defined	 the	relationship	between	the	state	and	enterprises	in	terms	of	responsibility,	rights,	and	 benefits	 through	 contracts	 based	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 separation	 between	ownership	and	control,	with	the	emphasis	of	not	requiring	changes	in	the	nature	of	 ownership.	 The	 general	 practice	 was	 to	 require	 an	 enterprise	 to	 be	responsible	for	delivering	a	certain	amount	of	profits	to	the	state.	The	enterprise	could	then	retain	profits	in	excess	of	the	quota	and	would	be	permitted	to	link	its	payroll	and	welfare	to	tis	performance	levels.	The	enterprise	contracting	system	had	 many	 staunch	 proponents.	 For	 instance,	 some	 advocators	 argued	 “the	adoption	of	 the	 contracting	 system	would	put	 in	place	 the	operating	 system	of	Chinese	socialist	enterprises,	 leading	 to	an	atomic	 fission	within	 the	enterprise	to	 give	 off	 its	 energy.”	 Thus,	 this	 would	 facilitate	 the	 reform	 of	 the	 overall	investment	 system,	 and	 help	 to	 bring	 about	 changes	 in	 the	 function	 of	 the	government165.		Among	 these	 theories,	 the	 enterprise	 contracting	 system	 was	 adopted	 and	applied	 in	 practice	 at	 last	 in	 this	 stage.	 By	 the	 end	 of	 1988,	 93%	 of	 large	 and	medium-sized	 enterprises	 had	 adopted	 the	 enterprise	 contracting	 system166.	
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However,	although	the	contracting	system	was	put	 into	practice,	 the	enterprise	failed	to	gain	complete	adherence	to	the	theoretical	and	policy	debates.	This	was	because	 the	 enterprise	 contracting	 system	 gave	 rise	 to	 a	 further	 series	 of	problems.	 The	 most	 prominent	 one	 was	 the	 so-called	 “short-termism”	 in	enterprise	strategy.	This	means	that	there	was	asymmetry	in	the	information	of	the	 state	 and	 that	 of	 the	 enterprises	 and	 their	 staff	 gained	 benefits	 from	 the	increase	 in	share	of	profits	due	to	 the	 increase	 in	enterprise	earning,	while	 the	state	 assets	 could	 not	 be	 increased	 along	with	 the	 improvement	 in	 enterprise	performance.	After	a	period	of	active	discussions,	additional	policy	proposals167	were	put	forward	to	solve	the	problems	arising	from	the	enterprise	contracting	system,	which	continued	to	aim	at	improving	this	system.	 	 		
3. The	Third	Stage		The	 third	 stage	 of	 discussions	 over	 China’s	 SOE	 reform	 –	 in	 the	 mid-1990s	 –	mainly	 focused	 on	 the	 goal	 of	 transforming	 the	 operating	mechanism	 of	 SOEs	and	 establishing	 a	 modern	 enterprise	 system.	 This	 followed	 the	 directive	confirmed	 at	 the	 Fourteenth	 Congress	 of	 the	 CPC,	 which	 declared	 that	 the	purpose	 of	 Chinese	 economic	 reform	 was	 to	 establish	 the	 socialist	 market	economy	 system.	 In	 particular,	 during	 the	 Third	 Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	Fourteenth	 Congress,	 the	 Decision	 of	 the	 Central	 Committee	 of	 the	 CPC	 on	Several	 Issues	 Concerning	 the	 Establishment	 of	 the	 Socialist	Market	 Economic	System	 was	 ratified.	 The	 Decision	 defined	 the	 basic	 features	 of	 the	 modern	enterprise	system	with	a	relatively	clear	delineation	of	property	rights	relations,	enterprise	responsibilities,	capital	contributors’	rights	and	interests,	government	functions	and	enterprise	management	system168.	With	the	deepening	of	reform,	the	 discussion	 became	 to	 fierce	 debates,	 two	 of	 which	 are	 most	 famous	 and	
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caused	a	 lot	of	attentions	from	both	public	and	academic	areas,	namely	are	the	Debates	between	Lin	and	Zhang,	and	the	Debates	between	Lang	and	Gu.	 		
3.1 The	Debates	between	Lin	and	Zhang		At	 the	beginning	of	China’s	SOE	reform,	especially	when	 the	 joint	stock	system	reform	took	place,	there	was	a	debate	between	Yifu	Lin	and	Weiying	Zhang.	Lin	believed	that	because	of	the	lack	of	a	perfect	market	system,	transplanting	such	a	kind	of	“the	modern	enterprise	system”	was	not	the	most	crucial	thing,	the	really	important	 thing	 was	 to	 create	 a	 fair	 competition	 condition	 and	 environment,	thus	 the	 budget	 would	 be	 restrain	 it.	 Without	 a	 healthy	 competitive	 market	environment,	 there	would	 not	 be	 serials	 of	 targets	 that	 simply	 and	 intuitively	reflected	the	enterprise	management,	 there	 fore	 the	owner	would	be	unable	 to	supervise	 the	management	 of	 the	 enterprise,	 the	 problem	 between	 enterprise	and	operator's	that	different	aims,	asymmetry	information	as	well	as	the	unequal	responsibility	would	be	hard	to	handle	with169.	Weiying	Zhang	thought	that	the	incomplete	enterprise	system	was	the	main	reason	of	the	inefficiency	of	the	SOEs,	and	 that	 problem	 would	 be	 hardly	 solved	 under	 the	 system	 of	 the	government-owned	 property,	 the	 only	 way	 out	 was	 to	 transfer	 “state-owned”	enterprises	 to	 “non-state-owned”	 enterprises.	 It	 was	 impossible	 to	 raise	 and	select	 the	 qualified	 entrepreneur	 community	 under	 system	 of	 the	 SOEs	 .The	state-owned	 stockholder's	 rights	 must	 transform	 into	 creditor's	 rights	 or	 use	other	methods	to	realize	the	withdrawal	of	the	state-owned	stockholder's	rights,	making	the	state-owned	business	become	the	non-State-owned	business170.		3.1.1 The	idea	of	Yifu	Lin	about	China’s	SOE	reform	
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	Yifu	 Lin	 concluded	 that	 the	 core	 problem	 of	 China’s	 SOEs	 is	 the	 absence	 of	viability	which	caused	by	policy	burden.	He	criticized	that	the	first	stage	of	SOE	reform	 was	 decentralizing	 powers	 and	 giving	 up	 profits,	 and	 promoting	enterprises	motivation,	which	could	not	solve	the	problem	of	SOEs’	viability;	and	the	 second	 stage	 of	 reform	was	 property	 structure	 reform,	which	 did	 not	 deal	with	this	issue	appropriately	either,	thus	the	reform	in	this	stage	was	also	failed.	Based	on	Lin’s	theory,	the	term	viability	according	to	the	expected	profitability	of	an	industry	in	a	perfectly	competitive	open	market	economy.	And	an	industry	is	viable	if	firms	in	the	industry	have	a	socially	acceptable	expected	profit	without	external	assistance171.	Therefore,	if	an	industry	could	not	achieve	expected	profit	in	 practice,	 the	 reasons	 must	 be	 the	 problem	 of	 corporate	 governance,	motivation	 mechanism,	 property	 structure,	 and	 inappropriate	 government	intervention.	 		Lin	 thought	 that	 the	 SOEs’	 policy	 burdens	 include	 strategy	 burdens	 and	 social	burdens,	 such	 as	 retirement	 pensions	 and	 other	 welfare	 costs,	 the	 redundant	workers,	 and	 the	 persistence	 of	 price	 distortions.	 These	 burdens	would	 cause	policy-related	 losses	 for	 sure,	 and	 the	 government	 that	 is	 accountable	 for	 the	policy	 burdens	 should	 give	 these	 enterprises,	 profitable	 or	 not,	 ex	 ante	 policy	favors,	such	as	access	to	low-interests	loans,	tax	reductions,	tariff	protection,	and	legal	 monopolies,	 in	 order	 to	 compensate	 for	 the	 burdens.	 In	 addition,	 these	enterprises	would	request	 that	 the	government	offer	some	ex	post	assistance	 if	they	still	have	some	losses172.	However,	it	is	very	difficult	for	the	government	to	determine	 the	 net	 impact	 of	 policy	 burdens	 on	 the	 enterprise’s	 costs,	 because	each	 enterprise	 has	 different	 burdens	 and	 receives	 different	 favors.	 Therefore,	the	enterprise	will	often	ascribe	all	 its	 loss	to	the	government’s	policy	burdens,	and	the	government	will	be	in	a	difficult	position	to	shun	the	responsibility.	The	soft	budget	constraint	thus	continues	to	exits.	Under	this	situation,	any	property	structure	 reform	 and	 corporate	 governance	 reform	 would	 fail,	 even	 lead	 to	
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worse	condition	 than	 in	planned	economy.	Lin	 indicated	 that,	 the	core	 issue	of	China’s	 SOE	 is	 policy	 burdens,	 and	 for	 enterprise	 in	 viable	 industries,	 the	prerequisite	 condition	 for	 a	 successful	 enterprise	 reform	 is	 the	 elimination	 of	policy	burdens173.	 	 		From	 the	 perspective	 of	 information	 asymmetry	 and	 incomplete	 market,	 Lin	argued	 that	 a	 fair	 competition	market	 in	 China	 has	 not	 been	 established,	 and	owing	to	the	existence	of	policy	burdens,	China’s	SOEs’	profits	cannot	be	used	as	a	 sufficient	 indicator	 for	 managers’	 performance.	 The	 problems	 of	 incentive	incompatibility	and	information	asymmetry	between	SOE	owners	and	managers	remain.	As	the	decentralization	and	profit-sharing	reform	goes	on,	the	conflict	of	interests	 between	 owners	 and	managers	 intensifies,	 and	 it	 becomes	 less	 likely	that	 managers	 are	 about	 to	 refrain	 from	 such	 behaviors.	 Besides,	 due	 to	 the	government	lacks	adequate	information,	it	cannot	tell	policy-induced	losses	from	operational	losses,	and	SOEs	tend	to	attribute	all	losses	as	policy	–induced,	so	the	government	must	bear	the	brunt	of	all	their	losses174.	To	avoid	this	situation,	the	only	 method	 the	 government	 could	 take	 is	 to	 intervene	 into	 enterprises’	operations,	 even	 into	 some	 specific	 and	 detailed	 activities.	 In	 fact,	 the	 more	concerns	 about	 maintaining	 and	 increasing	 enterprises’	 assets,	 the	 more	intervention	 the	government	would	 take.	Unless	 a	 fair	 competition	market	has	been	 established,	 in	which	 the	 owners	 of	 enterprises	 could	 compare	 its	 profit	level	 with	 average	 profit	 level	 to	 get	 full	 information	 of	 enterprise	 instead	 of	operation	 details,	 the	 direct	 intervention	 in	 unavoidable.	 Under	 this	circumstance,	 neither	 property	 structure	 reform	 nor	 the	 change	 of	 financing	structure	would	success.	Even	 these	enterprises	are	privatized,	private	owners	would	still	intervene	into	enterprise	operation	inevitably	if	they	could	not	get	full	operation	information	through	a	fair	competition	market.	In	contrary,	once	a	fair	competition	 market	 has	 been	 established,	 the	 intervention	 would	 become	unnecessary	 if	 the	 owners	 could	 get	 enough	 information	 about	 enterprise	operation	 through	 market.	 In	 this	 circumstance,	 neither	 public	 nor	 private	
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owners	would	intervene	into	enterprise	operation	any	more.	 		Based	on	above	theories,	the	idea	of	Yifu	Lin	about	China’s	SOE	reform	could	be	concluded	as:	first,	to	solve	the	problem	of	viability,	SOEs	should	be	divided	into	three	 types	 to	 deal	 with:	 the	 first	 type	 is	 capital	 and	 technology-intensive	enterprise,	which	does	not	have	comparative	advantages	but	is	necessary	to	the	state,	 this	 type	 should	 be	 managed	 directly	 by	 the	 State;	 the	 second	 type	 is	capital	and	technology-intensive	enterprise	which	has	huge	domestic	market,	 it	should	adopt	the	strategy	of	“market	for	capital”	to	solve	the	problem	of	lack	of	comparative	 advantages	 and	 viability;	 the	 third	 type	 enterprise	 also	 has	intensive	capital	and	 technology	but	does	not	have	enough	domestic	market,	 it	should	be	privatized	or	transferred	to	another	industry.	 		Second,	to	eliminate	policy	burdens.	Due	to	the	existence	of	policy	burdens,	SOEs	could	not	 compete	with	 other	 types	 of	 enterprise,	 therefore	 the	 average	profit	level	could	not	reflect	the	real	enterprise	operation,	the	problem	of	information	asymmetry	could	not	be	solved,	and	the	 interests	conflict	between	owners	and	managers	still	exits.	 		Third,	 to	complete	market	mechanism.	A	 fair	competition	market	could	perfect	external	 environment	 of	 enterprises,	 form	 a	 reliable	 average	 profit	 standard,	solve	the	problem	of	information	asymmetry;	the	owners	could	learn	enterprise	performance	through	the	average	profit	level,	to	establish	an	appropriate	reward	and	punishment	mechanism;	an	appropriate	internal	management	system	could	be	established	based	on	this	finally.	 		3.1.2 The	idea	of	Weiying	Zhang	about	China’s	SOE	reform		Weiying	 Zhang	 held	 a	 negative	 altitude	 to	 SOEs’	 function.	 In	 the	 article	 “The	Principal-agent	Relationship	in	Public	Economy	–	Theories	and	Policies”,	Zhang	argued	that	the	difference	between	SOEs	and	private	enterprises	as	being	on	the	tier	of	the	agency.	On	the	surface,	it	seems	that	owners	of	private	enterprise	may	simply	directly	entrust	managers	to	operate	their	assets.	In	the	case	of	the	SOEs,	
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the	 people	 as	 a	 whole	 as	 the	 owner	 of	 the	 properties	 have	 to	 entrust	 the	government,	which	in	turn	independently	entrusts	the	next	tier	of	agents.	Thus,	this	forms	a	multi-tier	agency	relationship.	This	lead	to	the	paradoxical	logic	that	the	 higher	 the	 level	 of	 the	 public	 ownership,	 the	 more	 the	 levels	 of	principal-agency	 relations	would	 form.	This	 results	 in	 longer	distance	between	the	 initial	principal	and	 the	 final	agent	and	more	 inefficiency	 in	 supervision175.	Drawing	 from	 this	 logic,	 the	 route	 to	 higher	 enterprise	 efficiency	 could	 be	achieved	 by	 eliminating	 the	 multi-tier	 agency	 structure	 (the	public-government-SOE	 managers)	 through	 privatization	 and	 establishing	 a	direct	 link	 between	 principal	 and	 agent	 (the	 shareholder-managers	 of	 private	enterprises)176.		To	 the	 approach	 of	 SOE	 reform,	 Zhang	 thought	 that	 the	 reform	 only	 focus	 on	establishing	a	modern	enterprise	system	rather	than	property	structure	reform	is	meaningless.	And	he	 indicated	that	the	most	 important	 issues	of	China’s	SOE	are	motivation	and	how	to	select	appropriate	enterprises	managers.	To	deal	with	these	 two	 issues,	 the	 residual	 claims	 and	 residual	 control	 rights	 must	 be	allocated	 properly:	 first,	 residual	 claims	 and	 residual	 control	 of	 enterprise	should	correspond,	which	means	the	one	who	has	the	residual	claims	right	and	take	a	risk	should	also	has	the	residual	control	rights;	second,	the	residual	claims	right	 should	 be	 given	 to	 the	most	 important	members	 of	 an	 enterprise;	 third,	certain	proportion	of	residual	claims	and	residual	control	rights	should	be	given	to	 those	who	 are	 difficult	 to	 supervise	 and	 have	 information	 advantages.	 As	 a	conclusion,	 those	 who	 makes	 decision	 and	 is	 responsible	 for	 enterprise	operation	should	have	certain	residual	reclaims	and	residual	control	rights	of	an	enterprise.	 		To	selection	of	managers,	since	a	modern	enterprise	is	a	production	organization	made	 up	 by	 a	 team,	 there	 are	 information	 problems	 between	 team	members.	
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These	problems	may	result	in	laziness	or	the	operator’s	position	may	be	held	by	an	 incompetent	person.	Solving	this	problem	requires	managers	be	selected	by	asset	owners	who	assume	risks	in	a	real	sense.	As	SOEs	do	not	have	real	ultimate	owners,	 the	 state	may	 occupy	 state-owned	 assets	 by	 transferring	 state-owned	property	 rights	 into	 state	 debts	 in	 order	 to	 realize	 the	 aim	 of	 ensuring	 stable	yields	despite	drought	or	excessive	rain177.	 		Generally,	Weiying	 Zhang	 questioned	 the	 state	 shareholding	 advocates	 on	 the	basis	 that	 the	 proposals	 are	 problematic	 in	 three	 crucial	 respects	 –	 the	mechanism	 for	managerial	 appointments,	 the	 value-adding	 of	 state	 assets,	 and	the	 separation	 of	 government	 and	 enterprise	 operations178.	 Instead,	 Zhang	suggested	 that	 changing	 state	 assets	 into	 creditor	 rights	 in	 order	 to	 clarify	property	rights	more	realistically	and	thus	separate	government	and	enterprise	operations.	 To	 clarify	 property	 rights	 in	 corporate	 governance	 and	 establish	effective	incentive	and	control	mechanism179.	Zhang	also	argued	that	the	genuine	privatization	is	the	only	way	forward	for	China’s	SOEs,	supporting	this	argument	by	 describing	 a	 number	 of	 cases	 of	 companies	 that	 have	 gone	 through	 such	ownership	restricting	in	the	late	1990s180.	 		
3.2 The	Debates	between	Lang	and	Gu		3.2.1	Arguments	of	Xianping	Lang		This	debates	actually	between	Xianping	Lang	and	some	mainstream	scholars.	In	August	2004,	Lang	made	number	of	consequent	public	statements	that	 focused	on	 Management	 Buy	 Out	 (MBO)	 activities	 during	 China’s	 SOEs	 reform.	 He	criticized	it’s	a	“evaporation”	of	the	state-owned	assets	went	through	a	number	of	 unlawful	 deals	 and	 twists	 and	 ended	 up	 in	 private	 hand	 in	 the	 process	 of	
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reform.	Lang	did	not	simply	mention	the	fact	of	the	state	capital	running	off	but	made	unprecedented	and	concrete	accusations.	For	instance,	he	took	Haier181	 as	an	 analyst	 case,	 told	 the	 story	 how	 this	 originally	 mainland	 state-owned	enterprise	became	 to	 a	 shell	 of	Hong	Kong	Based	private	 joint	 stock	 company.	According	 to	 him,	 Haier’s	 council	 of	 shareholders182	 got	 98,6%	 of	 the	 newly	established	“Haier	Investment”	company	(with	only	1,4%	of	shares	in	the	hands	of	Haier	itself)	and	in	2000	established	joint	venture	with	two	Hong	Kong	based	companies	starting	to	produce	mobile	phones.	In	2001	one	of	the	two	Hong	Kong	company’s	affiliated	corporation	bought	both	of	the	companies.	As	a	result	of	this	grey	 deal	 “Haier	 Investment”	 got	 almost	 30%	 of	 joint	 venture’s	 stock	 thus	becoming	the	second	biggest	shareholder	and	renaming	the	venture	into	“Hailer	Zhongjian”.	 In	 April	 2004	 Haier	 company	 decided	 to	 merger	 its	 best	 washing	machine	producing	facilities	as	well	as	the	rest	of	35,5%	shares	of	former	Hong	Kong	mobile	phone	producer	with	“Haier	Zhongjian”	thus	controlling	almost	60%	of	its	stock.	By	means	of	this	four	steps	operation	main	part	of	Haier‘s	capital	left	for	Hong	Kong	 and	 became	de-facto	 private.	 The	 central	 actor	 of	 the	 play	was	Haier’s	 council	 of	 shareholders	 whose	 investment	 activity	 was	 purely	 illegal	from	the	beginning183.		Another	object	of	Xiping	Lang’s	offensive	is	the	owner	of	Gerlinkeer	Chujun	Gu,	who	bought	one	of	the	biggest	Chinese	state-owned	producers	of	refrigerators	in	2001.	Lang	stated	that	Gu	controlled	the	main	facilities	of	“Gelinkeer”	company	through	 “Greencool	Capital	Limited”	which	was	 registered	 in	Great	Britain.	His	dubious	 fund	rising	practices	were	based	on	machinations	with	big	amounts	of	ready	cash	left	in	his	hands	during	the	time	gap	between	the	customer’s	payment	to	the	producing	company	and	the	latter’s	payment	to	shippers	and	advertisers.	Lang’s	 description	 of	 Gu’s	 methods	 of	 taking	 control	 of	 state	 enterprises	 is	written	in	the	language	of	Chinese	idioms	and	full	of	moral	indignation184.	 	
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	And	then	Xianping	Lang	began	questioning	the	concept	of	property	reform	itself.	In	 Lang’s	 view	 the	main	problem	with	Chinese	 SOEs	was	not	 the	 vagueness	of	property	 rights	 (as	 was	 supposed	 by	 the	 reforms’	 theoreticians)	 but	 the	overwhelming	 lack	 of	 trust	 and	 responsibility	 of	 the	 state	 companies’	managers185.	 The	 property	 rights’	 reform	 in	 China	 actually	 limits	 itself	 to	 the	right	 of	 managers	 of	 state	 companies	 to	 become	 de-facto	 owners	 of	 state	property	instead	of	managing	and	augmenting	it	for	the	sake	of	the	nation.		In	conclusion,	the	position	of	Xianping	Lang	about	the	reform	of	China’s	SOE	in	this	stage	are:	transition	of	state	assets	to	private	hands	(from	the	state	organs	to	the	managers)	“under	the	blanket”	of	the	property	reform	is	illegal;	the	price	of	the	asset	to	be	sold	is	the	subject	of	covert	bargain	between	the	state	organs	and	the	 management	 of	 given	 SOE	 and	 disproportionately	 low;	 it	 is	 not	 the	privatization	which	is	needed	but	the	establishment	of	efficient	system	of	trustful	corporate	governance	in	already	existing	state	sector186.	 		To	 Xianping	 Lang’s	 arguments,	 there	 are	 three	 groups	 of	 view	 diametrically	opposed.	 The	 first	 group	 agreed	 with	 Lang’s	 view	 and	 believed	 that	 the	 SOE	reform	should	 insist	 the	dominated	position	of	 state-owned	economy	 in	whole	national	 economic	 system,	 and	 the	 reform	should	be	undertaken	progressively	and	 cautiously	 to	 avoid	 losses	 of	 state-owned	 assets.	 The	 leading	 scholars	 are	Yifu	Lin,	Guoguang	Liu	and	Dapei	Zuo187.	The	second	group	included	those	who	were	not	against	reform	property	structure	but	thought	it	must	be	carried	out	in	fully	open,	socially	acceptable	and	generally	limited	way.	The	third	group	clearly	against	Lang	and	supported	that	SOE	should	reform	its	property	structure,	and	
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most	 SOE	 in	 China	 should	 be	 privatized.	 The	 leading	 scholars	 on	 this	 side	 are	Weiying	 Zhang,	 Jinglian	 Wu	 and	 Yining	 Li188.	 Actually,	 the	 core	 issue	 of	 this	debate	is	about	the	property	structure	of	China’s	SOE.	 		3.2.2 Standpoints	that	SOE	should	not	reform	its	property	structure		In	 the	 article	 “The	 Reform	 Does	 not	 Adhere	 to	 Socialist	 Path	 is	 also	 a	 Dead	End”189,	Guoguang	Liu	pointed	out	that,	currently	the	idea	of	“no	reform	is	a	dead	end”	 should	 not	 be	 simply	 emphasized,	 on	 the	 contrary,	 the	 reform	 should	adhere	 to	 socialist	 path,	 otherwise	 it	 is	 also	 a	 dead	 end.	 China	 should	 develop	both	 public	 and	 private	 sectors	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 public	 ownership	 playing	dominant	 role.	 Meanwhile,	 the	 degree	 and	 speed	 of	 public	 sector	 retreats	 as	private	sector	advances	in	Chinese	economy	should	be	controlled	and	postponed,	to	 prevent	 dominant	 ownership	 structure	 to	 be	 transformed	 from	 public	 to	private,	 and	 resolutely	 stop	 the	 trend	 that	 privatizing	 state-owned	 assets	 on	behalf	 of	 anti-monopoly.	 Liu	 also	 argued	 that,	 the	 difference	 in	 possession	 of	property	 is	 the	 biggest	 factor	 that	 decide	 the	 income	 gap,	 thus	 the	 widening	income	 gap	 in	 current	 China	 is	 deeply	 affected	 by	 the	 change	 of	 ownership	structure	and	the	situation	that	public	sector	retreats	as	private	sector	advances,	rather	 than	 other	 factors	 such	 as	 personal	 capacity,	 education,	 training,	opportunity	 and	 healthy.	 Therefore,	 to	 restructure	 income	 distribution	 system	and	 narrow	 income	 gap,	 the	 fundamental	 method	 is	 to	 adhere	 to	 the	 basic	principle	that	unswervingly	consolidate	and	develop	the	public	economy,	persist	in	the	dominant	position	of	public	ownership,	give	full	play	to	the	leading	role	of	the	 state-owned	 sector,	 and	 continuously	 increase	 its	 vitality,	 controlling	 force	and	 influence.	 In	 a	word,	 the	 income	 gap	 could	 be	 narrowed	 as	 long	 as	 public	ownership	playing	a	dominant	role	in	China’s	economy190.	 	 	 		From	the	perspective	of	adhering	to	public	sector	should	paly	dominant	role	in	China’s	national	economy,	Dapei	Zuo	held	the	same	point	of	view	with	Guoguang	
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Liu.	 In	 numerous	 articles	 and	 books,	 Dapei	 Zuo	 thought	 that	 the	 reform	 of	China’s	SOE	could	be	divided	 into	 two	stages:	 the	reform	 in	 the	 first	 stage	was	basically	about	improving	enterprise	efficiency	and	management	in	the	basis	of	public	sector	play	the	dominant	role;	and	the	reform	in	the	second	stage	which	begin	with	1996	actually	became	to	a	“privatization	campaign”	to	some	degree.	Zuo’s	opinions	are,	in	China	the	property	rights	of	the	state	must	be	in	the	hands	of	the	people.	The	problem	here	is	that	during	three	decades	of	reforms	in	China	the	institutional	basis	for	that	was	not	established.	Management	contract	system	in	 late	 80s,	 according	 to	 him,	 undermined	 managers’	 discipline	 and	 greatly	weakened	financial	and	statistical	control	of	the	state	over	its	property,	namely	SOE.	At	the	same	time	the	state	seriously	interferes	into	SOE	economic	activities,	still	 proceeds	 from	 “political	 achievements”	 criteria	 and	 nominates	 and	dismisses	managers	along	nepotistic	lines.	All	this	breeds	managers’	voluntarism,	dysfunctional	administration	and	overwhelming	corruption.	Such	state	of	affairs	often	 causes	 the	 problem	 of	 “unclear	 owner”	 or,	 as	 Dapei	 Zuo	 puts	 it,	 the	“ice-cream	 dilemma”.	 Just	 as	 in	 hot	 summer	 ice-cream	melts	 very	 quickly	 and	you	have	to	sell	it	as	soon	as	possible	to	prevent	its	total	meltdown,	the	Chinese	state	facing	the	lowering	efficiency	of	SOE	wants	to	get	rid	of	them	the	sooner	the	better.	And	they	sell	them	to	managers	at	disproportionately	low	price	–	the	so	called	“net	value”.	This	price	does	not	include	SOE	debt	which,	according	to	Zuo,	is	 twofold.	The	first	 is	 the	SOE	indebtedness	to	the	bank	(credit	 interest	rates),	the	 second	 is	 its	 indebtedness	 to	 the	 working	 personnel	 (wage	 arrears,	postponed	social	payments	of	different	sort	etc.).	The	size	of	the	debt	at	most	of	the	SOE	exceeds	50%	and	in	some	cases	comes	close	to	90%	of	their	asset	value.	Such	 deals,	 so	 believes	 Dapei	 Zuo,	 create	 undeserved	 wealth	 of	 the	managers	who	 capitalize	 on	 the	 state	 and	 simultaneously	 impoverish	 working	 class.	Chinese	MBO,	 being	 tremendously	 unjust,	 is	 unable	 to	 upgrade	 SOE	 efficiency	either.	 “Ice-cream	 dilemma”	 is	 not	 escaped.	 It	 may	 be	 even	 enhanced	 when	managers	would	try	to	transfer	“illiquid”	property	to	some	others’	hands,	might	be	to	foreign	capital.	In	addition,	Dapei	Zuo	also	opposed	Weiying	Zhang’s	words	about	the	need	to	“treat	managers	benevolently”	saying	that	who	really	deserve	benevolence	 from	the	state	are	the	working	people	of	 the	SOE	which	are	being	sold.	He	called	on	to	stop	all	forms	of	property	structure	reform	immediately	and	
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stressed	 that	 the	 urgent	 need	 of	 China	 is	 to	 establish	 a	 clear	 and	 effective	state-owned	property	management	system.	According	to	Zuo,	this	system	consist	three	 levels:	 the	 first	 and	 highest	 one	 are	 SPRC	 and	 other	 central	 government	department	on	behalf	of	whole	people	and	represents	the	joint	will	of	them;	the	second	 one	 includes	 organizations	 which	 are	 responsible	 for	 profitable	operation	of	SOE;	and	the	third	one	are	SOEs	themselves191.	 	 		Sheng	 Hua,	 sharing	 Dapei	 Zuo’s	 view	 that	 Chinese	 MBO	 actually	 are	 nothing	more	than	unjust	“big	free	meal”	for	SOE	managers,	he	wrote	that	in	this	country	the	concept	of	MBO	itself	suffers	from	intrinsic	contradiction.	If	the	government	deals	with	state	property	in	efficient	way	than	there	is	no	need	for	any	MBO.	If	the	government	efficiency	itself	is	low	than	MBO	is	even	less	suitable	because	in	this	case	micro-level	managers	are	prone	to	corrupt	practices	and	the	main	task	is	 not	 to	 give	 more	 power	 to	 them	 but	 to	 improve	 the	 overall	 systemic	arrangement	from	the	macro-level	down192.	 		Another	prominent	scholar,	Yifu	Lin,	also	showed	his	support	to	Lang.	Lin	gave	a	number	 of	 interviews	 in	 which	 he	 opposed	 privatization	 of	 SOE	 using	 mainly	economic	 reasoning.	His	general	 idea	was	 that	SOE	 in	China	are	overburdened	with	 political	 and	 social	 duties.	 They	 have	 high	 concentration	 of	 capital	 and	manpower	which	is	the	legacy	of	central	planning.	Laborer	in	China	is	associated	with	 the	 means	 of	 production.	 Under	 such	 circumstances,	 Lin	 believes,	 it	 is	almost	impossible	to	improve	efficiency	and	profitability,	be	the	enterprise	state	or	 private.	 The	 preliminary	 step	 to	 reform	 SOE	 should	 be	 elimination	 of	 this	political	and	social	burden193.		3.2.3 Points	of	view	that	not	against	 reform	property	structure	but	 thought	 it	must	be	carried	out	in	fully	open,	socially	acceptable	and	generally	limited	way	
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	The	representative	scholar	in	this	group	is	Fan	Yang.	Yang	called	on	to	stop	MBO	at	 least	 for	a	 time	being.	His	argument	was	 close	 to	 that	of	Zuo	but	he	did	not	exclude	managers’	 privatization	 for	 small	 local	 enterprises.	While	 dealing	with	big	local	enterprises	he	suggested	“equal	attention	to	justice	and	efficiency”	and	“respecting	 the	 workers’	 choice”	 meaning	 that	 personnel	 at	 such	 SOE	 is	 not	“against	market”	but	“opposes	corrupt	management”	and	thus	local	governments	should	 act	 together	 with	 the	 workers.	 As	 regards	 to	 196	 central	 SOE,	 Yang	proposed	to	establish	“strategic	production”	on	their	basis	but	added	that	169	of	them	belong	 to	 “competitive	 branches”	 thus	 a	 sort	 of	 thoughtful	 diminution	 of	state	presence	may	be	possible.	The	Chinese	state	which	has	controlling	parcel	of	shares	in	such	big	SOE	should	“follow	the	plan	on	the	market	basis”	and	develop	world	famous	national	brands,	probably	in	cooperation	with	foreign	firms	but	by	no	 means	 allowing	 transnational	 corporations	 to	 take	 the	 upper	 hand.	 These	ideas	were	also	in	principle	shared	by	Deqiang	Han	and	Xiaodong	Wang194.		3.2.4 The	 points	 of	 view	 that	 clearly	 against	 Lang	 and	 supported	 that	 SOE	should	 reform	 its	 property	 structure,	 and	most	 SOE	 in	 China	 should	 be	privatized		Weiying	Zhang	started	mentioning	that	at	the	early	stages	of	economic	reforms	in	China	nobody	spoke	about	the	necessity	to	restructure	the	state	property.	This	restructuring	was	not	the	result	of	anybody’s	beforehand	planning	or	conspiracy	but	 naturally	 came	 out	 from	 the	 practical	 experience.	 In	 certain	 sense	 state	property	reform	was	a	forced	one.	Zhang	admitted	that	there	is	a	problem	with	pricing	of	the	sold	state-owned	stocks.	The	root	of	this	problem	is	in	the	Chinese	stock	 market	 itself	 which	 “is	 not	 competitive	 enough”	 and	 thus	 prone	 to	“inadequate	 information”.	Zhang	said	 that	currently	 the	basis	 for	pricing	of	 the	sold	stocks	is	the	so	called	“net	value”195	 of	an	asset	and	insisted	that	it	 is	very	
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difficult	to	define	if	the	state	capital	runs	off	in	any	case,	irrespective	whether	the	stocks	are	sold	on	 the	prices	which	are	higher	or	 lower	 than	 this	basis.	 “Those	who	buy,	buy	not	the	past	but	the	future	of	the	concrete	state	asset”,	-	he	stressed.	While	 selling	 state	assets,	 continued	Zhang,	one	must	 “look	 in	 four	directions”:	“	 look	 forward”,	meaning	 the	need	 to	upgrade	 the	enterprise’s	efficiency,	 “look	back”,	 meaning	 to	 secure	 the	 interests	 of	 those	 who	 contributed	 to	 the	development	of	this	enterprise	in	the	past,	“look	left	and	right”	meaning	to	see	if	the	 general	 balance	 of	 interests,	 primarily	 those	 of	 working	 personnel	 is	guaranteed	and	“look	upwards”	which	means	considering	the	demands	and	rules	of	government	institutions	and	State	Law196.		Chaohua	 Han	 and	 Sujian	 Huang	 concentrated	 on	 the	 process	 of	 pricing	 of	 the	sold	 state	 property.	Han	 stressed	 that	 today	 the	price	 of	 state	 shares	 acquired	through	 MBO	 is	 defined	 by	 the	 bargain	 between	 government	 bodies	 and	 SOE	management.	In	case	the	price	seems	unjust	the	main	fault	is	on	the	side	of	the	government	that	agrees	to	sell	property	so	cheaply197.		Sujian	Huang	accused	Xianping	Lang	and	his	supporters	of	oversimplification	in	understanding	 the	 process	 of	 state	 assets’	 pricing.	 He	wrote	 that	while	 letting	state	shares	go	to	managers	local	governments	consider	not	only	(and	probably	not	 mainly)	 the	 state	 asset’s	 “net	 value”	 but	 the	 possibilities	 of	 its	 existence,	market	 for	 its	 goods,	 employment	 capacities,	 personnel	 income,	 debt	 volume	etc198.		Zhiguo	Han	believed	that	due	to	unclear	division	of	the	property	rights	between	central	and	local	governments	the	only	way	for	the	latter	to	consolidate	their	tax	revenue	and	political	prestige	is	to	allow	MBO	at	the	state	assets199.	 	
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	In	 addition,	 there	were	 some	other	 scholars	 gave	deeper	understanding	of	 the	property	 reform.	 For	 instance,	 Hengpeng	 Zhu,	 who	 pointed	 out	 that	 Chinese	public	 opinion	 and	 media	 highly	 overestimate	 the	 degree	 of	 real	 influence	 of	economic	 theoreticians	 over	 the	 state	 economic	 policy.	 Intellectual	 economists	may	arrive	at	certain	consensus	but	it	may	not	at	all	be	shared	by	the	people	and	political	 leaders.	 Putting	 this	 theoretical	 consensus	 into	 practice	 by	 economic	interest	groups	is	even	less	likely.	What	is	happening	in	China	is	not	Russian	or	East-European	 type	 of	 purposeful	 large-scale	 privatization	 but	 a	 sort	 of	spontaneous	 enlargement	 of	 non-state	 economic	 actors.	 As	 long	 as	 the	market	reforms	 are	 implemented	 the	 tendency	 to	 such	 enlargement	 is	 absolutely	inevitable	 irrespective	 of	 what	 was	 initially	 planned	 by	 this	 or	 that	 reform.	Spontaneous	 retreat	 of	 the	 state	 has	 unavoidable	 illegal	 dimension	 which	involves	 state	 capital	 “evaporation”	 and	 joining	 up	 of	 political	 power	 and	economic	might.	It	is	not	that	privatization	itself	should	be	blocked	but	such	kind	of	corrupt	practices	during	privatization200.	 		Zhu’s	view	was	developed	by	Hui	Qin,	a	professor	of	history.	Qin	indicated	that	both	sides	simply	make	 fool	of	Chinese	public.	With	 the	absence	of	democratic	system	of	social	and	political	checks	and	balances	the	first	group	of	discussants	would	 be	 unable	 to	 establish	 effective	 state	 while	 the	 second	 one	 would	 be	equally	incapable	of	creating	efficient	private	property	and	lawful	administration.	Being	 a	 historian,	 Qin	 draws	 a	 parallel	with	 Song	 dynasty	when	Wang	Ahshi’s	reforms	and	Si	Maguang’s	 “liberal	market”	 approach	both	 failed	under	 corrupt	absolute	 monarchy,	 eventually	 causing	 political	 disintegration	 and	 systemic	collapse.	 In	 a	 later	 article	 Qin	 dismissed	 the	 left-wing	 critic	 of	 Russian	privatization.	 While	 admitting	 that	 privatization	 in	 post	 Communist	 Russia	between	1992	and	1996	was	far	from	just,	Qin	stressed	that	it	was	nevertheless	implemented	under	“Eltsin’s	democracy”	which	allowed	wide	public	discussion.	He	 believes	 that	 it	 is	 due	 to	 this	 fact	 that	 Russian	 public,	 although	 widely	
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dissatisfied,	 still	 showed	 greater	 tolerance	 towards	 the	 results	 of	 privatization	than	Chinese	public	to	the	ongoing	“property	reform”201.	 		
3.3 Some	other	discussions	in	this	stage		Firstly,	the	idea	of	establishing	the	modern	enterprise	system	was	officially	put	forward	by	the	central	government.	This	idea	was	based	on	the	experience	and	lessons	obtained	from	the	experiments	in	the	share-holding	system	taken	place	in	1990s.	Many	scholars	and	policy	advisors	accepted	the	view	that	the	modern	enterprise	 system	 carries	 the	 same	 connotation	 as	 the	 modern	 corporate	system202.	That	is	to	say,	the	establishment	of	modern	enterprise	system	would	require	a	remolding	of	 the	existing	 forms	of	enterprises	 in	 to	companies	based	upon	 limited-liability	 stockholding,	 for	 example,	 turning	 into	 limited-liability	corporations.	 One	 should	 also	 refer	 to	 this	 process	 of	 setting	 up	 a	 modern	enterprise	system	as	“corporatization”.	For	instance,	Jinglian	Wu	stated	that	the	modern	 enterprise	 institution	 is	 the	 modern	 corporate	 system,	 which	 has	evolved	and	taken	shape	in	developed	market	economies	since	the	end	of	the	last	century203.	 		Secondly,	 the	 issue	 of	 corporate	 governance	 introduced	 above	 was	 being	discussed	as	a	means	for	solving	the	aforementioned	principal-agent	problem.	It	has	become	widely	noted	that	both	the	contracting	system	and	the	share-holding	experiments	 in	 SOEs,	 especially	 in	 large	 and	medium-sized	 SOEs,	 have	 put	 the	state	in	a	poor	position	for	obtaining	the	necessary	information	about	enterprise	operations.	 Moreover,	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 managers	 who	 posses	 the	 inside	information	 differ	 from	 those	 of	 the	 state,	 leading	 to	 contradiction	 between	ownership	and	management.	This	phenomenon	is	typical	in	the	transitions	of	the	SOEs	in	Russia	and	Eastern	European	countries204.	Masahiko	Aoki	described	this	
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phenomenon	 occurring	 in	 these	 countries	 as	 a	 problem	 of	 “inside	 control”205.	This	concept	was	accepted	by	most	Chinese	scholars	to	explore	the	direction	of	SOEs	reform.	 		Regarding	the	issue	of	how	to	reformulate	the	relationship	between	owners	and	managers,	Jinglian	Wu	proposed	a	state-holding	company	model	that	built	upon	a	hierarchical	structure206.	In	this	model,	the	National	People’s	Congress	and	its	standing	 committee	 elected	 a	 Public	 Capital	 Management	 Committee.	 This	committee	 would	 they	 serve	 as	 the	 board	 of	 directors	 of	 the	 SOE	 sector	 as	 a	whole.	 They	 would	 be	 responsible	 for	 establishing	 and	 owning	 a	 level-one	holding	company	and	investment	company,	whose	board	of	directors	would	be	selected,	 appointed,	 and	 supervised	 by	 the	 committee.	 Under	 the	 level-one	company,	there	would	be	a	level-two	holding	company	and	affiliated	companies,	which	 would	 in	 turn	 control	 companies	 directly	 involved	 in	 business	operations 207 .	 Wu	 suggested	 that	 this	 model	 could	 both	 separate	 the	administrative	functions	of	the	state	from	the	ownership	functions,	and	address	the	issue	of	absentee	ownership.	 		To	 state-owned	 bank,	 Mashiko	 Aoki	 suggested	 that	 when	 an	 enterprise	encountered	a	financial	crisis,	in	the	case	of	insider	control,	the	main	bank	within	a	loan	consortium	could	automatically	transfer	the	control	of	enterprise	from	the	insiders	 to	 the	 outsiders208.	 However,	 this	 theory	 is	 more	 appropriate	 to	 the	main	bank	type	of	corporate	governance	in	Japan	that	it	is	to	the	SOEs	in	China,	because	the	Banks	in	China	in	1990s	are	heavily	indebted	with	a	high	ratio	of	bad	debt209.	To	this	issue,	Xiaochuan	Zhou	proposed	a	combination	of	the	reshuffling	of	debt	with	 the	corporatization	reform.	The	debt	owned	by	 the	SOEs	to	banks	could	 be	 transferred	 into	 shares	 of	 the	 enterprise	 held	 by	 the	 banks	 through	
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equity-debt	 conversion	 so	 as	 to	 set	 up	 Chinese-style	 main	 bank	 system	 of	enterprise210.	 		To	 reshuffling	 of	 assets	 and	 debts	 with	 the	 design	 of	 corporate	 governance,	Weiying	 Zhang	 suggested	 that	 state	 assets	 be	 converted	 into	 state	 credit	 to	enterprises.	The	state	would	 thus	become	 the	 “creditor”	of	 the	SOEs	and	enjoy	the	rights	to	get	a	share	in	the	result	of	the	business	operations	while	avoiding	monitoring	 and	 controlling	 enterprises	 directly.	 This	 would	 also	 solve	 the	problem	of	information	asymmetry	and	effectively	save	the	monitoring	costs211.	 	 		
4. The	fourth	stage		With	the	deepening	of	reform,	China’s	SOE	has	entered	a	new	stage:	the	number	of	SOE	drastically	reduced,	Central-SOEs	has	set	up	after	 large-scale	merge	and	restructuring,	 basic	 modern	 corporate	 system	 was	 introduced,	 and	 a	state-owned	 assets	 supervision	 and	 administration	 department	 has	 been	established.	 The	 discussions	 about	 SOE	 in	 this	 stage	 paid	 more	 attentions	 on	some	 specific	 areas,	 such	 as	 SOEs’	 monopoly	 and	 efficiency	 issues,	 corporate	governance	issues,	and	the	function	and	status	of	state-owned	assets	supervision	and	administration	department.	The	discussions	about	monopoly,	efficiency	and	income	distribution	of	China’s	SOE	will	be	mainly	introduced	in	this	section.	 		
4.1 Arguments	about	China’s	SOE	monopoly	issues		China’s	economic	development	over	the	last	thirty	years	has	been	nothing	short	of	remarkable.	However,	it	still	faces	some	social	challenges,	for	instance,	rising	inequalities	and	increasing	corruption.	The	continuing	dominance	of	monopolies,	especially	 SOE	 monopoly	 within	 Chinese	 political	 economy	 is	 a	 primary	contribution	to	the	problem	of	economic	inefficiencies	and	corruption.	 		
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According	to	Peijun	Duan	and	Tony	Saich,	the	main	SOE	monopolies	in	China	are	resources	monopoly,	monopoly	pricing,	and	market	monopoly212.	The	resource	monopoly	 includes	 energy	 resources	 and	 telecommunications	 industry.	 In	energy	area,	several	legislations	were	made	to	ensure	SOEs	monopoly	control	in	this	 sector,	 cooperation	with	 foreign	 partners	 is	 tightly	 controlled,	 restrictions	limit	competition	among	the	main	enterprises,	 the	examination	and	procedural	process	of	foreign	engagement,	governing	investment	and	approval	procedures,	and	 engagement	 of	 private	 entities	 are	 also	 restricted.	 Similar	 trend	 toward	monopoly	control	and	restrictions	on	foreign	and	private	sector	engagement	also	exist	 in	 telecommunication	 industry.	 For	 instance,	 the	 permit	 system	 sets	 a	number	 of	 conditions	 for	 any	 foreign	 investor	 to	 operate	 basic	telecommunications	 services;	 restrictions	 are	 made	 on	 the	 form	 of	 business,	foreign	businesses	can	only	 invest	 in	 the	sector	as	a	Sino-foreign	 joint	venture,	with	 the	 foreign	 entity	 investing	 no	 more	 than	 49	 percent 213 ;	 some	business-license	restriction	are	also	made,	for	example,	a	notification	was	made	by	 the	government	 that	only	China	Telecom	and	China	Netcom	(both	 them	are	central	 SOEs)	 can	enage	 in	 the	 internet	phone	business,	 at	 the	 same	 time	 ,	 the	Skype	software	was	banned.		The	monopoly	 pricing	 includes	 government	 pricing	which	 are	 implemented	 in	tobacco,	 electricity	 and	 railway	 sectors;	 government	 directive	 pricing	 which	occurs	 when	 government	 or	 quasi-government	 enterprises	 set	 prices	 in	accordance	with	market	conditions,	but	control	remains	with	the	government	or	quasi-government	 enterprises;	 and	 hybrid	 pricing,	 which	 means	 government	pricing,	directive	pricing,	and	market	prices	coexist	in	a	particular	field,	as	in	the	case	 of	 the	 telecommunication	 industry,	 which	 the	 price	 for	 value-added	telecommunications	are	subject	to	the	government-directed	price	as	well	as	the	market	price.	 		The	market	monopoly	means	the	high	levels	of	market	concentration	in	Chinese	
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railway,	 oil,	 and	 gas,	 and	 telecommunications	 industries.	 For	 examples,	 the	state-owned	railways	still	remained	94.87	percent	in	passenger	traffic	and	83.5	percent	in	freight	traffic	in	2007214;	in	crude	oil	production	market,	although	the	share	of	CNPC	has	drroped	from	98	percent	to	53	percent,	but	the	whole	shares	of	 CNPC,	 Sinopec,	 CNOOC	 (all	 of	 them	 are	 central	 SOEs)	 was	 still	 over	 98	percent215.	Similar	pattern	can	be	found	in	the	telecommunication	market,	where	a	 basic	 monopoly	 was	 enjoyed	 by	 China	 telecom	 before	 1998,	 now	 four	enterprise,	namely	China	Telecom,	China	Netcom,	China	Mobil	and	China	Unicom	(all	of	them	are	central	SOEs)	took	the	97.6	percent	shares	of	the	market216.	 		In	 the	 theory	 that	 the	 SOEs	 are	 publicly	 owned,	 the	 control	 and	 ownership	belong	to	the	state	and	its	appointed	agency,	and	state-owned	assets	supervision	and	 administration	 department	 decides	 on	 mergers,	 separations,	 dissolutions,	increases	or	decreases	in	registered	capital,	the	issuance	of	corporate	bonds,	and	these	 decisions	 must	 be	 reported	 to	 the	 government	 for	 approval.	 However,	citizens	 as	 shareholders	 have	 no	 mechanism	 to	 restrict	 the	 possession,	management,	control,	or	distribution	of	profits.	Thus,	the	appointed	government	agents	hold	a	monopoly	over	the	assets.	This	phenomenon	leads	to	inefficiencies,	a	 lack	of	 innovation,	 inequitable	distribution,	corruption,	and	imbalances	in	the	economic	structure.	 		As	the	Prime	Minister,	Keqiang	Li	clearly	aware	the	seriousness	of	this	problem.	In	 his	 first	 briefing,	 Li	 stated	 that	 China	 has	 “a	 lot	 to	 learn”	 to	 deepen	market-oriented	 reforms	 and	 lower	 the	 entry	 barriers	 for	 private	 capital	 to	engage	 with	 the	 finance,	 railway,	 and	 energy	 sectors.	 He	 also	 urged	 that	administrative	powers	be	reduced	to	enable	markets	to	play	a	more	significant	role217.	This	proposal	has	been	recognized	by	majority	of	 scholars.	 Jinglian	Wu	indicated	 that	China’s	 SOEs	do	have	monopoly	 issues	and	 it	must	be	 regulated	
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properly.	He	stated	that	administrative	monopoly	in	some	important	industries	against	 the	 requirement	 of	 establishing	 the	 socialist	 market	 economy.	 To	 the	point	of	view	that	only	bad	monopoly	should	be	regulated	and	good	monopoly	(which	 benefit	 to	 the	 state)	 should	 not,	 he	 argued	 that	 this	 would	 turn	anti-monopoly	 mechanism	 to	 an	 uncertain	 and	 useless	 system218.	 Yining	 Li	believed	 that	 the	 industrial	 monopoly	 of	 SOEs	 is	 the	main	 factor	 that	 hinders	their	innovation.	The	root	of	SOEs’	industrial	monopoly	is	the	existence	of	vested	interests,	 which	 are	 always	 be	 protected	 by	 maintain	 the	 status	 quo,	 thus	systematical	reform	was	difficult	to	undertaken	in	practice.	Li	also	indicated	that	industrial	 monopoly	 is	 the	 inheritance	 of	 planned	 economy	 rather	 than	 the	outcome	of	market	economy,	it	must	be	regulated	by	enterprises	themselves	or	by	the	market	mechanism;	market	economy	does	not	means	the	state	should	not	play	its	role	on	macro-control	or	on	guiding	and	planning	industrial	development.	On	the	other	hand,	the	industrial	monopoly	also	hider	the	development	of	SOEs,	because	they	may	satisfy	with	the	monopoly	profits	and	neglect	innovation219.	 		Some	supporters	of	the	state-owned	sector	of	the	economy	and	those	benefiting	from	monopoly	control	have	different	opinions.	Yu	Zhang,	who	thought	China’s	SOEs	do	not	have	monopoly	problem,	used	HHI220	 to	analyze	and	examine	some	often	 criticized	 as	 monopoly	 industries	 such	 as	 oil	 and	 gas,	 electricity,	telecommunication	and	coal,	and	concluded	that	apart	from	telecommunication	and	 electricity	 where	 have	 natural	 monopoly,	 all	 other	 industries	 full	 of	competition.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 industrial	 involvement,	 90	 percent	 SOEs	are	in	competitive	industries.	The	main	factor	that	promotes	SOEs’	performance	is	 systematical	 reform	 of	 state-owned	 sector	 rather	 than	 monopoly	 control.	Therefore	the	core	task	is	to	make	SOE	bigger	and	stronger	instead	of	regulating	SOEs’	monopoly	activities221.	 		Yuyang	 Li	 made	 a	 spirited	 defense	 of	 China’s	 SOE	 system,	 claiming	 that	
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privatization	was	not	a	viable	path	and	that	simply	holding	a	dominant	position	in	 a	 particular	 market	 did	 not	 mean	 that	 the	 SOEs	 exhibited	 monopolistic	behavior222.	Such	contentions	were	quickly	rebutted	by	Sheng	Hong	who	argued	that	monopolistic	 trends	 in	 five	 industries	 (banking,	 oil,	 telecom,	 railways	 and	salt)	had	led	to	social	losses	amounting	to	4.8	percent	of	GDP	in	2010223.	 		In	 addition,	 some	 scholars	 thought	 some	 special	 industries	 should	 be	monopolized	by	SOEs	because	they	relate	to	national	security,	such	as	oil	and	gas,	and	 telecommunication	 industries224.	 Guoguang	 Liu	 pointed	 out	 that	 to	 those	industries	that	relate	to	national	security	and	lifeline,	the	problem	is	not	whether	there	 is	 monopoly	 control	 exists	 but	 who	monopoly	 them.	 Generally,	 national	strategy	interests	and	social	interests	would	be	protected	and	promoted	better	if	these	 special	 sectors	 and	 industries	 are	 controlled	 and	 monopolized	 by	 state	rather	than	private	sector225.	 		With	the	enactment	of	China’s	Anti-trust	Law	in	2008,	the	discussion	about	SOE	monopoly	became	more	detailed	and	specific,	and	turns	to	a	hot	topic	as	various	groups	attempted	to	influence	policy	direction.	One	of	the	most	important	issues	is	administrative	monopoly,	which	not	only	directly	relates	to	SOE,	but	also	was	clearly	written	in	specific	provisions	in	anti-trust	law.	 		Most	 scholars	 believe	 that	 administrative	 monopoly	 restrict	 and	 eliminate	competition	in	the	same	way	as	the	economic	monopoly,	thus	anti-trust	law	also	should	 regulate	 them226.	 Some	 scholars	 even	 think	 the	 primary	 mission	 of	current	China’	s	anti-trust	law	is	to	correct	governmental	distortion227.	However,	there	some	other	scholars	state	that	administrative	monopoly	is	not	the	subject	
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of	 regulation	 of	 anti-trust	 law,	 because	 first,	 the	 administrative	monopoly	 is	 a	political	 issue,	 which	 cannot	 be	 regulated	 by	 anti-trust	 law	 alone;	 second,	 all	regulations	 relating	 to	 traditional	 anti-trust	 law	 are	 not	 administrative	 but	economic	monopoly	activities;	third,	the	administrative	monopoly	activities	are	practiced	 based	 on	 state	 power,	 which	 cannot	 be	 efficiently	 regulated	 and	supervised,	 thus	anti-trust	 law	 is	powerless	 to	affect	 administrative	monopoly;	and	 fourth,	 under	 a	market	 economy,	 the	 self-interested	behavior	of	 a	 rational	economic	 man	 could	 damage	 the	 interests	 of	 the	 whole	 society,	 and	 then	government	 intervention	 is	 necessary,	 and	 the	 precondition	 of	 the	 Socialist	market	economy	with	Chinese	characteristics	is	government	intervention228.	 		To	the	provisions	concerning	administrative	monopoly	in	China’s	anti-trust	law,	Jin	 Sun	 thought	 although	 current	 anti-trust	 law	 has	 established	 a	 basic	mechanism	 for	 regulating	 administrative	 monopoly,	 some	 systematic	deficiencies	still	 exist229.	And	Shuli	Hu	stated	 that	 the	 law’s	 limitations	mean	 it	has	 not	 been	 strong	 enough	 to	 take	 on	 the	 state	 enterprises.	 For	 example,	 the	Article	7	of	the	law	uses	too	many	vague	and	general	languages,	which	blurs	the	lines	 of	 oversight.	 Hu	 also	 pointed	 out	 that	 in	 the	 five	 years	 since	 the	 law’s	enactment,	 only	 two	enforcement	 actions	 could	be	 said	 to	have	 targeted	 SOEs.	One	 was	 the	 2009	 investigation	 by	 the	 National	 Development	 and	 Reform	Commission	 (NDRC)	 into	 suspected	 price-fixing	 by	 TravelSky,	 a	 provider	 of	 IT	solutions	 to	 the	 tourism	 industry,	 which	 went	 nowhere.	 The	 second	 was	 the	2011	 investigation	 into	 the	 broadband	 business	 of	 the	 telecommunications	giants	China	Unicom	and	China	Telecom,	which	again	the	NDRC	suspended	after	the	 two	 companies	 applied	 to	 have	 the	 case	 dropped.	 Such	 enforcement	 is	disappointing,	to	say	the	least.	It	also	reflects	the	scale	of	the	challenge230.	 		
4.2 Arguments	about	China’s	SOE	efficiency	issue		
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The	discussion	about	the	efficiency	of	SOEs	focuses	main	on	the	following	areas:	changes	 to	performance	 in	 the	process	of	 transforming	 SOEs;	 varying	 levels	 of	efficiency	 accord	 to	 ownership;	 regional	 differences	 in	 efficiency;	 and	 research	on	 the	 productivity	 of	 SOEs.	 The	 primary	 researches	 are:	 by	 measuring	 the	factors	 influencing	 industrial	 efficiency	with	data	 collected	 through	nationwide	survey,	Xiaoxuan	Liu	found	that	different	ownership	structures	in	industries	has	a	 very	 important	 influence	 on	 industrial	 efficiency231.	 By	 using	 the	 data	 from	various	provinces	during	the	period	from	1978	to	2003,	Zhigang	Wang	measured,	compared	 and	 analyzed	 the	 production	 efficiencies	 between	 various	 regions	with	Stochastic	frontier	models,	finding	that	eastern	regions	enjoyed	the	highest	levels	 of	 efficiency,	 followed	by	 the	middle	 and	 the	western	 regions	 in	 turn232.	Xiaonian	 Xu’	 study	 on	 listed	 companies	 in	 China	 indicated	 that	 the	 higher	 the	proportion	of	 state	ownership	within	a	 company,	 the	worse	 its	performance	 is	likely	to	be;	conversely,	the	higher	the	proportion	of	corporate	shares,	the	higher	the	 company’s	 performance	 is	 likely	 to	 be;	 the	proportion	of	 individual	 shares	was,	however,	largely	irrelevant	to	an	enterprise’s	performance233.	Xiaodong	Xv	and	Xiaoyue	Chen	found	that	if	two	listed	companies	in	China	and	had	different	ownership	structures	and	governance	structures,	and	that	the	companies	where	the	 biggest	 shareholders	 were	 non-state	 shareholders	 had	 higher	 corporate	values	 and	 stronger	 profitability234.	 Yang	 Yao	 found	 that	 non-SOEs	were	more	efficiency	than	SOEs	by	conducting	an	empirical	study	of	state-ownership	on	the	technical	 efficiency	 of	 Chinese	 industrial	 enterprises235.	 Xiao	 Chen	 and	 Dong	Jiang	 pointed	 out	 that	 non-SOEs	 only	 enjoy	 remarkable	 higher	 efficiency	 in	competitive	industries236.	 	
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	Form	the	perspective	of	financial	index,	Xiaoxuan	Liu	and	Liying	Li	identified	the	typical	 features	 of	 enterprise	 restricting	 by	 using	 empirical	 and	 theoretical	analysis	 of	 survey	 data.	 They	 conducted	 horizontal	 and	 vertical	 comparisons	between	 the	 efficiency	 of	 enterprises	 of	 different	 ownership	 types.	 The	conclusions	 found	 that	 restricted	 enterprises	 were	 indeed	more	 efficient	 than	those	that	had	not	conducted	restricting,	and	that	enterprises	with	greater	levels	of	 private	 capital	 were	 more	 efficient	 than	 those	 with	 higher	 levels	 of	state-owned	 capital237.	 Yifan	 Hu	 studied	 the	 performance	 of	 privatized	 SOEs	based	on	the	World	Bank’s	survey	on	299	Chinese	manufacturing	companies.	Hu	concluded	 that	 there	 was	 a	 sharp	 increase	 in	 sales	 income	 and	 a	 remarkable	decline	 in	 the	cost	of	sales,	significantly	 improving	the	companies’	profitability,	and	 the	 productivity	 of	 the	 companies	 was	 significantly	 improved	 after	privatization238.	 	 		From	 the	 perspective	 of	 productivity	 indexes,	 Jinghai	 Zheng,	 Xiaoxuan	 Liu	 and	Arne	Bigsten	examined	the	impacts	of	various	endogenous	or	exogenous	factors	by	making	use	of	the	data	collected	from	700	SOEs	during	the	period	from	1980	to	1994	and	using	growth	 in	productivity	 and	efficiency	 changes	and	 technical	advances	of	its	component	parts	as	variables239.	Through	flat	panel	data	from	29	provinces	in	China	from	1979	to	2001,	Jinghai	Zheng	and	Angang	Hu	found	that	China	experienced	a	high	growth	period	of	toal	factor	productivity	(4.6%)	from	1978	to	1995,	and	a	period	of	law	growth	(0.6%)	from	1996	to	2001240.	Xiaoxuan	Liu	indicated	that,	in	terms	of	productivity	growth	of	enterprises,	SOEs	enjoyed	the	 biggest	 growth.	 The	 productivity	 growth	 of	 SOEs	 mainly	 came	 from	 the	growth	in	EC.	However,	the	growth	in	TC	of	SOEs	was	quite	limited	and	failed	to	surpass	the	TC	growth	of	private	enterprises241.	 	
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	To	 the	 comparison	 of	 the	 efficiency	 of	 SOEs	 and	 private	 enterprises,	 Gary	Jefferson	 measured	 and	 compared	 the	 efficiency	 of	 enterprises	 with	 different	ownership	 structure	using	 the	data	of	 22,000	 large	 and	medium-sized	Chinese	industrial	enterprises	collected	during	the	period	from	1994	to	1999.	He	found	a	clear	 negative	 correlation	 between	 the	 proportion	 of	 state	 ownership	 and	productivity,	 indicating	 the	 success	 of	 SOE	 reform	 in	 diversifying	 ownership.	Even	 SOEs	 with	 lower	 proportions	 of	 state	 ownership	 remained	 less	 efficient	than	 enterprises	with	other	 ownership	 structure242.	 Yang	Yao	pointed	out	 that	the	efficiency	of	non-SOEs	was	higher	than	those	of	SOEs	through	a	study	on	the	internal	 and	 external	 effects	 of	 non-state-owned	 capital	 on	 China’s	 industrial	enterprises243.	Xiaoxuan	Liu	found	that	SOEs	had	an	apparent	negative	effect	on	efficiency	while	private	enterprises	had	a	positive	effect	on	efficiency244.	 		
4.3 Discussions	about	China’s	SOE	Income	Distribution		The	discussions	about	China’s	SOE	distribution	began	 in	2005	when	the	World	Bank	published	 the	 report	 of	 SOE	Dividends:	How	Much	 and	 to	Whom.	 In	 this	report,	 the	authors	 indicated	 that	 in	China,	no	government	entity	–	neither	 the	Ministry	 of	 Finance	 nor	 state-owned	 assets	 supervision	 and	 management	department	–	receives	any	dividends	from	large	centrally-administered	SOEs,	a	patten	that	mostly	applies	as	well	to	local	governments	and	locally-administered	SOEs,	 due	 to	 historical	 reasons.	Which	 is	 in	 contrast	 to	 arrangements	 in	 other	countries,	where	the	state,	as	key	shareholders,	normally	receives	dividends,	like	other	shareholders.	The	authors	explained	the	reasons	why	SOE	dividend	policy	is	important	to	China,	because	this	policy	would	divide	SOEs’	after-tax	profit	into	two	parts:	retained	earnings	to	finance	investment	in	the	group	and	dividends	to	finance	general	public	spending	(consumption	or	investment	in	other	enterprise	
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and	 projects)	 by	 the	 government.	 As	 such,	 the	 rationale	 for	 a	 sound	 dividend	policy	 is	 twofold:	 first,	 it	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 enhance	 the	 efficiency	 of	investments	 financed	 by	 retained	 earnings	 of	 SOEs;	 and	 second,	 it	 would	improve	the	overall	allocation	of	public	financial	resources245.	 		To	the	question	of	“how	much	to	pay?”,	this	report	suggested	that:	to	companies	with	 relatively	 slow	 and	 dependable	 growth	 can	 typically	 support	 a	 dividend	payout	ratio	of	50	percent	of	earnings;	to	companies	in	cyclical	industries,	such	as	 basic	 materials,	 dividends	 may	 reach	 or	 exceed	 100	 percent	 of	 earnings	during	cyclical	downturns;	and	to	high-growth	or	high-tech	companies	may	pay	little	or	no	dividend,	on	the	assumption	that	reinvestment	in	company	is	the	best	use	for	surplus	cash246.	 		To	 the	 question	 of	 “who	 to	 pay?”,	 this	 report	 indicated	 that	 the	 state-owned	assets	 supervision	 and	management	 department	 as	 the	 shareholder	 agency	 of	the	government	would	be	the	direct	recipient	of	SOE	dividends,	and	the	principle	for	 specific	 arrangement	 on	 next	 level	 is	 that	 SOE	 profit	 and	 privatization	proceeds	 are	 all	 public	 financial	 revenue	 and	 should	 be	 managed	 as	 such.	 In	other	words,	 nobody	 has	 the	 legal	 power	 to	 decide	 on	 their	 spending	without	approval	of	 the	NPC	 through	 the	budgeting	process.	And	 from	other	 countries’	experiences,	 while	 the	 state-owned	 assets	 supervision	 and	 management	department	 acts	 as	 the	 state	 shareholder,	 SOE	 dividends	 and	 privatization	proceeds	should	go	to	the	Ministry	of	Finance	and	be	subject	to	standard	budget	process;	 and	 by	 going	 through	 standard	 budget	 processes,	 the	 state-owned	assets	 supervision	 and	 management	 department’s	 expenditure	 requests	 are	assessed	 and	 weighed	 against	 other	 competing	 spending	 requests	 by	 the	government	 and	 People’s	 Congress,	 which	 is	 supported	 to	 reflect	 the	 value	judgment	of	the	people247.	 		This	 report	 generated	 public	 concerns	 and	 debates.	 Those	 supportive	 of	 the	
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distribution	of	SOEs	dividends	hold	 the	 following	views:	 first,	 since	 the	state	 is	the	investor	of	SOEs;	it	has	the	right	to	participate	in	dividends	distribution	as	a	shareholder.	By	name	and	under	the	law,	the	shares	of	SOEs	should	belong	to	all	citizens.	 The	 governmental	 departments	 are	 only	 exercising	 administrative	power	 on	 their	 behalf.	 Therefore,	 all	 citizens,	 as	 opposed	 to	 certain	 groups,	should	become	direct	beneficiaries.	Second,	the	high	wages	and	welfare	benefits	of	 monopolistic	 SOEs	 come	 from	 their	 high	 profitability	 as	 they	 enjoy	institutional	monopolies.	 These	 profits	 should	 be	 turned	 over	 to	 the	 State	 and	then,	 through	 secondary	 distribution	 of	 the	 government,	 be	 used	 to	 safeguard	public	undertakings	such	as	education,	medical	care	and	old-age	pensions.	Third,	reasonable	 income	distribution	can	restrict	 the	flow	of	state-owned	capital	and	the	 investment	 and	 financing	 of	 SOEs.	 Besides,	 the	 government	 has	 borne	 the	majority	of	SOEs’	reorganization	costs	 in	social	responsibilities	such	as	schools,	hospitals	 and	 the	 costs	 caused	 by	 unemployment	 and	 early	 retirement	 of	employees.	 In	 fact,	 the	 exclusion	 of	 the	 above	 social	 burdens	 is	 one	 important	reason	for	the	rising	profit	of	SOEs.	This	has	also	given	more	reason	for	the	State	to	offset	these	costs248.	 		Some	 other	 scholars	 disagree	 with	 this	 view.	 One	 is	 that	 charging	 too	 much	dividends	from	monopoly	SOEs	will	force	them	to	think	of	ways	to	increase	costs	and	 lower	profits,	 such	 as	 trying	 every	means	 to	 translate	profits	 to	 employee	incomes	 and	welfare.	 The	 other	 is	 that	 this	will	 lead	 to	 financing	 chaos	 in	 the	country.	The	State	 should	 remove	 itself	 from	market	 competition	as	quickly	as	possible	so	that	state-owned	capital	may	only	be	used	to	correct	market	failures	and	meet	social	public	demands249.	 		
5. Assessment	China’s	SOE	Reform	Approaches	and	Theories		Since	 the	onset	of	 reform	and	opening	up	of	China,	SOE	reform	has	undergone	
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several	phases,	including	power	decentralization	and	profit	transfer,	the	contract	system,	 the	 substitution	 of	 tax	 payment	 for	 profit	 delivery	 and	 the	 modern	enterprise	system.	These	reforms	represented	part	of	China’s	 transition	 from	a	planned	 economy	 to	 a	 market	 economy.	 In	 the	 planned	 economic	 system,	state-run	 enterprises	 only	 received	 and	 implemented	 government	 plans.	 The	government	 directly	 controlled	 production,	 exchange,	 allocation	 and	 even	consumption.	In	short,	in	the	planned	economic	system,	the	main	function	of	the	government	was	to	“produce	for	the	public”	by	making	and	implementing	plans.	 		When	the	development	of	a	market	economy	was	established	as	a	goal	for	China,	the	 rules	 of	 the	 economic	 game	 were	 changed	 dramatically.	 SOEs	 became	independent	 corporations.	 This	 fundamentally	 ensured	 that	 SOEs	 could	 exit,	develop	and	make	profits	in	all	economic	areas.	In	addition,	SOE	managers	were	endowed	with	the	same	decision-making	and	managerial	powers	as	managers	in	market	 economies.	 For	 its	 part,	 the	 government	 was	 transformed	 from	 the	original	 plan	 maker	 to	 SOEs’	 capital	 contributor,	 which	 therby	 enjoys	 the	statutory	rights	and	interests	of	a	shareholder.	 In	this	way,	as	SOEs	are	further	defined	 as	 “state-funded	 enterprises”,	 one	 of	 the	 main	 functions	 of	 the	government	is	changed	from	“producing	for	the	public”	to	“making	profit	for	the	public”250.	 This	 process	was,	 then,	 a	 process	 of	 commercialization	 and	 a	move	toward	what	we	might	call	a	“revenue-oriented	government”,	which	maximized	its	fiscal	revenue	by	controlling	and	using	social	resources	(state-owned	assets,	factors	of	production,	rare	resources	and	public	power).	 		So	far,	the	nature	of	China’s	SOE	reform	is	the	commercialization	of	state-owned	assets,	for	instance,	making	profits	through	the	operation	of	state-owned	assets.	When	state-owned	assets	begin	to	take	on	capitalist	attributes,	the	government	slowly	becomes	a	representative	for	their	corporate	interests.	In	this	sense,	the	government	 is	 virtually	 the	 same	 as	 a	 businessman,	 and	 it	 also	needs	 to	make	
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SOEs	“larger	and	stronger”.	When	there	is	fierce	competition	in	industries	where	SOEs	are	engaged,	which	makes	SOEs	suffer	losses	and	heavy	fiscal	burdens,	the	government	will	flatly	choose	to	withdraw	SOEs.	On	the	contrary,	when	there	is	a	structure	 condition	 for	 monopoly	 in	 industries	 where	 SOEs	 are	 engaged,	 the	government	will	 establish	 institutional	 access	 barriers	 and	 impose	monopolies	for	SOEs,	 allowing	 them	 to	make	huge	profits.	This	 is	 the	nature	of	 the	 reform	entitled	 “hold	 on	 the	 big	 and	 let	 to	 of	 the	 small”.	 More	 importantly,	 when	combing	 the	motive	 to	make	money	with	public	 power	 it	 has,	 the	 government	will	 control	 rare	 resources	 such	 as	 land,	 minerals	 and	 finance	 through	 laws,	regulations	 and	 even	 by	 administrative	means,	 so	 as	 to	make	 huge	 profits	 for	SOEs	or	directly	 for	 itself.	 This	 explains	why	after	 large-scale	 “private	 advance	and	 state	 retreat”	 in	 the	 1990s,	 we	 have	 seen	 structural	 “state	 advance	 and	private	retreat”	in	recent	years.	 		In	this	way,	as	state-owned	assets	are	commercialized,	the	government	take	on	two	roles,	one	as	a	provider	of	public	goods	(revenue	government)	and	another	as	institutionalized	capital	(profit-oriented	government).	Such	dual	nature	is	also	reflected	by	the	aims	and	actions	of	SOEs.	First,	as	carriers	of	platforms	for	the	operation	of	state-owned	assets,	SOEs	need	to	maximize	their	profits	in	the	form	of	 independent	corporations,	 just	 like	regular	enterprises.	Yet	SOEs	also	aim	to	address	issues	in	the	interests	of	the	public	such	as	employment,	social	stability,	macro-control,	the	stability	of	the	government	and	national	security	under	some	circumstances.	Second,	as	assets	managers,	SOE	manager	are	virtually	the	same	as	 regular	 agents,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 as	 government	 goal	 implementers,	they	belong	 to	 the	government	and	can	partake	 in	 the	 revolving	door	between	enterprise	managers	and	government	officials.	Third,	in	market	operations,	SOEs	will	 emphasize	 the	 public	 nature	 of	 SOEs	 and	 obtain	 some	 special	 privileges	through	“in	house	lobbying”	in	order	to	pursue	illegitimate	interests.	 		The	 government’s	 aim	 of	 making	 money	 through	 SOEs	 is	 delegated	 to	 SOE	managers	 and,	 as	 a	 result,	 there	 is	 a	 principal-agent	 relationship	 between	 the	government	 and	 SOE	 managers,	 which	 is	 characterized	 by	 asymmetric	information	 (the	managers	have	more	detailed	and	specialist	knowledge	about	
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the	 operations	 of	 the	 enterprise	 than	 government	 officials,	 whose	 duties	 are	much	wider).	When	the	information	is	asymmetric,	interests	groups	consisting	of	SOE	managers	and	some	government	officials	that	claim	to	“make	money	for	the	public”	but	actually	seek	personal	gains	through	state-owned	assets	will	emerge.	Such	interest	group	will	not	only	make	the	wish	of	“making	money	for	the	public”	come	to	nothing	but	also	control	important	social	resources	through	their	public	power	 to	 constitute	 the	 social-economic	 characteristics	 of	 bureaucratic	capitalism	or	crony	capitalism.	 		Because	 of	 these	multiple	 principal-agent	 links,	 the	 low	 efficiency	 of	 SOEs	will	not	 be	 fundamentally	 improved	 with	 changes	 in	 the	 competitiveness	 of	industries,	 where	 SOEs	 are	 engaged.	 Although	 in	 recent	 years,	 the	 impressive	paper	results	of	SOEs	have	been	used	by	some	scholars	to	emphasize	their	high	efficiency,	the	real	performance	of	SOEs	is	seen	to	be	far	worse	than	that	of	other	firms	 in	 the	market	 after	deducting	 resources	 rents,	 land	 rent,	 underestimated	financial	 costs,	 government	 subsidies	 and	 administrative	 monopoly	 profits.	Therefore,	 as	 long	 as	 SOEs	 do	 not	 meaningfully	 withdraw,	 even	 if	 their	performance	 is	 improved	 after	 restricting,	 they	 are	 still	 in	 an	 unfavorable	position	as	compared	with	private	enterprises	in	all	but	a	few	cases.	 		The	 privatization	 of	 state-owned	 assets,	 especially	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 China’s	economic	 transformation,	was	 not	 only	 logically	 inevitable,	 but	 also	 promoted	meaningful	 market	 reforms.	 SOE	 reforms	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 market	mechanism	 promoted	 the	 development	 of	 a	 market	 economy	 represented	 by	private	 enterprises.	 the	 large-scale	 withdraw	 of	 SOEs	 from	 many	 competitive	areas	also	improved	production	factors	and	created	space	for	the	emergence	of	a	market	 economy.	 As	 a	 result,	 China	 was	 able	 to	 improve	 the	 structure	 and	efficiency	 of	 its	 national	 economy	 and	 achieve	 long-term	 stable	 and	 rapid	economic	growth.	 		However,	 along	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 market	 economy	 in	 China,	 the	historical	mission	of	privatization	state-owned	assets	is	about	to	come	to	an	end.	The	 reason	 is	 that	 SOEs	 are	 relatively	 less	 efficient,	 and	more	 importantly,	 the	
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continuous	existence	of	state-owned	capital	in	for-profit	factors	has	constituted	and	 continues	 to	 constitute	 a	 severe	 threat	 to	 the	 driving	 force	 of	 China’s	economic	growth,	adequate	and	fair	competition,	and	social	justice.	 		To	current	China’s	SOEs,	the	most	severe	problems	they	faces	are	monopoly	and	income	distribution	issues.	For	instance,	in	2010,	the	total	profit	of	central	SOEs	are	1314.5	billion	Yuan,	accounting	 for	67.5	percent	of	 the	 total	profit	of	SOEs.	Hereinto,	CNPC	and	China	Mobil	made	a	profit	of	128.56	billion	Yuan	and	148.47	billion	 Yuan,	 the	 total	 of	 which	 exceeds	 one	 fifth	 of	 the	 total	 profit	 made	 by	central	SOEs251.	It	can	be	seen	that	ptofits	of	central	SOEs	were	mainly	realized	by	 monopoly	 enterprises.	 To	 income	 distribution,	 from	 2007	 to	 2009,	 the	average	tax	burden	of	992	SOEs	was	10	percent,	while	that	of	private	enterprises	was	as	high	as	24	percent;	from	1994	to	2007,	SOEs	did	not	turn	over	any	profits,	and	in	2009,	only	6	percent	of	SOEs	profits	were	turned	over,	and	the	rest	was	all	distributed	 within	 enterprises;	 besides,	 dividend	 turnover	 by	 central	 SOEs	mainly	transfers	within	the	central	SOEs	system,	their	significance	in	benefiting	the	 common	people	has	not	been	embodied	yet;	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 the	average	staff	 wage	 of	 SOEs	 was	 17	 percent	 higher	 than	 that	 of	 other	 organizations	 in	2008,	and	 their	average	 labor	 income	 is	63	percent	higher	 than	 that	of	private	enterprises	and	36	percent	higher	than	that	of	non-state-owned	enterprises252.	 		As	 discussed	 above,	 the	 problems	 of	monopoly	 and	 income	 distribution	 could	not	be	solved	by	current	reform	approaches.	In	terms	of	ownership	relations,	the	manner	 in	 which	 the	 state-owned	 assets	 supervision	 and	 management	departments	(both	central	and	local)	act	as	the	owners	of	state-owned	assets	on	behalf	 of	 the	 state	has	not	 really	 solved	 the	problem	of	 a	 lack	of	 ownership	of	SOEs.	Moreover,	this	model	means	that	because	state-owned	assets	supervision	and	 management	 departments	 lacks	 sufficient	 supervision	 and	 oversight,	 it	 is	easy	 for	 the	 organization	 to	 make	 concessions	 to	 the	 management	 of	 SOEs,	allowing	the	misappropriate	or	embezzlement	of	state-owned	assets.	 	
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	In	 terms	 of	 operating	 performance,	 the	 question	 of	 whether	 the	 current	performance	of	SOEs	is	linked	to	improved	efficiencies	is	still	quite	controversial.	However,	it	is	obviously	that	SOEs	have	benefitted	a	great	deal	from	rising	global	commodity	prices	 and	privileged	 access	 to	 land	 and	 resources.	 They	have	 also	benefited	from	monopolies	in	some	key	industries,	where	they	have	been	able	to	squeeze	out	or	swallow	up	other	players	through	the	power	of	their	bureaucratic	connection.	 In	 doing	 so,	 they	 have	 greatly	 violated	 market	 rules	 and	 have	become	 the	 most	 important	 obstacle	 to	 the	 healthy	 development	 of	 China’s	economy.	 		In	 fact,	 the	problems	of	China’s	 SOEs	must	be	 solved	 systematically,	which	are	always	 neglected	 by	 majority	 scholars,	 who	 often	 tried	 to	 solve	 one	 specific	problem	by	using	one	method	within	one	area.	And	the	fundamental	thing	is	the	status	 of	 SOE.	 All	 former	 discussions	 about	 China’s	 SOE	 reform	 based	 on	 the	perspective	of	private	law,	in	turn	a	strategy	of	“hold	on	to	the	big	and	let	to	of	the	small”	and	“building	SOEs	bigger	and	stronger”	are	the	inevitable	results	of	the	 property	 approach.	 However,	 from	 the	 perspective	 of	 public	 interests	 and	public	functions,	it	is	not	necessary	so;	it	is	also	essential	to	build	small	SOEs	into	bigger	and	stronger	ones	and	establish	some	new	enterprises.	In	contrast,	some	large	and	strong	SOEs	may	need	to	be	downsized	or	even	dissolved.	Therefore,	current	China’s	SOE	reform	should	be	undertaken	from	the	perspective	of	public	law	that	SOEs	are	material	means	by	which	public	functions	are	fulfilled	instead	of	the	private	law	perspective	of	property	of	SOE	assets.	 		The	status	of	SOE	is	also	the	key	to	solve	the	problems	of	monopoly	and	income	distribution.	 The	 core	 of	 these	 two	 problems	 is	 actually	 the	misunderstanding	about	 SOE’s	 status.	To	monopoly	 issues,	 it	 is	 the	 strategy	of	 “making	profit	 for	public”	 and	 “making	 SOEs	 bigger	 and	 stronger”	 caused	 the	 motivations	 and	excuses	 of	 government	 and	 state-owned	 assets	 supervision	 and	 management	departments	 of	 giving	 preferential	 policies	 and	 privilege	 to	 SOEs.	 To	 income	distribution	issues,	it	is	the	unclear	status	of	SOEs	resulted	in	the	inappropriate	income	distribution	mechanism.	In	addition,	the	issues	of	monopoly	and	income	
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distribution	are	complementary	and	linkage:	one	hand,	majority	profits	of	SOEs	are	resulted	from	monopoly	behavior	of	SOEs,	and	its	income	distribution	could	not	be	regulated	properly	if	SOEs’	monopoly	behaviors	still	remain;	on	the	other	hand,	the	reform	of	SOEs’	 income	distribution	mechanism	would	also	affect	the	regulation	of	administrative	monopoly.	 		Therefore,	a	conclusion	could	be	made	that	the	problems	of	SOEs’	monopoly	and	income	distribution	problems	must	be	dealt	with	at	the	same	time,	based	on	the	fundamental	 that	 recognizing	 SOE’s	 status	 from	 public	 law	 perspective,	otherwise,	 China’s	 SOE	 reform	 would	 remain	 stagnant.	 In	 fact,	 the	 end	 of	 the	reform	 characterized	 by	 the	 commercialization	 of	 state-owned	 assets	 does	 not	mean	that	the	SOE	reform	is	finally	accomplished.	On	the	contrary,	it	only	marks	a	new	historical	beginning.	A	new	reform	approach	that	based	on	the	public	law	perspective	and	deal	with	monopoly	and	 income	distribution	at	 the	 same	 time	should	be	put	on	agenda.	 				 	
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CHAPTER	FOUR:	THE	PROPERTY	STRUCTURE	OF	CHINA’S	STATE-OWNED	
ENTERPRISES	 		The	 issues	 concerning	 state-owned	 enterprises	 have	 always	 been	 the	 key	 to	Chinese	 economic	 system	 reform.	 Before	 1978,	 as	 an	 important	 part	 of	 public	sector,	state-owned	enterprises	had	dominated	almost	every	market	of	national	economy	 for	 a	 long	 time.	 As	 a	 result,	 although	 state-owned	 enterprises	 had	exited	from	most	competitive	areas	and	the	proportion	of	them	in	whole	national	economy	 has	 decreased	 significantly,	 they	 still	 play	 an	 important	 role	 and	dominate	some	markets	in	certain	areas	after	the	Reform	and	Opening	Up	policy.	For	 the	 reform	 of	 state-owned	 enterprisers,	 experts,	 scholars	 and	 politicians	proposed	 varieties	 of	 reform	 plans	 and	 the	 government	 implemented	most	 of	them 253 .	 However,	 these	 solutions	 only	 scratched	 the	 surface,	 and	 the	state-owned	 enterprises	 of	 China	 still	 face	 many	 challenges	 and	 problems	 at	present.	For	 instance,	due	 to	 the	unclear	 status	of	government	 functions,	 some	competitive	sectors	are	still	controlled	or	dominated	by	state-owned	enterprises,	into	 which	 private	 sector	 could	 hardly	 enter.	 Lack	 of	 a	 modern	 cooperate	governance	 system	 and	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 perfect	 supervision	 and	 profits	distribution	mechanism	are	 some	of	 the	other	 challenges	 and	problems.	These	examples	 actually	 reflect	 an	 imbalanced	 relationship	between	government	 and	market.		In	 order	 to	 explore	 this	 subject	 in	 depth	 and	 find	 an	 appropriate	 solution,	 the	nature	of	state-owned	enterprises	and	its	reform	processes	should	be	rethought	profoundly,	 instead	of	 looking	for	partial	solutions	by	old	and	traditional	 ideas.	In	this	chapter,	the	history,	nature	and	reform	processes	of	China’s	state-owned	enterprises	 will	 be	 reflected,	 the	 current	 situation	 of	 it	 will	 be	 analysed	 by	relevant	cases,	and	the	short-term	plans	of	state-owned	enterprises	reform	and	the	ultimate	goals	of	it	will	be	proposed	at	the	end.		
1. The	History,	Functions	and	Role	of	Sate-owned	Enterprises	
																																								 																				 	
253 ƓÀJ2004sp7{Űŷ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	At	 the	 end	 of	 the	 19th	 century,	 along	 with	 the	 changes	 that	 major	 western	capitalist	countries	finished	their	industrial	revolution	and	went	into	monopoly	capitalism	 period,	 the	 state	 was	 required	 to	 interact	 and	 adjust	 the	 market	directly,	and	investing	and	creating	enterprises	by	State	was	the	main	method254.	After	 the	 First	 World	 War,	 especially	 after	 the	 Great	 Crash	 in	 1929,	 the	state-owned	 enterprise	 as	 the	 main	 method	 of	 adjusting	 national	 economy	structure	 and	 operation,	 draw	 attention	 to	 themselves	 and	 developed	 rapidly,	due	 to	 the	 fact	 that	 any	other	partial	measures	were	useless.	After	 the	 Second	World	War,	 the	function	of	state-adjustment	was	enhanced,	many	countries	set	off	waves	of	nationalization,	and	the	state-owned	enterprises	took	a	fundamental	position	in	national	economy.	 		In	 France,	 there	 were	 three	 major	 nationalization	 movements,	 respectively	 in	late	1930s,	middle	1940s	and	early	1980s255.	In	1938,	the	Societe	Nationale	des	Chemins	de	Fer	Francais	was	nationalized,	and	its	State	holding	increased	to	100%	in	1982256.	Some	most	important	banks	and	Renault	were	nationalized	in	1945,	and	a	large	part	of	the	banking	sector	and	industries	of	strategic	importance	to	the	 state,	 especially	 in	 electronics	 and	 communications	 were	 nationalized	 in	1982257.	 According	 to	 statistics,	 in	 1983,	 the	 French	 state-owned	 enterprise	accounted	for	17%	of	the	GDP,	35%	of	total	investment	in	fixed	capital	and	23%	of	employment258.	 		As	 early	 as	 1657,	 the	 United	 Kingdom	 set	 up	 the	 Postmaster	 General,	 and	nationalized	 inland	 telegraphs	 in	 1870s259.	 During	 the	 two	 World	 Wars,	 the	government	of	the	UK	controlled	coal,	railway	and	munitions	industries	to	deal	with	specific	issues	during	wartime260.	In	1926,	the	Central	Electricity	Board	was	established	 under	 the	 Electricity	 Act	 1926.	 The	 British	 Broadcasting	 Company	
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became	British	Broadcasting	Corporation	which	operated	under	a	Royal	Charter	in	 1927261.	 Afterwards,	 Bank	 of	 England,	 coal	 industry,	 cable	 and	 wireless,	domestic	 transportation,	 electricity	 and	 steel	 industry	 were	 nationalized,	 by	which	 state-owned	 enterprise	 had	 taken	 the	 fundamental	 position	 of	 the	 UK’s	economy262.	According	to	statistics,	 there	were	16,283	state-owned	enterprises	in	1979,	accounted	for	11.1%	of	the	GDP,	20%	of	total	investment	in	fixed	capital	and	8.1%	of	employment263.	Besides,	 after	 the	economic	 crisis	 in	2008,	 the	UK	government	 also	 nationalized	 (or	 partly)	 some	 falling	 banks	 such	 as	 Northern	Rock,	 Bradford	&	Bingley	 and	 the	Royal	 Bank	 of	 Scotland	 to	 stabilize	 financial	markets.		In	 other	 European	 countries,	 state-owned	 enterprises	 also	 had	 their	 own	positions,	 for	 instance,	 in	1978,	 the	 state-owned	enterprises	of	 Italy	 accounted	for	 24.7%	of	 the	GDP,	 47.1%	of	 total	 investment	 in	 fixed	 capital	 and	25.1%	of	employment264 .	 And	 in	 1980s,	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 of	 the	 Federal	Republic	of	Germany	accounted	for	12%	of	the	GDP,	13%	of	total	investment	in	fixed	capital	and	10%	of	employment265.	 		It	 is	worthwhile	 to	note	 that	 there	was	a	new	wave	of	nationalization	after	 the	2008	economic	crisis.	For	 instance,	Greece	nationalized	 the	Proton	Bank	 in	 the	midst	 of	 its	 financial	 crisis266;	 Iceland	 renationalized	 its	 leading	 commercial	banks:	 Kaupping,	 Landsbanki,	 Glitnir	 and	 Icebank267;	 and	 Ireland	 nationalized	Anglo	Irish	Bank	to	secure	its	viability268.	 		As	 concluded	 above,	 there	 are	 three	main	 purposes	 of	 setting	 up	 state-owned	
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enterprises:	 financial	 purpose	 to	 expand	national	 revenue;	political	 purpose	 to	safeguard	 national	 security	 by	 controlling	 important	 economic	 sectors;	 and	economic	purpose	to	promote	development	of	economy	by	State	investment	and	management	 directly.	 Before	 or	 at	 the	 initial	 stage	 of	 capitalism	 period,	 the	state-owned	 enterprises	 mainly	 aimed	 at	 expanding	 national	 revenue	 and	maintaining	securities.	Adjusting	activities	such	as	stabilizing	grain	market	and	balancing	supply	and	demand	also	occurred	sometimes	but	was	subordinated	to	the	 former	 two	 purposes	 apparently.	 	 Since	 the	 20th	 century,	 the	 purposes	 of	state-owned	 enterprises	 were	 mainly	 focused	 on	 adjusting	 national	 economy.	Implementing	 national	 economic	 policies	 and	 adjusting	 market	 are	 the	 major	objective	 of	 modern	 state-owned	 enterprises.	 They	 still	 have	 the	 functions	 of	expanding	national	revenue	and	safeguarding	security,	however,	these	functions	are	less	important	than	the	economic	one	relatively.	For	instance,	the	State	has	to	invest	 into	 some	 economic	 sectors	 and	 industries	 for	 long-term	 for	 overall	interests,	even	they	could	not	gain	profits	in	certain	periods.	 	 On	the	other	hand,	the	national	revenue	would	be	expanded	and	society	would	be	stable	if	national	economy	develops	healthily	under	the	adjustment	of	State.	 		Unlike	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 in	 capitalist	 countries,	 there	 was	 another	type	of	state-owned	enterprises	in	socialist	countries,	the	purposes	of	them	were	remarkably	 different	 from	 the	 capitalist	 one 269 .	 Although	 the	 socialist	state-owned	 enterprises	 also	 have	 financial,	 political	 and	 economic	 functions,	they	 are	 influenced	 and	 guided	 by	 communist	 theories.	 According	 to	 these	theories,	the	ultimate	goal	of	socialism	is	to	achieve	communism,	abolish	private	ownership	and	establish	common	ownership	of	the	means	of	production270.	 	 In	practice,	the	socialist	nationalization	was	regarded	as	common	ownership,	thus	state-owned	 economy	 took	 the	dominant	position	by	 seizing	 and	 transforming	private	economy,	and	state-owned	became	the	main	form	of	enterprises.	 	 		
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Afterwards,	 great	 changes	 occurred	 in	 these	 socialist	 countries.	 Differed	 from	Russian	and	East	European	countries	that	carried	out	large	scale	of	privatization,	China	 transformed	 its	 economy	 system	 to	 the	 socialist	 market	 economy	 with	Chinese	 characters	 and	 started	 reform	 its	 state-owned	 enterprises	 on	 its	 own	way.	 		
2. Debates	on	the	Nature	of	State-owned	Enterprises	
	Since	 1978,	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 reform	 experienced	 a	 series	 of	explorations	and	practices,	such	as	decentralizing	powers	and	giving	up	profits,	contractual	system	reform,	shareholding	system	reform	and	establishing	modern	enterprise	 system.	 In	 conclusion,	 all	 these	 reforms	 expected	 that	 state-owned	enterprises	would	become	independent	market	participants	through	separating	government	 functions	 from	 enterprise	 management	 and	 strengthening	enterprises	self-management.	 		There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 such	 reforms	 have	 their	 own	 positive	 significances	 in	certain	conditions,	however,	the	metaphysical	researches	also	important	as	well.	Basically,	 the	most	 fundamental	question	of	state-owned	enterprises	reform	 is:	“what	is	state-owned	enterprise?”	and	“what	is	not	state-owned	enterprise?”.	 		One	of	the	most	important	tasks	of	current	China’s	economic	reform	is	to	further	deepen	 the	 state-owned	 enterprise	 reform	 based	 on	 former	 experiences	 and	lessons,	and	the	top	priority	is	to	understand	and	define	the	nature	and	status	of	state-owned	enterprises.	
	
2.1 The	state-owned	enterprises	as	special	public	organizations		By	 comparing	 with	 government	 department,	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 are	more	similar	to	regular	enterprises	and	they	also	share	many	common	features	 	–	 that	 is	 the	 reason	why	 state-owned	enterprise	 are	 treated	 as	normal	market	participant.	 However,	 the	 understanding	 is	 superficial.	 In	 fact,	 state-owned	enterprises	and	ordinary	enterprises	are	fundamental	different.	
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2.1.1 The	characteristics	of	state-owned	enterprises	that	different	from	
regular	government	organization		State-owned	enterprise	is	an	organization	invested,	controlled	and	guided	by	the	State.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 their	 forms	 and	 names,	 the	 state-owned	enterprises	 have	 some	 characteristics	 of	 regular	 enterprises.	 The	 specific	characteristics	are	the	followings:		First,	the	organization	structure	of	state-owned	enterprises	differs	from	regular	government	 department.	 The	 state-owned	 enterprise	 always	 set	 up	 board	 of	directors	 and	 supervisors	 like	 regular	 enterprises,	 which	 are	 relatively	independent.	 		Second,	 by	 comparing	 with	 regular	 government	 department,	 the	 state-owned	enterprises	have	more	flexibility	 in	human	resources	and	finance.	 	 The	budget	of	 government	 department	 receives	 more	 strict	 control	 than	 state-owned	enterprises.	The	budget	of	government	department	is	approved	by	the	NPC,	and	the	surplus	should	return	 to	exchequer	as	a	general	rule.	The	 financial	policies	for	state-owned	enterprises	are	more	flexible,	 in	general	they	have	a	 long-term	appropriate	funds	system	instead	of	the	annual	budget	plan,	which	would	benefit	to	turn	from	deficits	to	profit	 for	those	loss-making	enterprises.	Besides,	only	a	few	brief	explanations	are	needed	for	the	state-owned	enterprises’	budget,	such	as	 financial	 condition,	 income	 and	 expenditure,	 bonds	 due	 for	 repayment	 and	other	relevant	supplementary	specifications,	because	it	is	hard	and	impossible	to	predict	the	commercial	demanding	for	a	long-term	project.		Third,	the	state-owned	enterprises	are	ruled	by	private	law	more	than	public	law	due	to	the	fact	that	they	have	much	more	civil	activities,	from	this	perspectives,	state-owned	 enterprises	 are	 similar	 to	 regular	 enterprises	 rather	 than	government	department.		Fourth,	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 own,	 control	 and	 manage	 more	 assets,	
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especially	 profitable	 assets	 than	 government	 department.	 Therefore,	 most	 of	them	 would	 obtain	 funds	 by	 loan,	 selling	 shares	 to	 government,	 providing	services	 and	 any	 other	 self-fund	 methods	 rather	 than	 receiving	 funds	 from	government	directly.	 		
2.1.2 The	difference	between	state-owned	enterprises	and	regular	
enterprises		The	bureaucracy	is	the	typical	form	of	government	department,	but	not	the	only	one.	Different	 government	departments	need	different	 organization	 structures.	In	fact,	structure	determines	function.	The	organization	structure	and	operating	method	of	public	institutions	depend	on	the	nature	of	their	public	functions.	For	instance,	 the	 individual	 regulatory	 agency,	 which	 was	 criticized	 for	 against	separation	 of	 powers,	 still	 could	 exist	 due	 to	 its	 public	 functions	 which	 need	professional	acknowledgement	and	experiences.	 		As	the	same	principle,	the	reason	why	the	form	of	enterprise	is	used	rather	than	regular	public	 institution	 is	because	 this	 form	would	 fulfil	 some	specific	public	functions	more	appropriate	due	to	its	relative	independent	structure	and	flexible	operating.	Hence	the	government	needs	to	adopt	the	more	flexible	and	efficient	form,	 which	 is	 the	 enterprise	 form,	 to	 deal	 with	 certain	 issues	 with	 more	enterprise	natures.		The	 public	 nature	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 could	 not	 be	 denied	 by	 its	 civil	activities.	 Even	 the	most	 typical	 public	 institutions	 would	 have	 civil	 activities,	own	 and	 manage	 profitable	 assets.	 For	 example,	 regular	 government	departments	would	gain	profits	by	 fine,	auction	and	providing	certain	services.	However,	these	governments	still	are	public	institutions	rather	than	independent	market	participants,	and	should	be	ruled	by	public	law.		As	 concluded	 above,	 the	 differences	 between	 state-owned	 enterprises	 and	regular	government	department	are	relative	and	formally,	and	their	uniformities	are	 absolute	 and	 fundamental.	 There	 are	 no	 clear	 distinctions	 among	different	
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public	 institutions.	 In	 addition,	 since	 1980s,	 with	 the	 emergence	 and	development	 of	 the	 theory	 of	 New	 Public	 Management,	 some	 scholars	 in	 this	area	believed	 that	 there	 is	no	 fundamental	difference	 in	management	between	public	and	private	sectors,	and	the	 theories	and	experiences	of	management	 in	private	 sectors	 could	 also	 be	 applied	 to	 public	 sectors.	 Therefore,	 in	 some	western	 countries,	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 could	 not	 be	 identified	accurately	 and	 be	 separated	 from	 regular	 government	 department	 completely.	For	 instance,	 the	Tennessee	Valley	Authority,	which	 is	 regarded	 as	 the	 biggest	state-owned	 enterprise	 in	 the	 United	 State,	 the	 Federal	 Deposit	 Insurance	Corporation	 and	 the	 Port	 Authority	 of	 New	 York	 and	 New	 Jersey	 are	 always	recognized	as	traditional	public	institutions	superficially.	 		
2.1.3 The	precondition	of	setting	up	the	state-owned	enterprises		In	which	condition	a	state-owned	enterprise	should	be	set	up	is	the	core	issue	of	state-owned	enterprises	 reform.	However,	 there	 are	no	 specific	 and	 applicable	consensus	 which	 could	 be	 achieved	 up	 to	 today,	 thought	 it	 has	 exerted	 all	scholars	and	experts’	strength	and	wisdom	in	this	area.	In	general,	setting	up	of	the	 state-owned	 enterprise	 is	 to	 protect	 and	 promote	 public	 interests,	 but	 the	purposes	 of	 other	 regular	 public	 institutions	 are	 the	 same	 as	well.	 The	 public	interest	 is	 a	 vague	 concept	 anyway,	 and	 has	 different	 explanations	 under	different	 conditions.	Thus	 it	 is	difficult	 to	define	 the	precondition	of	 setting	up	the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 accurately.	 Generally,	 to	 determine	 in	 which	condition	should	a	state-owned	enterprise	be	set	up	 to	protect	public	 interests	would	 through	 public	 selection,	 to	 confirm	 whether	 it	 is	 appropriate	 and	 by	which	method.	 Simply	 speaking,	 it	 depends	 on	 democratic	 process.	 Therefore,	setting	up	 a	 state-owned	 enterprise	 in	democratic	 countries	has	 to	be	base	on	legislations	instead	of	independent	actions.	 		Although	 the	 judgment	 on	 the	 precondition	 of	 setting	 up	 the	 state-owned	enterprises	from	practice	perspective	is	relative,	vogue	and	subjective,	it	still	has	practical	 significances	 for	 those	 countries	 lack	 of	 public	 opinion	 expression	mechanism.	 It	 is	 worthwhile	 to	 note	 that,	 the	 Annual	 Budget	 Message	 to	 the	
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Congress	of	Fiscal	Year	1948	of	 the	President	Truman	of	 the	United	States	has	listed	 four	 principles	 about	 government	 corporation,	which	 is	worth	 reference	for	 this	 issue.	 The	 principles	 are:	 “the	 corporate	 form	 of	 organization	 is	peculiarly	 adapted	 to	 the	 administration	 of	 governmental	 programs	which	 are	predominantly	of	 a	 commercial	 character--those	which	are	 revenue	producing,	are	 at	 least	 potentially	 self-sustaining,	 and	 involve	 a	 large	 number	 of	business-type	transactions	with	the	public”.271		
2.2 The	normative	significance	of	the	state-owned	enterprises	as	special	
public	organizations	
	In	 fact,	 the	 state-owned	enterprises	 are	 the	extensions	of	 government,	 and	 the	nature	and	functions	of	government	determines	state-owned	enterprise’s	nature	and	 functions.	 The	 modern	 state	 should	 be	 the	 combination	 of	 different	organizations	 fulfilling	public	 functions,	and	 the	state-owned	enterprise	 is	only	one	of	them	–	adopting	the	enterprise	from	is	to	fulfil	public	functions	easily.	The	priority	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 is	 to	 fulfil	 public	 functions	 rather	 than	gaining	 profits,	 since	 profits	 could	 be	 provided	 by	 private	 sectors	 as	well.	 The	word	 of	 enterprise	 could	 have	 more	 explanations	 than	 just	 a	 profit-gained	economic	 organization.	 For	 instance,	 in	 other	 Chinese	 language	 districts,	 the	state-owned	 enterprises	 are	 called	 “state-owned	 undertakings”	 in	 Taiwan,	 and	“state-owned	institutions”	in	Hong	Kong.	Furthermore,	it	is	not	necessary	to	fulfil	government	 functions	 through	 bureaucracy	 and	 traditional	 and	 mandatory	public	activities	only.	 		In	a	word,	the	state-owned	enterprise	is	a	special	form	of	public	institutions,	and	it	 is	a	public	agency	with	enterprise	 form	and	differs	 from	regular	government	department,	 that	 easily	 fulfil	 the	 functions	 of	 protecting	 and	 promoting	necessary	 and	 major	 public	 interests.	 The	 public	 natures	 of	 the	 state-owned	enterprises	 could	 be	 concluded	 as:	 it	 is	 owned	 by	 government;	 the	 ultimate	owner	is	the	whole	people;	the	purposes	of	it	are	to	promote	national	economy	
																																								 																				 	
271 Harry S. Truman. 1947. Annual Budget Message to the Congress of Fiscal Year 1948. See link: <	
http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2046&st=&st1=>. 
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and	welfare;	the	function	of	it	is	to	provide	public	facilities;	and	the	regulations	of	it	are	the	public	rules	and	regulations	based	on	whole	citizens	participant.	 		
2.2.1 The	legitimate	purpose	and	the	proportionality	principle	of	setting	
up	a	state-owned	enterprises		From	 the	 perspective	 of	 legitimacy,	 the	 primary,	 direct	 and	 only	 purpose	 of	setting	 up	 a	 state-owned	 enterprise	 is	 to	 protect	 and	 promote	 major	 public	interests,	 and	 profitability	 is	 legal	 only	 in	 the	 case	 of	 reducing	 cost	 and	improving	effective.	Then	the	state-owned	enterprises	whose	direct	and	primary	purposes	 are	 profitability	 rather	 than	 public	 interests	 should	 be	 closed;	 by	contrast,	 they	 should	 be	 established	 regardless	 profit	 and	 loss.	 From	 the	perspective	 of	 proportionality	 principle:	 first,	 the	 necessity.	 In	 certain	market,	the	 state-owned	 enterprise	 may	 not	 be	 necessary.	 If	 market	 can	 be	 met	 and	satisfied	by	the	private	sector	and	market	mechanism	itself,	goods	and	services	should	 not	 be	 provided	 by	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises.	 In	 situation	 where	market	cannot	be	satisfied,	the	state-owned	enterprises	and	other	methods	such	as	 Non-governmental	 Organizations	 (NGOs),	 government	 procurement	 and	government	 subsidies	 could	 enter	 market.	 In	 a	 word,	 the	 state-owned	enterprises	should	only	be	set	up	when	it	is	the	necessary	and	only	mechanism	to	meet	demand.	Second,	whether	the	cost	of	setting	up	a	state-owned	enterprise	is	proportional	to	the	public	interests	also	should	be	considered.	 		
2.2.2 Setting	up	and	closing	the	state-owned	enterprise	should	according	
to	law		The	state-owned	enterprises	should	be	set	up	according	to	 law	that	enacted	by	congress,	rather	than	government	department	and	the	enterprise	itself,	and	only	congress	 could	 close	 existed	 state-owned	 enterprises	 by	 direct	 or	 clear	authorization.	 The	 closure	 process	would	 be	 reviewed	 by	 congress	 and	 under	strict	supervision,	and	general	and	massive	withdraw	of	state-owned	enterprises	and	assets	allocation	should	through	referendum.		
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2.2.3 The	scope	of	activities	of	state-owned	enterprise	should	defined	by	
law		The	state-owned	enterprises	should	be	strictly	 limited	to	 its	statutory	scope	as	regular	 government	 department	 rather	 than	 free	 acting	 of	 private	 enterprises.	The	 public	 interests	 that	 the	 state-owned	 enterprise	would	 achieve	 should	 be	confirmed	by	legislation,	which	determines	that	each	state-owned	enterprise	has	its	specific	scope	of	activities.	Besides,	the	funds	of	the	state-owned	enterprises	belong	to	public,	and	it	could	not	be	spent	freely,	since	which	would	harm	public	property	and	operating	rights.	 	 		
2.2.4 Statutory	organization	structure	and	human	resource		The	organization	structure	of	the	state-owned	enterprises	should	be	base	on	law.	Despite	 of	 adopting	 enterprise	 form,	 its	 staffs	 still	 belong	 to	 civil	 servant	 and	should	be	regulated	by	the	Civil	Servant	Law272,	and	their	salaries	are	controlled	by	congress	and	relevant	legislations	except	of	professional	manager	that	cannot	enjoy	civil	servant’s	welfares.	The	illegal	activities	of	enterprises’	staff	would	be	punished	as	the	same	as	civil	servant	of	regular	government	department.	 		
2.2.5 Statutory	financial	system		Although	the	budget	and	appropriate	funds	of	state-owned	enterprises	are	more	flexible	 than	regular	government	department,	 they	are	still	restricted	by	public	financial	 system.	 From	 the	 perspective	 of	 formativeness,	 the	 profits	 of	state-owned	 enterprises	 should	 delivery	 to	 exchequer	 and	 public	 financial	system	undertakes	legal	and	reasonable	losses,	and	the	system	of	responsibility	for	 own	 profits	 and	 losses	 should	 be	 forbidden.	 In	 situation	 of	 under	 strict	auditing	 and	 supervision,	 state-owned	 enterprises	 could	 use	 profits	 directly	 to	cover	 expense	 and	 expand	 operating.	 Anyway,	 the	 tax	 and	 rent	 may	 not	 be	necessary,	but	the	profits	could	not	be	distributed	by	the	state-owned	enterprise	
																																								 																				 	
272 Y{£ƀCivil Servant Law. 2006.  
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itself	 only.	 By	 contrast,	 in	 current	 China,	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 could	manage	their	profits	and	incomes	after	paying	certain	tax	and	rents.		
2.2.6 The	state-owned	enterprises	should	be	limited	by	The	Institutional	
Law	 		The	 private	 activities	 of	 the	 sate-owned	 enterprises	 still	 belong	 to	 public	administration.	 The	 Institutional	 Law	 ruled	 that	 public	 institutions	 should	respect	the	basic	rights	of	citizens,	and	treat	them	equally,	which	should	remain	unchanged	no	matter	what	 form	 the	public	 institution	would	adopt.	Therefore,	state-owned	 enterprise	 should	 obey	 the	 institutional	 obligations	 when	 their	private	activities	against	them.		
2.3 The	strategic	significance	of	reaffirming	the	pubic	nature	of	
state-owned	enterprises	for	China’s	state-owned	enterprises	reform	
	Since	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 are	 more	 similar	 to	 regular	 enterprises,	people	 always	 concentrate	 on	 its	 private	 characters	 and	 emphasize	 its	self-management	and	 independent	status,	and	neglect	 its	public	characters	and	supervisions	 it	 should	 receive,	 which	 would	 result	 in	 the	 alienation	 of	state-owned	 enterprises,	 make	 them	 become	 to	 an	 interest	 group	 of	self-authority,	 self-duplication,	 self-expansion	 and	 self-profitability,	 and	 harm	public	 interests.	 The	 famous	 aphorism	of	 Germany	 legal	 system	 “Flucht	 in	 das	Privatrercht”	or	“Fluct	in	die	öffentlichte	Stiftung”,	which	describes	the	situation	that	 the	 private	 economic	 administration	 institutions	 such	 as	 the	 state-owned	enterprises	 would	 evade	 its	 public	 characters	 and	 relevant	 restrictions	 by	emphasizing	 its	 private	 characters	 and	 independent	 legal	 person	 status.	Specifically,	 government	 department	 would	 avoid	 supervisions	 by	 adopting	enterprise	form,	which	lead	to	the	failure	of	public	functions	and	waste	of	public	resources;	and	state-owned	enterprise	would	become	the	back	yard	gardens	of	retired	 civil	 servants.	 For	 example,	 there	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	 public	 functions	could	not	be	fulfilled,	in	the	situation	that	on	one	hand,	the	financial	obligations	of	 national	 revenue	 still	 exist;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 staff	 of	 state-owned	
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enterprises	lack	of	strict	regulation	by	the	Civil	Servant	Law,	ethics	requirements	and	appropriate	supervision	mechanism.		Moreover,	 the	 state-owned	enterprises	would	avoid	public	 restrictions	 such	as	government	 budget,	 audit,	 human	 resource	 and	 procurement,	 by	 adopting	private	 regulations.	 In	 1945,	 the	Government	 Corporation	 Control	 Act273	 of	 the	United	 States	 was	 promulgated	 based	 on	 the	 same	 reasons	 and	 situations,	because	during	that	period,	many	government	departments	are	given	enterprise	status	 just	 for	 simple	 purchase	 or	 sale	 activities,	 or	 try	 to	 get	 rid	 of	 regular	control	 and	 supervision	 from	 government,	 or	 setting	 up	 a	 new	 organization	according	 to	 the	 Company	 Law	 is	 much	 more	 easier	 than	 basing	 on	 strict	legislative	process	of	congress.	 		Therefore,	it	is	significant	to	review	the	nature	and	status	of	China’s	state-owned	enterprises	 according	 to	 its	 public	 functions	 and	 characters.	 From	 this	perspective,	 there	 are	 still	 many	 misunderstandings	 about	 the	 basic	 issues	 of	China’s	state-owned	enterprises	reform	currently,	which	are	the	followings:		
2.3.1 Is	the	independent	status	of	market	must	be	the	goal	of	reform?		In	China,	as	 the	 long-term	and	high-centralized	planned	economy	damaged	 the	autonomy	 and	 flexibility	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 severely,	 the	 reform	concentrated	on	giving	independent	market	status	to	state-owned	enterprises	at	the	 beginning,	 and	 which	 was	 agreed	 by	 almost	 all	 scholars	 and	 experts274.	However,	this	reform	strategy	could	work	only	in	specific	period	and	conditions,	for	example,	decentralizing	powers	and	giving	up	profits	have	achieved	certain	effects	 only	 in	 the	 special	 condition	 that	 state-owned	 enterprises	 were	completely	 controlled	 by	 government.	 Facts	 have	 proved	 that,	 current	 China’s	estate-owned	enterprises	obtain	and	enjoy	many	of	privileges	and	advantages	at	the	 same	 time	 they	 could	 avoid	many	 restrictions	 and	 obligations	 they	 should	
																																								 																				 	
273 United States. 1945. Government Corporation Control Act 
274 ɒUȀ1995±ō,œs÷įɳƱŬú¦ɉ”s~ 1995ðǕŎKesha Guo. 1995. 
“The Models and Approaches of State Ownership System Reform”. Economic Research 1995, Vol. 1. 
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receive	 by	 emphasizing	 their	 independent	 status,	 which	 turn	 the	 state-owned	enterprise	to	an	 interest	group	that	could	consume	public	resources	and	in	the	disguise	 of	 protecting	 and	 promoting	 public	 interest,	 and	 government	 would	cover	their	losses	and	internal	interest	group	divides	profits.	 		In	addition,	this	idea	would	also	provide	the	potential	theoretical	foundations	for	blind	 expansion	 of	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 to	 some	 degree.	 As	 the	independent	subject	of	market,	 the	state-owned	enterprise	could	expand	freely	without	 any	 restrictions,	 which	 lead	 to	 a	 series	 of	 harmful	 consequences.	 For	example,	during	China’s	economic	 stimulus	program,	most	of	RMB	 four	 trillion	Yuan	 (about	USD	571billion	 at	 the	 time	of	writing)	were	 given	 to	 state-owned	enterprises275,	 thus	 they	could	expand	 in	 irregular	 speed.	They	even	enter	 real	estate	industry	that	is	out	of	their	core	business	scope	but	has	generous	profits,	which	lead	to	the	sharply	increase	of	prices.	Meanwhile,	the	blind	expansions	of	state-owned	 enterprises	 also	 weaken	 private	 sectors’	 development,	 and	enhanced	 monopoly	 and	 reduced	 free	 competition.	 It	 is	 true	 that	 the	state-owned	 enterprises	 should	 have	 more	 independence	 and	 flexibility	 than	regular	government	department,	but	must	be	under	strict	supervision	of	public	law.	 In	 fact,	 the	 idea	 that	 state-owned	 enterprises	 should	 and	 must	 have	complete	 independent	 status	 of	 market	 denied	 the	 public	 characters	 of	state-owned	enterprises.	It	would	improve	enterprises’	operating	under	China’s	specific	 conditions	 and	 in	 short-term	 period,	 but	 also	 provides	 the	 strong	excuses	 for	public	power	“Flucht	 in	das	Privatrercht”,	avoiding	restrictions	and	obligations	from	public	law.	This	idea	is	the	major	and	most	dangerous	idea	of	all	misunderstandings	during	China’s	state-owned	enterprises	reform.		
2.3.2 Does	the	government	functions	have	to	be	separated	from	
enterprise	management?		Separating	government	functions	from	enterprise	management	is	also	one	of	the	main	streams	of	China’s	state-owned	enterprises	reform.	The	positive	effects	of	it	
																																								 																				 	
275 üï Ping zhang (Director of China’s Development and Reform Committee at that time) stated that 
at the press conference of the Second Session of the Eleventh NPC, on 6th March 2009.  
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could	not	be	 ignored,	especially	 in	China.	 In	 fact,	however,	 it	 is	very	difficult	 to	undertake	it.	In	other	word,	to	achieve	the	task	of	separating,	it	is	not	necessary	to	 give	 legal	 person	 status	 to	 enterprises,	 but	 could	 turn	 enterprises	 to	subsidiary	 organization	 of	 government	 department	 instead.	 Moreover,	 the	combination	 of	 enterprises	 and	 government	 department	 is	 needed	 indeed	 in	some	situations.	For	examples,	the	United	States	Postal	Service	was	transferred	from	 Post	 Office	 Department	 directly,	 and	 the	 Tennessee	 Valley	 Authority	combines	functions	of	production	and	administration,	which	would	reduce	costs	and	strengthen	government	department’s	responsibility.	 		The	 original	 intention	 of	 separating	 government	 functions	 from	 enterprise	management	 is	 to	 provide	 opportunities	 equal	 to	 state-owned	 enterprises	 for	other	ownership	 subjects	 in	 competition.	However,	 the	 fact	 is	 the	 innumerable	links	between	government	department	and	state-owned	enterprise	always	exist	no	 matter	 if	 they	 are	 separated,	 such	 as	 post	 and	 communications	 areas.	Furthermore,	 the	 government	 department	 and	 state-owned	 enterprises	 are	 all	belong	 to	 public	 institutions,	 and	 they	 would	 easily	 enter	 into	 alliance,	 thus	non-state	 enterprises	 could	 not	 obtain	 equally	 status	 and	 opportunities	 to	compete	at	all.	 		
2.3.3 The	perspective	of	property	right	or	public	interests?		Reforming	the	state-owned	enterprises	from	the	perspective	of	property	right	is	another	 popular	 idea,	 and	 relevant	 reforms	 have	 also	 achieved	 certain	 effects.	However,	from	the	perspective	of	formativeness,	the	major	and	basic	purpose	of	setting	 up	 state-owned	 enterprises	 is	 to	 fulfil	 public	 functions,	which	 is	 public	law	 logic	 rather	 than	 the	 private	 law	 logic	 of	 acting	 as	 agency	 of	 state-owned	property.	 According	 to	 the	 second	 logic,	 as	 the	 agent	 of	 state-owned	property,	the	 state-owned	 enterprise	 could	 do	 anything	 they	 want	 only	 if	 they	 could	maintain	and	increase	property	values.	And	based	on	the	first	logic,	the	functions	of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 are	 to	 fulfill	 public	 functions	 but	 maintaining	 and	increasing	 state-owned	 property	 values,	 in	 fact,	 the	 state-owned	 enterprise	 is	just	the	method	of	fulfilling	public	functions.	In	practice,	state-owned	enterprises	
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would	 get	 losses	 instead	 of	maintaining	 and	 increasing	 values	 by	 undertaking	some	specific	policies	 in	some	situations,	and	need	subsidies	from	government.	Therefore,	 the	 state-owned	 enterprises	 reform	 should	 be	 undertaken	 from	 the	perspective	of	public	interests	and	functions	rather	than	property	right,	and	that	is	 also	 the	 reason	 why	 Regulations	 of	 State-owned	 Assets	 Supervision	 was	denounced	widely.	 		
2.3.4 Is	the	“state-owned”	must	better	than	“state-operated”?		Similarly,	 turning	 state-operated	 enterprises	 to	 state-owned	 enterprises	 was	considered	 improvement	 of	 reform	 as	 separating	 government	 functions	 from	enterprises	 management.	 Nevertheless,	 it	 also	 has	 many	 disadvantages.	 The	“state-operated”	 means	 that	 government	 has	 inescapable	 responsibilities	 for	managing	state-owned	enterprises	 to	provide	better	public	goods	and	services,	and	the	“state-owned”	logic	may	turn	the	government	to	the	“owner”	rather	than	protector	 of	 public	 interests	 ultimately.	 In	 “state-operated”	 model,	 the	government	 only	 have	 the	 management	 right	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises,	 and	they	are	owned	by	the	whole	people.	 	
	
2.4 Epilogue	
	For	the	reason	of	the	public	characters	of	state-owned	enterprise,	actions	such	as	setting	up	and	operating	of	them	have	to	be	under	general	restrictions	the	same	as	 other	 public	 institutions:	 first,	 setting	 up	 and	 operating	 state-owned	enterprises	 should	 follow	 the	 principles	 of	 limited	 and	 effective	 government;	second,	it	should	be	through	democrat	process.		Of	course,	the	state-owned	enterprises	should	have	necessary	independent	and	flexibility	 to	 some	 degree.	 In	 fact,	 current	 China’s	 state-owned	 enterprises	reform	faces	a	kind	of	paradox,	which	is	the	state-owned	enterprises	have	to	be	restricted	by	public	law	as	giving	them	necessary	independence	and	flexibility.	 	
	
3. ±ɄŴɇ(Guo	Jin	Min	Tui)	–	Is	It	a	Trend?	
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±ɄŴɇ(Guo	 Jin	Min	Tui)	means	 that	 the	state	advances	as	 the	private	sector	retreats	 in	 Chinese	 economy.	After	massive	 reforms	 since	 early	 1990s,	 China’s	state-owned	 enterprises	 have	 exited	 from	 competitive	 areas	 gradually.	 The	
Decisions	on	Major	Issues	Concerning	the	Reform	and	Development	of	State-owned	
Enterprises	 of	 the	 CPC276	 that	 was	 issued	 in	 1999,	 called	 that	 state-owned	enterprises	should	be	limited	to	important	industries	and	core	areas	that	relate	to	 lifeline	 of	 national	 economy.	 According	 to	 this	 decision,	 state-owned	enterprises	have	taken	absolute	dominated	position	in	such	industries	and	areas	progressively.	 Besides,	 from	 2003	 when	 the	 State-owned	 Assets	 Management	and	 Supervision	 Commission	 was	 established	 to	 2013,	 the	 number	 of	 central	state-owned	 enterprises	 (which	 are	 invested	 and	 controlled	 by	 central	government	directly)	has	been	reduced	from	196	to	113277,	and	the	government	want	 to	 keep	 the	 target	 amount	 at	 below	 100	 in	 the	 future278.	With	 the	 rapid	expansion	of	state-owned	enterprises	by	government	encouragement,	especially	after	economic	crisis	in	2008,	some	scholars	claimed	that	government	continued	to	prop	up	state-owned	enterprises	whilst	letting	private	enterprises	fall	by	the	way	side,	which	named	“Guo	Jin	Min	Tui”279.		The	government	keeps	prudent	on	these	arguments.	At	an	economic	conference	in	 2009,	 the	 director	 of	 China’s	 National	 Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 said	 that	 the	phenomenon	 of	 “Guo	 Jin	 Min	 Tui”	 that	 people	 claimed	 does	 not	 exist	 in	 the	economy	 as	 a	 whole,	 by	 quoting	 statistics	 from	 2005	 to	 2008280.	 While	 local	officers	 in	 Shanxi	 Province	 where	 private	 coalmines	 had	 been	 nationalized	described	what	had	happened	was	not	“Guo	Jin	Min	Tui”	but	8Ʉ|ɇ(You	Jin	Lie	Tui)281,	and	these	movements	was	an	attempt	to	improve	safety	conditions282.	
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the Reform and Development of State-owned Enterprises of the CPC. 1999. 
277 According to the statistics from the website of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission of China, see link : <www.sasac.gov.cn> 1st December 2013. 
278 According to the plan of State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, see link: 
<www.sasac.gov.cn>. 
279 Unirule Institute of Economics. 2011. The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned 
Enterprises. See link: < http://www.unirule.org.cn/>. 
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281 8Ʉ|ɇWhich means the excellent enter and the inferior withdraw. 
	 148	
Another	defence	from	the	Bureau	Chief	of	China’s	Civil	Aviation	Administration,	which	 argued	 that	 mergers	 and	 acquisitions	 in	 the	 aviation	 sector	 was	 a	testament	 to	 “market	 behaviour”,	 and	 in	 the	 best	 interest	 of	 the	 industry	 as	 a	whole	 (most	 of	 China’s	 private	 airlines	were	 acquired	 by	 state-owned	 airlines	during	these	mergers	and	acquisitions)283.	 		However,	the	fact	is	the	phenomenon	of	“Guo	Jin	Min	Tui”	does	exist	in	specific	sectors,	 although	not	 exist	 in	 the	economy	as	 a	whole.	This	 structural	 “Guo	 Jin	Min	Tui”	 set	 up,	maintained	 and	 strengthened	monopoly	 in	 specific	 industries,	and	encroached	on	legal	properties	of	private	enterprises,	which	harmed	market	orders	and	private	economies	severely.	 		
3.1 The	structural	“Guo	Jin	Min	Tui”	
	It	seemed	that	the	claim	by	the	director	of	China’s	National	Bureau	of	Statistics	that	the	statistics	do	not	support	people’s	claim	of	“Guo	Jin	Min	Tui”	is	justified.	By	 observing	 China’s	 Statistical	 Yearbooks	 of	 recent	 years,	 the	 proportion	 of	state-owned	enterprises	is	reducing	year	by	year	from	1999	to	2009	(see	chart	1	and	2).	 In	addition,	 the	number	of	 registered	private	businesses	grew	by	more	than	30%	a	year	between	2000	and	2009	according	 to	China	Macro	Finance,	a	research	 firm	 in	 New	 York	 (see	 chart	 3).	 And	 non	 state-owned	 enterprises	account	 for	 75%-80%	 of	 profit	 in	 Chinese	 industry	 and	 90%	 in	 non-financial	services	according	to	Keywise	Capital	Management	(see	chart	4).		
Chart	1.	The	proportion	of	state-owned	enterprise’	industrial	output	(RMB	
billion	Yuan)284		Year	 Whole	 industrial	output	 State-owned	enterprises	 industrial	output	 Proportion	
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1999	 7270.704	 3557.118	 49%	2000	 8567.366	 4055.437	 47%	2001	 9544.898	 4240.849	 44%	2002	 11077.648	 4517.896	 41%	2003	 14227.122	 5340.79	 38%	2004	 20172.219	 7022.899	 35%	2005	 25161.95	 8374.992	 33%	2006	 31658.896	 9891.045	 31%	2007	 40517.713	 11968.565	 30%	2008	 50744.825	 14395.002	 28%	2009	 54831.142	 14663.000	 27%		
Chart	2.	The	proportion	of	fund	usage	of	state-owned	enterprises285	 (RMB	
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Chart	4287.	
		Although	the	phenomenon	of	“Guo	Jin	Min	Tui”	does	not	exist	in	industries	as	a	
																																								 																				 	
287 “Entrepreneurship in China: Let a million flowers bloom”. The Economist 12th March 2011. 
	 151	
whole,	it	does	happen	in	some	specific	sectors.	According	to	the	Guiding	Opinions	
on	 Promoting	 State-owned	 Assets	 Adjustment	 and	 State-owned	 Enterprises	
Restructuring 288 	 of	 the	 State-owned	 Assets	 Management	 and	 Supervision	
Commission,	 the	 scope	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 was	 limited	 to	 important	industries	 and	 core	 sectors	 relate	 to	 lifeline	 of	 national	 economy,	 which	 was	divided	 into	 11	 sectors:	 coal	 mining	 and	 washing,	 petroleum	 and	 natural	 gas	exploitation,	 ferrous	 metal	 mining,	 non-ferrous	 metal	 mining,	 petroleum	 and	nuclear	 fuel	 processing,	 ferrous	metal	 smelting	 and	 rolling,	 non-ferrous	metal	smelting	 and	 rolling,	 transportation	 equipment	 manufacture,	 production	 and	supply	of	electricity	and	heating,	production	and	supply	of	gas,	and	production	and	supply	of	water289.	 	 		According	 to	 the	 statistics	 from	1999	 to	 2009,	 the	 proportions	 of	 state-owned	enterprises	 in	 fund	 usage,	 industrial	 added	 value	 and	 industrial	 output	 have	increased	in	above	11	sectors,	which	could	prove	that	a	structural	“Guo	Jin	Min	Tui”	ad	indeed	happened.		From	 the	 perspective	 of	 fund	 occupation,	 the	 state-owned	 proportion	 in	petroleum	and	natural	gas	exploitation	industry	has	raised	from	96.3%	in	2005	to	98.6%	in	2006,	and	up	to	95.7%	in	2009	after	a	fall	in	2008.	In	electricity	and	heating	 production	 and	 supply	 industry,	 the	 proportion	 of	 state-owned	enterprises	 has	 raised	 from	 85.8%	 in	 2005	 to	 88.2%	 in	 2008.	 And	 the	proportions	in	ferrous	metal	smelting	and	rolling,	gas	production	and	supply	and	transportation	equipment	manufacture	industries	has	raised	from	56.7%,	57.1%	and	51.6%	in	2008	to	57.5%,	68.7%	and	52.9%	in	2009290.		From	 the	 perspective	 of	 industrial	 output,	 the	 state-owned	 proportion	 in	petroleum	and	natural	gas	exploitation	industry	has	raised	from	90.5%	in	2005	to	 98.9%	 in	 2006,	 and	 raised	 from	 91.6%	 in	 2008	 from	 89.3%	 in	 2005	 in	
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electricity	and	heating	production	and	supply	industry291.		The	 statistics	 of	 added	 industrial	 value	 also	 proved	 that	 the	 state-owned	proportions	in	electricity	and	heating	production	and	supply	and	petroleum	and	natural	 gas	 exploitation	 industries,	 which	 has	 raised	 from	 87%	 and	 88.9%	 in	2005	 to	 88.8%	 and	 99.2%	 in	 2008.	 Besides,	 the	 proportion	 in	 petroleum	processing	industry	has	risen	from	59.5%	in	2006	to	61.7%	in	2007292.		
3.2 Relevant	cases		Apart	 from	 statistics,	 some	 typical	 cases	 that	 affected	 regular	 competition	mechanism	also	proved	the	grave	consequences	of	“Guo	Jin	Min	Tui”.	 		
3.2.1 Setting	up,	maintaining	and	expanding	monopoly	in	petroleum	
sector		In	 current	 China,	 the	 strong	 administrative	 monopoly	 existed	 in	 petroleum	sector,	and	the	government	authorized	the	absolute	dominated	position	to	three	oligarchs:	 Petro	 China,	 which	 concentrate	 on	 petroleum	 and	 natural	 gas	exploitation;	 Sinopec,	which	 concentrate	 on	 crude	 oil	 processing	 and	 chemical	products;	 and	 CNOOC	 that	mainly	 concentrate	 on	 offshore	 oil	 exploitation	 and	processing.	All	of	these	three	enterprises	have	controlled	more	than	one	stage	in	production	 and	 distribution	 process,	 and	 basically	 monopolized	 the	 whole	China’s	petroleum	industry.		(1) The	monopoly	in	wholesales	petroleum	products	process	 		After	 the	 China’s	 Department	 of	 Petroleum	 Industry	 was	 dismissed	 in	 1988,	Petro	China,	Sinopec	and	CNOOC	have	taken	over	relevant	management	in	their	own	 areas.	 The	 Plan	 of	 Institutional	 Reform	 of	 the	 State	 Council293	 that	 was	
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approved	by	the	NPC	in	1998	decided	to	strategic	restructure	China’s	petroleum	and	 petrochemical	 industries,	 and	 established	 Petro	 China	 and	 Sinopec	 by	 a	serious	of	mergers	and	acquisitions.	Then	the	State	Council	issued	the	Decisions	
on	 Clean-up	 and	 Rectification	 Small-sized	 Oil	 Refinery	 and	 Standardized	 the	
Circulation	Process	 of	 Crude	Oil	 and	Petroleum	Product294	 in	1999,	which	 ruled	that	all	petroleum	products	 from	oil	 refineries	have	 to	be	wholesaled	by	Petro	China	 and	 Sinopec	 only295.	 Besides,	 the	 National	 Economy	 and	 Commercial	Commission	 also	 issued	 relevant	 rules	 to	 confirm	 no	 other	 enterprises	 and	organizations	but	Petro	China	and	Sinopec	could	wholesale	petroleum	products.	 		(2) The	monopoly	in	supply	and	distribution	process		The	 big	 three	 (Petro	 China,	 Sinopec	 and	 CNOOC)	 also	monopolized	 the	 supply	and	distribution	process.	 In	2003,	 the	Railway	Department	of	China	 issued	 the	
Notice	 on	 Strengthening	 Management	 of	 Petroleum	 Transportation296,	 which	clearly	stipulated	that	the	railway	department	would	only	accept	applications	for	petroleum	 transportation	 from	 Petro	 China	 and	 Sinopec	 only297.	 In	 addition,	according	 to	 the	Plan	 of	 Expanding	 Ethanol	 Gasoline	 for	Motor	 Vehicles	 Pilot298	that	was	issued	by	the	State	Development	and	Reform	Commission	in	2008,	only	Petro	 China	 and	 Sinopec	 have	 the	 right	 to	 produce	 and	 supply	 ethanol	gasoline299.	 And	 in	 Heilongjiang	 province,	 the	 local	 government	 issued	 the	
Regulations	 on	 Popularizing	 and	 Using	 Ethanol	 Gasoline	 for	 Motor	 Vehicles300,	which	 ruled	 that	 the	 ethanol	 gasoline	 would	 be	 sold	 only	 by	 Petro	 China	Heilongjiang	branch	since	2004.		
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(3) The	monopoly	in	importation	process		Currently,	 there	 are	 5	 state-owned	 and	 22	 private	 enterprises	who	 could	 take	petroleum	importation	business.	The	5	state-owned	enterprises	are	the	big	three,	Sinochem	and	Zhuhai	Zhenrong	Company;	and	half	of	private	enterprises	have	state	background301.	In	practice,	any	private	enterprises	must	have	certifications	issued	by	Petro	China	or	 Sinopec	 to	pass	 custom	and	apply	 for	 transportation,	and	 the	 petroleum	 they	 imported	 have	 to	 sale	 to	 Petro	 China	 and	 Sinopec.	Therefore,	 it	 is	very	hard	for	private	enterprises	to	take	petroleum	importation	business	even	though	they	have	relevant	qualification	and	quota.	 		(4) The	monopoly	in	storage	process		Even	 in	 the	storage	process	 the	private	enterprises	were	excluded.	Since	2003,	China	 started	 to	 build	 strategic	 oil	 reserve	 base,	 however,	 private	 enterprises	that	 take	 half	 of	 whole	 petroleum	 retail	 market	 were	 excluded	 due	 to	 the	government	 claimed	 that	 “they	 (private	 enterprises)	 are	 difficult	 to	 be	supervised”302.	By	contrast,	the	big	three	could	participate	at	the	beginning.	 		Obviously,	 excluding	 private	 enterprises	 by	 setting	 up	monopoly	 is	man-made	and	 administrative	 monopoly	 although	 some	 processes	 in	 petroleum	 industry	have	 natural	 monopolistic	 character,	 which	 has	 brought	 disastrous	consequences	 to	 private	 economies.	 According	 to	 statistics,	 in	 early	 2008,	two-third	 of	 663	 private	 wholesale	 petroleum	 enterprises	 were	 closed	 or	bankrupted,	 one-third	 of	 45064	 private	 petro	 stations	 were	 closed	 and	 more	than	 10000	 get	 loss.	 Before	 1998,	 85%	 of	 petroleum	 product	 market	 was	occupied	by	private	enterprises,	and	they	paid	RMB	100	billion	Yuan	tax,	which	is	less	than	RMB	20	billion	Yuan	at	present303.	 		
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3.2.2 Illegal	mergers	between	monopolistic	oligarchs	in	communication	
sector		According	to	Article	21	of	China’s	Anti-monopoly	Law,	mergers	between	central	state-owned	enterprises	must	report	 to	anti-monopoly	authorities304.	However,	most	 of	 them	 did	 not	 do	 it,	 and	 the	 merger	 between	 China	 Network	Communications	(CNC)	and	China	Unicom	is	the	typical	case	of	them.	 		In	24th	May	2008,	the	Department	of	Industry	and	Information	Technology,	the	State	 Development	 and	 Reform	 Commission	 and	 the	 Department	 of	 Finance	jointly	issued	the	Announcement	of	Deeping	Communication	Structure	Reform305,	which	planned	to	merge	six	communication	enterprises	into	three:	China	Unicom	merges	with	CNC;	China	Telecom	merges	with	China	Satcom	and	get	the	CDMA	business	from	CNC;	and	China	Mobil	merges	with	China	Railcom306.		In	 15th	 October	 2008,	 the	 China	 Unicom	 and	 CNC	 announced	 that	 they	 were	merged	 officially,	 however,	 this	 merger	 did	 not	 meet	 the	 requirements	 of	anti-monopoly	law	that	was	enacted	in	1st	August	2008.	According	to	Article	21	of	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law,	 “Where	 a	 concentration	 reaches	 the	 threshold	 of	declaration	 stipulated	 by	 the	 State	 Council,	 a	 declaration	 must	 be	 lodged	 in	advance	with	the	Anti-monopoly	Authority	under	the	State	Council,	or	otherwise	the	 concentration	 shall	 not	 be	 implemented”307.	 And	 the	 Regulations	 on	 the	
Standard	of	Concentration	Declaration308	 of	the	State	Council	stipulated	that,	all	enterprises	 involving	concentration	whose	worldwide	sum	turnover	more	than	RMB	 10	 billion	 Yuan,	 or	more	 than	 RMB	 2	 billion	 Yuan	within	 China,	 have	 to	make	to	declaration309.	 		According	to	the	Report	of	the	Major	Assets	Restructuring	between	China	Unicom	
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and	CNC	(Hong	Kong)	that	issued	in	24th	September	2008,	in	2007,	the	turnover	of	China	Unicom	was	about	100.	47	billion	Yuan,	and	CNC	got	RMB	86.92	billion	Yuan310.	 Therefore,	 both	 of	 China	 Unicom	 and	 CNC	 meet	 the	 requirement	 to	make	a	declaration	with	the	anti-monopoly	authorities,	but	it	never	happened.	 		
3.2.3 Encroaching	on	legal	properties	of	private	enterprises:	coal	mining	
nationalization	in	Shanxi	Province		The	 state-owned	 enterprises	 also	 have	 advantages	 in	 coal	 mining	 sector,	 in	which	 they	 could	 obtain	mining	 right	 by	 administrative	methods	 such	 as	 sale	agreement,	and	could	take	the	price	of	coal	resources	as	capital311;	by	contrast,	private	enterprises	have	 to	go	 through	biding	and	pay	 in	 cash.	 Since	2009,	 the	nationwide	campaign	of	 integration	of	coal	resources	gave	other	advantages	 to	state-owned	 enterprises,	 which	 is	 to	 assign	 state-owned	 enterprises	 to	merge	private	 coal	 enterprises	 by	 administrative	 methods,	 which	 enhanced	 the	monopolistic	position	of	them	in	coal	mining	sector.	 		In	May	2009,	the	Plan	of	Adjusting	and	Promoting	Coal	Mining	Industry	of	Shanxi	
Province312	 was	 unveiled,	 and	 its	 core	 tasks	 are:	 first,	 reducing	 the	 number	 of	mines	 from	2,598	 to	1,000	 in	2011,	 then	 to	800	 in	2015;	 second,	 reducing	 the	number	 of	 enterprises	 from	 2,200	 to	 130,	 and	 forming	 4	 extra	 large-sized	enterprises	 that	 have	 the	 capacity	 of	 RMB	 100	 million	 tons	 per	 year	 and	 3	large-sized	enterprises	that	have	50	million	tons	capacity	per	year313.	Up	to	date,	the	 number	 of	 coal	 mines	 in	 Shanxi	 province	 was	 reduced	 to	 1,053,	 and	 the	average	 capacity	 of	 single	 mines	 was	 increased	 from	 300	 thousand	 tons	 to	 1	million	tons	per	year;	5	major	state-owned	coal	enterprises	was	set	up	(Tongmei	Group,	Shanxi	Coking	Coal	Group,	Yangquan	Coal	Group,	Luan	Mining	Group,	and	Jincheng	 Anthracite	 Group)314.	 During	 the	 massive	 mergers	 and	 restructures,	
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there	was	 almost	 no	 space	 left	 for	 private	 enterprises	 in	 Shanxi’s	 coal	mining	sector.	 		There	are	so	many	reasons	for	the	government	to	integrate	coal	resources,	such	as	 the	 effectiveness,	 environment	 and	 safety.	 However,	 these	 reasons	 are	farfetched	 to	 some	 degree,	 for	 example,	 the	 Wangjialing	 mine	 that	 had	 an	accident	 in	 2010	 just	 belong	 to	 Huajin	 Coking	 Coal	 Group,	 a	 state-owned	enterprise 315 .	 In	 addition,	 the	 mergers	 have	 to	 follow	 the	 principles	 of	voluntariness	and	fairness,	but	what	happened	in	Shanxi	coal	mining	sector	had	broken	all	of	 them	in	practice.	The	private	coalmines	were	 forced	to	be	sold	to	state-owned	enterprises	by	government	orders,	and	the	price	was	made	by	the	government	directly,	which	was	much	lower	than	the	market.	Moreover,	due	to	many	private	investors	paid	several	times	even	dozens	of	times	of	regular	price	to	 purchase	 coalmines,	 they	 still	 would	 loss	 everything	 even	 they	 could	 get	compensations	based	on	market.		
3.2.4 State-owned	enterprises	restructure	private	enterprises	under	
government	guidance	 		A	 profitable	 private	 enterprise	 –	 the	 Rizhao	 Steel	 was	 restructured	 by	 a	 loss	making	state-owned	enterprise	–Shandong	Iron	and	Steel	Group	(Shandong	Steel)	under	 government	 guidance,	 is	 another	 typical	 case	 that	 reflect	 the	 bad	 living	environment	for	China’s	private	enterprises.	 		Shandong	Steel,	was	created	out	of	 the	restructuring	of	 Jinan	Steel,	Laiwu	Steel	and	Shandong	Metallurgical	Industry	Corporation	in	2008,	it	registered	capital	of	10	 billion	 Yuan	 and	 fully	 owned	 by	 Shandong	 Provincial	 State-owned	 Assets	Management	 Commission.	 Rizhao	 Steel	 was	 created	 in	 2003	 and	 engaged	 in	smelting,	 processing	 and	 sale	 of	 steel	 products,	 and	produced	RMB	7.5	million	tons	of	steel	products	in	2008316.	In	2009,	just	before	the	merger,	both	Jinan	Steel	
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and	 Laiwu	 Steel	 reported	 loss,	 but	 Rizhao	 Steel	 made	 net	 profit	 of	 RMB	 1.8	billion	 Yuan317.	 Such	 case	 that	 a	 profitable	 enterprise	 was	 merged	 by	 a	 loss	making	enterprise	has	aroused	widely	controversies.	 		First	of	all,	government	guided	this	restructuring	rather	than	a	merger	between	market	 subjects	 based	 on	 principles	 of	 voluntariness	 and	 fairness.	 As	 early	 as	2007,	Shandong	provincial	government	issued	the	Decisions	on	Speeding	Up	the	
Structure	Adjustment	 of	 Iron	 and	 Steel	 Industry,	which	 proposed	 to	 construct	 a	large-sized	 iron	 and	 steel	 factory	 in	 Rizhao318.	 Besides,	 the	Plan	 of	 Adjustment	
and	 Promotion	 of	 Shandong	 Iron	 and	 Steel	 Industry	 (2009-2011),	 which	 was	issued	in	2009,	also	confirmed	the	task	that	Shandong	Steel	would	restructure	all	steel	enterprises	 in	Shandong	province319.	Thus,	this	merger	was	totally	guided	by	 government,	 which	 was	 not	 only	 against	 the	 Company	 Law,	 but	 also	make	China’s	market	environment	more	unpredictable.	 		Secondly,	 according	 to	 the	 agreement,	 both	 Shandong	 Steel	 and	 Rizhao	 Steel	jointly	reorganized	the	assets	to	the	joint	venture	by	means	of	a	capital	injection,	and	Shandong	Steel	owns	67%	stakes	by	cash	and	Rizhao	Steel	holds	33%	stock	with	 net	 assets320.	 However,	 there	 are	 still	 different	 opinions	 on	 the	 exact	amount	that	Shandong	Steel	should	pay	in	the	joint	venture,	due	to	the	fact	that	Rizhao	Steel	did	not	accept	the	result	of	assets	evaluation	that	was	made	by	the	government321.	 		
3.2.5 Anti-competition	policies	on	the	ground	of	promoting	public	
interests		In	 early	 2010,	 Beijing	 government	 and	 Beijing	 Subway	 jointly	 issued	 a	prohibition	on	newsagent	in	subway.	This	prohibition	was	made	based	on	Article	
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26	 of	 the	 Management	 Measures	 of	 Beijing	 Subway	 Safety 322 	 that	 was	promulgated	in	16th	June	2006,	it	stipulated	that	any	activities	that	would	affect	traffic,	rescue	and	evacuation	such	as	street	performer	and	newsagent,	should	be	prohibited	 in	 ticket	 hall,	 platform,	 carriages	 and	 emergency	 exit323.	 However,	another	 policy,	 the	Meeting	 Note	 about	 Newsagent	 Issues	 in	 Beijing	 Subway324,	which	 ruled	 that	 any	 organizations	 and	 individuals	 are	 prohibited	 to	 sell	newspapers	and	magazines,	except	for	the	Star	Daily,	which	is	owned	by	Beijing	Daily	 Group	 (a	 news	 corporation	 owned	 by	 Beijing	 government),	 would	 be	allowed	provided	it	does	not	affect	subway	safety.	 	 		If	the	original	intention	of	the	prohibition	on	newsagent	in	subway	is	to	protect	public	safety,	all	newspapers	and	magazines	 including	 the	Star	Daily	should	be	prohibited;	 and	 if	 the	 Star	Daily	 could	 be	 allowed	 as	 long	 as	 it	 does	 not	 affect	safety,	 other	 newspapers	 and	 magazines	 should	 be	 equally	 treated	 under	 the	same	condition.	In	fact,	this	policy	is	an	anti-competition	policy,	which	gave	the	monopolistic	 position	 of	 state-owned	 newspapers	 (the	 Star	 Daily)	 in	 certain	market	(Beijing	Subway)	on	the	ground	of	protecting	public	interests.	 	 	 		
3.2.6 Anti-competition	legislations	 		In	 postal	 sector,	 the	 living	 spaces	 of	 private	 enterprises	 were	 squeezed	 by	relevant	legislations.	 		According	to	Article	55	of	the	China	Postal	Law325	 that	was	promulgated	in	April	2009,	“No	express	delivery	enterprise	shall	provide	the	correspondence	delivery	service	which	shall	be	exclusively	provided	by	postal	enterprises	or	deliver	the	official	 documents	 of	 state	 organs”326.	 Besides,	 Article	 5	 of	 it	 ruled	 that	 “The	correspondence	 delivery	 services	 within	 the	 scope	 prescribed	 by	 the	 State	
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Council	 shall	 be	 exclusively	 provided	 by	 postal	 enterprises” 327 ,	 and	 the	Regulations	 on	 the	 Business	 Scope	 of	 Postal	 Enterprises	 of	 the	 State	 Council	clearly	 stipulated	 that	 the	 correspondence	 under	 100g	 shall	 be	 exclusively	delivered	 by	 postal	 enterprises.	 In	 practice,	 40%-60%	 of	 private	 express	enterprises	 businesses	 are	 correspondence	 delivery,	 and	 80%	 of	 them	 under	100g328.	 	 		Thus,	 although	 law	 has	 confirmed	 the	 legal	 status	 of	 private	 express	 delivery	enterprises	at	the	first	time,	they	still	could	not	compete	with	postal	enterprises	(owned	by	state)	due	to	discriminatory	articles.	 		
3.2.7 Abusing	of	dominant	market	position		To	 enter	 the	 urban	 gas	 sector	 that	 has	 basic	 market	 mechanism,	 Petro	 China	adopted	the	strategy	of	exchanging	resources	for	market	by	using	 its	dominant	market	position.	As	the	one	of	the	founders	of	the	West-East	Gas	Pipeline	Project,	Petro	 China	 has	 controlled	 gas	 supply	 in	 certain	 provinces	 (where	 the	 gas	pipeline	 go	 through),	 which	 give	 it	more	 bargaining	 powers	 to	 negotiate	with	such	provincial	governments	for	entering	their	gas	market.	 		The	bargain	agreement	Petro	China	signed	with	provincial	governments	give	 it	comparative	advantages	over	incumbent	enterprises	in	market,	and	drove	them	out	of	business.	For	 instance,	 in	September	2007,	Xinjiang	Guanghui	 (a	private	enterprise)	had	signed	an	agreement	with	Wuwei	(a	district	in	Gansu	Province)	government	for	obtaining	a	gas	supply	license	for	30	years	through	open	tender.	However,	 this	 license	 was	 abolished	 soon,	 since	 Petro	 China	 signed	 the	agreement	 with	 Gansu	 provincial	 government	 in	 December	 2007,	 which	 gave	Petro	 China	 exclusive	 right	 to	 supply	 gas	 in	 whole	 Gansu	 province.	 The	 same	situation	 also	 happened	 in	 Shandong	 and	 Zhuhai,	 in	where	 incumbent	 private	gas	 suppliers	had	 to	 exit	 due	 to	Petro	China	 signed	 exclusive	 agreements	with	
																																								 																				 	
327 Ibid. Art 5.  
328 Unirule Institute of Economics. 2011. The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned 
Enterprises. See link: < http://www.unirule.org.cn/>. 
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local	governments	by	using	 its	strategic	advantages.	Obviously,	pushing	private	enterprises	 aside	 by	 using	 dominant	market	 position	 is	monopolistic	 activities	and	 against	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law,	which	 enhanced	 state-owned	 enterprises’	monopolistic	positions	and	caused	great	damages	to	private	economies.		
3.3 Conclusion		The	statistics	above	showed	that	the	proportion	of	state-owned	enterprises	has	reduced	in	national	economy	as	a	whole,	but	in	some	specific	sectors	especially	in	 basic	 resources	 sector,	 the	 phenomenon	 of	 “Guo	 Jin	Min	Tui”	 is	 severe.	 The	reasons	 are,	 first	 of	 all,	 the	 scope	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 was	 expanded.	According	 to	 the	 Decisions	 on	 Major	 Issues	 Concerning	 the	 Reform	 and	
Development	 of	 State-owned	 Enterprises	 of	 the	 CPC329	 that	was	 issued	 in	 1999,	the	scope	of	state-owned	enterprises	was	limited	to	“sectors	relating	to	national	security	and	has	natural	monopoly”330.	And	the	scope	was	expanded	to	“sectors	relating	 to	 national	 security	 and	 major	 infrastructures	 and	 important	 natural	resources”	by	the	Guiding	Opinions	on	Promoting	State-owned	Assets	Adjustment	
and	 State-owned	 Enterprises	 Restructuring	 of	 the	 State-owned	 Assets	Management	and	Supervision	Commission	that	was	issued	in	2006331,	which	give	state-owned	 enterprises	 the	 right	 to	 enter	 more	 competition	 areas.	 Secondly,	after	2008,	both	central	and	local	government	of	China	made	revitalization	plans	to	 deal	 with	 economic	 crisis,	 which	 encourage	 and	 support	 state-owned	enterprises	to	restructure	and	merge	private	enterprise.	Thirdly,	with	the	rapid	rise	 of	 resources	 prices,	 state-owned	 enterprises	 try	 to	make	more	 profits	 by	monopolizing	basic	resources	sector.	 		The	 damages	 of	 structural	 “Guo	 Jin	Min	 Tui”	 could	 not	 be	 ignored.	 The	 above	cases	 showed	 that	 the	 administrative	 monopoly	 of	 state-owned	 economy	was	enhanced	 by	 its	 political	 and	 resource	 advantages,	 and	 private	 economy’s	competitiveness	 was	 weakened	 during	 “Guo	 Jin	 Min	 Tui”.	 In	 addition,	 the	
																																								 																				 	
329 \Å]'±ō6įɳ¦åǹîɘÁɣɺƱeÕDecisions on Major Issues Concerning 
the Reform and Development of State-owned Enterprises of the CPC. 1999. 
330 Ibid.  
331 See note 634.  
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anti-monopoly	 rules	 and	 regulations	 were	 also	 ignored	 by	 state-owned	enterprises	and	they	did	not	get	any	punishment	due	to	government’s	protection,	such	 as	 the	 merger	 between	 China	 Unicom	 and	 CNC.	 Such	 activities	 damaged	China’s	economic	legal	system	and	would	lead	China	to	oligarchy	economy.	 	 	
	
4. Deepening	the	Reform	of	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises	
	
4.1 Review	and	rethink	China’s	state-owned	enterprises	reforms		Since	 Reform	 and	 Opening	 Up,	 China’s	 state-owned	 enterprises	 have	experienced	several	stages	such	as	“Fang	Quan	Rang	Li”,	“Liang	Quan	Fen	Li”	and	“establishing	modern	 enterprises	 system”.	 These	micro-level	 reforms	 reflected	the	transformation	from	planned	economy	to	market	economy	to	some	degree.		Under	 planned	 economy,	 state-owned	 enterprises	 (or	 called	 state-operated	enterprises)	were	only	the	executors	of	government	plans,	and	single	enterprise	was	 a	workshop	 if	 take	whole	national	 economy	as	 a	 factory.	The	 government	controlled	 production,	 exchange,	 distribution	 even	 consumption	 directly.	 In	 a	word,	the	major	function	of	government	is	“producing	for	public”	by	creating	and	implementing	plans	in	planned	economy.	Along	with	the	task	of	socialist	market	economy	has	been	confirmed,	the	rules	of	game	among	different	market	subjects	also	 has	 changed.	 State-owned	 enterprises	 have	 obtained	 independent	 legal	person	 status,	 which	 assured	 them	 to	 exist,	 develop	 and	 gain	 profits	 in	 every	economic	 sectors	 as	 a	 stakeholder.	 Besides,	 the	 managers	 of	 state-owned	enterprises	 also	 have	 been	 authorized	 the	 rights	 of	 making	 decisions	 and	management.	 The	 government,	 turned	 to	 investors	 instead	 of	 plans	 makers,	thereupon	 has	 relevant	 rights	 and	 obligations	 as	 shareholder.	 Thus,	 the	state-owned	enterprises	could	be	defined	as	“state-invested”	enterprises,	and	the	major	function	of	government	would	change	to	“making	profits	for	public”.	This	type	 of	 government	 could	 be	 described	 as	 “profit-making	 government”,	 which	aims	 at	 achieving	 revenue	 maximization	 by	 controlling	 and	 using	 social	resources	such	as	state-owned	assets,	elements	of	production,	scarce	resources	and	public	powers.	 	
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	So	 far,	 the	nature	of	China’s	state-owned	enterprises	reform	is	capitalization	of	state-owned	assets,	which	is	to	make	profits	by	operating	them.	The	government	was	 personified	 gradually	 when	 state-owned	 assets	 were	 more	 and	 more	capitalized.	From	this	perspective,	there	are	no	fundamental	differences	between	government	 and	 regular	 market	 participants.	 	 In	 practice,	 government	 would	let	 state-owned	 enterprises	 exit	 certain	 sectors	 when	 they	 face	 strong	competitions	and	make	continuous	losses;	contrarily,	if	state-owned	enterprises	have	had	dominant	positions	in	certain	sectors,	government	would	set	up	extra	institutional	barriers	in	it	to	make	excess	profits.	More	importantly,	government	would	control	 scarce	 resources	such	as	 lands	and	mines	by	 laws,	policies	even	administrative	 methods,	 when	 the	 motive	 of	 making	 profits	 meets	 its	 public	power.	This	would	explain	why	 the	structural	 “Guo	 Jin	Min	Tui”	occurred	after	massive	withdraw	 from	 competition	 areas	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 in	 early	1990s.		With	the	capitalization	of	state-owned	enterprises,	government	would	have	the	both	 characters	 of	 public	 goods	 provider	 (regular	 government)	 and	 profit	pursuer	 (profit-making	 government).	 First,	 on	 one	 hand,	 as	 the	 platform	 of	state-owned	assets	and	independent	legal	person,	the	state-owned	enterprise	is	expected	 to	 achieve	 the	 goal	 of	 profit	 maximization	 the	 same	 as	 regular	enterprises;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 has	 to	 fulfil	 some	 public	 functions	 such	 as	providing	jobs,	stabilizing	society,	macro	control	and	protecting	national	security	in	 some	 circumstances.	 Second,	 the	managers	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	who	operate	state-owned	assets	in	practice	have	no	difference	with	regular	agent;	but	they	could	switch	between	civil	servant	and	entrepreneurs	as	the	executor.	Third,	state-owned	enterprises	(or	managers)	would	emphasize	its	public	characters	to	obtain	special	conditions	and	advantages	from	government,	and	avoiding	public	restrictions	 and	 supervisions	 by	 emphasizing	 its	 private	 characters,	 to	 seek	illegal	and	excess	profits.	 		The	 government	 is	 made	 of	 officers	 of	 different	 levels,	 and	 state-owned	enterprises	need	specific	people	to	manage	and	operate,	thus	the	task	of	making	
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profits	 through	 state-owned	 assets	 of	 government	 need	 specific	 people	 to	achieve,	 which	 turned	 the	 agency	 relationship	 between	 government	 and	state-owned	enterprises	to	complex	interpersonal	relationships.	In	the	situation	of	 asymmetric	 information,	 certain	 interest	 group	 is	 made	 of	 managers	 of	state-owned	 enterprises	 and	 some	 government	 officers,	 which	 would	 make	profits	 for	 themselves	 by	 using	 state-owned	 assets	 on	 the	 ground	 of	 making	profits	for	public.	In	fact,	the	formation	of	such	interest	group	would	fail	the	task	of	making	profits	for	public,	and	lead	China’s	economy	to	bureaucratic	capitalism	and	crony	capitalism.		Since	 too	 many	 links	 exist	 in	 agency	 relationship	 between	 government	 and	state-owned	enterprises,	 the	 inefficient	would	not	be	changed	 though	different	sectors	have	different	competiveness.	According	to	statistics,	from	2001	to	2009,	the	cumulative	profit	of	China’s	state-owned	enterprises	are	RMB	5846.2	billion	Yuan,	 and	 the	 net	 profits	 are	 RMB	 4051.7	 billion	 Yuan.	 In	 2010,	 central	state-owned	 enterprises	 gained	 RMB	 1341.5	 billion	 Yuan	 profits,	 and	 Petro	China	 and	 China	 Unicom	 donated	 more	 than	 one-third	 of	 them.	 And	 the	 net	return	 on	 assets	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 is	 8.16%	 from	 2001	 to	 2009332.	However,	 such	performance	was	achieved	based	on	certain	advantages	 in	 land	and	 resources	 rent,	 financing	 and	 government	 subsides.	 For	 examples,	 from	2001	 to	 2009,	 state-owned	 enterprises	 should	 have	 paid	 RMB	 2578.7	 billion	Yuan	for	industrial	 land	rent	based	on	3%	of	land	cost,	and	RMB	2753.9	billion	Yuan	 for	 loan	 interest	 margin	 (the	 average	 loan	 interest	 rate	 of	 state-owned	enterprises	is	1.6%,	and	regular	one	is	4.68%).	Besides,	they	also	received	RMB	194.3	 billion	 Yuan	 of	 government	 subsides	 from	 2007	 to	 2009.	 The	 real	 net	return	on	 assets	 of	 China’s	 state-owned	enterprises	 should	be	 -1.47%	 if	 above	costs	 is	 added,	 and	 the	 private	 economy	 achieved	 12.9%	 during	 the	 same	period333.	Therefore,	state-owned	enterprises	did	not	obtain	higher	efficiency	by	reforming,	 and	 they	 just	made	profits	by	 taking	advantages	of	 exemption	 from	land	 and	 resources	 rents,	 lower	 loan	 interest	 rate,	 government	 subsides	 and	
																																								 																				 	
332 ±Ǧȓðɚ China Statistical Year Book 2001-2009. 
333 Unirule Institute of Economics. 2011. The Nature, Performance, and Reform of the State-owned 
Enterprises. See link: < http://www.unirule.org.cn/>. 
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administrative	 monopoly.	 Moreover,	 the	 expansion	 of	 low	 inefficient	state-owned	enterprises	would	cause	fragility	of	China’s	macro	economy.	 		No	doubt	that	the	approach	of	state-owned	assets	capitalization,	as	an	important	content	 of	 reform,	 is	 necessary	 and	 progressive	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 China’s	reform,	which	promoted	the	development	of	market	mechanism	and	system,	and	the	withdrawal	of	state-owned	enterprises	 from	some	competition	sectors	also	provided	certain	living	spaces	for	private	economies.	However,	the	state-owned	enterprises	 reform	 featuring	 state-owned	 assets	 capitalization	 should	 be	determined	 with	 the	 establishment	 of	 basic	 market	 economy,	 since	 not	 only	state-owned	 enterprises	 have	 lower	 inefficiency,	 but	 also	 its	 existence	 in	profitable	 sectors	would	 harm	 competition	 and	 fairness,	which	 are	 the	motive	powers	for	the	development	of	economy.	 		Therefore,	 the	reform	featuring	state-owned	assets	capitalization	should	be	the	beginning	of	the	next	stage	of	reform	instead	of	the	ending,	which	is	more	crucial,	and	more	difficult.		
4.2 Reform	in	transitional	period		The	 state-owned	 enterprises	 reform	 in	 transitional	 period	 should	 focus	 on	breaking	 up	 administrative	 monopoly	 and	 standardizing	 state-owned	enterprises	 activities,	 which	 would	 promote	 fair	 and	 perfect	 competition	between	different	economic	subjects,	and	economic	efficiency.	 		
4.2.1 Breaking	up	administrative	monopoly		 	(1) Standardize	government	behaviours	by	abolishing	relevant	rules	and	regulations		In	current	China,	rules	and	regulations	that	are	made	by	government	department	have	more	effectiveness	than	laws	made	by	congress	in	practice.	It	seems	certain	that	 such	 rules	 and	 regulations	would	 have	 administrative	monopoly	 contents	
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since	 government	 departments	 have	 their	 own	 interests	 and	 purposes	 when	creating	 them.	 And	 administrative	 monopoly	 is	 just	 the	 major	 factor	 that	damages	fair	and	perfect	competition	between	different	economic	subjects.		In	 fact,	 systems	 concerning	 competition	 and	 monopoly	 should	 be	 the	 basic	economic	 system.	 And	 according	 to	 the	 Legislation	 Law	 of	 the	 PRC334,	 basic	economic	 system	and	basic	 systems	of	 finance,	 taxation,	 customs,	 banking	 and	foreign	trade	shall	only	be	enacted	and	amended	by	the	Standing	Committee	of	the	NPC335,	other	government	department	even	 the	State	Council	have	no	such	rights.	This	 is	the	requirement	of	procedural	 justice.	For	the	same	reason,	even	the	 Several	 Opinions	 on	 Encouraging	 and	 Guiding	 the	 Healthy	 Development	 of	
Private	Investment	of	the	State	Councul336,	which	benefits	to	break	up	monopoly,	should	 be	 enacted	by	 the	Congress	 rather	 than	 the	 State	 Council	 to	 obtain	 full	legal	 status.	 Therefore,	 such	 rules	 and	 regulations,	 which	 damage	 substantive	and	 procedural	 justices,	 should	 be	 abolished	 to	 standardize	 government	behaviours,	including	but	not	limited	to:		
•	 Decisions	 on	 Clean-up	 and	 Rectification	 Small-sized	 Oil	 Refinery	 and	
Standardized	the	Circulation	Process	of	Crude	Oil	and	Petroleum	Product	(National	Economy	and	Commercial	Commission,	1999)	
•	Decisions	on	Further	Rectification	and	Standardized	the	Circulation	of	Petroleum	
Product	(State	Council,	2003)	
•	Notice	on	Strengthening	Management	of	Petroleum	Transportation	(Department	of	Railway,	2003)	
•	Plan	of	Expanding	Ethanol	Gasoline	for	Motor	Vehicles	Pilot	(State	Development	and	Reform	Commission,	2008)	
•	Regulations	 on	 Popularizing	 and	 Using	 Ethanol	 Gasoline	 for	Motor	 Vehicles	 of	
Heilongjiang	Province	(Heilongjiang	provincial	government,	2004)	
•	Notice	on	Speeding	Up	Coal	Mining	Enterprises	Mergers	and	Restructures	(Shanxi	provincial	government,	2009)	
																																								 																				 	
334 ǑƀƀLegislation Law. 2000  
335 Ibid. Art 8. 
336 ±{ɫ]'ʇ~¦ûÜŴɤĞȴPøåƱǹîčȑSeveral Opinions on Encouraging and 
Guiding the Healthy Development of Private Investment of the State Council. 2011. 
	 167	
•	Regulations	on	the	Business	Scope	of	Postal	Enterprises	(State	Council,	2009)	
•	Edible	Salt	Monopoly	Regulation	(State	Council,	1996)	
•	Guiding	Decisions	on	Prompting	State-owned	Assets	adjustment	and	state-owned	
enterprises	 restructure	 (State-owned	 Assets	 Management	 and	 Supervision	Commission,	2006)		(2) Amend	relevant	rules	and	regulations,	including	but	not	limited	to:		In	 current	 China,	 Tobacco	 was	 completely	 controlled	 and	 managed	 by	government	 based	 on	 the	 Tobacco	 Monopoly	 Law337 ,	 which	 not	 only	 made	excessive	 profits	 for	 China	 National	 Tobacco	 Corporation	 (a	 state-owned	enterprises	 that	 controls	 all	 stages	 in	 China’s	whole	 tobacco	 sector)	 and	 some	individuals	 (who	 have	 license),	 but	 also	 against	 tobacco	 control.	 Therefore,	tobacco	 sector	 should	 open	 to	 all	 market	 participants	 by	 amending	 even	abolishing	Tobacco	Monopoly	Law.		The	Postal	Law	also	should	be	amended,	for	instance,	Article	55,	which	ruled	“no	express	 delivery	 enterprise	 shall	 provide	 the	 correspondence	 delivery	 service	which	shall	be	exclusively	provided	by	postal	enterprises	or	deliver	 the	official	documents	of	state	organs”338,	should	be	deleted.	 		The	 most	 important	 issue	 currently	 is	 the	 administrative	 monopoly,	 but	 the	
Anti-monopoly	 Law	 not	 only	 ignores	 it	 but	 also	 provides	 protection	 for	 it.	According	 to	 Article	 7,	 “With	 respect	 to	 the	 industries	 controlled	 by	 the	State-owned	 economy	 and	 concerning	 the	 lifeline	 of	 national	 economy	 and	national	 security	 or	 the	 industries	 implementing	 exclusive	 operation	 and	 sales	according	to	law,	the	state	protects	the	lawful	business	operations	conducted	by	the	 business	 operators	 therein.	 The	 State	 also	 lawfully	 regulates	 and	 controls	their	business	operations	and	the	prices	of	their	commodities	and	services	so	as	to	 safeguard	 the	 interests	 of	 consumers	 and	 promote	 technical	 progresses”339,	
																																								 																				 	
337 ƜǽƀTobacco Monopoly Law. 2013.  
338 See note 337.  
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which	 make	 Article	 8	 that	 ruled	 “No	 administrative	 organ	 or	 organization	empowered	 by	 a	 law	 or	 administrative	 regulation	 to	 administer	 public	 affairs	may	 abuse	 its	 administrative	 powers	 to	 eliminate	 or	 restrict	 competition”	useless	 in	 practice340 .	 Obviously,	 the	 self-contradictory	 anti	 administrative	monopoly	mechanism	in	China	is	but	an	empty	shell.		(3) Break	up	administrative	monopolies		Both	government	and	state-owned	enterprises	should	not	seek	for	the	complete	control	in	certain	sectors,	which	equal	to	administrative	monopoly	in	fact.		Besides,	 the	 administrative	 monopoly	 should	 be	 broken	 up	 unconditionally	instead	 of	 guiding	 by	 government.	 In	 practice,	 private	 enterprises	 are	 always	limited	 in	 relatively	 less	 profitable	 sectors	 by	 government	 “guidance”.	 For	example,	 Article	 8	 of	 the	 Several	 Opinions	 on	 Encouraging	 and	 Guiding	 the	
Healthy	Development	 of	 Private	 Investment	 encourage	 private	 capitals	 enter	 oil	and	gas	exploration	and	pipeline	laying	sectors	that	have	relatively	less	profits341,	but	 refining	 and	 sales	 that	would	make	more	 profits.	 Could	 it	 be	 said	 that	 the	petroleum	sales	are	more	important	to	national	security	than	pipeline	laying?		(4) Ownership	Diversification		Establishment	 of	 a	 diversified	 ownership	 economy.	 The	 diversified	 ownership	should	be	integrated	by	State	capital,	collective	capital	and	private	capital,	which	is	 the	 prime	 method	 for	 materializing	 the	 basic	 economic	 system,	 helping	improve	 function,	 increase	 value	 and	 promote	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 State	capital.	Allowing	more	state-owned	enterprises	and	other	ownership	enterprises	to	 develop	 into	 mixed-ownership	 enterprises.	 Non-state	 shares	 should	 be	allowed	in	state	capital	 investment	projects.	Mixed-ownership	enterprises	shall	be	allowed	to	utilize	employee	stock	ownership	to	form	a	vested	community	of	
																																								 																				 	
340 Ibid. Art 8.  
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capital	 owners	 and	 workers.	 Improve	 the	 state-owned	 assets	 management	system	 and	 strengthen	 state-owned	 assets	 supervision	 by	 focusing	 on	 capital	management.	 Establishing	 a	 number	 of	 state-owned	 capital	 operating	enterprises	and	support	the	transformation	of	qualified	state-owned	enterprises	into	state-owned	investment	enterprises.	 	 		
4.2.2 Standardizing	state-owned	enterprises	activities		(1) Improve	management	of	state-owned	enterprises		Under	 appropriate	 conditions,	 the	 boards	 and	 directors	 and	 supervisors	 of	state-owned	enterprises	should	have	more	prominent	citizens,	which	would	lay	restraints	 on	 insider	 control	 issues	 and	 protect	 public	 interests.	 Thus,	 the	
Company	Law342	 and	State-owned	Assets	Law343	 should	be	amended	accordingly.	For	 instance,	Article	3	of	 the	State-owned	Assets	Law	 could	be	amended	to	“the	state-owned	assets	shall	be	owned	by	the	state,	i.e.	owned	by	the	whole	people.	In	transitional	period,	the	State	Council	that	is	authorized	by	the	Congress	shall,	on	behalf	of	the	state,	exercise	the	ownership	of	state-owned	assets”.		To	 avoid	 insider	 control,	 when	 deciding	 directors	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises,	more	 consideration	 should	 be	 given	 to	 those	 who	 are	 not	 involving	 in	management;	 and	 relevant	 committee	 of	 experts	 should	 be	 set	 up	 to	 promote	scientificity	 and	 efficiency	 of	 decision	 making.	 Besides,	 the	 switch	 between	government	officer	and	state-owned	enterprises	manager	should	be	prohibited	by	law.	 		(2) Complete	distribution	mechanism		State-owned	enterprises	should	deliver	their	incomes	to	State	in	different	types	such	as	rent,	tax	and	profits,	based	on	their	different	income	sources,	to	ensure	investor’s	 rights	 and	 reflect	 their	 real	 costs.	 The	 rent	 and	 tax	 should	 be	 paid	
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unconditionally,	and	investor	should	decide	the	proportion	of	profits	delivering.	Then	such	rent	and	profit	should	bring	into	whole	national	budget	as	the	same	as	tax.	Thus,	the	Land	Management	Law344	 and	the	State-owned	Assets	Law	should	be	amended	accordingly.		(3) Strengthen	supervision		Whether	 are	 listed	 or	 not,	 all	 state-owned	 enterprises	 should	 increase	transparency	by	information	disclosure,	which	is	the	important	precondition	of	strengthening	 public	 supervision.	 The	 key	 supervision	 focus	 of	 State-owned	Assets	 Management	 and	 Supervision	 Commission	 should	 be	 on	 whether	state-owned	 enterprises	 activities	 are	 against	 fair	 and	 perfect	 competition,	managers	obey	 rules	 and	 regulations,	 and	operating	of	 enterprises	 fulfil	 public	functions,	rather	than	simply	on	whether	enterprises	could	make	profit	or	not.		
4.3 The	ultimate	task	of	reform		
4.3.1 Tasks		There	are	two	ultimate	tasks	for	China’s	state-owned	enterprises	reform,	turning	state-owned	 enterprises	 to	 non-profit	 enterprises	 that	 are	 regulated	 by	 public	law,	 and	 establishing	 the	 state-owned	 assets	 governance	 mechanism	 under	institutional	structure.		As	 the	 non-profit	 enterprises	 that	 are	 regulated	 by	 public	 law,	 state-owned	enterprises	 would	 focus	 on	 public	 interests	 instead	 of	 making	 profits,	 which	would	 confirm	 the	 public	 nature	 and	 scope	 of	 it.	 Activities	 of	 state-owned	enterprises	such	as	setting	up,	management,	operating	and	withdrawal	have	to	be	 under	 specific	 legal	 procedure	 and	 public	 supervision.	 If	 state-owned	enterprises	would	enter	some	profitable	sector	 for	special	reasons,	 it	has	 to	be	reviewed	and	approved	by	the	congress.	 	
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	Since	 the	 whole	 people	 owns	 state-owned	 assets,	 thus,	 it	 is	 the	 Congress	 but	government	department	who	should	be	on	behalf	of	 the	whole	people	exercise	the	 ownership	 of	 state-owned	 assets,	 and	 the	 state-owned	 assets	 governance	should	 belong	 to	 public	 governance.	 The	 Congress	 would	 not	 only	 regulate	setting	 up,	 operating	 and	 withdrawal	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 by	 creating	relevant	 rules	 and	 laws,	 but	 also	 instruct	 state-owned	 assets	 supervision	mechanism	 to	 fulfil	 its	 functions	 legally	 and	 efficiently.	 Therefore,	 the	governance	 of	 state-owned	 assets	 exists	 in	 the	 structure	 formed	 by	 congress,	state-owned	assets	supervision	mechanism	and	enterprises	that	are	regulated	by	public	law.	 		To	 achieve	 this	 task,	 firstly,	 the	 profit-making	 government	 needs	 to	 be	transferred	 to	 service-oriented	 government.	 The	 profit-making	 government	focuses	 on	 GDP	 and	 revenue	 maximization,	 and	 service-oriented	 government	aims	 at	 promoting	 public	 welfare;	 profit-making	 government	 always	 develops	economy	by	controlling	or	monopolizing	social	 resources,	 and	service-oriented	government	 mainly	 focuses	 on	 providing	 better	 public	 goods.	 Therefore,	 the	nature	 of	 this	 transformation	 is	 to	 remove	 the	 capitalization	 character	 of	government,	 and	 turn	 it	 to	 a	 government	 only	 aims	 at	 providing	 public	 goods	and	pursuing	social	welfare	maximization,	instead	of	making	profits	and	revenue	maximization.	 		Secondly,	 state-owned	 assets	 (or	 state-owned	 enterprises)	 have	 to	 withdraw	from	profitable	 sectors.	 To	 remove	 the	 capitalization	 character	 of	 government,	and	 turn	state-owned	enterprises	 to	non-profit	enterprises,	 state-owned	assets	must	 withdraw	 from	 profitable	 sectors.	 In	 other	 words,	 government	 has	 no	necessity	 to	 own	 profitable	 assets	 in	 principle.	 Obviously,	 the	 former	 task	 of	“state-owned	 enterprises	 withdraw	 from	 competition	 sectors”	 based	 on	 the	capitalization	 of	 state-owned	 assets,	 which	 developed	 China’s	 economy	objectively,	but	also	caused	state-owned	enterprises’	monopolistic	activities	and	administrative	monopoly.	The	 task	of	 “state-owned	enterprises	withdraw	 from	profitable	sectors”	ultimately	denies	the	capitalization	character	of	state-owned	
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assets,	 and	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 regular	 and	 administrative	 monopoly	 of	state-owned	 enterprises,	 which	 provides	 the	 precondition	 for	 fair	 and	 perfect	competition.		Thirdly,	 establishing	 supervision	 mechanism	 for	 state-owned	 enterprises	 that	are	 regulated	 by	 public	 law.	 In	 current	 situation,	 the	 State-owned	 Assets	Management	 and	 Supervision	 Commission	 not	 only	 fulfil	 the	 functions	 of	investors,	 but	 also	 take	 up	 the	mission	 of	 supervising,	which	 give	 it	 too	much	power,	and	cause	failures	in	both	areas.	In	the	future,	it	should	be	changed	to	a	mechanism	that	only	has	supervision	functions.	 		
4.3.2 Specific	arrangements	for	State-owned	enterprises	withdraw	from	
profitable	sectors		(1) Precondition	and	timing	of	withdraw		State-owned	enterprise	could	withdraw	from	profitable	sectors	gradually,	under	fair	 competition,	 and	 after	 the	 administrative	 monopoly	 are	 broken	 up	 and	private	economy	has	certain	strength.	 		(2) Ways	of	withdraw		State-owned	 assets	 could	 withdraw	 from	 profitable	 sectors	 by	 stock	 transfer,	thus	the	withdraw	of	state-owned	assets	does	not	mean	certain	enterprises	have	to	be	closed.	State-owned	shares	could	be	transferred	to	social	 insurance	funds	and	change	to	preferred	stock,	which	would	secure	the	profits	and	benefit	to	the	public.	Such	shares	could	be	 transferred	 to	private	enterprises	and	 individuals,	but	to	foreign	enterprises	and	individuals,	it	must	be	under	strict	limitations.	To	avoid	 state-owned	 assets	withdrawing	 from	 one	 sector	meanwhile	 entering	 to	another,	 the	 precondition,	 scope	 and	 limitation	 of	 government	 investment	should	 be	 restricted	 by	 amending	 the	 Enterprise	 State-owned	 Assets	 Law,	 or	creating	 the	 Government	 Investment	 Law,	 which	 should	 rule	 that	 every	government	investment	shall	be	reviewed	and	approved	by	the	congress.	 	
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	(3) Complementary	approaches		Managers	 of	 state-owned	 enterprises	 should	 be	 rewarded	 by	 equity,	 based	 on	real	 performance	 of	 enterprises.	 Law	 should	 protect	 legal	 rights	 of	 laid-off	workers.	Besides,	salaries	of	government	officers	should	be	increased	largely	to	reduce	resistance	to	reform.	 		The	 withdrawal	 of	 state-owned	 assets	 from	 profitable	 sectors	 should	 be	completed	within	five	to	ten	years.		
4.3.3 Establishing	the	constitutional	structure	of	state-owned	assets	
governance	mechanism		(1) Basic	principles		
•	 The	 principles	 of	 regular	 government:	 the	 government	 should	 be	 non-profit	government,	and	should	not	engage	in	profitable	activities.		 	
•	The	public	principles:	 state-owned	enterprises	 should	be	 regulated	by	public	law,	and	the	governance	of	state-owned	assets	belongs	to	public	governance.		
•	Exception:	State-owned	assets	entering	to	profitable	sectors	must	be	reviewed	and	approved	by	the	Congress.		(2) Specific	arrangements		
•	 Deleting	 the	 content	 of	 “the	 basic	 economic	 system	 in	 which	 the	 public	ownership	is	dominant”	in	the	Constitution	of	PRC.		
•	 Confirming	 the	nature	of	 status	of	 state-owned	enterprises	as	non-profit	 and	public	law	enterprises,	by	amending	the	Constitution	of	PRC.		
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•	 The	 Congress,	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 whole	 people,	 exercises	 the	 ownership	 of	state-owned	assets,	which	should	be	confirmed	by	the	Constitution	of	PRC.		
•	 State-owned	 assets	 governance	 should	 be	 ranked	 with	 legislation	 and	administration,	as	the	major	functions	of	the	Congress.	Government	department	only	 provides	 public	 services,	 and	 purchases	 public	 goods	 from	 state-owned	enterprises	through	legal	procedures.	 		
•	The	State-owned	Assets	Governance	Commission	should	be	established	within	or	under	the	Congress	(equal	to	the	State	Council	and	the	supreme	court),	which	specializes	in	managing	and	operating	state-owned	assets.		
•	 The	 State-owned	 Assets	 Supervision	 Organization	 exercises	 its	 duties	 and	functions	 based	 on	 law,	 and	 report	 to	 the	 Congress	 directly	 or	 through	 the	State-owned	Assets	Governance	Commission.	 		
•	Like	government	officer,	board	directors	of	state-owned	enterprises	should	be	appointed	 and	dismissed	by	 the	 Congress,	 and	 their	 term	of	 service	 should	 be	confirmed.	 		
•	 There	 should	 be	 no	 administrative	 subordinations	 relationship	 between	state-owned	 enterprises	 and	 the	 State-owned	Assets	 Supervision	Organization,	and	 both	 of	 them	 need	 to	 report	 to	 the	 Congress	 directly	 or	 through	 the	State-owned	Assets	Governance	Commission.	 		This	mechanism	should	be	established	within	ten	to	fifteen	years.			 	
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CHAPTER	FIVE:	ADMINISTRATIVE	MONOPOLY	IN	CHINA		In	 transitional	 period,	 China	 faces	 a	 circumstance	 of	 imperfect	 market	mechanism,	 excessive	 intervention	 of	 government	 to	 the	 market,	 and	 the	absence	 of	 supervision	 mechanism345.	 Therefore,	 by	 comparing	 with	 Western	countries,	 the	 main	 monopoly	 problem	 in	 China	 is	 administrative	 monopoly	rather	 than	 regular	monopoly	 activities,	 which	 not	 only	 preclude	 competition,	but	also	affect	the	further	and	healthy	development	of	China’s	economy346.	The	administrative	monopoly	in	China	is	the	consequence	of	political	system,	and	is	given	 the	 coat	 of	 legitimacy347,	 thus	 it	 could	 only	 be	 regulated	 and	 limited	efficiently	 by	 rules	 and	 regulations.	 However,	 the	 current	 anti-monopoly	 legal	mechanism	 is	 powerless	 to	 regulate	 administrative	monopoly	 activities	 due	 to	systematical	 deficiencies	 and	 lack	 of	 effective	 enforcement	 organizations,	 even	after	 the	 enactment	 of	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law348	 and	 has	 specific	 provisions	about	administrative	monopoly.	 		This	chapter	will	clarify	the	basic	theories	about	administrative	monopoly,	such	as	 what	 it	 exactly	 is,	 its	 characteristics	 and	 origins,	 introduce	 the	 current	anti-monopoly	 legal	system	of	China	and	analysis	 its	shortcomings,	and	 look	to	the	experiences	of	European	Community	to	suggest	a	path	for	implementation	of	the	administrative	monopoly	provisions	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law349.	 		
1. Basic	Theories	of	Administrative	Monopoly		
1.1 Administrative	monopoly		Generally,	 the	 administrative	 monopoly	 can	 be	 defined	 as	 a	 monopoly	 the	economic	power	of	which	is	maintained	at	least	in	part	by	official	administrative	
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or	regulatory	power350.	 In	practice,	 from	local	 trash	pick	up	to	national	electric	grid	 are	 all	 administrative	 monopoly	 activities.	 The	 administrative	 monopoly	could	 be	 abused	when	 government	 uses	 its	 power	 to	 control	markets	 through	legislation,	 regulation,	 or	 use	 of	 administrative	 organizations	 to	 seek	 above	market	 rents,	which	would	harm	overall	 social	 interests	with	 increased	prices,	reduced	output,	and	reduced	competition.	 		The	 administrative	 monopoly	 in	 market	 is	 a	 common	 problem	 in	 transitional	countries351,	 and	 is	 strictly	 regulated	 and	 limited	 by	 their	 anti-monopoly	 laws.	The	typical	countries	are	Russian	and	Ukraine.	 		Russian,	a	typical	transitional	country,	experienced	the	same	transition	process	as	China,	 such	as	 they	all	had	a	highly	 centralized	planned	economy	 for	a	 long	time,	introduced	market	economy	to	reform	their	economic	system,	and	had	an	economic	structure	in	which	private	sector	and	public	sector	coexisted.	Although	the	 large-scale	 privatization	 of	 state-owned	 assets	 were	 undertaken	 after	 the	collapse	of	Soviet	Union,	 the	public	sector	still	dominant	the	national	economy,	and	 the	 interferences	 of	 the	 government	 to	 the	 market	 still	 existed	 due	 to	immature	market	mechanism352.	 Therefore,	 Russian	made	 comprehensive	 and	strict	regulations	on	administrative	monopoly,	and	the	Federal	Law	on	Protection	
of	 Competition353	 is	 the	major	 legislation.	 Article	 4	 of	 it	 defined	 the	 subject	 of	administrative	 monopoly:	 “State	 or	 municipal	 preferences	 means	 granting	advantages	to	economic	entities	by	the	federal	executive	bodies,	the	authorities	of	 the	 constituent	 territories	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation,	 local	 self-government	bodies,	other	agencies	or	organizations	exercising	the	functions	of	those	bodies,	which	 put	 then	 in	 more	 advantageous	 conditions	 for	 economic	 activity,	 by	transferring	 State	 of	 municipal	 property,	 other	 objects	 of	 civil	 rights	 or	 by	providing	property	allowances;	State	or	municipal	guarantees”354.	And	Article	16	
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of	 the	 Federal	 Law	 on	 Protection	 of	 Competition	 clearly	 prohibits	 government	agencies	or	relevant	organizations	abuse	administrative	power	to	seek	rents	and	restrict	competition355.	This	article	ruled	that:	 		 Agreements	 between	 federal	 executive	 authorities,	 public	 authorities	 of	 the	constituent	territories	of	the	Russian	Federation,	local	self-government	bodies,	other	bodies	or	organizations	exercising	the	functions	of	the	above-mentioned	bodies,	 as	 well	 as	 public	 extra-budgetary	 funds,	 the	 Central	 Bank	 of	 the	Russian	 Federation	 or	 between	 them	 and	 economic	 entities	 or	 execution	 of	concerted	 practices	 by	 these	 bodies	 and	 organizations	 are	 forbidden	 if	 such	agreements	 or	 such	 execution	 of	 concerted	 practices	 lead	 or	 can	 lead	 to	prevention,	restriction	or	elimination	of	competition,	in	Particular,	to:		1) increase,	decrease	or	maintaining	of	prices	(tariffs)	except	the	cases	when	such	agreements	are	provided	for	by	Federal	Laws	or	statutory	 legal	acts	of	 the	 President	 of	 the	 Russian	 Federation,	 statutory	 legal	 acts	 of	 the	Government	of	the	Russian	Federation;	2) economically,	 technologically	 or	 in	 any	 other	 way	 unjustified	establishment	of	different	prices	(tariffs)	for	the	same	commodity;	3) division	of	the	goods	market	according	to	the	territorial	principle,	volume	of	sale	or	purchase	of	commodities,	range	of	sold	products	or	composition	of	sellers	or	purchasers	(customers);	4) restriction	 of	 entry	 into	 a	 goods	 market	 (exit	 from	 a	 goods	 market)	 or	removal	of	economic	entities	from	it.356		In	 Ukraine,	 the	 Law	 on	 Limitation	 of	 Monopolism	 and	 Prevention	 of	 Unfair	
Competition	 in	 Entrepreneurial	 Activities 357 	 also	 provides	 regulations	 on	restricting	 and	 prohibiting	 administrative	 monopolies.	 The	 Article	 6	 of	 this	legislation	 –	 “Discrimination	 against	 economic	 entities	 practiced	 by	 bodies	 of	State	power,	bodies	of	 local	 self-government,	 and	bodies	of	 administrative	 and	
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economic	management	and	control”358	 ruled	 that	 following	activities	practiced	by	 government	 agencies	 or	 relevant	 organizations	 should	 be	 restricted	 and	prohibited,	including:		 1) establishment	 of	 new	 enterprises	 or	 other	 organization	 forms	 of	entrepreneurship	in	any	sphere	of	activities	as	well	as	putting	restrictions	on	being	engaged	 in	some	activities,	on	production	of	particular	kinds	of	products,	which	resulted	or	can	result	in	restriction	of	competition;	 	2) compulsion	 of	 economic	 entities	 to	 join	 associations,	 concerns,	interbranch,	regional,	and	other	amalgamations	of	enterprises,	to	practice	a	 priority	 conclusion	 of	 contracts,	 and	 to	 provide	 a	 primary	 supply	 to	 a	particular	circle	of	consumers;	 	3) making	 decisions	 about	 centralized	 distribution	 of	 products,	 which	resulted	or	can	result	in	monopoly	position	on	the	market;	 	4) establishment	of	prohibition	against	 sale	of	products	 from	one	 region	 to	the	republic	into	another	one;	 	5) giving	 particular	 economic	 entities	 such	 as	 fax	 and	 other	 privileges	 that	place	them	in	a	privileged	position	with	respect	to	other	economic	entities,	which	 resulted	 or	 can	 result	 in	 monopolization	 of	 the	 market	 of	 a	particular	product;	 	6) restriction	of	the	rights	of	economic	entities	to	purchase	and	sell	products;	 	7) establishment	 of	 prohibitions	 or	 limitations	 with	 respect	 to	 particular	economic	entities	or	groups	of	economic	entities359.		In	addition,	this	article	also	ruled	that	“Conclusion	of	agreements	between	bodies	of	 State	 power,	 bodies	 of	 local	 self-government,	 bodies	 of	 administrative	 and	economic	 management	 and	 control,	 conclusion	 of	 agreements	 between	 those	bodies	 and	 economic	 entities	 as	 well	 as	 their	 giving	 natural	 or	 legal	 persons	powers	to	perform	the	actions	provided	for	by	item	1	of	the	present	article	shall	also	be	considered	to	constitute	discrimination	against	economic	entities”360.	 	
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	Apart	 from	 for	 transitional	 countries,	 some	Western	 countries	 also	 have	 rules	and	 regulations	 about	 administrative	 monopoly.	 For	 example,	 the	 Act	 against	
Restrains	on	Competition	of	German361	 ruled	clearly	that	“this	act	shall	apply	also	to	undertakings	which	are	entirely	or	partly	in	public	ownership	or	are	managed	or	operated	by	public	authorities”362.	 		In	China,	Chapter	V	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	–	Abuse	of	Administrative	Power	to	Eliminate	 and	Restrict	 competition363,	 is	 the	main	 legislation	 concerning	 about	administrative	 monopoly.	 Chapter	 V	 begins	 with	 a	 series	 of	 negative	 duties;	Article	 33	 prohibits	 government	 agencies	 and	 relevant	 organizations	 from	granting	monopolies364;	Article	34	prohibits	protectionist-bidding	procedure365;	Article	 35	 prohibits	 unequal	 treatment	 of	 outside	 business366 ;	 Article	 36	prohibits	government	agencies	from	forcing	business	to	engage	in	monopolistic	activities367;	 and	 Article	 37	 is	 a	 catch-all	 provision	 prohibiting	 government	agencies	from	eliminating	or	restricting	competition368.	However,	Chapter	V	does	not	 make	 a	 clear	 definition	 of	 administrative	 monopoly	 in	 detail,	 such	 as	 the	subject	of	administrative	monopoly	activities.	 		
1.2 The	nature	and	origin	of	administrative	monopoly	 		Generally,	the	term	of	monopoly	means	economic	monopoly.	It	is	the	inevitable	result	of	the	development	of	market	economy,	it	is	pure	market	activities	rather	than	State	activities,	 and	 the	power	of	 the	 subject	of	monopoly	activities	 could	not	 beyond	 the	 State	 no	matter	 how	 powerful	 it	 is.	 In	 other	words,	 economic	monopoly	is	the	market	activities	while	could	be	managed	and	restricted	by	the	State.	In	the	period	when	the	anti-monopoly	law	in	Western	countries	emerged	and	developed,	 the	 State	 rarely	 interfere	 the	market,	 even	 in	 the	mercantilism	
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period	 the	 State	 only	 enacted	 some	 rules	 and	 regulations	 that	 encouraging	 or	prohibition	 export	 and	 import.	 Thus,	 the	 main	 regulation	 subject	 of	 regular	anti-monopoly	law	(Western	anti-monopoly	law)	is	regular	monopoly	(economic	monopoly)	 but	 administrative	 monopoly.	 The	 administrative	 monopoly	problems	widely	existed	in	current	China	is	neither	the	common	phenomenon	of	the	initial	stage	of	market	economy,	nor	the	common	characteristics	of	modern	market	 economy.	 There	 are	 unique	 problems	 that	 arisen	 in	 those	 countries	transferred	from	highly	centralized	planned	economy	to	market	economy,	such	as	China,	Russian	and	Ukraine.	To	determine	which	is	the	appropriate	approach	to	 solve	 the	 problems	 of	 administrative	 monopoly,	 the	 nature	 of	 it	 should	 be	clarified	at	first.		To	 the	 nature	 of	 administrative	monopoly,	 some	 scholar	 though	 it	 is	 a	 kind	 of	economic	 monopoly	 to	 some	 degree,	 its	 purpose	 is	 to	 monopolize	 economic	benefits	 rather	 than	administrative	power,	and	 the	monopoly	activities	are	not	practiced	by	regular	enterprises	but	by	abusing	of	administrative	power369.	They	thought	the	nature	of	administrative	monopoly	is	that	the	subjects	of	monopoly	activities	 obtain	 excessive	 benefits	 by	 using	 administrative	 power	 that	 beyond	the	scope	of	authority	 in	the	market,	which	 is	 for-profit	behavior	essentially370.	Therefore,	 administrative	 monopoly	 is	 economic	 monopoly,	 and	 the	 only	difference	 between	 them	 is	 the	 subject	 dominates	 the	 market	 by	 using	administrative	 but	 economic	 power.	 And	 the	 results	 of	 administrative	 and	economic	 monopoly	 activities	 are	 the	 same	 as	 well,	 which	 is	 to	 restrict	 and	eliminate	competition	in	certain	market.	 		However,	the	above	argument	does	not	provide	a	comprehensive	illustration	of	administrative	monopoly	 as	 it	 only	 address	 the	 external	 performance	 of	 it.	 In	essence,	 the	administrative	monopoly	 is	 the	activities	 that	are	practiced	by	 the	government	 agencies	 or	 relevant	 organizations	 to	 restrict	 and	 eliminate	competition	on	behalf	of	 the	State	and	based	on	coercive	power	of	State371.	By	
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comparing	with	 regular	monopoly,	 the	 fundamental	 differences	 between	 them	are:	administrative	monopoly	 is	undertaken	on	behalf	of	 the	State;	 it	 is	backed	with	 coercive	 power;	 and	 it	 is	 legitimate	 and	 always	 protected	 by	 law.	 These	characteristics	 determine	 that	 administrative	 monopoly	 is	 the	 activities	 that	restrict	 and	 eliminate	 competition	 with	 super	 power,	 which	 is	 much	 more	powerful	 than	 economic	 power.	 And	 this	 is	 its	 nature.	 It	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	administrative	 monopoly	 shares	 some	 common	 features	 with	 economic	monopoly,	 such	 as	 they	 all	 pursue	 excessive	 benefits,	 restrict	 and	 eliminate	competition	 in	 certain	market,	 and	harm	 the	 interests	 of	 other	market	 players	and	 consumers.	 But,	 these	 common	 features	 are	 only	 similarities	 of	 external	perfomance,	 and	 there	 are	 essential	 differences	 between	 them.	 In	 addition,	 by	comparing	 with	 State	 monopoly,	 administrative	 monopoly	 has	 different	purposes,	 which	 is	 to	 obtain	 excessive	 benefits	 rather	 than	 providing	 public	goods	 and	 services372.	 Therefore,	 administrative	monopoly	 is	 a	 unique	 activity	practiced	 by	 government	 agencies	 and	 relevant	 organizations	 by	 using	 their	administrative	power,	and	it	is	a	State	action	rather	than	market	activities.		The	 reasons	 caused	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 administrative	 monopoly	 are	 varied.	First	of	all,	the	administrative	monopoly	is	caused	by	political	rather	than	market	factors373.	 During	 planned	 economy	 period,	 the	 government	 agencies	 were	authorized	with	 strong	economic	 functions,	 and	 the	productive	 factors	and	 the	whole	production	process	were	not	 controlled	by	 the	market	 but	 by	 the	 State.	The	 long-term	 planned	 economy	 not	 only	 resulted	 in	 low	 efficient	productiveness,	 but	 also	 affected	 current	 economic	 system.	 For	 example,	although	the	market	mechanism	has	been	introduced	to	China	for	three	decades,	the	inertia	of	traditional	system	still	remain:	the	functions	of	government	rarely	changed,	 and	many	 government	 agencies	 are	 still	 interfering	 with	 the	market	just	 like	 what	 they	 did	 in	 the	 planned	 economic	 system.	 Therefore,	 the	administrative	monopoly	is	the	result	of	the	government	controlling	the	market	under	“planned”	thinking	patterns,	and	it	is	the	inheritance	of	planned	economy.	
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The	administrative	monopoly	is	not	an	economic	but	political	problem,	this	is	the	essential	 characteristics	 of	 it,	 and	 should	 be	 considered	 as	 the	 fundamental	 of	regulating	the	administrative	monopoly	activities.	 		Second,	the	incorrect	profit	motive	is	the	subjective	reason	of	the	administrative	monopoly	problems374.	 In	modern	market	economy,	the	government	is	allowed	to	interfere	the	market	to	some	degree,	but	the	purposes	of	this	intervention	are	to	maintain	 the	operation	of	market	mechanism	and	 to	pursue	 the	 interests	of	the	whole	 society	 rather	 than	 interests	of	 certain	 regions,	 industries	and	 itself.	The	 incorrect	 profit	 motive	 is	 resulted	 from	 current	 political	 system.	 Taking	China	 as	 an	 example,	 after	 Reform	 and	 Opening	 Up,	 local	 governments	 were	authorized	 with	 more	 autonomy	 in	 revenue,	 which	 directly	 relate	 to	 the	development	 of	 regional	 economy,	 especially	 the	 performance	 of	 local	state-owned	 enterprises.	 This	 situation	 has	 created	 opportunities	 for	 the	creation	 and	 abuse	 of	 administrative	 monopoly	 and	 incentives	 for	 local	protectionism.	 In	 practice,	 to	 increase	 revenues,	 the	 local	 government	 always	provides	local	enterprises	more	preferential	policies	such	as	low	loan	interests,	or	directly	set	trade	barriers	to	restrict	and	block	the	entry	of	enterprises	from	other	 regions.	 One	 example	 of	 this	 phoneme	 includes	 charging	 higher	 fees	 in	Shanghai	for	cars	produced	outside	the	city.	 		Third,	 the	 government	 running	 or	 managing	 enterprises	 and	 engaging	 in	commercial	 activities	 is	 another	 reason	 of	 the	 administrative	 monopoly	problems375.	Under	market	economy,	enterprises	should	operate	independently	based	 on	 clear	 ownership,	 and	 the	 main	 functions	 of	 the	 government	 are	 to	maintain	the	market	order	and	to	create	a	healthy	environment	for	enterprises.	The	 government	 should	 not	 interfere	 with	 the	 rightful	 competition	 among	market	players,	and	cannot	directly	participate	in	competition	for	certain	groups’	interests.	However,	in	transitional	countries,	the	close	relationship	between	the	government	 departments	 and	 enterprises	 still	 remained:	 on	 one	 hand,	 the	government	still	controlled	and	managed	enterprises	under	traditional	planned	
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patterns,	 and	gave	 them	more	preferential	 policies	 to	obtain	more	benefits	 for	themselves;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 enterprises	 heavily	 relied	 on	 the	 protection	 of	government	departments,	and	always	seek	for	assistance	from	the	government,	which	 created	 opportunities	 for	 abusing	 of	 administrative	 power.	 This	 is	 the	main	reason	of	the	administrative	monopoly	problems	occurred	widely.	 		Last	 but	 not	 least,	 the	 unbalanced	 position	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	market	 cause	 the	 problems	 of	 the	 administrative	 monopoly.	 Under	 market	economy,	the	position	of	the	government	and	the	scope	of	its	functions	directly	determine	 whether	 a	 market	 mechanism	 could	 be	 established	 and	 the	performance	 of	 it.	 The	 development	 of	 economy	 should	 be	 based	 on	 the	performance	 of	 market	 mechanism	 rather	 than	 the	 intervention	 of	 the	government,	and	the	government	could	neither	participate	in	competition	for	the	interests	 of	 certain	 industries,	 regions	 and	 itself,	 nor	 directly	 or	 indirectly	restrict	 and	 eliminate	 competition	 by	 all	 means.	 In	 fact,	 the	 administrative	monopoly	 is	 the	 inappropriate	 intervention	 of	 the	 government	 to	 the	market,	and	 it	 is	 the	damage	 to	market	 competition.	From	 this	perspective,	 to	 regulate	administrative	monopoly	is	to	regulate	the	relationship	between	the	government	and	the	market.	 		Thus	it	can	be	seen	that	the	administrative	monopoly	is	not	the	inventible	result	of	the	development	of	market	economy	but	the	remnant	of	planned	economy	and	unique	 phoneme	 in	 transitional	 period,	 it	 is	 the	 sequel	 of	 traditional	 political	system	 and	 incomplete	 reform,	 it	 is	 the	 result	 of	 the	 government	 lowing	 its	status	from	the	provider	of	public	goods	and	services	to	the	represent	of	certain	interests	 group,	 and	 it	 is	 the	 reflection	 of	 State	 power	 beyond	 society	 at	 the	initial	stage	of	the	separation	of	civil	society	and	State	authorities.	In	essence,	the	administrative	monopoly	 is	a	complicated	systematical	problem	rather	 than	an	economic	problem,	and	 it	 is	 caused	by	political	and	systematical	 factors	 rather	than	market	and	economic	factors.	 		
2. The	Administrative	Monopoly	in	China	
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2.1 The	Forms	of	China’s	Administrative	Monopoly	
	The	 main	 administrative	 monopoly	 problems	 in	 China	 are	 industrial	 or	departmental	 monopoly	 and	 regional	 monopoly.	 The	 industrial	 and	departmental	 monopoly	 means	 the	 government	 agencies	 and	 relevant	authorities	 control	 and	 dominate	 certain	 industries	 and	 departments,	 restrict	and	 eliminate	 competition	 of	 other	 market	 players,	 and	 provide	 their	subordinate	 enterprises	 with	 preferential	 policies	 so	 they	 could	 dominate	 or	monopolize	 certain	 market,	 by	 using	 their	 legal	 administrative	 power	 and	specific	 advantages	 such	 as	 investment	 power,	 resource	 management	 power,	and	 financial	 power.	 In	 practice,	 on	 one	 hand,	 the	 government	 agencies	 and	relevant	 authorities	 directly	 participate	 in	 competition	 and	 strengthen	competiveness	 of	 their	 subordinate	 or	 related	 enterprises	 by	 giving	 them	preferential	 policies,	 such	 as	 low	 loan	 interests,	 tax	 preference,	 sufficient	resources	supply	and	fast-track	for	examination	and	approval.	On	the	other	hand,	they	restrict	and	eliminate	competition	of	other	market	players,	by	setting	direct	or	 indirect	 market	 and	 systematical	 barriers.	 For	 examples,	 the	 tobacco	monopolization	 system	 in	 China,	 and	 some	 local	 Administration	 of	 Press,	Publication,	 Radio	 Film	 and	 Television376	 directly	 stipulates	 that	 the	 sale	 and	rent	 business	 of	 audio-video	 products	 are	 exclusively	 operated	 by	 its	subordinate	 audio	 and	 video	 enterprise,	 these	 are	 examples	 of	 direct	systematical	and	market	barriers;	in	commercial	bank	industry	in	China,	despite	the	 fact	 that	 there	 is	no	existing	 laws	and	 regulations	 that	prohibit	 the	private	sector	 entering	 this	 industry,	 the	 difficulty	 in	 obtaining	 administrative	 and	approval	documents	from	the	government	made	it	impossible	for	private	sector	enter	such	market,	this	is	a	typical	example	of	indirect	market	barriers.	 		The	 regional	 monopoly	 means	 the	 local	 government	 agencies	 and	 relevant	authorities	 restrict	 competition	 and	 block	 new	 entrants	 from	other	 regions	 by	abusing	their	administrative	power	to	protect	their	own	interests.	For	instance,	giving	preferential	policies	to	local	enterprises	to	enhance	their	competitiveness	
																																								 																				 	
376 ĸɥiƟòƮâAdministration of Press, Publication, Radio Film and Television. 
	 185	
and	 expand	 their	 market	 share;	 restricting	 the	 entrance	 of	 goods	 from	 other	regions	to	local	market	by	setting	barriers	at	the	border,	applying	unreasonable	high	standard	for	those	goods;	restricting	the	sale	of	other	region’s	goods	at	local	market,	 such	 as	 directly	 controlling	 the	 price	 to	 reduce	 the	 profits	 of	 the	enterprises	from	other	regions,	even	directly	prohibition	of	them;	and	restricting	local	goods	and	technology	outflow	on	behalf	of	protecting	local	interests.	 		In	addition	to	above	two	main	types	of	administrative	monopoly,	there	are	two	other	 types	 in	 current	 China:	 the	 government	 appointed	 trade	 and	 the	administrative	 enterprises377.	The	government	 appointed	 trade	means	 that	 the	government	agencies	and	relevant	authorities	require	consumers	to	buy	or	use	certain	 goods	 and	 services	 from	 themselves	or	 a	designated	business	operator	exclusively	without	any	justifiable	cause,	by	abusing	their	administrative	power.	For	example,	the	government	could	directly	appoint	electricity	or	transportation	suppliers	 by	 enacting	 relevant	 administrative	 orders,	 or	 it	 could	 restrict	 the	scope	 and	 qualification	 of	 certain	 goods	 and	 services	 suppliers	 to	 force	consumers	to	buy	or	use	such	goods	and	services	from	certain	suppliers.	 		The	administrative	enterprises	are	those	enterprises	that	have	both	the	power	to	regulate	 an	 industry	 and	 engage	 in	 the	 industry	 itself.	 The	 administrative	enterprises	 is	 a	 result	 of	 incomplete	 economic	 and	 political	 reform,	 and	 the	combination	 of	 market	 participation	 and	 regulatory	 power	 are	 some	 of	 the	problems	associated	with	 regulatory	 capture:	 an	administrative	enterprise	will	have	 the	 conflicting	 goals	 of	 earning	 profits	 in	 the	 market	 and	 regulating	 the	market	 for	the	benefit	of	consumers,	 the	economy,	and	the	State	as	a	whole.	 In	practice,	 these	 administrative	 enterprises	 always	 pay	 more	 attentions	 on	obtaining	more	profits	for	themselves	than	regulating	market	order,	and	restrict	and	 eliminate	 competition	 of	 other	 market	 players	 to	 pursue	 excessive	monopoly	profits	by	abusing	its	regulatory	power.	 	
	
2.2 The	Causes	of	China’s	Administrative	Monopoly	
																																								 																				 	
377 Ř[¨2006	3V6Yª¯~-ǤƇǋÍiƟǁLanpin Yang. 2006. Study on 
Administrative Monopoly in China. Beijing: Economic Science Press. 
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	2.2.1 The	inertia	of	the	planned	economy		Before	 reform	 and	 opening	 up,	 a	 highly	 centralized	 planned	 economic	 system	had	 existed	 for	 almost	 30	 years	 in	 China.	 Under	 this	 system,	 the	 government	managed	 the	 economy	entirely	by	 administrative	decisions,	 directing	 all	 of	 the	behavior	of	enterprises.	Usually,	the	central	government	controlled	both	macro-	and	micro-economic	variables	through	all-encompassing	plans	and	orders.	These	long-blurred	 lines	 between	 government	 departments	 and	 enterprises	 fostered	the	 long-standing	practice	of	 government	 administrators,	directly	 commanding	and	managing	enterprises.		During	the	first	20	years	of	reform	and	opening	up,	this	situation	has	changed	to	a	great	 extent,	but	 these	 tendencies	 towards	 control	have	not	been	completely	eradicated.	 The	 crucial	 political	 reforms	 during	 this	 period	 involved	 the	transformation	 of	 government	 functions,	 but	 the	 exact	 division	 of	 powers	 and	responsibilities	was	difficult	to	grasp	given	the	speed	of	reforms.	This	leads	to	a	disjointed	 and	 often-conflicting	 division	 of	 responsibilities,	 which	 opened	 the	door	to	abuse	of	administrative	power.	This	phenomenon	is	most	apparent	when	dismantling,	merging,	 or	 creating	 government	 departments.	 As	 a	 result,	 blurry	lines	 separating	 government	 departments	 and	 enterprises	 laid	 the	 foundation	for	the	creation	of	administrative	monopolies.		Almost	 all	 the	 major	 industries	 characterized	 by	 administrative	 monopoly	discussed	in	this	study	evolved	out	of	the	completely	planned	economic	system.		Given	 that	 these	 industries	 evolved	 from	 the	 planned	 economy	 and	 an	SOE-dominated	system,	many	observers	wait	patiently	with	the	expectation	that	the	government	will	eventually	break	these	monopolies	and	guide	them	into	the	market	 economy.	 Moreover,	 the	 concept	 of	 the	 planned	 economy	 persists	 in	some	 people’s	 minds	 and	 misleads	 them	 into	 thinking	 that	 some	 special	industries	 require	 control	 and	 planning,	 leading	 them	 to	 tolerate	 such	administrative	monopolies.	
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	2.2.2 Absence	of	fiscal	pressure	on	central	government	for	reform	 		One	of	the	important	driving	forces	for	the	reform	in	the	1980s	and	1990s	was	the	 fiscal	pressure	 felt	by	 the	central	government.	For	example,	 fiscal	pressure	was	the	main	factor	that	led	to	reform	of	the	telecom	industry378.	The	economic	losses	incurred	by	the	government-run	telecom	industry	not	only	increased	the	fiscal	burden	of	 the	central	government,	but	also	restricted	the	development	of	the	industry	itself.	When	demand	dramatically	increased	at	the	established	price	level,	the	financial	shortages	became	apparent.	At	this	time,	the	gains	in	revenue	from	 loosening	 administrative	 controls	 made	 it	 a	 very	 practical	 and	 natural	choice.		During	the	establishment	of	China	Unicom,	the	State	Council	supported	the	move	while	 also	 balancing	 the	 interests	 of	 all	 parties.	 The	 result	 was	 that	 the	 State	Council	ended	up	being	one	of	the	biggest	beneficiaries	of	the	move.	The	reason	is	 that	 the	establishment	of	China	Unicom	benefited	the	overall	 interests	of	 the	central	 government.	 First,	 the	 financial	 problems	 resulting	 from	 the	development	 of	 the	 telecom	 industry	were	 resolved.	 Second,	 the	move	 greatly	improved	 China’s	 telecommunications	 networks	 by	 increasing	 the	 supply	 and	better	 meeting	 customer	 demands	 through	 competition.	 Third,	 the	 central	government’s	strong	position	allowed	it	to	lower	prices	during	negotiations	with	the	telecoms.	Fourth,	given	the	huge	markets	in	China,	the	entry	of	China	Unicom	did	 not	 need	 to	 be	 a	 zero-sum	 game	 for	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Posts	 and	Telecommunications.	More	fundamentally,	no	matter	what	organization	form	or	asset	 structure	 China	 Unicom	 took,	 it	 was	 still	 nominally	 a	 state-owned	 and	state-controlled	telecom	enterprise	for	the	near	future.	Therefore,	in	terms	of	the	development	of	the	industry,	 the	establishment	of	China	Unicom	was	beneficial	to	 the	 central	 government’s	 finances.	 This	 perhaps	 explains	 why	 the	 central	government	opened	the	door	to	a	few	new	entrants	to	the	telecom	industry379.	
																																								 																				 	378	üǨɂ1995YōsǤƇƱÉė.
/Ƨ.]ǙǤƇƼǐ1995ðǕ 4ŎWeiying	Zhang.	1995.	“The	Principal-agent	Relationship	in	Public	Economy	–	Theories	and	Policies”.	
Economic	Research.	Vol.	4..	379	 Ibid.	 	
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	As	 reforms	 progressed	 into	 the	 1990s,	 most	 of	 the	 SOEs	 were	 found	 to	 be	unprofitable.	Rather	than	a	major	source	of	revenue	for	the	central	government,	they	instead	became	a	burden.	Now,	after	years	of	reforms	to	the	political	system,	the	main	 source	 of	 revenue	 has	 already	 shifted	 to	 taxable	 income.	 The	 central	government	has	a	motivation	to	reform	SOEs,	but	not	to	break	their	monopolies.	On	the	contrary,	one	of	the	ways	to	ease	the	fiscal	burden	brought	by	SOEs	is	to	provide	monopoly	power	through	preferential	policies	for	SOEs.		2.2.3 The	market	value	of	administrative	monopolies	and	the	formation	of	self-aware	monopoly	interest	group		There	 is	 a	 huge	 lap	 between	 the	 monopoly	 interest	 groups	 and	 the	 interest	groups	formed	by	SOE	managers	because	both	groups	have	similar	motivations.	There	 exist	 great	 inducements	 in	 the	 form	 of	 valuable	 resources	 and	 related	markets,	 and	 these	 groups	 are	 also	 now	 very	 aware	 of	 their	 own	 interests	 in	these	markets.		With	 the	 success	 of	 economic	 reforms	 in	 China,	 huge	 domestic	 markets	 have	gradually	 taken	 shape	 in	 telecoms,	 energy,	 and	 finance,	 among	 others.	 The	appearance	of	 these	promising	markets,	 in	 turn,	highlights	the	value	of	holding	monopolies	 in	 these	markets.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 enormous	 value	 of	 these	resources	motivates	relevant	 interest	groups	to	seize	monopoly	power	through	administrative	means.	The	goal	of	 the	 interest	group	 is	 to	continuously	expand	the	amount	of	wealth	that	falls	within	the	boundaries	of	its	operation,	and	at	the	same	time	to	expand	those	boundaries.		There	exist	two	key	documents	that	have	allowed	interest	groups	to	improperly	expand	 their	 boundaries.	 The	 first	 key	 document	 is	 the	Decisions	 by	 the	 State	Council	on	 the	 Implementation	of	a	Tax	Sharing	Financial	Management	System	issued	 in	 December	 1993,	 which	 contained	 the	 following	 statement:	 “As	 a	transitional	measure,	as	judged	on	a	case-by-case	basis,	most	old	SOEs	that	were	registered	before	1993	can	be	free	 from	handing	 in	their	after-tax	profits.”	The	
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document	 set	 a	 precedent	 that	 SOEs	 could	 avoid	 turning	 over	 profits380.	 From	1994	up	 to	 today,	SOEs	as	a	whole	have	 in	 fact	not	 turned	over	a	 cent	of	 their	profits.		The	second	key	document	is	the	Opinions	on	the	Intensification	of	the	Reform	of	
Personnel,	Labor,	and	the	Distribution	System	of	SOEs,	issued	in	2001	by	the	State	Economic	and	Trade	Commission,	the	Ministry	of	Personnel,	and	the	Ministry	of	Labor	and	Social	Security.	The	document	states	that	“The	wage	level	of	workers	in	 an	 enterprise	 under	 the	 state’s	 macro	 control	 should	 be	 decided	 by	 the	enterprise	itself	according	to	local	average	wage	and	the	economic	results	of	the	enterprise.”381	 The	document	removed	the	upper	limit	on	wages	and	bonuses	in	SOEs	so	that	they	can	set	the	payment	to	their	workers	without	constraints.	By	removing	 these	 limits,	SOEs	now	saw	their	profits,	which	 technically	should	be	returned	 to	 the	people,	 turn	 into	 higher	 compensation	 for	 SOE	 employees	 and	managers.	With	gains	to	income	for	SOEs	now	being	channeled	into	the	pockets	of	 managers	 and	 employees,	 the	 interest	 groups	 formed	 by	 them	 have	 even	stronger	motivations	to	expand	their	monopoly	powers.		2.2.4 In	house	lobbying		“In-house	 lobbying”	 refers	 to	 senior	 SOE	 managers	 attempting	 to	 obtain	administrative	 monopoly	 powers	 through	 the	 lobbying	 of	 administrative	department	officials.	 It	 is	a	phenomenon	 found	 in	all	 the	 industries.	One	of	 the	reasons	 this	 has	 proved	 successful	 is	 the	 revolving	 door	 that	 links	 officials	 in	these	 industry-focused	 departments	 with	 the	 SOEs	 themselves.	 These	 officials	and	SOE	managers	are	likely	to	swap	positions	over	the	course	of	their	careers,	giving	 good	 reason	 to	 foster	 good	 relations.	 How	 frequently	 officials	 and	 SOE	managers	 use	 this	 revolving	 door	 is	 an	 important	 indicator	 that	 indirectly	reflects	the	strength	of	the	administrative	monopoly	in	an	industry.		
																																								 																				 	380	 The	Decisions	by	the	State	Council	on	the	Implementation	of	a	Tax	Sharing	Financial	Management	System,	1993.	 	381	 The	Intensification	of	the	Reform	of	Personnel,	Labor,	and	the	Distribution	System	of	SOEs,	2001.	 	
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For	example,	in	China	Telecome,	41%	of	their	senior	manager	has	spent	time	in	the	department	tasked	with	overseeing	the	industry,	and	the	proportion	of	that	in	China	Mobil	and	China	Unicom	are	33%	and	21%,	respectively.	In	oil	industry	the	 proportion	 is	 even	 larger,	 and	 the	 average	 proportion	 of	 that	 of	 CNPC,	Sinopec	and	CNOOC	is	33%.	This	proportion	in	Railway	Corporations382,	Four	Big	Banks383,	and	Salt	Enterprises384	 are	21%,	47%	and	43%,	respectively385.	 		2.2.5 Department	Legislation		Departmental	legislation	refers	to	legislation	that	is	guided	or	even	controlled	by	administrative	departments,	and	a	broader	definition	can	include	administrative	activity	 by	 departments	 that	 effectively	 amount	 to	 the	 creation	 of	 legislation.	Departmental	 legislation	 emerges	 out	 of	 a	 political	 environment	 in	 which	departments	 lack	 effective	 constraints	 on	 their	 actions,	 allowing	 them	 to	 both	directly	and	indirectly	affect	legislation.		The	 narrowly	 defined	 version	 of	 department	 legislation	 emerges	 when	administrative	 departments	 draft	 legislation	 or	 amendments	 and	 then	 submit	these	drafts	to	the	People’s	Congress	for	approval.	Chinese	laws	do	not	preclude	administrative	 officials	 from	 also	 serving	 as	 representatives	 to	 the	 National	People’s	Congress,	and	in	fact	approximately	40%	of	NPC	members	also	serve	in	the	 government	 administrative	 department	 or	 related	 posts	 in	 the	 Chinese	Communist	 Party.	 Elected	 representatives	 who	 do	 not	 hold	 posts	 in	 the	government	or	 the	Party	 are	 also	 selected	 in	non-competitive	 elections	 run	by	those	powers.	This	means	that	drafts	submitted	by	administrative	departments	are	more	likely	to	be	approved	by	the	National	People’s	Congress,	including	laws	that	establish	administrative	monopoly	powers,	such	as	the	Railway	Law	and	the	Sports	Law.		The	 second	 form	 of	 departmental	 legislation	 occurs	 when	 departments	 use	
																																								 																				 	382	 Including	CNR,	CSR,	CRECG,	CRCC,	Northern,	TAIJI,	Jinxi	Axle	and	TGOOD.	 	383	 ICBC,	CCB,	BOC,	ABC.	 	384	 Including	YSSC,	LANTAI,	NAFine,	YanHu.	 	385	 Statistics	from	annual	reports	of	relevant	enterprises.	 	
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“implementation	guidelines”	to	add	clauses	that	violate	the	principle	of	 the	 law	and	further	expand	administrative	powers.		The	 third	 form	of	 departmental	 legislation	occurs	 in	 areas	where	 legislation	 is	non-existent	or	unclear.	In	these	situations,	administrative	departments	directly	issue	 administrative	 laws	 and	 regulations,	 department	 rules,	 even	 policy	documents,	 all	 under	 the	 guise	 of	 “regulations,”	 “opinions,”	 or	 “notices.”	 These	myriad	 forms	 of	 pseudo-legislation	 empower	 the	 departments,	 often	 granting	them	the	right	to	establish	administrative	monopolies.		More	 important	 is	 that	 regardless	 of	which	 government	 body	makes	 the	 laws,	administrative	 departments	 can	 always	 shape	 the	 way	 they	 are	 implemented	and	executed.	In	practice,	the	impact	of	any	type	of	regulation	does	not	depend	on	where	it	originates	from,	but	whether	it	is	executed	or	not.	Though	they	may	carry	no	 legal	weight,	 the	opinions	and	guidelines	put	 forward	by	departments	can	 easily	 become	 the	most	 influential,	 whereas	 regulations	 originating	 in	 the	constitution,	 theoretically	 the	 highest	 law	 of	 the	 land,	 are	 dead	 paper	 if	 not	implemented.		In	 some	 situations,	 departmental	 legislation	 directly	 benefits	 some	 enterprises	and	institutions.	For	example,	almost	all	of	the	legislation	that	led	to	the	creation	of	China	Unicom	came	in	the	form	of	submissions	from	the	Ministry	of	Posts	and	Telecommunications	 that	 were	 then	 quickly	 approved	 by	 the	 State	 Council.	During	 this	 transition	 period,	 these	 departments	 became	 the	 biggest	beneficiaries	 of	 the	 policies	 and	 the	 monopolies	 they	 created.	 When	 China	Unicom	 was	 formed	 out	 of	 three	 departments,	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Posts	 and	Telecommunications	 reinforced	 the	 ties	 between	 the	 government	 and	 the	enterprise	 by	 solidifying	 its	 own	 monopoly	 powers.	 The	 task	 of	 managing	 an	industry	became,	instead,	a	way	to	maintain	monopoly	status.		Even	 more	 serious	 problems	 arise	 when,	 under	 special	 circumstances,	administrative	 departments	 give	 administrative	 powers	 directly	 to	 monopoly	enterprises	 themselves.	 This	 is	 especially	 common	 during	 the	 process	 of	
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abolishing	or	 combining	of	departments,	when	unclear	boundaries	 and	 rapidly	changing	areas	of	responsibility	open	the	door	to	abuses	of	administrative	power.	This	has	been	apparent	in	the	oil	industry,	where	the	related	departments	have	undergone	seven	different	changes	in	structure,	with	no	departments	in	charge	of	 management	 from	 2001	 to	 2003.	 In	 September	 1988,	 the	 government	abolished	 the	Ministry	of	Petroleum,	 restructuring	 it	 into	CNPC.	Personnel	 and	responsibility	for	industry	management	were	moved	directly	into	the	enterprise,	binding	at	the	hip	the	company	and	those	responsible	for	management.		In	 summary,	 defects	 in	 the	 ability	 of	 the	 constitutional	 framework	 to	 limit	administrative	 power	 are	 the	main	 reason	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 administrative	monopolies.	In	addition,	the	revolving	door	that	links	officials	in	administrative	departments	with	high-level	management	 at	 SOEs	makes	 cooperation	between	the	two	all	too	easy.	The	easy	opportunities	to	reap	monopoly	rents	by	shaping	the	formation	and	execution	of	laws	are	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	widespread	administrative	monopolies	in	China.		
3. The	Anti	Administrative	Monopoly	Legal	System	of	China		
3.1 Arguments	about	the	legislation	of	anti	administrative	monopoly		To	administrative	monopoly	activities,	most	scholars	believed	that	they	restrict	and	 eliminate	 competition	 as	 the	 same	 as	 the	 economic	 monopoly,	 thus	 they	should	 be	 regulated	 by	 anti-monopoly	 law	 as	 well386.	 Some	 scholars	 even	thought	currently	the	primary	mission	of	China’s	anti-monopoly	law	is	to	correct	governmental	 distortion	 rather	 than	 limit	 private	 restrictive	 practices,	 due	 to	excessive	government	intervention	still	widely	existed	all	over	the	country	and	is	by	far	the	top	threat	to	competition387.	 		
																																								 																				 	386	ɒÔŚ2007V6Y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However,	 there	 are	 some	 other	 scholars	who	 disagreed	with	 this	 opinion,	 and	stated	 that	 administrative	 monopoly	 is	 not	 the	 regulation	 subject	 of	anti-monopoly	 laws388.	 Their	 main	 reasons	 are:	 firstly,	 they	 believed	 that	 the	administrative	 monopoly	 is	 a	 political	 issue,	 which	 could	 not	 be	 regulated	 by	anti-monopoly	 law	 only389.	 In	 fact,	 the	 solution	 to	 every	 social	 problem	 is	 a	systematical	 process,	 including	 legislation,	 enforcement,	 judicial	 process,	 and	public	supervision.	For	example,	 to	protect	consumers’	 interests,	 the	Consumer	Protection	 Law	 is	 not	 the	 only	 legal	 mechanism	 to	 use,	 other	 laws	 such	 as	competition	law,	civil	law,	product	quality	law	and	quarantine	law	must	also	be	applied.	 It	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	 administrative	 monopoly	 problems	 should	 be	solved	by	both	political	and	economic	measures,	and	no	one	expects	they	could	be	 completely	 solved	 just	 by	 one	 anti-monopoly	 law.	 In	 addition,	 although	administrative	 monopoly	 and	 economic	 monopoly	 control	 and	 dominate	 the	market	 by	 different	 approaches	 and	 powers,	 they	 all	 have	 the	 same	consequences	such	as	restriction	and	elimination	of	competition,	damage	to	the	market	 order,	 hampering	 the	 development	 of	 economy,	 and	 harm	 for	 the	consumer	 and	 other	 market	 players’	 interests.	 Therefore,	 excluding	administrative	monopoly	activities	from	the	regulation	of	the	anti-monopoly	law	is	 not	 tenable.	 Moreover,	 the	 possibility	 of	 the	 administrative	 monopoly	transferring	to	economic	monopoly	also	exists.	 		Secondly,	 some	 scholars	 stated	 that	 all	 regulation	 subjects	 of	 traditional	anti-monopoly	 law	 are	 not	 administrative	 but	 economic	 monopoly	 activities,	therefore	 exclude	 administrative	 monopoly	 from	 anti-monopoly	 law	 is	 an	international	 general	 rules 390 .	 In	 fact,	 this	 is	 a	 misunderstanding	 about	traditional	anti-monopoly	law.	These	scholars	only	noticed	the	external	features	of	 anti-monopoly	 law	 and	 neglected	 the	 nature	 of	 it.	 The	 fact	 is	 that	administrative	 monopoly	 often	 happens	 in	 the	 Chinese	 market	 but	 less	 in	western	economies,	and	the	anti-monopoly	laws	in	western	countries	also	have	
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relevant	 provisions	 on	 restricting	 government	 intervention	 to	 the	 market	 by	abusing	administrative	monopoly.	 		Thirdly,	 some	 scholars	 thought	 the	 administrative	 monopoly	 activities	 are	practices	based	on	State	power,	and	which	could	not	be	efficiently	regulated	and	supervised,	thus	anti-monopoly	law	is	powerless	to	administrative	monopoly391.	It	 is	 indeed	 true	 that	 administrative	 monopoly	 is	 hard	 to	 be	 regulated	 and	restricted,	because	of	the	particularity	of	the	subject	matter	and	the	complexity	of	its	cause	of	formation.	However,	this	situation	was	caused	by	the	incomplete	anti	administrative	monopoly	mechanism,	and	the	main	discussion	here	should	focus	 on	 how	 to	 make	 the	 anti	 administrative	 monopoly	 mechanism	 more	rational	and	effective,	and	not	whether	such	mechanism	is	needed	or	not.	 		Fourthly,	 some	scholars	argued	 that	under	market	economy	 the	self-interested	behaviors	 of	 rational	 economic	man	would	 damage	 the	 interests	 of	 the	whole	society,	then	the	government	intervention	is	necessary,	and	the	precondition	of	the	 socialist	 market	 economy	 with	 Chinese	 characteristics	 is	 government	intervention392.	This	point	of	 view	completely	neglects	 the	existence	of	market	rationality	and	the	restriction	of	the	market	to	economic	individuals,	and	it	also	denies	the	basic	function	of	the	market	to	allocate	resources.	This	point	of	view	tends	 to	strengthen	administrative	power	and	activities,	and	essentially	violate	the	purport	of	socialist	market	economy.	 It	 is	certain	 that	 the	market	economy	and	 the	 government	 intervention	 are	 not	 opposite	 to	 each	 other	 and	 could	coexist,	but	market	competition	is	the	most	effective	way.	The	market	should	be	managed	 and	 adjusted	 by	 itself,	 and	 the	 intervention	 from	 outside	 the	market	should	be	conditional	and	limited,	and	the	government	should	only	intervene	the	market	when	anti-competitive	behavior	results	in	market	failure.	Therefore,	the	government	 intervention	 should	 be	 based	 on	 market	 economy,	 and	 aims	 at	restoring	 the	 competition	market	 order.	 The	 only	 purpose	 of	 the	 government	intervention	 should	 be	 providing	 conditions	 for	 achieving	 the	 optimum	
																																								 																				 	
391 ɩ)Ƕ2007“®r±	ȼȻǤƇƀƱ3O”pL)> 2007ðǕZŎYunliang 
Chen. 2007. “Back to China, the Value of Transitional Economic Law”. In the Law and Social 
Development Vol. 6. 
392 Ibid. 
	 195	
efficiency	of	the	market.	Therefore,	government	should	be	penalized	if	it	abuses	its	administrative	power	to	restrict	competition	since	this	violates	the	objectives	of	the	government	intervention.		
3.2 The	legislations	about	administrative	monopoly	in	China		The	 current	 China’s	 legislations	 that	 concern	 about	 administrative	 monopoly	could	 be	 divided	 in	 three	 aspects:	 first,	 comprehensive	 legislations	 that	 have	provisions	 of	 prohibiting	 administrative	 monopoly.	 These	 legislations	 are:	 the	whole	 fifth	 chapter	 of	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law;	 the	 Article	 7	 of	 the	 Anti-unfair	
Competition	Law,	which	stipulates	that	“the	government	and	its	organ	shall	not	abuse	 its	 authority	 to	 force	 the	 others	 to	 purchase	 the	 commodities	 from	 the	appointed	seller	or	prohibit	the	fair	competition	from	the	others…and	shall	not	abuse	its	authority	to	prohibit	outside	commodities	going	into	home	market,	or	prohibit	domestic	commodities	from	going	to	outside	market”393;	the	Article	22	and	 23	 of	 the	 Price	 Law,	 which	 stipulates	 that	 “in	 fixing	 government-set	 and	guided	prices,	price	departments	and	other	related	departments	shall	carry	out	investigations	 into	 prices	 and	 costs	 and	 hear	 from	 consumers,	 business	operators	and	other	quarters”,	and	“in	fixing	government-set	and	guided	prices	for	 public	 utilities	 services	 of	 public	 welfare	 in	 nature	 and	 the	 prices	 for	merchandises	of	monopoly	in	nature	that	are	important	to	immediate	interest	of	people,	 public	 hearings…should	 be	 conveyed…”394;	 the	 Article	 6	 and12	 of	 the	
Bidding	 Law,	which	 rules	 that	 “no	 entity	 or	 individual	 shall	 illegally	 restrict	 or	exclude	 the	 participation	 of	 legal	 persons	 or	 other	 organizations	 beyond	 the	region	or	industry	in	the	biding,	nor	illegally	interfere	with	the	biding	activities	in	 any	 other	 means”,	 “no	 entity	 or	 individual	 shall	 in	 any	 way	 designate	 any	biding	 agency	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 tenderee”,	 and	 “no	 entity	 or	 individual	 may	compel	the	tenderee	to	entrust	any	biding	agencies	with	biding	operations”395.	 		Second,	specific	legislations	that	prohibit	industrial	monopoly	and	regional	trade	
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barriers,	 and	 include	 the	 Notice	 on	 Breaking	 Regional	 Trade	 Barriers	 and	
Promoting	Commodity	Circulation	of	the	State	Council396,	and	the	Regulations	on	
Prohibiting	Regional	Trade	Barriers	in	Economic	Activities397.	 		Third,	 industrial	 legislations	 that	 have	 content	 of	 prohibiting	 administrative	monopoly,	 including	 the	 Telecommunication	 Regulations 398 	 and	 the	
Pharmaceutical	Administration	Law399.	The	discussion	in	the	following	section	is	primarily	 concerned	 with	 the	 relevant	 provisions	 of	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law,	since	 it	 is	 the	 most	 comprehensive	 and	 powerful	 legislations	 about	administrative	monopoly.		
3.2.1 The	administrative	monopoly	provisions	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law		As	discussed	above,	the	administrative	monopoly	is	the	top	threat	to	competition	in	 current	 China,	 thus	 China’s	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 has	 a	 special	 chapter	addressing	 administrative	monopoly.	 This	 unique	 feature	 distinguishes	 it	 from	competition	 laws	 in	most	other	 jurisdictions.	The	provisions	on	administrative	monopoly	of	 the	Anti-monopoly	 law	 include	Article	8	 in	General	Provisions,	 the	whole	 fifth	chapter,	Article	51	 in	Chapter	7.	Article	7	 in	General	Provisions	 is	a	provision	 for	exemption.	Although	 these	provisions	 could	not	 completely	 solve	the	administrative	monopoly	problems	due	to	their	deficiencies,	they	reflect	not	only	the	interests	and	needs	of	current	of	Chinese	common	people,	but	also	show	the	 determination	 of	 the	 government	 on	 restricting	 and	 prohibiting	administrative	monopoly.	 For	 the	 first	 time	 the	 anti-monopoly	 legal	 system	 of	China	 makes	 explicit	 and	 systematic	 regulations	 on	 administrative	 monopoly,	which	 is	 a	 huge	 progress	 of	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 in	 China.	 The	 main	 contents	 of	administrative	monopoly	provisions	are	embodied	in	following	aspects:		
a. Principle	for	the	regulation	of	administrative	monopoly.	 	
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	Article	 8	 in	 the	 general	 provisions	 of	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 stipulates	 that	“Administrative	department	or	organizations	authorized	by	 laws	or	regulations	to	 perform	 the	 function	 of	 administrative	 public	 affairs	 shall	 not	 abuse	 their	administrative	 power	 to	 restrict	 and	 eliminate	 competition.”400In	 reality,	 the	administrative	 monopoly	 problems	 are	 so	 complicated	 that	 current	 rules	 and	regulations	cannot	completely	restrict	and	prohibit	them,	and	to	set	a	principled	regulation	in	the	general	provisions	could	apply	the	law	to	regulate	them	more	easily	 in	 realistic	 economic	 life.	 This	 principled	 regulation	 also	 provides	 the	enforcement	 agency	 of	 the	 anti-monopoly	 law	 discretion	 power	 to	 decide	whether	 a	 behavior	 restricts	 and	 eliminates	 competition	 by	 abusing	administrative	 power,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 clearly	 included	 in	 Chapter	 5401.	Moreover,	this	 principled	 regulation	 shows	 the	 special	 attention	 of	 the	 top	 legislature	 on	regulating	administrative	monopoly.		
b. Enumerate	 concrete	 forms	 of	 administrative	 monopoly	 in	 specific	
provisions		The	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 of	 China	 not	 only	 set	 a	 principled	 regulation	 on	administrative	monopoly,	 but	 also	 enumerates	 specific	 characteristics	 of	 some	administrative	monopoly	activities	so	as	to	give	a	comprehensive	definition.	The	Chapter	 5	 –	 Abuse	 of	 Administrative	 Power	 to	 Restrict	 and	 Eliminate	Competition,	has	six	articles	(Article	32,	33,	34,	35,	36,	and	37)	concerning	about	the	 specific	 behaviors	 of	 administrative	 monopoly.	 This	 chapter	 clarifies	 the	denotation	 and	 external	 characteristics	 of	 administrative	monopoly,	 and	 helps	the	enforcement	agency	of	anti-monopoly	law	to	judge	administrative	monopoly	activities	and	enhance	the	maneuverable	of	the	law.	 		Article	 32	 prohibits	 designating	 transactions	 of	 the	 government	 agencies	 and	relevant	 authorities.	 Designating	 transaction	 means	 the	 government	 agencies	and	relevant	authorities	abuse	their	administrative	power,	“to	restrict	or	restrict	
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in	 a	 disguised	 form	 entities	 and	 individuals	 to	 operate,	 purchase	 or	 use	 the	commodities	 provided	 by	 business	 operators	 designated	 by	 them.” 402 This	activity	is	often	used	by	local	or	departmental	government	agencies	and	relevant	authorities	to	control	or	monopolized	local	market	or	certain	industries,	for	their	own	 interest.	 In	practice,	 the	designating	 transactions	 include	compulsory	sale,	compulsory	purchase	and	compulsory	use.	 		Article	 33	 prohibits	 local	 protectionism	 and	 unequal	 treatment	 of	 local	 and	outside	goods403.	In	practice,	local	government	agencies	and	relevant	authorities	often	 set	 regional	 trade	 barriers	 to	 hinder	 the	 free	 circulation	 of	 goods,	 and	restrict	 and	 eliminate	 competitiveness	 of	 outside	 market	 players,	 by	 abusing	their	administrative	power,	to	protect	local	interests.,	which	harm	the	free	flow	and	 allocation	 of	 resources,	 and	would	 divide	 a	 unified,	 open	 and	 competitive	market	 into	 several	 narrow	 regional	 markets.	 Considering	 that	 the	 regional	monopoly	 have	 many	 specific	 forms	 in	 reality,	 Article	 33	 uses	 5	 detailed	paragraphs	to	make	all	kinds	of	regional	monopoly	activities	to	be	subject	to	the	regulation	by	the	Anti-monopoly	Law.	These	regional	monopoly	activities	include:	“imposing	discriminative	charge	items,	standards	or	prices	upon	outside	goods”;	“imposing	 technology	 requirements	 and	 inspection	 standards	 upon	 outside	goods	 that	 different	 from	 those	 upon	 local	 goods”;	 “exerting	 administrative	licensing	specially	on	outside	goods”;	“setting	barriers	or	other	measures	so	as	to	hamper	 outside	 goods	 entering	 the	 local	 market”;	 or	 “other	 conducts	 for	 the	purpose	of	hampering	goods	from	free	circulation	between	regions”404.	 		Article	 34	 prohibits	 protectionist	 biding	 procedure 405 .	 Currently,	 local	government	agencies	and	relevant	authorities	often	directly	participate	in	biding	process	to	restrict	and	eliminate	competitiveness	of	outside	market	players,	and	help	local	enterprises	to	win	the	biding,	by	abusing	their	administrative	power,	which	 would	 harm	 the	 regular	 order	 and	 competition	 mechanism	 in	 biding	process,	and	the	interests	of	market	players	from	outside	the	locality.	In	order	to	
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maintain	 and	 restore	 an	 open,	 fair	 and	 impartial	 biding	 and	 tendering	 system,	Article	 34	 stipulates	 that	 protectionist	 biding	 procedure	 is	 prohibited,	 such	 as	“imposing	discriminative	qualification	requirements	or	assessment	standards	or	releasing	 information	 in	 an	 unlawful	 manner”406 .	 Article	 34	 and	 relevant	provisions	 in	 the	 Biding	 Law 407 	 constitute	 the	 mechanism	 that	 regulates	administrative	monopoly	activities	in	biding	process.	 		Article	 35	 prohibits	 activities	 that	 “reject	 or	 restrict	 business	 operators	 from	outside	 the	 locality	 to	 invest	 or	 set	 up	 branches	 in	 the	 locality	 by	 imposing	unequal	 treatment	 thereupon	 compared	 to	 that	 upon	 local	 business	 operators,	by	abusing	administrative	power.”408	 In	practice,	local	government	agencies	and	relevant	authorities	often	restrict,	and	even	reject	market	players	 from	outside	locality	 to	 invest	 or	 open	 branches	 in	 local	 market,	 by	 abusing	 their	administrative	power,	in	order	to	restrict	and	eliminate	competitiveness	of	them	and	 strengthen	 that	 of	 local	 enterprises,	 which	 not	 only	 harm	 the	 interests	 of	outside	 market	 players,	 but	 also	 would	 turn	 local	 enterprises	 to	 monopoly	enterprises	and	harm	Local	consumers’	interests	eventually.	 		Article	36	prohibits	government	agencies	and	relevant	authorities	 from	forcing	market	 players	 to	 practice	 monopoly	 activities	 as	 prescribed	 in	 the	
Anti-monopoly	Law	by	abusing	their	administrative	power409.	In	order	to	adjust	structure	 in	 certain	 industries,	 and	 strengthen	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 certain	enterprises	 in	 market,	 the	 local	 and	 departmental	 government	 agencies	 and	relevant	 authorities	 often	promote	 concentration	of	market	 players	 or	 directly	force	 them	 to	 participate	 in	monopoly	 conducts,	which	 harm	 the	 autonomy	 of	market	players,	distorts	the	competition	mechanism	of	market,	and	violates	the	basic	 principles	 of	market:	 voluntariness,	 equality,	 and	 compensating	 at	 equal	values.	 		Article	37	rules	 that	administrative	organizations	shall	not	enact	any	rules	and	
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regulations	 that	 restrict	 and	 eliminate	 competition	 by	 abusing	 their	administrative	 power 410 .	 In	 China’s	 current	 legal	 system,	 administrative	monopoly	 activities	 could	 be	 divided	 to	 specific	 and	 abstract	 administrative	monopoly	 activities.	 The	 specific	 administrative	 activities	 mean	 government	agencies	 and	 relevant	 authorities	 impose	 specific	 administrative	 activities	 to	specific	objects.	The	objects	are	concrete	and	the	results	will	directly	restrict	and	eliminate	competition	 in	specific	market	and	harm	 interest	of	 specific	 subjects.	The	 abstract	 administrative	 monopoly	 activities	 refer	 to	 enactment	 by	government	 agencies	 and	 relevant	 authorities	 of	 normative	 documents	 for	extensive	 and	 unspecific	 objects	 to	 restrict	 and	 eliminate	 competition.	 The	normative	documents	could	be	applied	repeatedly	over	an	uncertain	period,	and	the	 objects	 whose	 interests	 are	 harmed	 are	 uncertain	 as	 well.	 Since	 the	documents	are	 legitimate,	 the	administrative	monopoly	activities	based	on	that	are	also	legitimate	apparently.	In	reality,	due	to	lack	of	efficient	supervision	and	restriction	mechanism,	 government	 agencies	 and	 relevant	 authorities	 that	 are	given	the	power	to	enact	rules	and	regulations	or	normative	documents,	would	abuse	 their	 legislative	 authority	 to	 expand	 their	 power	 and	 practice	 in	administrative	 monopoly	 activities.	 The	 abstract	 administrative	 monopoly	activities	are	more	harmful	than	specific	administrative	monopoly	activities	and	should	 be	 strictly	 restricted	 and	 prohibited,	 since	 they	 could	 repeatedly	 take	place.	Article	37	also	shows	that	the	economic	law	in	China	has	a	special	function	of	both	correcting	market	failures	and	adjusting	government	failures.	 		
c. The	anti-monopoly	authorities		The	provisions	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	create	two	anti-monopoly	authorities:	the	 Anti-monopoly	 Commission411,	 and	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 Enforcement	Agency412.	According	to	Article	9,	the	Anti-monopoly	Commission	is	established	by	the	State	Council	to	organize,	coordinate	and	guide	anti-monopoly	work,	and	perform	 the	 functions	 of	 studying	 and	 drafting	 related	 competition	 policies,	
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investigating	and	assessing	the	competition	situation	of	the	market,	constituting	and	 issuing	 anti-monopoly	 guidelines,	 and	 other	 functions	 as	 assigned	 by	 the	State	 Council413.	 According	 to	 Article	 10,	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 Enforcement	Agency	 is	 designated	 by	 the	 State	 Council	 and	 shall	 be	 in	 charge	 of	anti-monopoly	 law	 enforcement	 in	 accordance	 with	 the	 law414.	 However,	 the	status	 of	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 Enforcement	 Agency	 is	 unclear,	 such	 as	whether	 it	 will	 be	 an	 independent	 body	 under	 the	 State	 Council,	 or	 part	 of	another	agency;	or	separate	and	subordinate	to	the	Department	of	Commerce415	or	the	National	Development	and	Reform	Commission416.	 		
d. The	legal	liability	of	the	administrative	monopoly	activities		Article	51	of	 the	Anti-monopoly	Law	 provides	 that	where	government	agencies	and	 relevant	 authorities	 restrict	 and	 eliminate	 competition	 by	 abusing	 their	administrative	 power,	 the	 department	 at	 higher	 level	 shall	 instruct	 them	 to	rectify;	 the	 leading	 person	 directly	 in	 charge	 and	 the	 other	 persons	 directly	responsible	shall	be	given	administrative	sanctions	in	accordance	with	the	law;	the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 Enforcement	 Agency	 may	 submit	 a	 proposal	 to	 the	relevant	department	at	higher	level	for	handling	the	matter	according	to	law.	In	addition,	 in	 the	 event	 of	 a	 conflict	 between	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 and	 other	specific	rules	and	regulations	that	governing	government	agencies	and	relevant	authorities,	the	other	rules	and	regulations	shall	prevail417,	which	actually	limits	the	effectiveness	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law.		
e. The	exemption	of	administrative	monopoly		As	 an	 escape	 provision	 of	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law,	 Article	 7	 rules	 that	 “With	respect	to	the	industries	controlled	by	the	state-owned	economy	and	concerning	the	 lifeline	 of	 national	 economy	 and	 national	 security…	 the	 State	 protects	 the	
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lawful	 business	 operations	 conducted	 by	 the	 business	 operators	 therein.	 The	State	 also	 lawfully	 regulates	 and	 controls	 their	 business	 operations	 and	 the	prices	of	their	commodities	and	services…”.418Article	7would	potentially	exclude	any	 state-owned	 entity	 that	 can	 be	 regulated	 by	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law,	 and	cause	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	powerless	eventually	if	the	provision	of	Article	7	is	interpreted	broadly.	 		
3.2.2 The	assessment	of	the	provisions	on	administrative	monopoly	of	the	
Anti-monopoly	Law	
	
a. Regulations		Although	relevant	provisions	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	have	established	a	basic	mechanism	 for	 regulating	 administrative	 monopoly	 problems,	 there	 still	 exit	some	 systematical	 deficiencies	 and	 these	provisions	need	 to	be	 clarified	 either	through	further	regulations	or	by	anti-monopoly	authorities.	 		First	 of	 all,	 although	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 set	 a	 special	 chapter	 for	administrative	 monopoly,	 it	 fails	 to	 do	 the	 most	 basic	 thing	 –	 define	 what	administrative	monopoly	exactly	 it	 is.	 Instead,	 the	Anti-monopoly	Law	 just	uses	the	 vague	 language	 of	 “eliminate	 and	 restrict	 competition	 by	 abusing	administrative	 power”.	 In	 addition,	 it	 also	 fails	 to	 give	 a	 comprehensive	definition	 on	 the	 “abuse	 of	 administrative	 power”,	 which	 may	 give	 rise	 to	different	 understanding	 and	 lead	 to	 the	 confusion	 in	 the	 identification	 of	administrative	monopoly.	In	common	sense,	the	“abuse	of	administrative	power”	refers	 to	 abuse	 of	 discretionary	 power,	which	 obviously	 violates	 the	 statutory	goal	and	the	common	belief,	and	is	just	one	of	illegal	administrative	activities.	In	other	 words,	 it	 means	 the	 administrative	 subjects	 wrongfully	 perform	 their	administrative	 power	 that	 violate	 statutory	 goal.	 From	 this	 perspective,	 the	“abuse	of	administrative	power”	only	 includes	specific	administrative	activities	but	 abstract	 administrative	 activities,	 and	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 could	 only	
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regulate	specific	but	abstract	administrative	monopoly	activities	in	practice.	This	will	 narrow	and	obscure	 the	 extent	 of	 administrative	monopoly,	 and	 leave	 the	abstract	 administrative	 monopoly	 activities	 free	 from	 the	 regulation	 of	 the	
Anti-monopoly	Law.	 		Secondly,	 the	purpose	of	Article	7	of	 the	Anti-monopoly	Law	 is	 to	protect	State	monopoly.	 By	 comparing	 with	 administrative	 monopoly,	 which	 is	 illegal	monopoly	 and	 its	 purpose	 is	 to	 obtain	 or	 protect	 local	 and	 departmental	interests	 of	 administrative	 subjects,	 the	 State	 monopoly	 is	 legitimate	 and	 its	purpose	is	to	provide	public	goods	and	services	or	to	protect	national	and	social	interests.	 They	 are	 fundamentally	 different.	 However,	 the	 extent	 of	 State	monopoly	 is	 not	 defined	 clearly,	 which	 would	 lead	 to	 the	 situation	 where	state-owned	enterprises	get	away	from	the	regulation	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	in	the	name	of	the	State	monopoly.	 		Thirdly,	the	provisions	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	prohibit	the	local	government	agencies	 or	 relevant	 authorities	 from	 restricting	 and	 eliminating	 the	competitiveness	of	market	players	from	outside	the	locality.	However,	there	is	a	completely	 opposite	 phenomenon	 widely	 exiting	 in	 reality	 –	 the	 reverse	discrimination.	 The	 reverse	 discrimination	 refers	 to	 the	 circumstance	 where	local	government	provides	the	foreign	enterprises	and	capitals	with	preferential	policies	 to	 attract	 foreign	 investments,	 and	 reverse	 discrimination	 to	 local	enterprises,	 which	 strengthen	 the	 competitiveness	 of	 foreign	 enterprises	 and	capitals	 in	 local	market,	 and	 harm	 the	 interests	 of	 local	 enterprises,	 especially	small	 and	 medium	 sized	 enterprises.	 The	 reason	 for	 this	 phenomenon	 is	 that	some	officers	thought	foreign	investment	would	promote	the	local	GDP	and	raise	the	profile	of	locality.	It	is	a	significant	shortcoming	that	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	ignores	this	phenomenon.	 		
b. The	anti-monopoly	authorities		The	establishment	of	 the	Anti-monopoly	Commission	 is	of	great	 significance	 to	China’s	anti-monopoly	 legal	 system,	and	 its	main	 function	 is	 to	 investigate	and	
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assess	 the	 competition	 situation	 of	 the	market	 and	 enact	 competition	 policies,	which	means	it	needs	professional	knowledge.	However,	the	staff	composition	of	this	commission	shows	that	its	members	are	mostly	ministers	or	vice	ministers	of	 relevant	 government	 departments	 rather	 than	 anti-monopoly	 experts.	 This	would	affect	the	regulation	on	industrial	and	departmental	monopoly,	and	cause	a	 weak	 commission	 who	 has	 enough	 authority	 but	 lack	 of	 efficiency	 and	professional	technology	in	practice.	 		According	 to	 current	 laws	 and	 regulations,	 the	 functions	 of	 anti-monopoly	 law	enforcement	China	are	performed	by	three	agencies:	the	State	Administration	for	Industry	and	Commerce419,	which	is	responsible	for	monopoly	agreement,	abuse	of	market	dominance,	and	abuse	of	administrative	power;	the	State	Development	and	 Reform	 Commission,	 which	 is	 responsible	 for	 fixed	 price;	 and	 the	Department	 of	 Commerce,	 which	 is	 responsible	 for	 concentration	 of	 business	operators.	 Besides,	 the	 anti-monopoly	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 may	 come	down	to	provincial	levels	and	to	several	industrial	regulatory	organizations	with	the	authorization	of	the	State	Council.	 		This	 arrangement	 causes	 the	 following	 deficiencies	 of	 the	 anti-monopoly	 law	enforcement	 agencies.	 First,	 lack	 of	 independence.	 The	 current	 enforcement	agencies	are	all	subordinated	organizations,	and	they	do	not	have	enough	power	to	 regulate	 local	 enterprises	 or	 state-owned	 enterprises	 that	 have	 close	relationship	with	 government	 agencies	 and	 relevant	 authorities,	 or	 to	 regulate	some	 administrative	 subjects	 that	 have	 higher	 level	 status	 than	 them.	 In	particular,	the	State	Development	and	Reform	Commission	has	enacted	rules	and	regulations	that	have	contents	of	administrative	monopoly,	thus	it	is	difficult	for	these	 agencies	 to	 enforce	 the	 law	 in	 practice.	 Second,	 lack	 of	 experienced	 and	professional	staffs.	The	officers	in	these	agencies	are	all	civil	servants	rather	than	law	 specialists	 and	 experts	 in	 anti-monopoly	 area,	 and	 the	 administrative	monopoly	 issues	 are	 complex	 and	 relate	 to	 various	 branches	 of	 knowledge.	 	They	 obviously	 lack	 specialized	 knowledge	 of	 economy	 and	 law	 and	 thus	
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unequipped	 to	 the	 anti-monopoly	 enforcement	 work.	 Third,	 lack	 of	 powerful	regulations	 for	 enforcement.	 The	 administrative	 monopoly	 often	 based	 on	administrative	 power,	 and	 it	 could	 not	 be	 efficiently	 and	 completely	 regulated	without	 powerful	 regulations.	 However,	 the	 current	 rules	 and	 regulations	provide	only	the	powers	of	inspection,	inquiry	and	consultation	to	these	agencies,	thus	they	could	not	perform	their	functions	completely	in	reality.	Fourth,	lack	of	a	 unified	 coordination	 mechanism	 among	 these	 agencies.	 The	 division	 of	anti-monopoly	law	enforcement	functions	to	three	agencies	that	belong	to	three	departments	 creates	 the	 possibility	 for	 debilitating	 turf	 wars.	 These	 agencies	may	fight	for	jurisdiction	or	shift	their	responsibilities	to	another,	and	may	even	make	 contradictory	 statements,	 which	 would	 damage	 the	 judicial	 authority	 of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law,	and	cause	a	high	cost	and	low	efficiency	of	enforcement.	Fifth,	 lack	 of	 clear	 provisions	 on	 regulating	 the	 relationship	 between	 agencies	and	 industrial	 and	 departmental	 authorities.	 In	 current	 China,	many	 industrial	and	departmental	authorities	have	the	power	to	enact	rules	and	regulations,	and	regulate	economic	activities	in	certain	market,	such	as	railway,	oil,	banking	and	electricity.	 It	 is	 not	 clear	 that	 which	 authority	 should	 be	 in	 charge	 when	 the	administrative	monopoly	activities	occur	in	these	industries,	the	anti-monopoly	law	enforcement	agencies	or	industrial	and	departmental	authorities?	And	which	law	 should	 be	 applied,	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 or	 the	 rules	 and	 regulations	enacted	by	industrial	and	departmental	authorities?	 		
c. The	legal	liabilities		The	 provisions	 about	 the	 legal	 liability	 of	 administrative	 monopoly	 also	 have	some	deficiencies.	Firstly,	the	principle	that	other	rules	and	regulations	are	given	priority	to	the	provisions	on	administrative	monopoly	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	is	unreasonable,	which	would	weaken	the	authoritativeness	of	the	Anti-monopoly	
Law	 and	 affect	 its	 enforcement	 effects.	 In	 current	 China,	 all	 the	 industries	 of	telecommunication,	 railway,	 electricity,	 banking	 and	 postal	 services	 have	 their	own	 regulations	 and	 authorities,	 and	 they	 are	 also	 the	 industries	 where	
	 206	
administrative	 monopoly	 problems	 mostly	 occurred 420 .	 If	 the	 rules	 and	regulations	 of	 these	 industries	 have	 priority	 to	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law,	 and	administrative	subjects	of	these	industries	restrict	and	eliminate	competition	by	abusing	 their	 administrative	 power	 in	 the	 name	 of	 social	 interests,	 the	
Anti-monopoly	Law	simply	cannot	regulate	these	activities	and	would	exist	only	on	paper.	 		Secondly,	by	comparing	with	the	legal	liabilities	of	economic	monopoly	activities,	which	 include	 both	 civil	 and	 administrative	 liabilities,	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	
Anti-monopoly	Law	only	provides	the	administrative	liabilities	to	administrative	monopoly	 activities.	 Administrative	 monopoly	 activities	 not	 only	 violate	 the	regulatory	 goal,	 but	 also	 damage	 the	 interests	 of	 other	 market	 players	 and	consumers,	which	should	bear	civil	liabilities	as	well.	Besides,	the	administrative	monopoly	activities	violate	the	administrative	law,	the	civil	law	and	the	criminal	law,	thus	they	should	apparently	bear	the	 liabilities	that	 include	administrative	liability,	civil	liability	and	criminal	liability.	In	addition,	the	liability	of	“rectifying	upon	 instruction”	 is	 difficult	 to	 be	 applied	 in	 practice	 without	 further	 and	comprehensive	explanation.	The	 time	 limit	of	 “instructing	 it	 to	 rectify”	and	 the	result	of	 refusing	 to	do	 it	are	not	provided	either	by	 the	Anti-monopoly	Law	or	other	rules	and	regulations.	Moreover,	“instructing	it	to	rectify”	actually	is	not	a	punishment	 measure,	 it	 just	 requires	 the	 violator	 to	 perform	 its	 statutory	obligation,	 correct	 unlawful	 act,	 and	 remove	 negative	 effects,	 which	 is	 the	liability	 of	 administrative	 inappropriateness	 and	 violation	 of	 administrative	procedure.	However,	 administrative	monopoly	activities	obviously	violate	 laws	and	 have	 more	 serious	 effects	 than	 administrative	 inappropriateness	 and	violation	of	administrative	procedure,	and	apply	the	measure	of	“instructing	it	to	rectify”	 is	 inappropriate.	 Therefore,	 the	Anti-monopoly	 Law	 should	 enact	more	strictly	 punitive	 measures	 rather	 than	 “instructing	 it	 to	 rectify”	 to	 regulate	administrative	monopoly	activities.		Thirdly,	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 law	 enforcement	 agencies	 are	 not	 authorized	 the	
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power	to	sanction	the	subjects	of	administrative	monopoly	activities.	According	to	 the	 provisions	 of	 the	Anti-monopoly	 Law,	 only	 the	 “higher	 level	 authorities”	have	 the	 right	 to	 impose	 punishments	 to	 the	 liable	 subjects,	 and	 the	anti-monopoly	authorities	only	have	a	suggestion	right	but	no	punishment	right	at	 all.	 This	 situation	 would	 cause	 many	 problems	 in	 reality,	 for	 example,	 the	higher-level	authorities	of	local	and	departmental	agencies	often	tend	to	protect	each	other	to	protect	administrative	monopoly	activities	behind	them,	and	they	would	 negatively	 impose	 punishment	 to	 violators	 or	 accept	 suggestions	 from	anti-monopoly	agencies.	They	also	lack	professional	knowledge	of	economy	and	law	 to	 deal	 with	 complex	 and	 specialist	 administrative	 monopoly	 issues.	Moreover,	the	“higher	level	authorities”	is	not	a	judicial	authority,	and	the	legal	procedure	 of	 correcting	 and	 punishing	 illegal	 activities	 and	 violators	 and	relevant	supervision	mechanism	are	absent,	which	would	lead	to	the	higher	level	authorities	 to	 abuse	 their	 power	 again	 in	 the	 process	 of	 dealing	 with	administrative	monopoly.	 		Fourthly,	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 only	 provides	 the	 legal	 liabilities	 to	administrative	 subjects,	 but	 no	 liabilities	 to	 enterprises	 that	 benefit	 from	administrative	 monopoly	 activities,	 which	 means	 the	 enterprises	 could	 only	enjoy	 the	 benefits	 but	 do	 not	 have	 to	 bear	 relevant	 liabilities,	 and	 their	strengthened	 competiveness	 and	 the	 damages	 to	 other	 market	 players	 would	last.	Besides,	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	also	does	not	provide	the	legal	liabilities	to	the	 executive	 officers	 of	 the	 enterprises	 that	 benefit	 from	 administrative	monopoly,	and	they	are	the	people	who	often	require	the	administrative	subjects	to	eliminate	and	restrict	competition	by	abusing	their	administrative	power	on	their	 own	 initiative	 in	 reality,	 and	 they	 also	 benefit	 from	 strengthened	competiveness	of	their	enterprises	such	as	excessively	high	salary.	Therefore,	the	absence	of	the	legal	liabilities	to	the	enterprises	that	benefit	from	administrative	monopoly	 and	 their	 executive	 officers,	 is	 actually	 an	 encouragement	 to	administrative	 monopoly,	 and	 would	 affect	 the	 enforcement	 of	 the	
Anti-monopoly	Law.	 		
d. The	judicial	remedy	system	
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	According	 to	 the	 Administrative	 Procedural	 Law	 of	 PRC 421 ,	 abstract	administrative	activities	cannot	be	instituted	legal	proceedings	to	the	court,	and	the	 only	 judicial	 remedy	 is	 the	 administrative	 reconsideration422 .	 And	 the	
Anti-monopoly	 Law	 stipulates	 that	 “the	 authorities	 for	 enforcement	 of	 the	
Anti-monopoly	 Law	 may	 submit	 a	 proposal	 to	 the	 relevant	 department	 at	 a	higher	level	for	handling	the	matter	according	to	Law”423.	Therefore,	it	is	not	the	anti-monopoly	authorities	but	 the	higher	 level	authorities	can	directly	 regulate	abstract	administrative	monopoly	activities.	As	discussed	above,	the	higher	level	authorities	often	deal	with	administrative	monopoly	positively,	which	results	in	that	it	 is	hard	for	the	abstract	administrative	monopoly	activities	to	get	judicial	remedy	in	practice.		Meanwhile,	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 does	 not	 provide	 the	 market	 players	 and	consumers	whose	 interests	are	damaged	by	administrative	monopoly	activates	with	any	judicial	remedies,	such	as	civil	and	administrative	lawsuits.	What	they	only	 can	 do	 is	 to	 complain	 to	 superior	 authorities,	 or	 apply	 administrative	reconsideration,	or	seek	help	from	media.	These	indirect	and	weak	remedies	are	obviously	far	from	being	enough	to	protect	their	lawful	rights	and	interests.	 		
4. The	Improvement	Approaches	of	Constitutional	Level	
	
4.1 Restricting	and	Forbidding	Departmental	Legislation	
	The	constitution	is	the	fundamental	law	of	the	nation.	The	key	to	controlling	and	regulating	public	powers	lies	in	the	constitution.	From	a	normative	perspective,	the	principle	of	 legal	 reservation	 requires	 that	 all	monopoly	powers	 should	be	authorized	explicitly	by	 laws,	because	 they	 constitute	 restrictions	on	economic	freedom	 for	 enterprises	 and	 organizations.	 Therefore,	 Article	 7	 of	 the	
Anti-monopoly	 Law	 is	 far	 too	 vague	 in	 its	 allowance	 for	 state-run	 monopolies	
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422 Ibid. Art 12.  
423 Ibid. Art 51.  
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wherever	 national	 security	 or	 “national	 economic	 lifelines”	 are	 involved.	Moreover,	 the	 article	 only	 reinforces	 current	 monopolies	 in	 its	 reference	 to	industries	where	 “state-owned	economies	are	already	dominant.”	Almost	 all	 of	the	 current	 administrative	 monopolies	 would	 be	 able	 to	 use	 this	 simple	statement	as	a	shield	for	their	defense.	Instead,	the	decision	to	provide	monopoly	status	 to	 some	 industries	 or	 enterprises	 should	 first	 be	 explicitly	 made	 by	representative	 bodies	 through	 legislation,	 and	 whether	 the	 authorization	 is	appropriate	or	not	should	be	restricted	by	the	constitution.		In	 current	 practice,	 some	 administrative	 monopolies	 are	 established	 in	legislation	enacted	by	the	National	People’s	Congress	or	its	Standing	Committee.	For	 example,	 the	monopolies	 in	 the	 salt	 industry,	 railway	 industry,	 and	 sports	industry	 are	 established	 by	 the	 Power	 Law,	 Railway	 Law,	 and	 Sports	 Law	respectively.	However,	due	 to	severe	defects	 in	 legislative	procedures	 in	China,	any	 laws	 enacted	 by	 the	 People’s	 Congress,	 still	 bear	 a	 clear	 imprint	 of	departmental	 legislation.	 First,	 these	 laws	 were	 drafted	 by	 relevant	administrative	departments.	Second,	the	legislatures	of	China	are	relatively	weak	and	 lack	 representation	 and	 expertise.	 It	 is	 hard	 for	 them	 to	 effectively	differentiate	 and	 examine	 the	 problems	 existing	 in	 legislative	 drafts,	 and	 they	often	pass	inappropriate	authorizations	of	monopoly	powers.		The	 above	 situation	 is	 widespread	 in	 Chinese	 legislative	 bodies.	 Similarly,	legislation	 involving	 administrative	 monopoly	 such	 as	 the	 Power	 Law,	 the	
Railway	Law,	and	the	Sports	Law,	were	drafted	by	the	former	Ministry	of	Power,	the	Ministry	of	Railways,	 and	 the	 former	Sports	Commission.	Furthermore,	 the	laws	that	were	finally	approved	have	few	if	any	substantive	changes	compared	to	the	 drafts	 submitted	 by	 administrative	 departments.	 From	 this	 rubber-stamp	legislative	 procedure	 we	 can	 see	 that	 the	 submission	 of	 drafts	 to	 acquiescent	legislatures	 has	 become	 its	 own	 kind	 of	 administrative	 monopoly,	 with	 the	administrative	departments	as	monopolists.		If	we	hope	to	eliminate	departmental	legislation,	improvements	should	be	made	to	 legislative	 procedures	 and	 legislative	 techniques.	 There	 should	 be	 a	 rule	
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barring	 administrative	 departments	 from	 submitting	 draft-legislation,	 which	establishes	administrative	monopolies	that	operate	under	the	department.	At	the	very	 least	 it	 should	 be	 drafted	 by	 a	 neutral	 party	 and	 then	 submitted	 to	 the	legislature	 for	 authorization.	 Moreover,	 the	 legislature	 should	 organize	committees	of	experts	to	consult	on	drafts	of	laws	that	establish	monopolies	for	specific	industries.	Finally,	the	establishment	of	any	monopoly	should	be	treated	as	 an	 exception	 rather	 than	 the	 rule,	 and	 no	 broad	 categories	 (for	 example,	“related	 to	 national	 security”)	 should	 be	 used	 to	 justify	 the	 creation	 of	monopolies.		Whether	the	administrative	monopolies	 that	have	been	already	established	are	proper	 or	 not	 should	 be	 examined	by	 restrictions	 that	 satisfy	 the	 constitution.	However,	as	we	all	know,	despite	a	seemingly	perfect	system	for	reviewing	the	constitutionality	of	 laws,	we	all	 recognize	deep	deficiencies	 in	 the	process.	 For	example,	 the	 Standing	 Committee	 of	 the	 National	 People’s	 Congress,	 which	 is	responsible	 for	 guarding	 the	 constitution,	 is	 a	 conference	 organization	 whose	actual	 political	 status	 is	 limited.	 Further,	 the	 proceedings	 for	 checks	 on	constitutionality	 are	 internal	 procedures	 that	 are	 closed	 to	 public.	 Taken	together,	these	factors	have	crippled	the	system’s	checks	and	made	it	such	that	the	 proceedings	 have	 never	 had	 any	 substantive	 function	 to	 date.	 With	 some	glaringly	 inappropriate	 administrative	 monopolies	 untouchable	 through	 the	constitutional	 review	 process,	 improvements	 to	 the	 review	 system	 itself	 are	needed	to	truly	restrict	administrative	monopolies.		In	 addition,	 new	 provisions	 should	 be	 added	 to	 the	 constitution	 to	 prevent	administrative	departments	from	establishing	administrative	monopoly	powers	through	 department	 regulations.	 For	 example,	 administrative	 departments	should	not	have	the	power	to	establish	specific	monopolies,	and	any	monopolies	established	by	administrative	departments’	regulations	or	statutes	are	illegal.	On	top	of	this,	departments	should	be	banned	from	drafting	“implementation	details”	or	 “regulations,”	 or	 at	 the	 very	 least	 supervision	 should	 be	 strengthened	 to	prevent	these	additions	from	establishing	specific	monopolies.		
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Moreover,	it	should	also	be	stipulated	at	the	constitutional	level	that	the	power	of	 administrative	 departments’	 to	 regulate	 prices	 comes	 specifically	 from	legislative	action.	When	an	administrative	department	uses	 its	price	 regulating	power,	 it	 should	be	bound	by	 the	Price	Law,	 i.e.	 it	 should	 follow	due	processes	specified	by	the	law.	In	particular,	it	should	differentiate	between	adjustments	of	interest	 rates	 by	 the	 central	 bank	 to	 implement	 monetary	 policy	 from	adjustment	 to	 interest	 rates	 at	 commercial	 banks.	 This	 would	 help	 avoid	 the	conflation	of	appropriate	actions	on	monetary	policy	from	undue	interference	in	commercial	interest	rates.		
4.2 Effective	Control	of	State	Economy	and	SOEs		One	 problem	 that	 requires	 addressing	 is	 the	 numerous	 articles	 in	 the	constitution	that	implicitly	or	explicitly	privilege	the	state	sector,	especially	SOEs.	These	 provisions	 pose	 a	 threat	 to	 progress	 in	 that	 they	 appear	 to	 provide	 a	constitutional	basis	for	administrative	monopoly.	Below	are	several	examples	of	such	 language.	 Article	 6:	 “The	 basis	 of	 the	 socialist	 economic	 system	 of	 the	People’s	 Republic	 of	 China	 is	 socialist	 public	 ownership	 of	 the	 means	 of	production,	namely,	ownership	by	the	whole	people	and	collective	ownership	by	the	working	people,”	…	“In	the	primary	phase	of	socialism,	the	state	adheres	to	the	basic	 economic	 system	with	 the	public	 ownership	playing	 a	 dominant	 role	and	diverse	forms	of	ownership	developing	side	by	side.”424	 Article	7:	“The	state	economy	 is	 the	 sector	 of	 the	 socialist	 economy	under	ownership	by	 the	whole	people;	 it	 is	 the	 leading	 force	 in	 the	 national	 economy.	 The	 state	 ensures	 the	consolidation	and	growth	of	 the	state	economy.”425	 Article	12:	 “Socialist	public	property	 is	 inviolable.	 …	 The	 state	 protects	 socialist	 public	 property.	Appropriation	or	damaging	of	state	or	collective	property	by	any	organization	or	individual	by	whatever	means	is	prohibited.”426		It	 is	 not	 hard	 to	 see	 that,	 in	 order	 to	 fundamentally	 break	 administrative	
																																								 																				 	424	 Article	6,	The	Constitution	of	China.	 	425	 Article	7,	The	Constitution	of	China.	426	 Article	12,	The	Constitution	of	China.	
	 212	
monopoly,	 the	above	provisions	 in	 the	constitution	should	be	 reinterpreted,	or	even	 amended.	Otherwise,	 any	 anti-administrative	monopoly	measures	will	 be	unable	 to	 withstand	 criticism	 and	 challenges	 relying	 on	 these	 constitutional	provisions.	 Specific	 practices	 could	 include:	 (1)	 reinterpreting	 “socialism”;	 (2)	amending	 provisions	 regarding	 publicly	 owned	 property	 in	 the	 constitution	 in	order	 to	 equally	 protect	 the	 private	 economy,	 public	 property,	 and	 private	property;	 (3)	 for	 the	 state-owned	 economy,	 establish	 special	 supervisory	 and	regulatory	 institutions	 to	prevent	 the	abuse	and	embezzlement	of	 state-owned	property,	 including	strict	 restrictions	on	 the	acquisition	of	monopoly	power	by	SOEs.		In	fact,	from	another	point	of	view,	the	constitutional	protections	of	the	publicly	owned	economy	and	the	state	sector	could	be	used	to	monitor	and	constrain	the	management	 of	 state-owned	 companies	 more	 effectively.	 Given	 that	 public	resources	 and	 assets	 should	 be	 owned	 by	 all	 people,	 the	 supervision	 of	 these	resources	 and	 assets	 should	 be	 strengthened.	 It	 must	 be	 assured	 that	 these	assets	are	not	co-opted	and	controlled	by	managers	of	state-owned	companies.	In	 fact,	 the	 very	 difficulty	 of	 creating	 institutions	 and	mechanisms	 to	monitor	public	resources	is	reason	to	emphasize	this	point	in	the	constitution.	Otherwise,	the	“publicly	owned	economy”	can	become	a	mere	pretext	for	enterprises	to	take	a	bite	out	of	the	public	interest.		At	the	constitutional	level,	special	care	should	be	given	to	the	following	questions	in	 relation	 to	 the	 public	 economy	 and	 the	 state-owned	 economy:	 first,	 are	 the	public	resources	sold	or	rented	for	reasonable	prices?	In	other	words,	have	the	enterprises	paid	enough	in	compensation	for	using	national	resources?	Second,	has	 compensation	 of	 managers	 and	 empolyees	 in	 SOEs	 been	 controlled	 at	 a	reasonable	 level?	 Third,	 have	 the	 profits	 derived	 from	 state-owned	 property	been	turned	over	to	the	relevant	bodies	or	used	for	reinvestment?	And	fourth,	is	the	supervision	of	public	resources	and	state-owned	property	by	administrative	departments	sufficient	and	effective?		Given	 the	 lackluster	 record	 to	 date	 on	 supervising	 the	 use,	 allocation	 and	
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revenue	recovery	from	public	resources	and	state-owned	property,	the	Chinese	people	 should	 be	more	 cautious	 in	 allowing	 the	 establishment	 of	more	 public	institutions	 and	 SOEs.	 The	 corresponding	 legislatures	 should	 establish	 strict	legal	procedures	 in	order	 to	prohibit	 the	unauthorized	establishment	of	public	institutions	and	SOEs	by	administrative	departments.	
	
5. The	Improvement	Approaches	of	China’s	Anti-monopoly	Law	Regarding	
Administrative	Monopoly		
5.1 Enact	detailed	and	specific	rules	and	regulations	for	implementation	of	
the	Anti-monopoly	Law		Since	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 only	 has	 8	 chapters	 and	 57	 articles,	 there	 are	general	principles	 that	 are	 to	 some	degree	 too	 general	 and	 flexible	 to	 apply	 in	practice.	 For	 example,	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 would	 be	 difficulty	 to	 apply	 to	some	 cases	 due	 to	 the	 ambiguity	 application	 standards	 and	 unclear	 definition,	and	 results	 in	 anticompetitive	 activities	 being	 left	 out	 regulations	 and	punishments.	 The	 implementation	 of	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 is	 a	 highly	specialized	 and	 professional	work,	which	 demands	 clarity	 and	 certainty	 of	 the	law	 itself.	 Thus,	 detailed	 and	 specific	 rules	 and	 regulations	 for	 its	implementation	need	to	be	enacted	as	early	as	possible,	in	order	to	improve	the	efficiency	 of	 anti-monopoly	 works	 and	 the	 practicability	 of	 the	 Anti-monopoly	
Law.	 Only	 by	 this	 would	 solve	 the	 problems	 that	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 is	powerless	when	 facing	specific	 cases	 in	practice	due	 to	 its	unclear	and	general	provisions.	 In	 2009,	 the	 Procedure	 Provisions	 for	 Industry	 and	 Commerce	
Preventing	 from	Excluding	 or	Restricting	 Competition	 by	Abusing	Administrative	
Power427	 was	 issued	 by	 the	 State	 Administration	 for	 Industry	 and	 Commerce.	This	is	a	good	start	and	has	great	significance	in	practice.	However,	it	is	far	from	satisfaction	and	need	more	relevant	rules	and	regulations	in	the	future.	 		
																																								 																				 	427	ê«ȌıǘƧŒ]sŭƒƪȌıœvĨɬɪsǓ$ȌǍóȒÕProcedure	Provisions	for	Industry	and	Commerce	Preventing	from	Excluding	or	Restricting	Competition	by	Abusing 
Administrative Power. 2009.  
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Furthermore,	the	emphasis	should	also	be	focused	on	the	coordination	between	the	various	departmental	 laws	and	the	Anti-monopoly	Law,	giving	specific	rules	and	regulations	on	how	to	deal	with	 the	relationship	between	them	when	they	conflict	 with	 each	 other,	 to	 avoid	 the	 situation	 of	 fighting	 for	 jurisdictions	 or	mutually	making	excuses428.	 		
5.2 Improve	the	deficiencies	of	the	provisions	on	administrative	monopoly	
of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law		The	provisions	on	administrative	monopoly	of	current	Anti-monopoly	Law	have	some	deficiencies	that	need	to	be	improved.		Firstly,	 clearly	 defining	 the	 concept	 of	 administrative	 monopoly.	 The	
Anti-monopoly	Law	uses	the	phrase	of	“eliminating	or	restricting	competition	by	abusing	 administrative	 power”.	 This	 provision	 cannot	 cover	 all	 State	anticompetitive	activities,	for	instance	the	anticompetitive	activities	practiced	by	legislative	 authorities	 are	 also	 the	 State	 anticompetitive	 activities	 but	 they	apparently	are	excluded	from	the	regulation;	the	term	“abuse”	is	too	principle	to	apply	in	practice.	Therefore,	such	activities	should	be	defined	as	“eliminating	and	restricting	 competition	 by	 illegally	 using	 public	 power”.	 Using	 “public	 power”	would	cover	all	State	activities	 including	 legislative,	 judicial	and	administrative	activities,	 and	 the	 term	 “illegally”	 would	 be	 far	 more	 applicable	 in	 reality	 for	enforcement.	Moreover,	 activities	 that	 “illegally	 using	 public	 power”	 should	 be	identified	by	the	Constitution,	thus	it	may	add	a	general	provision	on	prohibiting	activities	that	eliminate	and	restrict	competition.	 		Secondly,	clearly	defining	the	scope	of	“the	 industries	concerning	the	economic	lifeline	of	 the	State	and	national	 security”.	The	current	 scope	 is	 so	general	 and	wide	 that	most	 state-owned	monopoly	 enterprises	 could	be	 excluded	 from	 the	regulation	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	by	using	it	as	exemption.	The	Anti-monopoly	
Law	and	some	relevant	rules	and	regulations	should	specifically	list	all	markets	
																																								 																				 	
428 ƏwǾ2006(6Ypk¤~-.ŴƀɫiƟǁQuanrong You. 2006. Comparative 
Study on Anti-monopoly Law. Beijing: People’s Court Press. 
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that	belong	 to	natural	monopoly	or	 concerning	 “economic	 lifeline	 and	national	security”,	 and	 which	 should	 be	 approved	 by	 the	 NPC.	 The	 anticompetitive	activities	 should	 be	 strictly	 limited	 to	 these	 markets	 and	 cannot	 shift	 to	neighboring	but	separate	markets.	 		Thirdly,	 adding	 provisions	 on	 prohibiting	 reverse	 discrimination.	 In	 order	 to	regulate	 and	 restrict	 reverse	discrimination	 issues	 that	widely	 existed	 in	 some	local	 market,	 an	 equal	 treatment	 should	 be	 given	 to	 both	 local	 and	 outside	market	 players,	 and	 protect	 and	 maintain	 fair	 competition.	 In	 this	 regard	 the	
Anti-monopoly	Law	should	add	provisions	prohibiting	local	government	agencies	and	 relevant	 authorities	 from	 taking	 any	 reverse	 discrimination	 against	 local	private	and	small-medium	seized	enterprise	or	any	other	reverse	discrimination	activities	that	would	harm	the	free	and	fair	competition.	 		
5.3 Improve	the	regulations	on	the	Anti-monopoly	Committee		The	 functions	 of	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Committee	 means	 that	 it	 should	 be	 an	authority	with	comprehensive	knowledge	including	law,	economy,	management	and	 so	 on,	 and	 its	 members	 should	 be	 jurists,	 economists,	 and	 experienced	experts	 rather	 than	 civil	 servants.	 Although	 current	 committee	 consists	 of	high-level	government	officers	(most	of	them	are	ministers	or	vice	ministers	of	relevant	 departments	 such	 as	 the	 Department	 of	 Commerce	 and	 the	 State	Administration	 of	 Industry	 and	 Commerce)	 benefit	 to	 its	 authoritativeness,	 it	would	fail	to	effectively	perform	its	functions	due	to	lack	of	relevant	knowledge	and	 experiences.	 Therefore,	 a	 rigorous	 personal	 selection	 process	 and	mechanism	should	be	established	to	ensure	the	members	of	this	committee	are	qualified.	Besides,	this	committee	should	be	authorized	with	some	enforcement	functions	 and	 powers	 to	 deal	 with	 some	 complicated	 cases	 that	 general	anti-monopoly	enforcement	agency	cannot	regulate	and	to	make	final	decisions,	and	 to	 review	 and	 correct	 the	 decisions	 made	 by	 general	 anti-monopoly	enforcement	agency.	Moreover,	 in	order	 to	obtain	 the	power	 to	 review,	amend	and	abolish	anticompetitive	rules	and	regulations,	this	committee	should	be	set	up	directly	under	the	NPC	rather	than	the	State	Council.	
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5.4 Improve	the	regulations	on	Anti-monopoly	Enforcement	Agency		The	current	arrangement	of	anti-monopoly	enforcement	has	some	systematical	deficiencies,	and	should	be	improved	at	following	aspects.	 		First,	 the	 anti-monopoly	 enforcement	 should	 be	 independent,	 which	 is	 the	guarantee	 to	 the	 justice	 and	 efficiency	 of	 this	 agency.	 Therefore,	 this	 agency	should	be	directly	set	up	under	 the	Anti-monopoly	Committee	rather	 than	as	a	subordinated	 organization	 of	 government	 departments.	 Besides,	 there	 also	should	 be	 some	 provisions	 on	 the	 officers	 of	 this	 agency	 to	 ensure	 its	independence.	 For	 example,	 the	 officers	 of	 this	 agency	 should	 not	 serve	 any	duties	 in	 any	 other	 organizations	 or	 enterprises	 by	 all	 means;	 they	 should	 be	appointed	 and	dismissed	by	 strictly	procedure;	 and	 they	would	be	punished	 if	they	fail	to	perform	their	duties.	 		Second,	 similar	 to	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Committee,	 the	 anti-monopoly	enforcement	agency	also	needs	officers	with	professional	knowledge	and	skills.	Therefore,	 a	 personal	 selection	 process	 and	mechanism	 should	 be	 established	accordingly.	 In	addition,	by	comparing	with	the	Anti-monopoly	Committee,	 this	agency	needs	a	huge	numbers	of	staffs	due	to	the	fact	that	it	is	the	frontier	to	deal	with	 massive	 complicated	 and	 detailed	 works,	 which	 require	 that	 a	 specific	training	mechanism	 or	 organization	 should	 be	 established	 to	meet	 the	 human	resource	demands	of	anti-monopoly	enforcement	works.	 		Third,	 this	 agency	 should	 be	 granted	 clear	 authorities	 by	 law	 to	 effectively	perform	 its	 duties.	 Currently,	 the	Anti-monopoly	 Law	 only	 provides	 the	 agency	with	 the	 rights	 to	 inspection,	 interrogation,	 and	 examination,	 which	 obviously	are	 not	 enough	 to	 regulate	 anticompetitive	 activities	 in	 practice.	 To	 solve	 this	problem,	this	agency	should	also	be	authorized	the	following	rights:	rule-making	right,	examination	and	approval	right,	administrative	compulsory	measures	such	as	 force	 to	 stop,	 dissolve,	 seal	 and	 seizure,	 penalty	 right,	 punishment	recommendations	right,	and	the	right	 to	 transfer	certain	case	 to	 judiciary	or	 to	
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the	Committee.	Besides,	to	some	rules	and	regulations	that	may	contrary	to	the	
Anti-monopoly	Law,	this	agency	should	be	authorized	the	right	to	make	objection	to	relevant	authorities.	 		Fourth,	a	coordination	system	for	current	anti-monopoly	enforcement	agencies	should	 be	 established.	 For	 example,	 a	 joint	 conference	 system	 involving	 the	People’s	 Bank	 of	 China429,	 Securities	 Regulatory	 Commission430	 and	 Banking	Regulatory	 Commission 431 	 to	 communicate	 each	 other	 and	 ensure	 the	unification	 of	 the	 identification	 and	 treatment	 to	 the	 same	 or	 similar	 cases	 to	guarantee	its	fairness	and	authoritativeness.	Furthermore,	it	is	also	necessary	to	coordinate	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 anti-monopoly	 enforcement	 agencies	and	 other	 departmental	 or	 industrial	 regulators.	 Currently,	 most	 industries	 of	China	have	 their	 own	 regulators,	 and	 the	 anti-monopoly	 enforcement	 agencies	would	 be	 useless	 and	 powerless	 if	 these	 regulators	 have	 exclusive	 right	 to	regulate	all	activities	within	certain	 industries.	Especially	 for	departmental	and	industrial	 monopoly	 activities,	 the	 regulators	 often	 have	 the	 trend	 to	 protect	them	by	all	means	 rather	 than	 to	 regulate	 them	 to	protect	 their	own	 interests.	Thus,	 there	 should	 be	 a	 provision	 to	 draw	 a	 clear	 line	 between	 them	 and	stipulate	 that	 these	 industrial	 regulators	 have	 no	 right	 to	 deal	 with	anticompetitive	activities.	All	 of	 above	measures	 should	be	 temporary,	 and	 the	final	 goal	 is	 to	 set	 up	 an	 independent	 and	 united	 anti-monopoly	 enforcement	agency	that	directly	under	the	Anti-monopoly	Committee.	 		
5.5 Improvements	for	the	legal	liabilities	of	State	anticompetitive	activities		First	 of	 all,	 the	 legal	 liabilities	 for	 State	 anticompetitive	 activities	 should	 be	unified.	 Before	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 was	 issued,	 some	 industrial	 and	departmental	 authorities	 such	 as	 the	 Banking	 Supervision	 Committee	 and	Electricity	Supervision	Committee432,	enacted	some	industrial	and	departmental	rules	 and	 regulations	 such	 as	 the	 Telecommunication	 Law	 and	 the	 Electricity	
																																								 																				 	
429 ±.ŴɝȌChina’s central bank.  
430 Ȟƴ:Securities Regulatory Commission. 
431 ɝƴ:Banking Regulatory Commission. 
432 Ʈƴ:Electricity Supervision Committee. 
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Law433,	to	regulate	the	competition	activities	in	certain	market.	These	rules	and	regulations	are	 contradictory	 to	 the	Anti-monopoly	Law	 on	 the	 legal	 liability	of	State	 anticompetitive	 activities	 to	 some	 degree.	 Therefore,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	amend	and	abolish	such	rules	and	regulations	that	contrary	to	the	Anti-monopoly	
Law	 so	 as	 to	 set	 up	 an	 effective	 and	 authoritative	 anti-monopoly	 enforcement	and	unified	legal	liability	for	State	anticompetitive	activities.	 		Second,	 improving	 the	 administrative	 liability	 system	 for	 State	 anticompetitive	activities.	 The	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 only	 provides	 the	 anticompetitive	 activities	with	the	liability	of	“correct	ordered	by	higher	authority”,	which	is	obviously	not	strong	enough.	The	administrative	 liabilities	 for	State	anticompetitive	activities	should	also	include	measures	of	dismissing	illegal	administrative	organizations,	ordering	 subjects	 to	 stop	 illegal	 activities,	 declaring	 anticompetitive	 activities	invalid,	and	administrative	compensation	and	punishment.	Besides,	the	personal	liability	 of	 State	 anticompetitive	 activities	 should	 also	 be	 considered.	 Although	State	 anticompetitive	 activities	 are	 practiced	 by	 government	 agencies	 and	relevant	 authorities	 in	 the	 name	 of	 the	 State,	 the	 policy	 makers	 and	 specific	executors	 may	 have	 direct	 responsible	 for	 such	 activities	 in	 some	 situation.	Therefore,	 the	 person	 directly	 in	 charge	 and	 other	 responsible	 person	 should	take	 personal	 responsibilities,	 which	 should	 be	 clearly	 stipulated	 by	 the	
Anti-monopoly	Law.		Third,	improving	the	civil	liability	for	State	anticompetitive	activities.	According	to	Article	121	of	the	General	Principles	of	the	Civil	Law	of	the	PRC,	the	State	organ	or	 its	 staff	 shall	 bear	 civil	 liability	 if	 it	 encroaches	 upon	 the	 lawful	 rights	 and	interests	of	a	citizen	or	legal	person	and	caused	damage434.	From	the	perspective	of	 civil	 law,	 the	 State	 anticompetitive	 activities	 damage	 the	 property	 right	 of	other	market	players	due	to	their	competitiveness	are	restricted,	which	is	a	kind	of	civil	trespass.	Therefore,	the	subjects	of	State	anticompetitive	activities	should	bear	the	civil	liabilities	if	this	activities	cause	economic	loss	to	citizens	and	legal	persons.	 The	 civil	 liabilities	 provided	by	 the	General	 Principles	 of	 the	 Civil	 Law	
																																								 																				 	
433 ƮvƀElectricity Law.  
434 ±ŴƀɊoGeneral Principles of the Civil Law of China. 1987. Art 121. 
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include	 stopping	 infringement,	 removing	 and	 eliminating	 obstacles,	compensation	 for	 economic	 loss	 and	 so	 on,	 which	 should	 be	 the	 base	 of	 civil	liability	 system	 for	 State	 anticompetitive	 activities.	 Among	 these	measures	 the	compensation	is	the	most	important,	therefore	a	clear	compensation	calculation	method	 for	 damages	 caused	 by	 State	 anticompetitive	 activities,	 should	 be	provided	by	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	or	relevant	rules	and	regulations.	 		Fourth,	the	criminal	liability.	As	an	illegal	activity,	the	social	damages	caused	by	State	 anticompetitive	 activities	 are	 far	more	 serious	 than	 that	 caused	by	 some	economic	crimes,	thus	the	criminal	liability	for	State	anticompetitive	activities	is	necessary.	According	to	Article	397	of	China’s	Criminal	Law,	“A	public	servant	of	a	State	organ	who	abuses	his	power	of	office	or	neglects	his	duty,	thus	causing	a	heavy	 loss	 to	 public	 property	 or	 interests	 of	 the	 State	 or	 the	 people,	 shall	 be	sentenced	 to	 fixed-imprisonment	 of	 not	 more	 than	 three	 years	 or	 criminal	detention;	 and	where	 the	 circumstances	 are	 exceptional	 serious,	 not	 less	 than	three	 years	 and	 not	 more	 than	 seven	 years	 of	 fixed-term	 imprisonment”435.	Apart	from	China,	there	are	some	other	countries	which	also	set	criminal	liability	for	State	anticompetitive	activities.	For	example,	Article	21	of	the	Federal	Law	on	
Protection	 of	 Competition	 of	 Russian	 states	 that,	 “the	 federal	 administrative	authorities,	 administrative	 authorities	 in	 Russian	 federation	 departments	 and	municipal	 officials,	 commercial	 organs,	 non-profit	 organs	 and	 their	 operators,	citizens	will	be	pursued	to	bear	civil,	administrative	and	criminal	liability	when	they	 are	 sentenced	 to	 have	 violated	 anti-monopoly	 law” 436 .	 To	 China’s	
Anti-monopoly	 Law,	 a	 provision	 that	 the	 person	 directly	 involved	 in	 a	 serious	State	anticompetitive	activity	shall	bear	criminal	liability	should	be	set.	 		Fifth,	 the	 sanction	 on	 administrative	 anticompetitive	 activities	 should	 be	exercised	 by	 the	 anti-monopoly	 enforcement	 agency.	 According	 to	 current	
Anti-monopoly	 Law,	 the	 authorities	 excising	 the	 power	 of	 sanction	 on	administrative	 anticompetitive	 activities	 is	 the	 “higher	 authorities”,	 and	 the	anti-monopoly	enforcement	agencies	only	have	the	suggestion	right	to	them.	In	
																																								 																				 	
435 lƀCriminal Law of China. Art 397.  
436 Russia. 2009. The Federal Law on Protection of Competition 
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practice,	 the	 higher	 authorities	 cannot	 effectively	 regulate	 administrative	anticompetitive	activities	due	to	lack	of	professional	knowledge	and	experiences,	and	 a	 trend	 to	 protect	 those	 activities	 practiced	 by	 their	 subordinated	 organs.	Therefore,	 the	 anti-monopoly	 enforcement	 should	 be	 authorized	 exclusive	power	 to	punish	administrative	anticompetitive	activities,	 at	 least	be	given	 the	compulsory	power	for	proposing	sanction	suggestions.	 		Sixth,	 providing	 the	 sanctions	 on	 the	 enterprises	 that	 benefit	 from	 State	anticompetitive	 activities.	 Every	 State	 anticompetitive	 activity	 has	 specific	purposes,	and	most	of	them	are	to	protect	certain	economic	interests	and	certain	enterprises	are	 the	eventual	beneficiaries.	The	punishment	of	only	 the	subjects	of	these	activities	and	the	person	directly	in	charge	of	them	is	obviously	unfair,	which	 would	 help	 the	 enterprises	 that	 benefit	 from	 anticompetitive	 activities	only	obtain	profits	but	do	not	have	to	bear	any	risk	and	liability;	and	they	would	still	have	strong	competitiveness	which	would	continuously	harm	other	market	players’	 interests.	 Hence,	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 should	 set	 a	 provision	 that	impose	sanctions	to	enterprises	that	benefits	from	anticompetitive	activities,	and	require	 them	 to	 bear	 civil	 and	 administrative	 liabilities,	 such	 as	 compensation	and	removing	specific	license;	if	the	circumstances	are	serious,	they	should	bear	criminal	liability	according	to	the	Criminal	Law.		Last,	 providing	 the	 sanctions	 on	 the	 executors	 of	 the	 enterprises	 that	 benefit	from	State	anticompetitive	activities.	Generally,	almost	all	anti-monopoly	laws	in	different	countries	have	the	provision	that	directors,	managers	and	other	senior	management	members	shall	bear	the	legal	 liability	 if	 the	enterprises	they	work	in	 carry	out	 anticompetitive	 activities,	 because	 they	 are	 the	direct	 and	 specific	decision	 maker	 and	 executor	 of	 the	 decision	 making	 and	 implementation.	Therefore,	 China’s	Anti-monopoly	 Law	 should	 set	 a	 provision	 that	 the	 director,	manager	 and	 other	 management	 members	 of	 certain	 enterprises	 that	 benefit	from	 anticompetitive	 activities,	 shall	 bear	 corresponding	 legal	 liabilities,	otherwise	they	need	to	prove	that	they	have	made	appropriate	efforts	to	prevent	such	activities	happened.	 		
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5.6 Improve	the	judicial	remedy	system	for	State	anticompetitive	activities		The	 judicial	 remedy	 system	 for	 State	 anticompetitive	 activities	 should	 be	improved.	 Firstly,	 the	 rule	 of	 “illegal	 per	 se”	 should	 be	 adopted	 by	 the	
Anti-monopoly	 Law.	 The	 term	 “illegal	 per	 se”	 means	 that	 the	 act	 is	 inherently	illegal.	This	rule	and	the	“rule	of	reason”	are	the	two	basic	principles	to	identity	the	 illegality	of	monopoly	activities.	When	the	rule	of	 “illegal	per	se”	 is	applied,	the	plaintiff	only	need	to	prove	that	the	share	of	the	monopoly	enterprises	in	the	market	exceed	a	certain	amount	or	 its	activities	are	prohibited	by	 the	 law,	and	the	 defendant	 and	 its	 activities	 would	 be	 identified	 as	 monopoly	 or	anticompetitive	activities,	 even	 though	 the	defendant	argue	 that	 such	activities	would	promote	competition	to	some	degree.	If	the	rule	of	reason	is	applied,	the	court	needs	to	review	specific	activity	carefully	and	examine	its	background	and	the	 influences	 on	 the	 market.	 To	 the	 activity	 that	 restrict	 and	 eliminate	competition	while	also	promoting	competition	or	other	overall	social	benefits,	it	would	be	considered	to	be	legitimate.	Only	the	activity	that	restrict	and	eliminate	competition	 without	 any	 reasonable	 excuses	 would	 be	 identified	 illegal.	 By	comparing	 with	 the	 rule	 of	 reason,	 the	 “illegal	 per	 se”	 apparently	 have	 more	advantages	 to	 be	 adopted:	The	 “illegal	per	 se”	 is	 far	 clearer	 than	 the	 reason	of	rule	in	practice.	It	would	draw	a	clear	line	between	legal	and	illegal,	and	is	easier	for	 the	 judge	 to	 determine	 whether	 an	 activity	 is	 anticompetitive	 activity	 by	using	this	principle.	This	principle	obviously	suits	the	real	condition	in	China	that	most	 judge	 and	 officers	 of	 anti-monopoly	 enforcement	 agencies	 lack	 relevant	acknowledges	 and	 experiences.	 Contrarily,	 the	 rule	 of	 reason	 requires	 high	professional	acknowledges	and	experiences	to	examines	and	analyze	the	facts	of	a	 specific	 activity,	which	 is	 a	big	 challenge	 to	 current	China’s	 judicial	 structure	and	 the	 quality	 of	 judges	 and	 anti-monopoly	 officer.	 And	 the	 flexibility	 of	 this	rule	 would	 cause	 different	 judges	 and	 anti-monopoly	 officers	 make	 different	decision	to	the	cases	that	have	same	or	similar	conditions,	which	would	harm	the	authoritativeness	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	and	affect	the	enforcement	of	it.	On	the	 other	 hand,	 the	 rule	 of	 “illegal	 per	 se”	 would	 save	 the	 litigation	 cost	 of	anti-monopoly	due	to	its	clear	definition	and	fewer	objects	need	to	be	examined	and	analyzed,	 this	 is	 important	 to	effectively	enforce	 the	Anti-monopoly	Law	 as	
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there	 are	 too	 many	 State	 anticompetitive	 activities	 in	 China	 that	 need	 to	 be	regulated.	 		Second,	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Committee	 directly	 under	 the	 NPC	 should	 be	authorized	more	 functions	 and	 powers	 to	 deal	with	 anticompetitive	 rules	 and	regulations.	 For	 those	 rules	 and	 regulations	 that	 have	 been	 issued,	 the	Committee	could	adopt	the	measure	of	judicial	review	to	examine	whether	they	have	 restricted	 and	 eliminated	 competition	 and	 are	 contrary	 to	 the	
Anti-monopoly	 Law,	 and	 propose	 suggestions	 of	 amending	 or	 abolishing	 those	anticompetitive	rules	and	regulations	to	the	NPC.	The	Anti-monopoly	Committee	also	could	use	the	measures	of	prior	review	to	examine	the	rules	and	regulations	relating	 to	 competition.	 If	 the	 Committee	 finds	 some	 provisions	 of	 these	 rules	and	 regulations	may	 restrict	 and	 eliminate	 competition,	 it	 could	 prevent	 their	promulgating	 and	 implementing,	 and	 require	 the	 issuing	 authorities	 to	 amend	these	 provisions	 within	 limited	 period,	 or	 it	 could	 propose	 the	 suggestion	 of	revoking	these	rules	and	regulations	to	the	NPC	or	relevant	authorities.	 		Third,	 establishing	 the	 public	 interests	 litigation	 system	 against	 State	anticompetitive	 activities,	 which	means	 that	when	 a	 State	 competitive	 activity	has	damaged	or	may	damage	social	and	public	 interests,	any	citizen,	organ	and	legal	 person	 could	 bring	 a	 suit	 against	 the	 subject	 that	 practices	 such	 activity	under	 their	 own	 name.	 For	 example,	 in	 the	 US,	 both	 corporate	 victims	 and	common	citizen	can	claim	or	acquire	injunctive	relief	to	monopoly	activities.	To	introduce	 this	 system,	 the	provisions	of	 the	General	Principles	of	Civil	 Law	 that	the	plaintiff	must	be	 the	 “direct	 interested	person”	should	be	amended	 to	 “any	citizen,	 organ	and	 legal	person	 could	bring	a	 suit	 against	 State	 anticompetitive	activities	 to	 the	 court	 for	 public	 interests”.	 Establishing	 the	 public	 interests	litigation	 against	 State	 anticompetitive	 activities	 is	 meaningful	 to	 China:	 in	practice,	it	is	hard	to	sue	an	abstract	anticompetitive	activity	due	to	the	fact	that	its	 objects	 are	 unspecific	 and	 the	 victims	 are	 difficult	 to	 identity.	 The	 public	interests	 litigation	 system	 would	 strengthen	 the	 protection	 of	 the	 victims	 of	abstract	 anticompetitive	 activities,	 and	make	 the	 litigation	 against	 them	much	easier	 and	 applicable	 in	 practice.	 Moreover,	 it	 would	 strengthen	 the	 ideas	 of	
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anti-monopoly,	 especially	 against	 State	 anticompetitive	 activities	 among	common	 peoples,	 and	 arouse	 the	 citizen’s	 initiative	 of	 participating	 and	supervising	anti-monopoly	enforcement.
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CHAPTER	SIX:	CHINA’S	STATE-OWNED	ENTERPRISE	INCOME	
DISTRIBUTION	LEGAL	SYSTEM	REFORM		
1. The	 Development	 of	 China’s	 State-owned	 Enterprise	 Income	
Distribution	Legal	System		
1.1 Breaking	equalitarianism	period	(1978-1992)		From	1953,	China	has	carried	out	the	socialist	transformation,	which	intended	to	transfer	the	capitalism	to	national	capitalism,	then	to	socialism	eventually.	At	the	end	 of	 the	 first	 quarter	 of	 1956,	 99%	 of	 private	 industry	 and	 85%	 of	 private	commerce	 business	 were	 public-private	 joint	 management437,	 which	 marked	that	 the	 socialist	 transformation	 has	 been	 completed	 basically.	 Along	with	 the	change	of	the	system	of	ownership	of	the	means	of	production,	relative	income	distribution	 system	 has	 been	 established	 as	 well.	 From	 1956	 the	 socialist	transformation	 had	 been	 completed	 to	 1978	 China	 started	 to	 reform,	 the	 only	system	of	ownership	of	the	means	of	production	was	public	ownership,	namely	the	 ownership	 by	 the	 whole	 people	 and	 collective	 ownership,	 and	 the	 only	income	distribution	system	was	distribution	according	to	work,	under	which	the	wage	 system	 was	 applied	 to	 all	 enterprise	 owned	 by	 the	 whole	 people,	government	 department	 and	 urban	 collective	 enterprises,	 and	 the	êj(Gong	Fen)438	 system	was	applied	to	rural	collective	economy.		Generally,	 there	 were	 little	 legislation	 concerned	 about	 income	 distribution	system	 during	 this	 period,	 and	 income	 was	 distributed	 mainly	 by	 planning	orders	 and	 administrative	management	 of	 government	 departments.	 In	 urban	area,	 all	 accommodation,	 education	and	health	care	were	covered	by	 the	State,	and	 individuals	were	paid	depending	on	 their	positions	 that	was	 stipulated	by	the	 State;	 in	 rural	 area,	 the	Regulations	 on	 People’s	 Commune	 of	 Rural	 Area439	ruled	that	the	collective	owns	all	the	lands	of	rural	area	including	curtilage,	and	
																																								 																				 	437	±Ǧȓðɚ China	Statistical	Yearbook.	438	êjWork	point	system.	 	439	dŕ.ŴYǁêCŖGRegulations	on	People’s	Commune	of	Rural	Area.	1962.	 	
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members	of	collective	only	have	the	usufruct	of	such	lands440.	This	system	lasted	till	late	1970s.		Due	 to	 the	 shortcomings	 of	 the	 system	 of	 distribution	 according	 to	 work,	 the	Third	 Plenary	 Session	 of	 the	 11th	 CPC	 Congress	 put	 forward	 “breaking	equalitarianism”441.	 Then	 the	 Fourth	 Plenary	 Session	 affirmed	 the	 system	 of	contracted	responsibility	that	peasant	could	retain	all	rest	agricultural	products	after	 delivering	 to	 state	 and	 collective,	 which	 cleared	 the	 distribution	relationship	among	state,	collective	and	peasant442.	 		In	October	1984,	the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	the	12th	CPC	Congress	issued	the	
Decision	 on	 Economic	 Reform	 of	 the	 CPC443,	 which	 encouraged	 some	 areas	 and	individuals	 to	 become	 rich	 first	 by	 honest	 work	 and	 lawful	 operation,	emphasized	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 economic	 reform	 in	 urban	 area	 rather	 than	rural	 area,	 and	 required	 to	 establish	 various	 types	 of	 economic	 responsibility	system	and	apply	the	principle	of	distribution	according	to	work444.	 		The	 reform	of	 income	distribution	 system	 in	 this	 period	 could	 be	 divided	 into	two	stages:	 the	rural	 income	distribution	system	reform	and	 the	urban	 income	distribution	 system	 reform.	 In	 rural	 area,	 the	 main	 reform	 is	 to	 establish	 the	household	 contract	 responsibility	 system,	 which	 allows	 farming	 household	 to	manage	 agricultural	 production	 on	 their	 own	 initiatives	 while	 the	 farmland	remains	in	the	ownership	of	the	rural	collective.	This	system	not	only	remained	the	 origin	 collective	 ownership	 structure,	 but	 also	 aroused	 the	 enthusiasm	 for	production	of	peasant.	According	 to	statistics,	 the	gross	grain	output	 increased	significantly	from	282,725,000	tons	to	391,512,000	tons	for	the	period	between	1978	 and	 1986,	 and	 the	 gross	 value	 of	 agricultural	 production	 increased	 from	RMB	 101.82	 billion	 Yuan	 to	 RMB	 277.2	 billion	 Yuan	 from	 1977	 to	 1986445.	 In	
																																								 																				 	440	 Ibid.	 	441	äX:ġ¢The	Report	of	the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	the	11th	CPC	Congress.	1978.	442	ä­X:ġ¢The	Report	of	the	Four	Plenary	Session	of	the	11th	CPC	Congress.	1979.	443	\Å]'ǤƇAsįɳƱeÕThe	Decision	on	Economic	Reform	of	the	CPC.	1984.	 	444	 Ibid.	 	445	±ǦȓðɚChina	Statistical	Yearbook	1977-1986.	
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urban	area,	 the	reform	of	 income	distribution	system	was	carried	out	after	 the	contract	 responsibility	 system	 had	 achieved	 a	 great	 significance	 in	 rural	 area.	This	 reform	 concentrated	 on	 expanding	 autonomy	 of	 and	 wage	 scheme	 of	state-owned	enterprises.	The	Decision	on	Economic	Reform	of	the	CPC	proposed	a	series	 of	 methods	 including:	 to	 establish	 an	 economic	 responsibility	 system	mainly	 depend	 on	 contract	 responsibility	 system	apply	 the	 responsibility	system	 of	 manager	 to	 state-owned	 enterprises,	 giving	 more	 autonomy	 to	state-owned	 enterprises	 (including	 the	decision	 to	 set	 their	 own	wage),	widen	the	wage	gap	between	different	management	levels	in	aiming	to	encourage	and	reward	 more	 efficient	 staffs446.	 In	 addition,	 the	 State	 Council	 also	 issued	 the	
Notice	 on	 the	 Reform	 of	 Wage	 Scheme	 of	 State-owned	 enterprises447,	 which	required	 that	 the	 total	 wage	 of	 a	 state-owned	 enterprise	 should	 be	 tied	 to	 its	benefits448.	 		Specifically,	 in	 terms	 of	 SOEs’	 profit	 distribution,	 before	 1984,	 all	 SOEs	 had	 to	turn	in	their	profits	to	the	State	and	then	received	funding	from	the	Treasury	for	to	make	investments	and	to	cover	their	losses.	In	1978,	revenue	from	enterprises	were	 the	primary	source	of	 fiscal	 revenue.	SOEs	 turned	 in	57.199	billion	Yuan,	accounting	for	50.5%	of	fiscal	revenue449.	The	SOE	reforms	in	the	1980s	started	with	expanding	management	autonomy	and	allowing	SOEs	to	retain	some	profits.	The	core	of	this	reform	strategy	was	to	break	the	old	system	in	which	everyone	benefitted	 equally,	 regardless	 of	 their	 contribution.	 According	 to	 the	profit-retention	policy,	SOEs	that	made	higher	profits	could	retain	more	of	their	profits.	 Some	 of	 the	 retained	 profits	 could	 be	 used	 for	 collective	 benefits	 and	employee	 reward,	 so	 that	 the	managers	 and	 employees	 could	 receive	 tangible	benefits	 and	 foster	profit	motives	 in	 SOEs.	Moreover,	 in	most	 cases,	 the	bonus	rewards	 that	 employees	 received	 were	 decides	 and	 allocated	 by	 the	management.	Better-performing	 employees	 could	 receive	 compensation	 in	 line	with	their	performance.	 	
																																								 																				 	446	 See	note	715.	 	447	±{ɫ]'±ō6êȴįɳɣɺƱɊƹNotice	on	the	Reform	of	Wage	Scheme	of	State-owned	enterprises.	1985.	448	 Ibid.	449	 Sheng	Hong.	2011.	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises;	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform.	Unirule	Institute	of	Economics.	P.	195.	
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	In	1984,	SOEs	began	to	pay	taxes	instead	of	turning	in	profits	with	the	issuance	of	 the	 Interim	Measures	 for	 Substitution	 of	 Tax	 Payment	 for	 Profit	 Delivery	 for	
State-run	 Enterprises 450 	 by	 the	 State	 Council.	 In	 practice,	 medium-	 and	large-sized	 state-run	 enterprises	 paid	 income	 tax	 at	 a	 rate	 of	 55%.	 They	 then	turned	in	some	post-tax	profits	and	retained	some	profits	according	to	the	ratio	approved	 by	 the	 state.	 Small-sized	 state-run	 enterprises	 could	 completely	 pay	taxes	instead	of	turning	in	profits	to	the	state.	After	paying	taxes	according	to	the	8-level	progressive	tax,	they	could	independently	allocate	the	remaining	profits	and	assume	sole	responsibility	for	their	own	profits	or	losses.	But	for	enterprises	that	 still	 had	 huge	 profits	 after	 paying	 the	 taxes,	 the	 state	 could	 collect	 some	contract	 fees	or	a	 fixed	amount	of	profit451.	 In	September	of	 the	same	year,	 the	
Report	on	the	Step-2	Reform	of	Substitution	of	Tax	Payment	for	Profit	Delivery	for	
State-Run	Enterprises452	 and	the	Interim	Measures	 for	Step-2	Substitution	of	Tax	
Payment	for	Profit	Delivery	for	State-run	Enterprises453	 were	issued	by	the	State	Council,	 which	 stated	 that	 Profit-making	 medium	 and	 large-sized	 state-run	enterprises	 shall	 pay	 income	 taxes	 at	 a	 fixed	 rate	 of	 55%.	 Profit-making	small-sized	 state-run	 enterprises	 shall	 pay	 income	 taxes	 according	 to	 the	 new	8-level	progressive	tax	rate	in	excess	of	specific	amount.”	“50%	of	the	profits	that	enterprises	 retain	 from	 the	 increased	 profit	 shall	 be	 used	 for	 production	 and	development,	 20%	 for	 collective	 employee	 benefits	 and	 30%	 for	 employee	rewards.”454		In	terms	of	SOEs’	remuneration	and	internal	distribution	system,	SOEs	began	to	give	out	bonuses	 in	addition	 to	salaries	 to	employees	after	 the	policy	of	power	decentralization	 and	 profit	 transfer	 was	 adopted	 in	 1978,	 which	 changed	 the	situation	that	SOE	leaders	were	officials	who	were	appointed	and	dismissed	by	
																																								 																				 	450	]'±ȃ6qįǎƱĪȌxƀMeasures	for	the	Implementation	of	Paying	Tax	instead	of	Delivering	Profits	of	State-owned	Enterprises.	1984.	451	 Ibid.	452	]'±ȃ6ĪȌqįǎǕ&ůįɳĹŦxƀThe	Report	on	the	Step-2	Reform	of	Substitution	of	Tax	Payment	for	Profit	Delivery	for	State-Run	Enterprises,	1984.	453	±ȃ6Ǖ&ůqįǎȢȌxƀThe	Interim	Measures	for	Step-2	Substitution	of	Tax	Payment	for	Profit	Delivery	for	State-run	Enterprises,	1984.	454	 According	to	note	16,	17.	 	
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the	 government	 and	 whole	 remuneration	 was	 also	 decided	 by	 the	 State.	Generally	speaking,	the	bonuses	of	the	managements	were	higher	than	those	of	ordinary	employees,	but	the	disparity	was	quite	limited.	 		From	1987,	SOEs	began	to	adopt	the	contract	managerial	responsibility	system	in	 a	 bid	 to	 provide	 mangers	 with	 greater	 powers.	 The	 basic	 principles	 of	 the	system	 were	 to	 solve	 the	 fundamentals	 of	 the	 system,	 increasing	 profits,	 and	reducing	inefficiency.	In	1988,	the	State	Council	issued	the	Interim	Regulations	on	
Contracted	Managerial	 Responsibility	 System	 in	 Industrial	 Enterprises	 Owned	 by	
the	Whole	People455.	In	1992,	the	Ministry	of	Labour	and	the	Economic	and	Trade	Office	 of	 the	 State	 Council	 issued	 the	 Opinions	 on	 Improving	 the	 Income	
Distribution	Measures	for	Managers	of	Enterprises	Owned	by	the	Whole	People456.	This	 clearly	 stipulated	 that,	 if	 an	 enterprise	 fulfils	 its	 targets	 and	 increases	 its	asset	values	for	three	consecutive	years,	the	managing	director	or	other	leaders	of	the	same	level	should	be	rewarded,	further	linking	the	income	of	managers	to	their	work	performance.		In	 the	1990s,	China	gradually	 loosened	control	over	 income	distribution	 inside	SOEs	by	linking	salaries	to	performance.	SOEs	therefore	acquired	greater	power	to	 decide	 salaries	 within	 their	 overall	 budgets.	 According	 to	 Article	 19	 of	 the	
Regulations	 on	 Transforming	 the	 Management	 Mechanism	 of	 Industrial	
Enterprises	Owned	by	the	Whole	People,	“enterprises	have	the	power	to	distribute	salaries	 and	 bonuses.	 Gross	 salaries	 should	 be	 determined	 by	 linking	 gross	salaries	 to	 economic	 performance.	 Enterprises	 have	 the	 power	 to	 use	 and	distribute	 salaries	 and	 bonuses	within	 the	 extracted	 gross	 salaries.”457	 At	 that	time,	 SOE	 executives	 did	 not	 dare	 to	 increase	 the	 disparity	 between	 their	remuneration	and	 the	 income	of	ordinary	employees	 so	as	not	 to	 intensify	 the	conflict.	 However,	 to	 make	 up	 the	 insufficient	 cash	 remuneration	 incentives,	invisible	incomes	and	duty	consumption	were	increase	rapidly.	 	
																																								 																				 	455	XŴĕōsê6ěȬ4sňȌŖGThe	Interim	Regulations	on	Contracted	Managerial	Responsibility	System	in	Industrial	Enterprises	Owned	by	the	Whole	People.	 	456	]'īʀXŴĕōs6ĮWjɔxƀƱčȑThe	Opinions	on	Improving	the	Income	Distribution	Measures	for	Managers	of	Enterprises	Owned	by	the	Whole	People.	 	457	 Article	19	of	the	Regulations	on	Transforming	the	Management	Mechanism	of	Industrial	Enterprises	Owned	by	the	Whole	People,	1992.	 	
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	In	a	word,	the	unitary	income	distribution	was	modified,	inspiriting	mechanism	such	as	bonus	and	welfare	income	were	introduced	although	the	main	principle	was	still	distribution	according	to	work.		
1.2 The	period	that	multiple	distribution	system	coexist	while	distribution	
according	to	work	as	the	fundamental	means	(1992-2002)		In	1992,	the	14th	National	Congress	of	the	CPC	put	forward	to	set	up	the	socialist	market	 economic	 system458,	 which	 marked	 that	 China’s	 economic	 reform	 has	entered	 into	 a	 new	 stage.	 It	 clearly	 stated	 that	 partial	 people	 and	 areas	 are	allowed	and	encouraged	 to	get	 rich	 first,	 to	bring	along	 the	 rest	 to	achieve	 the	goal	 of	 common	 prosperity	 gradually.	 In	 1993,	 the	 Decisions	 on	 Establishing	
Socialist	 Market	 Economic	 System 459 	 was	 issued,	 which	 set	 up	 the	 basic	distribution	system	under	market	economic	system	initially460.	It	proposed	that	individual	income	distribution	should	insist	on	the	system	in	which	distribution	according	 to	work	 is	dominant	and	 in	which	a	variety	of	modes	of	distribution	coexist,	 and	 put	 forward	 the	 principle	 of	 giving	 priority	 of	 efficiency	with	 due	consideration	 to	 fairness461.	 The	 subjects	 and	 methods	 of	 distribution	 were	pluralized,	 and	 unearned	 incomes	 such	 as	 stock	 dividend,	 interests	 and	 bonus	were	legalized462.	 	 		In	terms	of	SOEs	profit	distribution,	the	Decision	on	Implementing	a	Tax-sharing	
System463	 was	adopted	 in	1993.	Which	stated	 that	 “A	distribution	system	shall	be	gradually	established	in	which	the	investment	proceeds	of	state-owned	assets	shall	be	divided	in	 line	with	contributions,	or	the	after-tax	profits	of	SOEs	shall	be	 turned	 in.	As	a	 transitional	measure,	most	SOEs	that	were	registered	before	
																																								 																				 	458	±\,V­Áġ¢The	Report	of	the14th	National	Congress	of	CPC.	1992.	 	459	\Å]'ùǑǁ:ì¶ǤƇAsǹîɣɺƱeÕDecisions	on	Establishing	Socialist	Market	Economic	System.	1993.	 	460	 Ibid.	 	461	 Ibid.	 	462	 Ibid.	 	463	ÖĺjǎsƱeÕThe	Decision	on	Implementing	a	Tax-sharing	System,	1993.	 	
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1993	 may	 retain	 their	 after-tax	 profits.”464	 Although	 the	 measure	 prescribing	that	SOEs	should	pay	taxes	to	the	government	(administrator)	and	not	to	turn	in	their	 profits	 to	 the	 owners	 was	 classified	 as	 a	 temporary	 measure,	 it	 was	enforced	 for	 14	 years.	 The	 reasons	why	 SOEs	 exempted	 from	 turning	 in	 their	profits	to	the	government	were:	first,	the	core	of	SOEs	reform	at	that	time	was	to	expand	enterprise	management	autonomy	and	reduce	government	intervention.	This	 policy	 was	 a	 natural	 condition	 of	 the	 SOE	 reform	 approach	 followed	throughout	the	1980s.	Second,	in	the	early	1990s,	the	financial	condition	of	SOEs	was	generally	very	poor.	The	government	could	hardly	get	any	profit	back	from	SOEs.	The	injection	of	capital	into	SOEs	was	considered	to	be	a	more	urgent	and	necessary	 task.	The	net	profit	of	nonfinancial	 SOEs	only	accounted	 for	0.3%	of	GDP	 in	 1994465.	 Third,	 SOEs	 were	 originally	 exempted	 from	 turning	 in	 their	profits	 so	 that	 they	 could	 use	 such	 profit	 to	 solve	 a	 series	 of	 reform-related	problems	such	as	the	relocation	of	laid-off	workers	and	pension	funds.	 		In	 terms	 of	 SOEs’	 remuneration	 and	 internal	 distribution	 system,	 SOEs’	wages	were	 decided	 by	 themselves	 before	 SASAC	 was	 founded.	 According	 to	 the	
Opinions	on	Deepening	the	Reform	of	Personnel,	Labour	and	Distribution	Systems	
inside	 State-owned	 Enterprises	 which	 was	 issued	 by	 the	 State	 Economic	 and	Trade	 Commission	 in	 2001,	 “Salary	 levels	 of	 employees	 should	 be	 decided	 by	enterprises	under	the	state	macro	control	according	to	the	 local	average	salary	levels	and	the	economic	performance	of	enterprises.”466	 This	provided	a	policy	basis	for	SOEs	to	determine	wages.	In	addition	to	nominal	remuneration,	there	is	much	room	for	invisible	incomes	and	expenses	for	senior	SOE	executives.		Furthermore,	the	Report	of	the	15th	National	Congress	of	the	CPC467	 put	forward	that	 capital,	 technology	 and	 other	 factors	 of	 production	 are	 allowed	 and	encouraged	to	participate	in	the	distribution	of	income,	illegal	earning	should	be	banned,	 excessively	 high	 incomes	 should	 be	 regulated,	 individual	 income	 tax	
																																								 																				 	464	 Ibid.	 	465	 See	the	Financial	Year	Book	of	China	1995.	 	466	 The	Opinions	on	Deepening	the	Reform	of	Personnel,	Labour	and	Distribution	Systems	inside	State-owned	Enterprises,	2001.	 	
467 ±\,V*Áġ¢The Report of the15th National Congress of CPC. 1997.  
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system	 and	 new	 taxes	 as	 inheritance	 tax	 should	 be	 improved	 and	 introduced,	and	 distribution	 system	 should	 be	 standardized.	 It	 also	 required	 correctly	handling	 the	 relationships	 among	 the	 state,	 enterprises	 and	 individuals,	 and	between	 the	 central	 and	 local	 government,	 improving	 the	 level	 of	 education,	medical	and	health	care,	and	providing	basic	social	security468.	 		In	legal	area,	the	1993	Amendment	to	the	Constitution	confirmed	that	China	is	at	the	 primary	 stage	 of	 socialism469,	 revised	 the	 statement	 of	 “the	 state	 practices	planned	economy…it	ensures	 the	proportionate	and	coordinated	growth	of	 the	national	 economy	 through	 overall	 balancing	 by	 economic	 planning…”	 to	 “the	state	 practices	 socialist	 market	 economy…the	 state	 strengthens	 economic	legislation,	 improve	macro-regulation	 and	 control”470,	 and	 recognized	 the	 legal	status	of	responsibility	system	(the	main	form	of	which	is	household	contract)	in	rural	area471.	Then	the	1999	Amendment	added	a	paragraph	to	the	Constitution,	which	 provided	 “China	 governs	 the	 country	 according	 to	 law	 and	 makes	 it	 a	socialist	country	ruled	by	law.”472It	stated	that	“in	the	primary	stage	of	socialism,	the	state	uphold	 the	basic	economic	system…	in	which	 the	public	ownership	 is	dominant	 and	 diverse	 forms	 of	 ownership	 develop	 side	 by	 side	 and	 keeps	 the	distribution	 system…	 in	which	distribution	according	 to	work	 is	dominant	 and	diverse	models	of	distribution	 coexist.”473This	Amendment	also	abandoned	 the	contents	 about	 household	 contract	 responsibility	 system,	 and	 recognized	 that	non-public	 sectors	 of	 economy	 constitute	 an	 important	 component	 of	 the	socialist	market	economy.	 			
1.3 The	 period	 paying	 equal	 attentions	 to	 efficiency	 and	 fairness	
(2003-present)		
																																								 																				 	
468 Ibid.  
469 .Ŵ\¦±ØƀMŮŦ The Amendment to the Constitution of PRC. 1993. Art 3.  
470 .Ŵ\¦±ØƀMŮŦ The Amendment to the Constitution of PRC. 1993. Art 7. 
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Although	 the	 distribution	 system	 in	 which	 distribution	 according	 to	 work	 is	dominant	and	divers	models	of	distribution	coexist	has	arose	the	enthusiasm	of	majority	of	workers,	there	were	many	problems	in	income	distribution	area	due	to	 factors	 such	 as	 the	widening	 income	gap.	Therefore,	The	Decisions	 on	 Issues	
concerning	about	Improving	Socialist	Market	Economic	System474	 that	was	issued	in	the	Third	Plenary	Session	of	the	16th	CPC	Congress	in	2003,	and	The	Decisions	
on	 Several	 Major	 Issues	 on	 Building	 Socialist	 Harmonious	 Society475	 that	 was	issued	 in	 the	Sixth	Plenary	Session	of	 the	16th	CPC	Congress	 in	2006,	 aimed	at	improving	 income	 distribution	 system	 and	 standardizing	 income	 distribution	orders476 .	 These	 two	 decisions	 called	 for	 increasing	 regulation	 on	 income	distribution,	 and	 said	 attention	 should	 be	 paid	 to	 the	 problem	 of	 increasing	income	gap	among	social	members.	They	called	for	efforts	to	speed	up	building	a	social	security	system	in	accordance	with	the	economic	development,	to	improve	endowment	 insurance	 system,	 unemployment	 insurance	 system	 and	 urban	residents’	 basic	 medical	 insurance	 system,	 and	 to	 build	 a	 rural	 lowest	 life	insurance	system	in	some	areas477.	These	two	decisions	also	called	for	improving	the	distribution	system	in	which	distribution	according	to	work	is	dominant	and	divers	 models	 of	 distribution	 coexist,	 adhering	 to	 the	 principle	 that	 allows	factors	of	production	participate	in	distribution	according	to	their	contribution,	paying	 more	 attentions	 to	 social	 equity,	 and	 narrowing	 income	 gap	 among	different	areas	and	social	members478.	 		In	 2007,	 the	Report	 of	 the	17th	National	 Congress	 of	 the	CPC	 stated	 “equitable	income	distribution	is	an	important	indication	of	social	equity”,479and	called	for	efforts	 to	 pay	 equal	 attention	 to	 efficiency	 and	 equity	 in	 both	 primary	distribution	 and	 redistribution,	 with	 particular	 emphasis	 on	 equity	 in	redistribution.	It	held	that	efforts	will	be	made	to	raise	the	income	of	low-income	group,	 increase	 poverty-alleviation	 aid	 and	 the	 minimum	 wage,	 and	 set	 up	 a	
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mechanism	of	regular	pay	increases	for	enterprise	employees	and	a	mechanism	for	 guaranteeing	 payment	 of	 salaries.	 Lawful	 incomes	 will	 be	 protected,	excessively	high	income	will	be	regulated	and	illegal	gains	will	be	banned480.	 		In	 2010,	 the	 12th	 Five-Year	 Plan	 was	 passed,	 which	 aimed	 at	 protecting	 and	improving	 people’s	 livelihood,	 adjusting	 income	 distribution	 relations,	increasing	 the	 share	of	personal	 income	 in	 the	distribution	of	national	 income,	and	 raising	 that	of	work	 remuneration	 in	primary	distribution.	 It	 stressed	 that	legal	income	and	private	property	of	citizen	should	be	protected	on	the	premise	of	 adhering	 to	 the	 basic	 income	 distribution	 system,	 increasing	 transfer	payments,	 intensifying	 the	regulation	of	 incomes	 through	 taxation,	overhauling	income	 distribution	 practices,	 and	 reversing	 the	 growing	 income	 disparities	between	urban	and	rural	area,	among	different	areas	and	industries.	 		During	 this	 period,	 SOEs	 profits	 increased	 significantly	 with	 improved	profitability.	 In	2007,	 the	aggregate	profits	of	nonfinancial	SOEs	reached	7%	of	GDP,	equivalent	to	one-sixth	of	China's	capital	formation.	Had	it	been	completely	added	to	the	budget,	the	total	government	fiscal	revenue	would	have	been	higher	by	 one-third.	 In	 1998,	 for	 example,	 nonfinancial	 SOEs	 collectively	 reported	0.3	Yuan	aggregate	profits481	 for	every	100	Yuan	of	sales	revenue.	This	ratio	rose	to	9	Yuan	in	2007.	Similarly,	the	aggregate	profits	that	SOEs	earned	for	every	100	Yuan	of	equity	capital	 jumped	from	0.4	Yuan	to	12.1	Yuan	in	these	10	years482.	This	highlights	the	potential	significance	of	SOE	dividend	policy483.	 		A	 dividend	 policy	 for	 SOEs	 would	 divide	 its	 after-tax	 profits	 into	 two	 parts:	retained	 earnings	 to	 finance	 investment	 in	 the	 group	 and	dividends	 to	 finance	general	public	 spending	by	 the	 government.	As	 such,	 the	 rationale	 for	 a	 sound	dividend	policy	is	twofold.	First,	it	has	the	potential	to	enhance	the	efficiency	of	investments	 financed	 by	 retained	 earnings	 of	 SOEs;	 and	 second,	 it	 would	improve	 the	 overall	 allocation	 of	 public	 financial	 resources.	 The	 absence	 of	 a	
																																								 																				 	480	 Ibid.	 	481	 Defined	as	total	profit	net	of	loss	of	all	non-financial	SOEs	482	 See	Financial	Year	Book	of	China	2008,	and	China	Statistical	Yearbook	2008.	 	483	 World	Bank,	2010.	 	
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dividend	policy	seems	to	have	an	implicit	assumption	that	there	is	no	better	use	of	 SOE	 profit	 other	 than	 reinvestment	 back	 into	 SOEs.	 This	 is	 obviously	questionable.	 Indeed,	 China	 now	 faces	 the	 urgent	 challenge	 of	 refocusing	 its	public	 spending	 to	 improve	 equity	 and	 efficiency	 of	 the	 delivery	 of	 key	 social	services,	such	as	education	and	health,	which	are	considered	critical	 to	achieve	national	 development	 goals.	 And	 the	 isolation	 of	 SOE	 profits	 from	 the	 normal	budgeting	process	unjustified.	From	this,	the	reform	kicked	off	by	the	Opinions	of	
the	 State	 Council	 on	 the	 Pilot	 Implementation	 of	 the	 State-owned	 Capital	
Management	Budget484	 (No.	26	Document)	 issued	by	 the	State	Council	 in	2007	marked	 a	 major	 step	 in	 the	 right	 direction.	 Which	 stated	 “The	 state-owned	capital	management	budget	shall	refer	to	the	income	and	expenditure	budget	for	the	 state	 as	 the	 owner	 to	 legally	 receive	 and	 distribute	 the	 proceeds	 from	state-owned	 capital,	 which	 constitutes	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 the	 government	budget.”	Therefore,	SOEs	are	legally	owned	by	the	whole	people,	and	they	should	advance	the	benefits	of	the	whole	society	rather	than	benefit	a	few	people.	 		At	the	end	of	2007,	SASAC	and	the	Ministry	of	Finance	jointly	issued	the	Interim	Measures	for	the	Administration	of	the	Collection	of	Proceeds	from	State-owned	Capital	of	Central	SOEs485,	marking	the	end	of	an	era	of	14	years	in	which	SOEs	only	 paid	 taxes	 and	 retained	 profits.	 According	 to	 relevant	 regulations,	 SOEs	were	 divided	 into	 three	 categories	 for	 turning	 in	 their	 profits:	 SOEs	 in	 five	resource	 sectors	 including	 tobacco,	 petroleum	 and	 petrochemical,	 power,	telecom	 and	 coal	 should	 turn	 in	 10%	 of	 their	 profits;	 SOEs	 in	 steel,	transportation,	 electronics,	 trade,	 construction	and	other	generally	 competitive	sectors	 should	 turn	 in	5%	of	 their	profits.	Research	 institutions	 reorganized	 in	defence	sector	did	not	need	to	turn	in	their	profits.	Obviously,	these	rates	were	too	 low486.	 In	 2009,	 the	 profits	 and	 net	 profits	 of	 central	 SOEs	 covered	 in	 the	state-owned	capital	management	budget	totalled	965.56	billion	Yuan	and	702.35	billion	 Yuan	 respectively.	However,	 the	management	 budget	 after	 profits	were	
																																								 																				 	484	 The	Opinions	of	the	State	Council	on	the	Pilot	Implementation	of	the	State-owned	Capital	Management	Budget,	2007.	 	485	 The	Interim	Measures	for	the	Administration	of	the	Collection	of	Proceeds	from	State-owned	Capital	of	Central	SOEs,	2007.	 	486	 Ibid.	 	
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drawn	only	reached	44	billion	Yuan	in	2010,	accounting	for	only	6%	of	their	net	profits,	a	rate	lower	than	the	individual	income	tax	rate487.		In	terms	of	SOEs’	remuneration	and	internal	distribution	system,	 in	2003,	 local	state-owned	assets	supervision	and	administration	committees	were	established.	The	State	Council	and	local	governments	began	to	perform	capital	contributor's	duties	 and	 responsibilities,	 and	 enjoy	 the	 capital	 contributor's	 rights	 and	interests	 for	state-funded	enterprises	on	behalf	of	 the	state	 in	accordance	with	laws	 and	 administration	 regulations.	 At	 the	 end	 of	 2003,	 SASAC	 issued	 the	
Interim	Measures	for	Evaluation	of	Operational	Performance	of	Persons	in	Charge	
of	Central	SOEs488.	In	2004,	it	issued	the	Detailed	Rules	for	the	Implementation	of	
the	 Interim	 Measures	 for	 Evaluation	 of	 Operational	 Performance	 of	 Persons	 in	
Charge	of	Central	SOEs489,	 adopting	a	performance-driven	annual	 remuneration	system	for	people	in	charge	of	central	SOEs.	 		After	 2004,	 the	 remuneration	 of	 SOE	 employees	 began	 to	 exceed	 the	 salary	 of	employees	 of	 other	 enterprises,	 exacerbating	 income	 inequalities.	 In	 2010,	SASAC	began	to	 launch	a	new	salary	management	system	in	central	SOEs	 in	 its	portfolio.	This	involved	a	“dual	control”	system	where	the	overall	salary	budget	was	managed,	as	well	as	per-capita	salaries.	The	detailed	procedure	is	as	follows:	at	 the	beginning	of	a	year,	 central	SOEs	would,	according	 to	 their	performance	and	profits	in	the	previous	year,	submit	their	salary	budget	plan	for	the	year	to	SASAC.	 On	 its	 part,	 SASAC	 would	 check	 whether	 the	 plans	 are	 reasonable	according	 to	 the	 budgets	 submitted	 by	 central	 SOEs	 and	 its	 own	 control	requirements	and	decide	the	upper,	middle	and	lower	per-capita	salary	increase	limits	 according	 to	 the	 salaries	 in	 different	 industries.	 It	 hoped	 to	 solve	 the	problems	of	irrational	salary	distribution	structures	between	different	groups	of	employees	in	central	SOEs	and	too	high	salaries	in	some	monopolized	industries	
																																								 																				 	487	 Sheng	Hong.	2011.	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises;	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform.	Unirule	Institute	of	Economics.	P.	197.	 	488	Å6ȪȬ.ǧĲȟ>ňȌŖGThe	Interim	Measures	for	Evaluation	of	Operational	Performance	of	Persons	in	Charge	of	Central	SOEs,	2003.	 	489	Å6ȪȬ.ǧĲȟ>ňȌŖGĘȌǢoThe	Detailed	Rules	for	the	Implementation	of	the	Interim	Measures	for	Evaluation	of	Operational	Performance	of	Persons	in	Charge	of	Central	SOEs,	2004.	 	
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through	the	salary	reform.		SASAC	began	the	pilot	of	new	governance	structure	in	some	central	SOEs	in	2005,	where	the	remuneration	committee	in	the	board	would	decide	the	remuneration	of	senior	executives.	The	Regulations	on	the	Executives	of	State-owned	Enterprises	
for	 Performing	 Management	 Duties	 with	 Integrity490	 also	 stipulated	 that	 the	remuneration,	 housing	 subsidy	 and	 other	 benefits	 of	 executives	 should	 not	 be	determined	 without	 the	 approval	 of	 the	 organization	 that	 performs	 capital	contributor's	 duties	 and	 responsibilities	 for	 state-owned	 assets	 and	 the	personnel	 authority491.	 The	document	 also	 stipulated	 that	 the	 remuneration	of	SOE	 executives	 should	 be	 linked	 to	 the	 performance	 of	 SOEs492.	 However,	 the	reality	did	not	show	the	positive	relationship	between	the	remuneration	of	SOE	executives	 and	 SOE	 profits.	 As	 of	 February	 15,	 2009,	 according	 to	 the	 annual	reports	released	by	31	companies	listed	at	the	main	board	markets	of	Shanghai	and	Shenzhen	stock	exchanges,	17	companies	reported	a	significant	 increase	in	net	 profits	 over	 2007	 and	 14	 companies	 posted	 a	 slide	 in	 their	 performance.	However,	 21	 companies	 reported	 an	 increase	 in	 executive	 remuneration	 over	2007,	 2	 companies	 registered	 unchanged	 executive	 remuneration	 and	 8	companies	posted	decline	in	executive	remuneration493.	 		In	 December	 2009,	 SASAC	 released	 the	 Interim	 Measures	 for	 Evaluation	 of	
Operational	 Performance	 of	 Persons	 in	 Charge	 of	 Central	 SOEs494,	 linking	 the	“economic	 value	 added”	 (EVA)	 to	 the	 remuneration	 of	 senior	 executives	 of	central	 SOEs	 for	 the	 first	 time.	 Although	 it	 is	 a	 commendable	 advance	 to	introduce	 the	 EVA	 index	 to	 evaluate	 the	 performance	 of	 those	 in	 charge	 of	central	 SOEs	 because	 it	 brings	 some	 restraint	 and	 pressure	 to	 the	 operational	behaviour	of	senior	executives	of	central	SOEs.	However,	it	still	cannot	hide	the	fact	that	the	operational	performance	of	central	SOEs	is	not	based	on	fair	market	
																																								 																				 	490	 The	Regulations	on	the	Executives	of	State-owned	Enterprises	for	Performing	Management	Duties	with	Integrity,	2009.	 	491	 Ibid.	 	492	 Ibid.	 	493	 Sheng	Hong.	2011.	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises;	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform.	Unirule	Institute	of	Economics.	 	494	 The	Interim	Measures	for	Evaluation	of	Operational	Performance	of	Persons	in	Charge	of	Central	SOEs,	2009.	 	
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competition.	The	large	quantity	of	resource	elements	occupied	by	SOEs	for	free	or	at	low	costs	and	the	monopoly	enables	SOEs	to	gain	profits	much	higher	than	what	they	can	get	under	fair	market	competition.		
1.4 Conclusion		As	a	conclusion,	the	development	of	China’s	SOE	income	distribution	system	was	based	 on	 the	 acknowledgement	 about	 the	 relationship	 between	 efficiency	 and	equity.	 From	 traditional	 equalitarianism	 to	 give	 priority	 to	 efficiency	 due	consideration	 to	 equity,	 then	 to	 correctly	 handling	 the	 relationship	 in	 both	primary	 distribution	 and	 redistribution	 with	 particular	 emphasis	 on	 equity	 in	redistribution,	which	reflected	different	positions	of	income	distribution	system	in	 different	 periods.	 The	 legal	 system	 of	 income	 distribution	 is	 incomplete,	relevant	rules	and	regulations	scattered	 instead	of	a	single	 income	distribution	law.	Before	economic	reform,	income	distribution	was	guided	by	the	government	and	 mainly	 depended	 on	 policies	 and	 orders	 of	 the	 State,	 and	 there	 were	 no	other	 rules	 and	 regulations	 to	 regulate	 income	 distribution	 except	 for	 the	Constitution.	Since	Reform	and	Opening	up,	some	relevant	rules	and	regulations	were	 created	 to	 standardize	 income	 distribution	 orders	 and	 balance	 the	relationship	between	efficiency	and	equity.	However,	due	to	the	fact	this	system	is	 unstable	 and	 discontinuous	 and	 lacks	 of	 contents	 about	 redistribution,	 the	income	distribution	are	regulated	by	policies	of	the	government	more	frequently	rather	than	the	market	and	laws.	 		
2. The	Current	Condition	of	China’s	SOE	Income	Distribution	System		
2.1 The	Monetary	and	Non-monetary	Income	of	the	Employees	of	SOEs.	 	 		2.1.1 The	Comparison	between	SOEs	and	other	economic	organizations	and	the	social	average		According	to	statistics,	in	2005,	the	average	wage	of	SOEs	exceeded	the	average	incomes	of	other	units	 for	 the	 first	 time.	After	 that,	 the	gap	kept	 increase	each	
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year.	In	2008,	the	average	wage	of	the	employees	of	SOEs	was	17%	higher	than	that	of	non-SOEs.	In	2009,	the	average	wage	of	SOEs	employees	was	65%	higher	than	that	of	urban	collective	units	and	8.87%	higher	than	that	of	other	units495.	 		The	 gradually	 widening	 gap	 between	 the	 incomes	 of	 SOE	 employees	 and	 the	incomes	of	other	units	and	the	whole	society	after	2004	was	due	to	the	“holding	onto	the	big	and	letting	go	of	the	small”	policy	of	SOE	restructuring	that	began	in	1997.	From	1997	to	2009,	the	number	of	SOEs	dropped	from	98,600	to	20,500496.	The	small	SOEs	with	either	losses	or	poor	performance	were	closed	down,	forced	to	 suspend	 operations,	 merged	 with	 others	 or	 shifted	 into	 different	 lines	 of	production,	 and	most	of	 the	 enterprises	 left	 are	 those	 in	 “important	 industries	and	 key	 sectors	 related	 to	 national	 security	 and	 the	 health	 of	 the	 national	economy”497.		The	 range	 of	 the	 gross	 wages	 of	 enterprises	 in	 our	 country	 is	 based	 on	 the	
Provisions	 on	 the	 Composition	 of	 Gross	 Wages498 	 promulgated	 by	 National	Bureau	 of	 Statistics	 in	 1990.	 However,	 according	 to	 the	 provisions,	 invisible	incomes	 such	 as	 insurance	 and	 welfare	 funds,	 labor	 protection	 fees,	 housing	funds,	extra	premiums,	transfer	incomes	and	other	incomes	are	not	included	in	the	gross	wage.	As	a	result,	most	SOEs	have	made	use	of	the	loopholes	in	wage	linkage	 policies	 and	 grant	 welfare	 subsidies	 and	 invisible	 incomes	 to	 senior	executives	and	employees.	According	to	the	data	of	relevant	statistical	agencies,	in	some	monopoly	 industries,	 the	highest	proportion	of	off-the-book	 income	to	declared	 wages	 has	 reached	 60%499.	 We	 can	 find	 examples	 from	 the	 annual	reports	of	 listed	companies,	 in	which	employees'	remuneration	mainly	consists	of	three	parts:	wage,	salary	and	allowance,	employee	welfare	benefits	and	social	insurance	 premiums.	 According	 to	 the	 provisions,	 only	 wage,	 salary	 and	allowance	belong	to	gross	wage,	and	the	rest	belong	to	off-the-book	income.	
																																								 																				 	495	 See	China	Statistics	Yearbook	2010.	 	496	 Idid.	 	497	 Sheng	Hong.	2011.	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises;	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform.	Unirule	Institute	of	Economics.	P.	67.	 	498	 The	Provisions	on	the	Composition	of	Gross	Wages,	1990.	 	499	 Sheng	Hong.	2011.	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises;	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform.	Unirule	Institute	of	Economics.	P.	67.	
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	In	 addition,	 through	 calculation	 based	 on	 the	 data	 from	 China	 Statistical	Yearbook	 2010,	 before	 2004,	 the	 per-capita	 labor’s	 remuneration	 of	 SOEs	was	lower	 than	 those	 of	 private	 and	 non-SOEs;	 after	 2004,	 the	 per-capita	 labor’s	remuneration	 of	 SOEs	 exceeded	 those	 of	 private	 and	 non-SOEs	 and	 the	differences	are	getting	bigger.	The	growth	in	2008	was	exceptionally	noticeable	when	 it	 was	 63%	 higher	 than	 private	 enterprises	 and	 36%	 higher	 than	non-SOEs500.	 		2.1.2 The	Comparison	of	wage	levels	between	different	industries		The	correlation	between	remuneration	levels	and	industries	gets	stronger	while	the	differences	between	 industries	are	widening.	According	 to	China	Statistical	Yearbook	2009,	the	top	five	sub-sectors	in	terms	of	average	wages	of	employees	in	2008	were	securities,	other	financial	activities,	air	transport	and	software	and	computer	 services.	 Among	 them,	 the	 average	 employee	 the	 securities	 industry	earned	 10	 times	 as	 much	 as	 one	 in	 the	 textile	 industry.	Within	 the	 industrial	sector	 alone,	 the	 top	 five	 industries	 in	 terms	 of	 average	 wages	 were	 tobacco	products,	 oil	 and	natural	 gas	 exploitation,	 electric	 and	 thermal	 production	 and	supply,	 oil	 refinery,	 coking	 and	 nuclear	 fuel,	 and	 ferrous	 metal	 smelting	 and	rolling	processing501.		A	considerable	number	of	SOEs,	especially	those	in	a	monopolistic	position,	may	obtain	 high	 profits	 without	 improving	 market	 competitiveness	 or	 expanding	market	sales	volumes,	thanks	to	their	monopoly	of	key	resources,	the	use	of	land,	minerals	and	other	natural	resources	at	low	cost	or	even	for	free,	the	preferential	credit	 and	 taxation	 treatments,	 and	 the	 existence	 of	 the	 policies	 linking	wages	with	efficiencies	have	also	 caused	gross	wages	 to	 rise.	The	average	 incomes	of	the	 employees	 of	 such	 monopolistic	 SOEs	 are	 far	 higher	 than	 the	 average	incomes	 of	 the	 employees	 of	 general	 SOEs.	 About	 one-third	 of	 the	 wage	differences	 between	 different	 industries	 in	 our	 country	 have	 been	 caused	 by	
																																								 																				 	500	 See	China	Statistic	Yearbook	2010.	 	501	 See	China	Statistic	Yearbook	2009.	 	
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monopoly502.		According	 to	a	 statistical	yearbook	compiled	by	Statistics	Evaluation	Bureau	of	SASAC	on	July	11,	2006,	the	wages	of	the	employees	of	12	SOEs	in	petroleum	and	petrochemical,	 telecommunications,	coal,	 traffic	and	transportation	and	electric	power	industries	were	two	to	three	times	higher	than	the	average	wages	across	the	 country.	 The	 median	 of	 labor	 cost	 per	 capita	 of	 the	 employees	 of	 these	enterprises	 was	 between	 60,000	 Yuan	 to	 70,000	 Yuan,	 while	 the	 average	employee	wage	 in	 eastern	provinces	 and	 the	 central	 regions	 in	 that	 year	were	22,400	 Yuan	 and	 less	 than	 15,000	 Yuan	 respectively.	 National	 Bureau	 of	Statistics	data	indicates	that	the	average	wage	of	the	employees	in	electric	power,	telecommunications,	 finance,	 insurance,	 water,	 electricity	 and	 gas	 supply	 and	tobacco	industries	were	one	to	two	times	higher	than	those	of	other	industries.	If	off-the-book	 incomes	 and	 the	 differences	 in	 welfare	 benefits	 are	 taken	 into	account,	the	actual	income	gap	may	be	five	to	ten	times503.		According	 to	 Wang	 Xiaolu's	 estimation,	 in	 2005,	 there	 were	 8.33	 million	employees	in	electric	power,	telecommunications,	petroleum,	finance,	insurance,	water,	 electricity	and	gas	 supply	and	 tobacco	 industries.	This	number	was	 less	than	8%	of	the	total	number	of	employees	across	China,	but	their	gross	income	and	off-the-book	income	was	1.07	trillion	Yuan,	accounting	for	55%	of	the	gross	wage	 of	 employees	 across	 the	whole	 country	 in	 the	 same	 year504.	Most	 of	 the	SOEs	in	these	industries	are	central	SOEs		The	 income	 levels	of	employees	 in	 labor-intensive	SOEs	and	SOEs	 in	 industries	with	perfect	competition	are	relatively	 low.	For	 instance,	 in	 textile,	 feather	and	chemical	 fiber	manufacturing	 industries,	 the	wages	of	SOE	employees	were	not	only	 significantly	 lower	 than	 those	 of	 other	 units	 but	 also	 slightly	 lower	 than	urban	collective	units.	 	
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	2.1.3 Comparison	of	employee	benefits		An	 employee’s	 income	 mainly	 includes	 wage,	 salary	 and	 allowance,	 benefit,	social	insurance	and	housing	fund.	 		In	terms	of	retirement	benefits,	 in	addition	to	participating	 in	and	enjoying	the	local	 government-organized	 integrated	planning	 on	 the	 endowment	 of	 retirees	with	 fixed	 contributions,	 some	 SOEs	 also	 participate	 in	 the	 supplementary	old-age	insurance	schemes	and	medical	insurance	plans	under	the	management	of	 independent	 insurance	 companies.	 Besides,	 some	 SOEs	 with	 satisfactory	performances	also	provide	 their	 employees	with	enterprise	annuity.	According	to	incomplete	statistics	made	by	State	Administration	of	Taxation,	by	the	end	of	2008,	 33,000	 enterprises	 in	 China	had	 established	 enterprise	 annuity	 systems,	which	covered	10,380,000	employees,	or	only	about	6%	of	those	participating	in	the	national	basic	old-age	insurance	scheme.	Most	of	these	enterprises	that	have	established	 annuity	 systems	 are	 in	 electric	 power,	 railway,	 finance,	 insurance,	telecommunications,	 coal,	 nonferrous	 metal,	 transportation,	 petrol	 and	petrochemical	and	other	high-income	or	monopoly	sectors505.		In	 terms	 of	 medical	 insurance,	 the	 standards	 on	 the	 payment	 of	 the	 national	medical	 insurance	 are:	 the	 work	 unit	 contributes	 8%	 of	 the	 wage	 base	 while	individual	 employee	 contributes	 2%.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	 medical	 insurance	prescribed	 by	 the	 State,	 the	 high-performing	 SOEs	 also	 buy	 commercial	supplementary	medical	insurance	for	their	employees.	For	example,	according	to	its	2009	annual	reports,	Jinxi	Axle	Company	Limited	paid	each	employee	11,796	Yuan	 in	medical	 insurance	benefits,	while	Aerospace	Communications	Holdings	Co.,	Ltd.	paid	41,977	Yuan	to	each	employee,	both	of	which	far	exceeded	the	State	requirement506.		
																																								 																				 	505	 Sheng	Hong.	2011.	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises;	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform.	Unirule	Institute	of	Economics.	p.	71.	 	506	 See	the	Annual	Report	of	Jinxi	Axle	Company	Limited	and	Aerospace	Communications	Holdings	Co.,	Ltd.,	2009.	 	
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In	 terms	 of	 housing,	 according	 to	 the	 current	 provisions	 on	 the	 accumulation	fund	 system,	 the	 deposit	 ratios	 of	 accumulation	 funds	 of	 an	 employee	 and	 his	employing	unit	should	not	be	lower	than	5%	of	the	average	monthly	wage	of	the	employee	in	the	previous	year	and	should	not	be	higher	than	12%	in	principle.	Many	 SOEs	 and	 public	 institutions	 in	 monopoly	 industries	 have	 raised	 the	percentage	 to	20%.	According	 to	 the	principle	of	 “equal	payment	by	 individual	employee	 and	 his	 employing	 unit,”	 individual	 employees	 are	 the	 ultimate	beneficiaries	 of	 the	 housing	 funds.	 Thus,	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 that	 the	 excessive	payment	of	the	funds	for	employees	in	monopoly	industries	is	a	typical	payment	of	 additional	 welfare	 benefits	 in	 disguise.	 Besides,	 SOEs	 also	 provide	 a	 large	amount	 of	 non-monetary	 welfare	 benefits	 in	 the	 form	 of	 housing	 subsidies,	which	are	allocated	in	two	ways.	One	is	that	SOEs	build	apartments	on	the	land	allocated	by	the	State	 for	 free,	and	the	other	 is	 that	SOEs	sell	houses	bought	 in	the	market	to	respective	employees	at	low	prices.	Although	the	State	has	banned	the	 allocation	 of	 apartments	 to	 employees,	 in	 reality,	 the	 vast	 land	 SOEs	 took	over	 at	 low	 or	 no	 cost	 has	 provided	 “favorable	 conditions”	 for	 them	 to	 build	houses	on	their	own.		
2.2 Comparison	 of	 Income	 of	 Senior	 Managers	 between	 SOEs	 and	 Other	
Types	of	Enterprises		The	executive	annual	salaries	of	 listed	companies	in	China	was	disclosed	began	in	1998.	 In	that	year,	 the	average	annual	salary	of	board	chairman	and	general	managers	of	over	840	companies	was	51,800	Yuan.	According	to	the	information	from	 SASAC,	 the	 average	 annual	 salaries	 of	 senior	 executives	 of	SASAC-administered	central	SOEs	increased	from	350,000	Yuan	to	550,000	Yuan	from	2004	to	2008.	And	in	2009,	the	average	annual	salary	of	central	SOEs’	CEOs	was	about	600,000	Yuan.	The	remuneration	structure	of	the	senior	executives	of	central	 SOEs	 comprises	 capital	 salary	 and	 performance	 salary.	 A	 few	 listed	companies	also	provide	stock	options.	Performance	salary	is	a	loose	component	of	the	remuneration	value	system.	Although	most	SOEs	have	adopted	measures	used	to	incentivize	executives	in	Europe	and	the	U.S.,	they	have	only	imitated	the	forms	and	there	still	lacks	a	supervision	mechanism.	
	 243	
	According	to	annual	reports	of	listed	SOEs,	the	remunerations	of	a	considerable	number	of	members	of	 the	boards	of	directors	and	boards	of	supervisors	were	“zero.”	 However,	 they	 also	 hold	 other	 posts	 and	 receive	 remunerations	 and	allowances	 from	 the	 shareholders	 or	 other	 affiliated	 units.	We	 cannot	 find	 the	specific	remunerations	of	these	senior	executives.	Besides,	the	senior	executives	of	SOEs	also	enjoy	institutional	advantages	that	market-oriented	enterprises	do	not	 have,	 such	 as	 enjoying	 preferential	 treatment	 and	 expenses	 reserved	 for	bureaucratic	 officials.	 These	 institutional	 bonuses	 are	 also	 a	 part	 of	 the	remunerations	 of	 senior	 executives	 at	 SOEs.	 Relevant	 researches	 indicate	 that	the	 annual	 remunerations	 of	 senior	 executives	 are	 always	 far	 less	 than	 their	expenses.	 During	 the	 period	 from	 1999	 to	 2002,	 the	 average	 position-related	consumption	of	senior	executives	of	listed	companies	was	11.8	times	higher	than	their	average	annual	remuneration507.		According	to	the	analysis	conducted	by	the	Investor	Journal	on	the	efficiencies	of	senior	 executive	 incentive	 schemes	 of	 listed	 companies	 of	 different	 ownership	structure,	 it	remains	questionable	whether	the	operational	efficiency	of	an	SOE	and	the	remunerations	of	its	senior	executive	are	correlated	in	a	fair	way.	First,	SOE’s	possession	and	use	of	resources	may	ensure	their	profitability.	Second,	the	senior	 executive	 of	 some	 SOEs	 are	 selected	 through	 bureaucratic,	 but	 not	market-oriented	 appointment.	 Third,	 senior	 executive	 of	 SOEs	 do	 not	 have	 to	pass	 appropriate	 evaluation	 to	 obtain	 high	 remuneration,	 and	 the	 assessment	mechanism	is	not	transparent508.	 	 		
2.3 Comparison	 of	 the	 Tax	 Payment	 between	 SOEs	 and	 Other	 Types	 of	
Enterprises		2.3.1 Payment	of	income	taxes		
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According	to	the	analysis	by	Investor’s	 Journal,	among	all	 listed	companies,	 the	income	 taxes	 of	 private	 enterprises	 (average	 value	 from	 2007	 to	 2009)	 were	significantly	 higher	 than	 those	 of	 SOEs.	 Among	 the	 more	 than	 1,700	 A-share	listed	 companies,	 992	 companies	 (nearly	 60%	 of	 all	 the	 listed	 companies)	resemble	SOEs.	The	average	income	tax	paid	by	992	SOEs	was	only	10%,	while	that	of	private	enterprises	during	the	same	period	averaged	24%,	which	was	14%	higher	 than	 that	 of	 the	 SOEs.	 This	 means	 that	 the	 tax	 burdens	 of	 private	enterprises	were	far	heavier	than	those	of	SOEs509.		2.3.2 Overall	tax	burdens		In	2009,	the	overall	tax	burdens	of	central	and	local	SOEs	and	private	enterprises	were	8.8%,	3.5%	and	3.1%,	respectively.	The	tax	burdens	of	central	SOEs	were	higher	 than	 those	 of	 private	 enterprises510 .	 In	 the	 list	 of	 top	 tax-paying	enterprises	 in	China	published	by	the	State	Administration	of	Taxation	and	the	Journal	of	Taxation,	304	of	the	top	500	tax-paying	independent	enterprises	were	SOEs511.	The	tax	they	paid	accounted	for	75.58%	of	the	total	tax	paid	by	the	500	enterprises;	305	of	the	top	500	tax-paying	group	enterprises	were	SOEs,	the	tax	they	paid	accounted	for	89.75%	of	the	total	tax	paid	by	the	500	enterprises;	65	of	the	top	100	enterprises	paying	EIT	were	SOEs,	the	total	tax	they	paid	accounted	for	77.84%	of	the	total	tax	paid	by	the	100	enterprises.	The	overall	tax	burdens	of	central	SOEs	were	higher	than	those	of	private	enterprises512.		This	is	due	to	the	following	reasons:	first,	as	a	result	of	monopolies,	most	of	the	listed	central	SOEs	are	in	industries	with	higher	tax	burdens	such	as	petrol,	coal,	petrochemical,	 finance	 and	 real	 estate.	 There	 are	 special	 tax	 categories	 in	 all	these	industries.	In	terms	of	different	industries,	mining,	real	estate	and	financial	services	 are	 the	 three	 industries	 with	 the	 heaviest	 tax	 burdens.	 Some	 of	 the	special	 tax	 categories	 in	 these	 industries	 should	 also	 be	 regarded	 as	 resource	
																																								 																				 	509	 Sheng	Hong.	2011.	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises;	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform.	Unirule	Institute	of	Economics.	p.	75.	510	4ʁÏ2010¸ķɋàÅ6ʀǎȪP Q2010ð 4Ō 19ĻPengyu	Ren.	2010.	“Monopoly	Causes	the	High	Tax	Burden	of	SOEs”.	Investor	Daily.	March	19	2010.	511	 Ibid.	512	 Ibid.	
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rents.	In	these	industries,	central	SOEs	enjoy	overwhelming	advantages	in	output	value.		Second,	 statistics	 indicate	 that,	 due	 to	 monopolies,	 the	 sales	 margin	 of	 listed	central	 SOEs	 is	 also	 significantly	 higher	 than	 that	 of	 private	 enterprises.	 As	 a	result,	 the	general	 tax	burden	of	 central	 SOEs	 is	higher	when	using	 income,	 as	opposed	 to	 pre-tax	 profit,	 as	 the	 denominator.	 The	 main	 reason	 for	 the	significant	 difference	 is	 the	 high	 profit	 rate	 of	 central	 SOEs.	 According	 to	 the	statistics	 of	 the	 Data	 Research	 Department	 of	 Investor	 Journal,	 in	 2009,	 the	overall	net	profit	margin	of	central	SOEs	reached	11.03%,	while	 that	of	private	enterprises	was	only	8.85%.	The	reason	central	SOEs	have	higher	net	profits	 is	also	 due	 to	 their	 monopolistic	 advantages.	 In	 the	 market	 environment	 where	there	is	insufficient	competition,	central	SOEs	may	have	stronger	pricing	power	over	 their	 products	 and	 enjoy	 higher	 gross	 profit	 ratios.	 Moreover,	 compared	with	private	enterprises,	central	SOEs	may	save	quite	a	sum	on	sales	expenses513.		2.3.3 Comparison	of	tax	burdens	between	SOEs	and	non-SOEs	using	the	VAI		From	 the	 perspective	 of	 VAI,	 and	 using	 the	VAI	 data	 provided	 by	 the	National	Bureau	of	Statistics,	the	total	tax	burden	of	SOEs	(nominal	tax	burden	-	subsidies	-	 resource	 rents	 for	oil	 and	natural	gas	paid)	accounts	 for	about	24.1%	of	VAI,	while	that	percentage	of	non-SOEs	is	18%.	Considering	the	fact	that	most	SOEs	are	monopolistic,	and	there	are	other	special	tax	types	besides	the	resource	rents	paid,	as	well	as	the	fact	that	the	average	value-added	tax	rate	of	non-SOEs	(which	are	 usually	 smaller)	 is	 relatively	 low	 (10.8%),	we	may	 consider	 that	 SOEs	 and	non-SOEs	have	similar	tax	burdens.	However,	as	the	share	of	total	profit	of	SOEs	is	higher	than	that	of	non-SOEs,	 it	 is	unusual	that	the	share	of	 income	tax	SOEs	paid	(2.2%)	is	significantly	lower	than	that	of	non-SOEs	(5%).	The	result	is	that	SOE's	 net	 profit	 rate	 (20%)	 is	 significantly	 higher	 than	 that	 of	 non-SOEs	(15.8%)514.	 	
																																								 																				 	513	 Sheng	Hong,	2011,	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises;	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform,	Unirule	Institute	of	Economics,	p.	77.	 	514	 Calculated	based	on	the	data	from	China	Statistic	Yearbook	2010;	also	see	Sheng	Hong,	2011,	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises;	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform,	Unirule	Institute	of	
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2.4 The	Profit	Payment	and	Dividend	Distribution	of	SOEs		2.4.1 SOEs’	profits	contribution	to	the	State		Based	on	a	report	of	the	SASAC	in	2009	about	108	central	SOEs’	operation,	the	total	profit	of	the	top	ten	SOEs	such	as	Petro	China,	China	Mobil,	China	telecom	and	China	Unicom	was	530	billion	Yuan,	accounting	 for	about	74%	of	 the	 total	profit	 of	 all	 SASAC-administrered	 central	 SOEs515.	 Among	 them,	 the	 profit	 of	Petro	 China	 and	 China	 Mobil	 were	 129	 billion	 Yuan	 and	 149	 billion	 Yuan,	respectively516.	 Their	 total	 profit	 exceeded	 one	 third	 of	 the	 total	 profits	 of	 all	central	 SOEs.	 Therefore,	 most	 SOE	 profit	 come	 from	 central	 SOEs,	 and	 most	central	SOEs	profits	come	from	SOEs	in	monopoly	industries.	 		In	 2007,	 the	 State	 Council	 issued	 the	Opinions	 of	 the	 State	 Council	 on	 the	 Pilot	
Implementation	of	the	State-owned	Capital	Operation	Budget517.	According	to	this	document,	the	government	start	to	collect	some	SOEs’	profits	from	2006,	and	it	would	 implement	 central-level	 state-owned	 capital	 operating	 budget.	 Which	ended	 the	 thirteen	 years	 of	 SOEs	 not	 paying	 dividends	 to	 the	 government.	However,	the	central	state-owned	capital	operating	budget	currently	only	covers	the	 SASAC-administered	 central	 SOEs,	 China	 National	 Tobacco	 Corporation,	China	 Post	 Group,	 and	 over	 6,000	 enterprises	 affiliated	 to	 over	 80	 central	departments	(units),	such	as	science	and	technology,	education,	culture,	health,	administration,	 politics	 and	 law,	 agriculture,	 railway	 and	 finance	 departments	are	not	covered	by	the	pilot	program.		The	 profits	 turned	 over	 by	 SOEs	 account	 for	 a	 very	 low	 proportion	 of	 their	overall	profits.	In	2009,	the	total	profit	turned	over	by	SOEs	accounted	for	7.38%	of	 the	 total	 profit	 of	 SOEs.	 In	 2010,	 this	 proportion	 further	 dropped	 to	 2.12%.	
																																								 																																								 																																								 																																								 														Economics,	p.	80-84.	 	515	 The	Report	of	the	SASAC	on	Central	SOEs’	Operation,	2009.	 	516	 Ibid.	 	517	 The	Opinions	of	the	State	Council	on	the	Pilot	Implementation	of	the	State-owned	Capital	Operation	Budget,	2007.	 	
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Except	 for	 the	 profits	 turned	 over,	 all	 the	 rest	 profits	 are	 distributed	 within	SOEs518.		2.4.2 Dividend	rates	of	SOEs	listed	abroad		According	to	the	report	of	the	World	Band,	although	China’s	SOEs	did	not	deliver	to	profit	to	the	government,	those	SOEs	listed	in	overseas	markets	have	followed	the	 international	 convention	 on	 dividend	 distribution	 policies.	 Form	 2002	 to	2008,	the	average	dividend	rate	of	172	Chinese	enterprises	listed	in	Hong	Kong	Stock	 Exchange,	 owned	 directly	 or	 indirectly	 by	 the	 Chinese	 Government	through	 shareholding,	was	23.2%,	 and	 the	median	was	22.7%519.	 According	 to	the	data	as	of	2005,	the	average	dividend	rate	of	the	main	Chinese	SOEs	listed	in	the	US	was	35.4%520.	According	to	the	study	of	the	World	Bank	on	1,264	Chinese	SOEs,	 35%	of	 them	 (444)	did	not	 distribute	dividends.	 The	Chinese	 SOEs	with	negative	profits	rarely	distribute	dividends,	and	only	eight,	or	0.6%	of	the	1,264	companies	distributed	dividends	when	they	were	at	a	loss.521	 		2.4.3 Expenditure	structure	of	dividends	contributed		According	to	statistics	provided	by	the	Ministry	of	Finance,	 from	2008	to	2011,	the	 total	 operating	 budget	 expenditure	 of	 SOEs	 was	 285.186	 billion	 Yuan522.	These	 funds	 were	 mainly	 used	 in	 state-owned	 economic	 and	 industrial	restructurings,	 subsidizing	 reforms	 and	 reorganizations,	 new	 investments,	 and	supplementing	 SOEs,	 SOE	 post-disaster	 production	 resumption	 and	reconstruction	central	SOEs,	and	relief	subsidies	for	central	SOEs	during	reform.	From	2008	 to	2001,	 the	 total	expenditure	 in	 the	above	 five	areas	amounted	 to	235.04	 billion	 Yuan,	 accounting	 for	 82.42%	 of	 SOEs'	 operating	 budget	
																																								 																				 	518	 Sheng	Hong.	2011.	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises;	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform.	Unirule	Institute	of	Economics.	p.	80.	 	519	 The	Report	of	the	World	Bank,	2005.	 	520	 Ibid.	521	 Ibid.	 	522	 Sheng	Hong.	2011.	China’s	State-owned	Enterprises;	Nature,	Performance	and	Reform.	Unirule	Institute	of	Economics.	p.	80-82.	
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expenses523.	 Among	 the	 27	 billion	Yuan	 of	 state-owned	 capital	 supplements	 in	2008,	 the	 three	major	airlines	and	 the	 five	major	electric	power	SOEs	received	huge	capital	 injections.	China	Eastern	Airline	received	9	billion	Yuan	twice,	and	China	 Southern	 Airline	 received	 3	 billion	 Yuan.	 In	 2009,	 a	 special	 fund	 of	 60	billion	Yuan	from	the	operating	budget	expenditure	of	state-owned	capital	was	used	in	telecom	restructuring524.		About	 10	 billion	 Yuan	 of	 funds	 was	 brought	 into	 public	 budgets	 and	 used	 to	supplement	social	securities.	These	funds	only	accounted	for	3.51%	of	the	total	expenditure525.	In	terms	of	the	expenditure	structure,	the	contributed	dividends	are	 mainly	 transferred	 within	 the	 SOE	 system.	 Little	 is	 spent	 to	 benefit	 the	people.	 The	 common	 international	 practice	 is	 that	 regardless	 of	 the	 state	shareholder	 representatives,	 SOEs	 are	 required	 to	 turn	 over	 dividends	 to	 the	financial	departments	to	be	used	for	the	public.		
3. The	 Basic	 Characteristics	 of	 China’s	 SOE	 Income	 Distribution	 Legal	
System		By	reviewing	the	development	of	China’s	SOEs	income	distribution	legal	system,	and	 its	 current	 situation,	 the	 conclusion	 could	 be	 made	 that	 SOEs'	 dividend	distribution	 neither	 embodies	 equality	 nor	 fixes	 important	 social	 injustice	problems.	 It	 has	 actually	 infringed	 upon	 the	 principle	 of	 equality	 severely:	through	paying	fewer	or	not	resource	rents,	such	as	land	rents,	natural	resource	rents	and	other	resource	rents,	a	significant	portion	of	resource	owners'	income	is	 are	 transferred	 to	 SOEs;	 through	 obtaining	 below-market	 interest	 rates,	incomes	of	loan	owners	have	been	transferred	to	SOEs;	under	the	guise	of	huge	ostensible	profits,	 public	 finance	 resources	 are	 transferred	 to	 SOEs;	 SOEs	have	obtained	unjust	monopoly	profits	through	bureaucratic	monopoly;	through	price	control,	usually	set	higher,	consumers	benefits	are	compromised	by	SOEs;	for	a	long	time,	SOEs	did	not	give	back	profits	 to	 their	owners	to	 let	 them	decide	on	
																																								 																				 	523	 Ibid.	524	 Ibid.	525	 Ibid.	
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dividend	distribution	 .	They	also	barely	distributed	any	dividend;	based	on	 the	aforementioned	 factors,	SOEs	record	ostensibly	 larger	profits	and	use	 them	for	internal	rewards,	thus	transferring	the	benefits	that	should	have	belong	to	other	factor	owners	and	the	public	to	the	management	and	employees	of	SOEs;	higher	nominal	 profits,	 and	 fewer	 income	 taxes	 to	 a	 large	 extent	 mean	 that	 SOEs'	nominal	net	profits	are	also	higher	and	that	SOE	owners	receive	higher	returns	on	investment.	Therefore,	SOEs	play	a	negative	role	in	income	distribution,	and	the	main	characteristics	of	it	are	the	followings:		
3.1 The	Income	Distribution	System	is	Regulated	Mainly	by	Policies	rather	
than	Rules	and	Regulations	
	One	of	the	characteristics	of	China’s	SOE	income	distribution	legal	system	is	that	policies	 play	 more	 important	 role	 in	 it	 than	 rules	 and	 regulations526 .	 By	reviewing	history,	the	development	of	income	distribution	system	was	guided	by	policies	made	by	 the	CPC.	Under	planned	economy,	 since	 the	State	applied	 the	method	of	unified	distribution	according	to	planning,	the	government	exclusively	exercised	the	right	of	 income	distribution	depended	on	polices,	and	there	were	few	 rules	 and	 regulations	 to	 regulate	 income	 distribution	 except	 for	 the	Constitution.	After	 1978,	 the	 socialist	market	 economic	 legal	 system	has	 taken	shape	 initially,	 and	 the	 amount	 of	 rules	 and	 regulations	 about	 income	distribution	has	been	increased	gradually.	However,	these	rules	and	regulations	are	 too	 general	 to	 practice,	 and	 the	 regulating	 function	 of	 them	 could	 not	 be	realized.	 For	 example,	 there	 are	 no	 relevant	 rules	 and	 regulations	 but	 the	government	directly	manages	and	regulates	 the	standards	of	wage	scheme	and	social	security,	and	the	distribution	of	 financial	 fund.	Generally,	most	plans	and	advices	about	income	distribution	system	reforms	are	put	forwarded	by	relevant	government	department,	and	are	decided	by	the	Central	Committee	of	the	CPC.	Thus,	 the	 guiding	 theory	 of	 income	 distribution	 are	 usually	 proposed	 in	 the	National	 Congress	 of	 the	 CPC,	 which	 confirms	 the	 direction,	 principles	 and	models,	and	are	implemented	by	governments	in	different	levels.	The	policies	of	
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the	CPC	remain	the	dominant	position	in	regulating	income	distribution,	and	the	Constitution	and	other	relevant	rules	and	regulations	are	just	the	legalization	of	such	polices.	 	
	
3.2 The	Income	Distribution	Legal	System	Pays	More	Attentions	to	Primary	
Distribution	
	In	1993,	the	paragraph	of	“the	state	strengthens	economic	legislation,	improves	macro-regulations	 and	 control”	 was	 added	 to	 the	 Constitution527.	 After	 that,	numerous	civil	and	economic	rules	and	regulations	 including	 legislations	about	income	 distribution	 were	 created	 to	 promote	 the	 development	 of	 socialist	market	 economy.	 However,	 the	 current	 income	 distribution	 legal	 system	 pays	more	 attentions	 to	 primary	 distribution	 than	 redistribution,	 which	 caused	 the	inequity	of	income	redistribution.	For	instance,	legislations	about	social	security,	social	 welfare	 and	 transfer	 payment	 are	 still	 incomplete	 as	 yet,	 especially	 the	seriously	 short	 of	 rules	 and	 regulations	 about	 promoting	 coordinated	development	 among	different	 regions,	 transferring	 payment	 and	 taxation.	 This	leads	 to	 the	 income	 gap	 among	 different	 regions	 social	 members	 increased	continuously.		
3.3 The	Income	Distribution	Legal	System	Pays	More	Attentions	to	Protect	
the	Interests	of	the	State	than	that	of	Individuals	
	China	 is	 a	 socialist	 country	 based	 on	 public	 ownership,	 the	 State	 interest	 is	paramount	 to	 all	 others	 before	 the	 law,	 and	 no	 interest	 of	 individual	 may	contravene	that	of	the	State	or	collective.	All	of	rules	and	regulation,	whether	the	Constitution	 or	 civil	 and	 economic	 legislations,	 incline	 to	 protect	 the	 State	interests,	in	both	the	planned	economy	or	market	economy	period.	For	instance,	the	 State	 and	 the	 collective	 have	 the	 advantages	 in	 resource	 allocation	 over	individual,	and	the	state	and	collective	fortune	always	increase	much	faster	than	that	of	individual.	After	1978,	individual’s	interest	began	to	be	respected	by	law,	
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especially	the	Amendment	to	the	Constitution	confirmed	that	the	lawful	private	property	of	citizens	may	not	be	encroached	upon,	and	the	relations	between	the	State,	collective	and	individual	should	be	handled	correctly.	In	practice,	however,	the	interests	of	the	State	and	collective	still	have	priorities,	and	the	interests	of	individual	 will	 become	 weaker	 before	 them.	 Current	 land-related	 demolition	system	 and	 expropriation	 system	 have	 proved	 that.	 In	 addition,	 the	 on-going	reforms	of	 health	 care,	 state-owned	 enterprises	 and	housing	 also	 do	not	 show	enough	 respect	 to	 individual’s	 interest,	 the	 imbalance	 between	 the	 State	 and	individual	in	income	distribution	system	is	obvious.		
3.4 The	Great	Income	Disparity	among	Different	Industries	
	Currently,	 the	 income	 gap	 between	monopoly	 and	 non-monopoly	 industries	 is	the	hot	issue	in	China	and	attracts	most	attentions.	During	the	transition	period,	the	 market	 mechanism	 is	 incomplete	 and	 the	 influence	 of	 traditional	 planned	economy	 still	 exists,	 the	 government	 has	 the	 exclusive	 power	 to	 guide	 the	development	 of	 economy	 and	 market	 segmentation.	 As	 some	 important	industries	relating	to	national	economy	were	controlled	by	the	government	in	a	long	term,	and	the	management	and	manufacturing	activities	of	these	industries	were	protected	by	the	State	policies,	the	monopoly	industries	have	taken	shape	inevitably,	which	must	lead	to	the	imbalance	of	 income	between	monopoly	and	non-monopoly	industries.	For	instance,	in	monopoly	industries	such	as	banking,	electricity,	 communication,	 postal	 and	 oil,	 monopolistic	 enterprises	 (most	 of	them	 are	 state-owned	 enterprises)	 gains	 excessive	 benefits	 by	 using	 their	dominant	 advantages,	 then	 these	 benefits	 are	 transferred	 to	 excessive	 income	and	welfare	of	their	staffs,	which	lead	to	the	continuous	growing	gap	of	income	between	 monopoly	 and	 non-monopoly	 industries,	 and	 between	 monopolistic	and	 regular	 enterprises.	 In	 fact,	 from	 1995	 to	 2005,	 there	 is	 a	 rising	 trend	 on	average	 wage	 rate,	 however	 the	 rate	 for	 those	 in	 monopoly	 industries	experiences	a	significantly	higher	rise	for	the	same	periods528.	 	
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Problems of China’s Wage Distribution. See Link: 
<http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/30178/5757458.html>. 
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	According	 to	 statistics529,	 from	 1990	 to	 2002,	 the	 ratio	 of	 average	 wage	 in	top-paid	industries	to	that	in	the	lowest-paid	industries	has	been	increased	from	1.76:1	to	2.99:1.	After	2002,	since	the	new	standard	of	industry	classification	of	national	economy	was	applied,	this	ratio	was	further	increased	to	4.63:1	in	2003,	4.60:1	in	2004	and	4.88:1	in	2005.	According	to	the	Ministry	of	Labour	and	Social	Security,	the	average	wage	of	electricity,	communication,	banking,	insurance	and	tobacco	 industries	 is	 twice	 even	 thrice	 as	much	 as	 that	 of	 other	 industries;	 in	2005,	the	average	wage	of	top	12	state-owned	enterprises	that	earned	more	than	10	billion	Yuan	benefits	is	thrice	even	four	times	of	that	of	the	whole	country.	In	consideration	 of	 off-payroll	 income	 and	 welfare,	 the	 real	 proportion	 between	them	 could	 be	 5	 to	 10	 times.	 From	 1990	 to	 2002,	 the	 average	 growth	 rate	 of	average	wage	is	20.2%	in	banking	and	insurance	 industry,	17.0%	in	postal	and	communication	 industry,	 and	 16.4%	 in	 electricity	 and	 gas	 industry,	 which	 are	obviously	higher	than	that	in	mining,	building	and	agriculture	industries.	In	2007,	the	 average	wage	 of	 the	whole	 country	 is	 RMB	 24,721	 Yuan,	 and	 the	 average	wage	 of	 the	 securities	 –	 the	 top-paid	 industry	 is	RMB	14,0505,	which	 is	 14.61	times	of	that	of	animal	husbandry.	 		Furthermore,	 the	 inequity	 income	 distribution	 also	 exists	 within	 monopoly	industries.	Even	 in	the	same	enterprise,	 the	 investors	and	managers	could	gain	much	more	incomes	than	regular	staff.	According	to	Rongrong	Li530,	the	former	chairman	of	the	State-owned	Assets	Supervision	and	administration	Commission,	in	 2006,	 the	 average	 wage	 of	 senior	 executives	 of	 central	 state-owned	enterprises	 was	 RMB	 531,000	 Yuan,	 and	 that	 of	 regular	 staff	 was	 only	 RMB	100,000	Yuan.	 In	oil	 industry,	 the	ratio	of	 the	 top-paid	 to	 the	 lowest	paid	even	reaches	100:1531.		
3.5 The	Imbalanced	National	Income	Distribution	
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530 ŔǾȋRongrong Li.  
531 The Research on the Wage System of Central Sate-owned Enterprise. 5th September 2013. See link: 
< http://finance.people.com.cn/money/BIG5/n/2013/0905/c218900-22810760.html>. 
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As	a	socialist	country	based	on	public	ownership,	the	State	interests	of	China	is	paramount	 to	 all	 others,	 and	 have	 priority	 to	 individual	 interests	 when	 they	collide.	 The	 Constitution	 also	 stipulated	 “socialist	 public	 property	 is	inviolable”532.	 In	 national	 income	 distribution,	 resources	 allocation	 inclines	 to	the	 State	 and	 collective,	 and	 state-owned	 enterprises	 controls	 massive	properties	on	behalf	of	the	state.	This	results	in	private	properties	and	interests	are	neglected,	and	the	growth	rate	of	national	wealth	is	significantly	faster	than	that	of	 individual	wealth.	Therefore,	 the	proportion	of	 individual	 income	 in	 the	national	income	distribution	is	seriously	imbalanced.		Statistics	 shows	 that	 the	 share	 of	 individual	 income	 in	 national	 income	distribution	 continuously	 decreases	 while	 that	 of	 enterprise	 and	 government	income	 increases.	 In	 1978,	 the	 income	 distribution	 ration	 of	 individual,	enterprise	and	the	government	 is	55.0:11.1:33.9.	Then	the	shares	of	enterprise	and	 the	 government	 income	 have	 decreased	 to	 some	 degree	 in	 the	 period	between	1978	and	1988,	and	increased	slightly	from	1995	to	2000.	After	1995,	the	 shares	 of	 enterprise	 and	 the	 government	 income	 in	 national	 income	distribution	significantly	increased	while	that	of	individual	income	considerably	decreased.	 In	 2004,	 the	 proportion	 of	 individual	 income	 in	 national	 income	distribution	 decreased	 from	 66.81%	 in	 1995	 to	 57.83%,	 and	 that	 of	 the	government	increased	from	16.5%	in	1995	to	20.3%533.	 		According	 to	 this,	 some	 scholars	 believe	 that	 wealth	 tend	 to	 become	concentrated	 in	 China’s	 national	 income	 distribution:	 first,	 wealth	 is	concentrated	 in	 the	 hand	of	 the	 government.	During	 the	 period	between	1994	and	2008,	the	ratio	of	the	government	revenue	to	GDP	has	increased	from	10.39%	to	19.99%534.	Second,	the	share	of	labour	remuneration	continuously	decreases.	From	 1996	 to	 2007,	 the	 ratio	 of	 that	 has	 decreased	 from	 53.4%	 to	 39.7%535.	Third,	wealth	is	concentrated	to	monopoly	industries.	 		
																																								 																				 	
532 .Ŵ\¦±Øƀ The Constitution of PRC. Art 12. 
533 ±Ǧȓðɚ China Statistical Year Book 1995-2004 
534 ±Ǧȓðɚ China Statistical Year Book 1994-2008 
535 ±Ǧȓðɚ China Statistical Year Book 1996-2007 
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In	 redistribution	area,	 this	phenomenon	also	exists.	 Since	1998,	 the	 reforms	of	old-aged	pensions,	healthcare	and	education	system	are	carried	out,	the	policies	of	free	accommodation,	medical,	education	and	old-aged	pensions	which	are	all	provided	by	 the	government	under	planned	economy	are	abolished.	Therefore,	although	the	income	of	individual	has	increased	to	some	degree,	they	also	spent	much	more	on	accommodation,	healthcare	and	education	that	used	to	be	free.	 		
The	table	of	the	revenue	and	expenditure	of	the	government	Year	 The	government	revenue	(billion	Yuan)	
Expenditure	on	economic	development	(billion	Yuan)	
The	proportion	of	expenditure	to	 the	revenue	 	
Expenditure	on	agriculture	(billion	Yuan)	
The	proportion	of	expenditure	to	 the	revenue	
Expenditure	on	social	security	(billion	Yuan)	
The	proportion	of	expenditure	to	 the	revenue	
Expenditure	on	administrative	management	(billion	Yuan)	
The	proportion	of	expenditure	to	 the	revenue	
1980	 115.9	 71.5	 61.68%	 14.9	 12.2%	 0.5	 0.46%	 7.5	 6.51%	1985	 200.4	 112.7	 56.24%	 15.3	 7.66%	 0.7	 0.38%	 17.1	 8.53%	1990	 293.7	 136.8	 46.58%	 30.7	 9.98%	 1.2	 0.41%	 41.4	 14.11%	1995	 624.2	 285.5	 45.75%	 57.4	 8.43%	 24.1	 0.39%	 99.6	 15.96%	2000	 1339.5	 574.8	 42.91%	 123.1	 7.75%	 59.1	 0.46%	 276.8	 20.67%	2005	 3164.9	 931.6	 29.44%	 245.0	 7.22%	 32.4	 1.02%	 651.2	 20.58%		
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By	observing	the	table	of	the	revenue	and	expenditure	of	the	government536,	it	is	clear	that	the	expenditure	on	administrative	management	increases	rapidly	and	significantly	 more	 than	 that	 on	 agriculture	 and	 social	 security	 areas,	 and	 the	proportion	of	the	expenditure	on	these	two	areas	continuously	decreases.	 		Therefore,	 all	 income	 distribution	 among	 individual,	 enterprise	 and	 the	government,	 between	 different	 enterprises,	 individuals	 and	 regions	 are	imbalanced.	 After	 three	 decades	 development	 since	 economic	 reform,	 the	incomes	of	individual,	rural	residents,	non-monopoly	industries	and	developing	regions	have	greatly	increased,	however,	they	did	not	accord	with	the	economic	development	and	were	slower	than	the	increase	of	the	income	of	others.	These	widening	 income	 gaps	 not	 only	 hinder	 the	 development	 of	 economy,	 but	 also	lead	to	social	instability.		
4. The	 Factors	 Contribute	 to	 Current	 Situation	 of	 China’s	 SOE	 Income	
Distribution	Legal	System	
	The	 widening	 income	 gap	 and	 inappropriate	 income	 distribution	 system	 are	resulted	 from	 many	 factors,	 such	 as	 the	 basic	 economic	 system,	 resources	allocation	 mechanism,	 the	 boundary	 between	 market	 regulation	 and	macro-control	and	relevant	legal	system.		
4.1 The	 Inequity	 Resource	 Allocation	 Mechanism	 and	 Imbalanced	
Distribution	of	Factors	of	Production	
	The	income	of	social	members	is	determined	by	the	social	resources	they	could	use,	 and	 the	 resource	 allocation	 mechanism	 determines	 whether	 the	 income	distribution	is	equity	or	not537.	Under	planned	economy,	the	public	ownership	of	means	 of	 productions	 is	 applied,	 social	 resources	 are	 possessed	 by	 the	 whole	people,	and	labour	is	the	only	factor	that	could	participate	in	income	distribution,	
																																								 																				 	
536 ±Ǧȓðɚ China Statistical Year Book 2007  
537 ȇŹŰ2011T©spľŹȏ.ŴiƟǁJiangwu Xue. 2011. The 
Regulation of Economic Law on Income Distribution. Nanchang: Jiangxi People Press. 
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thus	distribution	according	to	work	could	be	accepted	widely	during	that	period.	In	 market	 economy,	 the	 income	 of	 a	 social	 member	 is	 closely	 related	 to	 the	means	of	productions	he	occupied,	and	the	income	of	one	industry	depend	on	the	market	 resources	 and	 means	 of	 productions	 it	 obtained	 rather	 than	 its	productivities538.	Therefore,	whether	social	members	could	equally	enter	certain	market	divisions	and	participate	 in	resources	allocation	is	directly	relate	to	the	equity	of	income	distribution.	 		The	 basic	 principle	 of	 income	 distribution	 under	 market	 mechanism	 is	distribution	 according	 to	 factors	 of	 productions.	 The	 factors	 of	 productions	contain	labour	factor	and	non-labour	factor,	and	the	later	includes	land,	natural	resources,	 technology	 and	 capital	 and	 etc..	 On	 one	 hand,	 as	 China	 has	 an	enormous	 population	 and	 labour	 surplus,	 the	 labour	 market	 is	 the	 buyer’s	market,	labour	force	devalues	and	the	income	of	regular	staff	that	gains	payment	only	by	labour	is	low.	On	the	other	hand,	China	adopts	the	system	that	resources	are	 owned	 by	 the	 State,	 all	 land	 and	 natural	 resources	 are	 exclusive	 owned,	operated	and	used	by	the	State,	and	it	is	hard	for	market	mechanism	to	perform	its	functions.	These	resources	are	directly	used	or	transferred	at	a	low	price	even	free,	which	virtually	increase	the	value	of	other	non-labour	factors.	Therefore,	in	practice,	those	who	have	capitals	could	obtain	excessive	benefits	by	purchasing	low-price	 land	 and	 natural	 resources,	 and	 the	 growth	 rate	 of	 the	 benefits	 of	non-labour	 factors	 such	 as	 capital	 and	 technology	 is	 much	 faster	 than	 that	 of	labour	factor.	The	more	capital	factor	he	has,	the	more	benefits	and	social	wealth	he	 could	 obtain,	 and	 the	 one	 has	 less	 capital	 is	 always	 at	 an	 unfavourable	position,	which	would	lead	to	the	Matthew	effect	at	last.	The	history	told	us	the	income	 gap	 is	 unavoidable	 while	 the	 market	 economy	 handling	 the	 efficiency	issues.	 To	 narrow	 this	 gap,	 an	 income	 distribution	 system	 in	 accordance	with	market	economy	must	be	established.		
4.2 Market	and	the	State	Regulation	Failure	
	After	 30	 years	 development,	 China	 has	 established	 a	 basic	market	mechanism	
																																								 																				 	
538 Ibid.  
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during	transitional	period.	However,	it	could	not	perform	all	of	its	functions	due	to	the	absence	of	regulation	on	market	competition.	In	income	distribution	area,	the	 market	 mechanism	 failure	 lead	 to	 national	 income	 polarizes	 because	 this	system	gives	more	attention	to	efficiency	while	neglects	equity.	 		In	 addition,	 the	 regulation	 of	 the	 State	 to	 income	 distribution	 also	 does	 not	achieve	 the	 object	 aimed	 at.	 For	 example,	 due	 to	 inappropriate	 standard	 of	transfer	 payment,	 unscientific	 taxation	 rate	 and	 administrative	 monopoly,	 the	imbalanced	primary	distribution	could	not	be	corrected	by	redistribution;	on	the	contrary,	 the	 contradiction	 is	 increased.	The	 fact	 that	 the	 government	 controls	excessive	 fundamental	 resources	and	 fail	 to	distribute	 them	 is	one	of	 the	most	important	 reasons	 that	 causes	widening	 income	gap	between	different	 regions	and	industries.	Specifically,	first,	the	land	resources	are	highly	concentrated	and	exclusively	 controlled	by	 the	 government,	 and	marketization	of	 land	 resources	guided	 by	 the	 government	 (such	 as	 forced	 demolition	 and	 expropriation)	certainly	will	deprive	individuals	of	their	interests	and	give	excessive	benefits	to	the	government,	which	will	lead	to	housing	price	increases	significantly	thus	the	real	estate	developer	can	gain	excessive	benefits.	Second,	some	 industries	such	as	banking,	electricity,	communication,	postal,	oil,	railway	and	tobacco	are	totally	controlled	 by	 state-owned	 enterprises,	 and	 the	 resources	 allocation	 of	 these	industries	 could	 not	 be	 optimized	 by	 market	 mechanism.	 These	 state-owned	enterprises	 in	monopoly	 industries	directly	or	 indirectly	 transfer	 the	excessive	benefits	to	their	staff’s	income	or	welfare,	which	results	in	the	high-income	level	of	 these	 monopoly	 industries.	 Third,	 by	 comparing	 with	 private	 enterprises,	medium	 and	 small	 sized	 enterprises	 and	 individuals,	 state-owned	 enterprises	and	 large	sized	enterprises	can	obtain	 loan	easier	and	get	more	supports	 from	credit	policy	of	the	state.	Without	sufficient	capital,	private	enterprises,	medium	and	 small	 sized	 enterprises	 cannot	 compete	with	 those	 state-owned	 and	 large	sized	enterprises,	and	the	development	and	income	of	them	are	limited.	Fourth,	the	 fiscal	 and	 taxation	 system	 do	 not	 solve	 the	 problems	 emerged	 in	 primary	distribution.	 On	 contrary,	 due	 to	 the	 unscientific	 decision,	 less	 expenditure	 on	vulnerable	 group,	 absence	 of	 social	 security	 system,	 and	 imbalanced	development	 among	 different	 regions,	 the	 redistribution	 also	 failed.	 To	 solve	
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these	 problems,	 the	 intervention	 of	 the	 government	 to	 the	 market	 must	 be	reduced,	expand	the	resources	allocation	space	by	market	mechanism	as	much	as	possible,	and	push	forward	the	reform	of	income	distribution	system.	
	
4.3 The	Shortages	of	Current	Income	Distribution	Legal	System		The	 imperfect	 income	 distribution	 legal	 system	 is	 another	 important	 factor	contributes	 to	 the	 current	 situation	 of	 income	 distribution,	 and	 is	 marked	 by	insufficient	 legislations,	 imbalance	 between	 efficient	 and	 equity	 and	 lack	 of	practicability.		4.3.1 The	imbalance	between	efficiency	and	equity		A	big	 issue	 in	economics	 is	 the	 relation	between	efficiency	and	equity,	 and	 the	nature	 of	 income	 distribution	 is	 how	 to	 correctly	 handle	 this	 relation.	 The	equilibrium	 point	 between	 efficiency	 and	 equity	 is	 the	 foundation	 of	 a	reasonable	 income	 distribution	 system.	 China,	 however,	 fails	 to	 achieve	 the	balance	between	them.	 		Under	the	planned	economy,	the	State	over	emphasized	on	equity	and	neglected	efficiency,	which	lead	to	inefficiency	of	productivity.	After	the	economic	reform,	following	by	the	guideline	of	development	of	economy	is	a	top	priority,	efficiency	became	to	the	centre	of	attention	and	equity	was	neglected,	which	resulted	in	the	widening	 income	 gap	 among	 individual,	 enterprise	 and	 the	 government,	 and	between	 different	 regions	 and	 individuals.	 In	 market	 economy,	 efficiency	 is	superior	to	equity,	 it	 is	determined	by	the	nature	and	characteristics	of	market	economy.	Only	in	this	way,	the	potential	of	market	player	could	be	developed	as	much	 as	 possible	 to	 promote	 economic	 development.	 There	 is	 no	 efficiency	 if	equity	is	overemphasized,	and	the	equity	without	efficiency	is	also	pointless.	 		Giving	 priority	 to	 efficiency	 does	 not	 deny	 the	 importance	 of	 equity.	 The	cognition	 of	 the	 relation	 between	 them	 is	 changeable	 according	 to	 different	historical	circumstances	and	specific	conditions.	At	the	initial	stage	of	economic	
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reform,	 to	 rapidly	 develop	 economy,	 the	 State	 adopts	 the	 principle	 of	 giving	priority	 to	 efficiency	 due	 consideration	 to	 equity,	 which	 gives	 priority	 to	 the	development	of	urban	area	and	eastern	regions,	and	allow	partial	individuals	to	get	rich	first.	This	not	only	promotes	the	economic	development	greatly,	but	also	leads	to	the	imbalance	between	urban	and	rural	area,	and	between	eastern	and	central	 and	western	 regions.	With	 the	 income	gap	 continuously	widens,	 equity	should	draw	attentions.	Therefore,	there	is	no	specific	standard	for	the	balance	between	 efficiency	 and	 equity,	 and	 it	 should	 change	 according	 to	 different	situations	and	keep	up	with	times.		4.3.2 Current	 legislations	 about	 income	 distribution	 are	 unlikely	 to	 work	 in	practice		In	current	China’s	income	distribution	legal	system,	relevant	legislations	are	too	general,	 and	 are	 unlikely	 to	 work	 in	 practice,	 which	 should	 be	 supported	 by	specific	rules	and	regulations	to	apply.	For	example,	 the	Constitution	stipulates	the	 basic	 principle	 of	 income	distribution	 is	 “distribution	 according	 to	work	 is	dominant	 and	 divers	 models	 of	 distribution	 coexist”539.	 The	 term	 of	 “divers	models	of	distribution”,	however,	 is	 too	general,	and	which	models	belong	to	 it	and	 which	 does	 not	 is	 not	 clear.	 Besides,	 there	 are	 also	 no	 specific	 rules	 and	regulations	about	the	subject	and	object	of	distribution,	rights	and	obligations	of	them,	and	legal	liability	in	distribution	process.	It	is	no	doubt	that,	without	these	rules	 and	 regulations,	 the	 general	 principle	 of	 the	 Constitution	 could	 not	 be	applied	to	practice,	and	the	balance	between	efficiency	and	equity	would	not	be	achieved.	Another	example	 is,	 according	 to	 the	Constitution,	 individual’s	 lawful	rights	are	protected	and	defended.	However,	in	early	time,	individuals	could	not	get	any	remedy	at	all	 if	 their	 lawful	rights	were	 invaded	as	the	 judicial	remedy	mechanism	 was	 absent.	 Although	 recently	 some	 legislations	 about	 labour	contract	 and	 social	 security	 are	 created,	 and	 the	 basic	 labour	 arbitration	mechanism	is	established,	the	Ǩœ(Wei	Quan)540	 phenomenon	still	exists.	
																																								 																				 	
539 .Ŵ\¦±Øƀ The Constitution of PRC Art 6. 
540 Which means that individual protect and defend his lawful rights through litigation and legal 
activism. 
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	4.3.3 Insufficient	legislations	about	primary	distribution	
	Primary	 distribution	 is	 the	 core	 of	 income	 distribution	 system,	 and	 an	appropriate	legal	system	is	the	precondition	of	equity	primary	distribution.	Civil	and	 commercial	 law	 under	 market	 economic	 system	 is	 the	 basic	 rules	 and	regulations	 to	 regulate	 primary	 distribution.	 However,	 as	 affected	 by	 the	 legal	thoughts	of	Soviet	Union,	China	pays	more	attentions	to	public	 law	and	neglect	private	 law,	the	civil	and	commercial	 law	is	underdeveloped	for	a	 long	term541.	Before	 reform,	 there	were	barely	 legislations	about	 income	distribution	except	for	 the	basic	 principle	 of	 the	Constitution,	 and	 even	basic	 civil	 law	was	 absent	until	 1986	 the	 General	 Principles	 of	 Civil	 Law	 was	 created.	 After	 1993	 that	socialist	 market	 economy	 is	 confirmed,	 some	 commercial	 laws	 such	 as	 the	
Company	Law,	the	Securities	Law,	the	Bankruptcy	Law	and	the	Insurance	Law	are	created	and	improved	gradually.	There	are	still	no	legislations	about	regulating	excessive	 income,	 illegal	 income,	 transfer	 payment	 and	 macro-control	 on	 the	table.	 This	 is	 the	main	 factor	 contributing	 to	 the	 situation	 of	 inequity	 primary	distribution.	 		For	 example,	 during	 transitional	 period,	 the	 State	 overemphasizes	 on	decentralizing	power	to	state-owned	enterprises	and	giving	them	autonomy,	and	neglect	regulating	to	them	by	administrative	and	legal	methods.	Therefore	even	the	 benefits	 distribution	 and	 wage	 scheme	 of	 monopolistic	 enterprises	 are	decided	 not	 by	 the	 State,	 but	 these	 enterprises	 themselves,	 which	 lead	 to	 the	huge	income	gap	between	top	managers	and	regular	staff.	 		The	 direct	 result	 of	 overemphasizing	 on	 efficiency	 and	 economic	 development	while	 neglecting	 equity	 and	 livelihood	 is	 inequity	 income	 distribution	 and	widening	 income	 gap.	 Therefore,	 to	 solve	 these	 problems,	 the	 primary	distribution	legal	system	must	be	improved	at	first,	to	protect	the	lawful	rights	of	individuals	and	achieve	 the	balance	among	 individual,	 enterprise	and	 the	 state	
																																								 																				 	
541 ȇŹŰ2011T©spľŹȏ.ŴiƟǁJiangwu Xue. 2011. The 
Regulation of Economic Law on Income Distribution. Nanchang: Jiangxi People Press. 
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by	legal	means.	
	4.3.4 The	secondary	distribution	legal	system	is	imperfect	
	Generally,	 the	 secondary	distribution	 is	 regulated	by	economic	 law,	 labour	 law	and	administrative	law.	However,	legislations	in	these	areas	such	as	competition	law	 and	 macro-control	 law	 are	 neglected	 in	 a	 long	 term	 in	 China.	 Take	anti-monopoly	 as	 an	 example.	 Although	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 is	 created	 in	2008,	 it	 does	 not	 contain	 any	 strong	 contents	 in	 regulating	 administrative	monopoly,	 which	 is	 the	 main	 issue	 in	 China’s	 economy.	 On	 contrary,	 some	industrial	 legislation	such	as	 the	Oil	Law,	 the	Gas	Law,	 the	Communication	Law	and	the	Electricity	Law	have	strong	overtones	of	protecting	monopoly	industries.	 		Legislation	in	social	security	area	is	also	imperfect.	The	nature	of	social	security	system	is	the	distribution	and	redistribution	of	social	income,	it	directly	relate	to	distribution	equity.	Most	countries	have	a	social	security	and	assistance	system	that	aims	at	protecting	basic	rights	of	citizens,	and	developed	countries	such	as	the	UK	have	 a	perfect	 and	 complete	 social	 security	 legal	 system.	This	 not	 only	protects	 individual’s	 rights	 but	 also	 maintains	 social	 stability.	 However,	 as	China’s	economy	has	gained	significantly	achievement,	its	social	security	system	and	relevant	legislation	are	lagged	behind	obviously.	Despite	the	Social	Security	
Law	is	promulgated	in	2008,	the	problems	such	as	narrow	coverage,	insufficient	fund	and	low	security	level	still	exist	in	current	social	security	system.		
5. Regulating	SOE	Income	Distribution	by	Anti-monopoly	Law	
	In	 economic	 law	 system,	 market	 regulations	 include	 anti-monopoly	 law,	anti-unfair	competition	law	and	consumer	protection	law.	All	of	them	are	aimed	at	 removing	 market	 barriers,	 improving	 competition	 mechanism,	 regulating	excessive	 income	 from	 monopoly	 and	 unfair	 competition	 activities,	 and	protecting	 legal	 rights	 of	 market	 players.	 Since	 antimonopoly	 activities	 is	 the	main	 factor	 distributes	 to	 the	widening	 income	 gap	 in	 current	 China’s	 income	distribution	 system,	 and	 it	 is	 also	 the	most	 important	 and	 efficient	method	 of	
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market	 regulation,	 this	 section	 will	 focus	 on	 discussing	 and	 analysing	 the	theoretical	 and	 practical	 issues	 in	 current	 China’s	 income	 distribution	 system	and	how	to	reform	it	from	the	perspective	of	anti-monopoly.		
5.1	General	theory		Free	competition	is	the	indispensible	factor	of	healthy	development	of	economy,	and	 the	 precondition	 and	 fundamental	 of	 market	 mechanism	 performing	 its	functions.	However,	 it	also	results	 in	 the	survival	of	 the	 fittest	and	reduces	 the	amount	 of	market	 players	 inevitably,	 and	 then	 the	monopoly	 is	 emerged.	 The	monopolistic	activities	not	only	hinder	economic	development,	but	also	affect	the	equity	 of	 income	 distribution.	 In	 micro	 level,	 it	 causes	 the	 inequity	 income	distribution	among	market	players;	in	macro	level,	it	would	affect	social	stability	if	 the	 inequity	 income	distribution	becomes	general	and	severe.	Thus	 it	 can	be	seen	 that	monopoly	 and	 unfair	 competition	 activities	 are	 the	main	 factor	 that	hinder	 market	 mechanism	 performing	 its	 functions	 and	 regulating	 income	distribution.	To	monopoly	and	unfair	competition	activities,	civil	and	commercial	law	 are	 powerless	 since	 they	 are	 based	 on	 freedom	 of	 contract,	 and	 some	monopolistic	alliances	such	as	price	trust	and	the	agreement	of	sharing	market	are	 based	 on	 the	 very	 same	 principle.	 At	 this	 moment,	 anti-monopoly	 law	emerges	as	the	times	require.	 		The	 existence	 of	monopolistic	 activities	 enable	 industries	 and	 enterprises	 that	have	 dominant	 positions	 to	 obtain	 excessive	 income	 and	 lead	 to	 widening	income	 gap,	 and	 anti-monopoly	 law	 would	 protect	 free	 competition	 and	maintain	 social	 equity	 by	 breaking	 these	 monopolies.	 In	 fact,	 the	 process	 of	breaking	 up	 monopolies	 is	 also	 the	 process	 of	 income	 distribution	 and	redistribution.	 		The	basic	theory	of	income	distribution	by	anti-monopoly	law	will	be	discussed	and	analysed	as	following:		
5.1.1	 Monopoly	 profits	 is	 the	 main	 source	 of	 excessive	 high	 income	 in	
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monopoly	industries		Free	 competition	 is	 the	quintessence	of	market	 economy,	 and	monopoly	 is	 the	inevitable	 result	 of	 free	 competition.	 Some	 powerful	 and	 well-performed	enterprises	 could	 obtain	 monopolistic	 position	 during	 competition.	 By	 using	advantages	of	their	dominant	position,	these	enterprises	(and	industries)	could	control	market	 and	 resources,	 and	 obtain	monopoly	 profits	much	 higher	 than	average	level.	The	high	income	of	staffs	in	monopoly	enterprises	(and	industries)	closely	 relate	 to	 monopoly	 profits.	 Monopoly	 enterprises	 (and	 industries)	creates	higher	price	to	obtain	monopoly	profits	by	using	their	dominant	position,	and	these	profits	would	ultimately	transfer	to	their	staff’s	excessive	high	income	due	to	shortages	of	external	supervision	and	individualism	and	arbitrariness	 in	internal	 contribution	system.	Therefore,	monopoly	profit	 is	 the	 fundamental	of	excessive	high	income	in	monopoly	enterprises	and	industries.	 		The	formation	of	monopoly	profits	severely	breaches	the	law	of	value	because	it	is	 not	 the	 result	 of	 free	 competition.	 Monopoly	 enterprises	 (and	 industries)	obtains	 monopoly	 profits	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 sacrificing	 the	 interests	 of	 regular	enterprises	 and	 consumers:	 on	 one	 hand,	 monopoly	 enterprises	 uses	 their	monopoly	 position	 to	 restrict	 and	 exclude	 competition	 activities	 of	 regular	enterprises,	as	a	result	these	enterprises	could	not	obtain	reasonable	profits;	on	the	 other	 hand,	 staffs	 of	 these	monopoly	 enterprises	would	 earn	much	 higher	income	 than	 that	 of	 regular	 enterprises.	 This	 would	 result	 in	 the	 large	 and	widening	 income	gap	between	monopoly	and	regular	enterprises,	and	between	staffs	in	them.	Take	China	as	an	example,	electricity,	communication	and	tobacco	industries	 obtain	 excessive	 high	 profits	 and	 their	 staffs	 also	 earn	much	 higher	income	than	regular	level.	These	excessive	incomes,	however,	do	not	result	from	these	 staff	 have	more	 efficient	 productivity	 and	 create	more	 labour	 value	 but	from	excessive	monopoly	profits.	Monopoly	enterprises	and	their	staffs	share	the	monopoly	 profits	 while	 other	 market	 players	 and	 consumers’	 interests	 are	harmed,	which	lead	to	the	imbalanced	income	distribution.	Civil	and	commercial	laws	 are	 powerless	 to	 regulate	 and	 redistribute	 monopoly	 profits,	 and	 only	anti-monopoly	 law	 could	 break	 up	 monopoly	 and	 regulate	 monopoly	 profits,	
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which	is	the	main	purpose	of	it.	 		Monopoly	could	be	observed	in	two	aspects:	structural	monopoly	and	monopoly	activities.	Structural	monopoly	means	enterprise	has	obtained	market	dominant	position	 and	 no	 other	 enterprises	 could	 compete	 with	 it;	 monopoly	 activities	include	monopoly	agreement,	concentration	of	business	operators	and	abuse	of	dominant	position.	Anti-monopoly	law	should	regulate	both	of	them.	 		Currently,	the	main	regulation	object	of	almost	all	countries’	anti-monopoly	law	is	 monopoly	 activities.	 For	 instance,	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 of	 China	 makes	specific	 provisions	 of	 monopoly	 agreement	 (chapter	 2),	 abuse	 of	 market	dominance	 (chapter	 3)	 and	 concentration	 of	 business	 operators	 (chapter	 4)	separately.	 		Structural	monopoly	also	should	be	regulated,	because	under	market	economy,	it	would	 easily	 lead	 to	 abuse	 of	market	 dominant	 position	 and	 it	 is	 the	 result	 of	monopoly	 activities.	 In	 the	 United	 States,	 in	 order	 to	 break	 up	 structural	monopoly	 and	 turn	 a	 monopoly	 market	 to	 a	 competitive	 market,	 a	 large	enterprise	 could	 be	 divided	 into	 several	 small	 enterprises	 if	 it	 has	 too	 much	power	 and	 too	 large	 proportion	 of	 certain	market,	 even	 there	 is	 no	 evidences	that	 show	 this	 enterprise	 abuses	 of	 its	 dominance	 at	 that	 moment.	 Recently,	China	 introduces	competition	mechanism	into	traditional	monopoly	markets	 to	hinder	 enterprises	 in	 this	 market	 obtaining	 excessive	 monopoly	 profits.	 For	instance,	 the	 mobile	 communication	 business	 was	 exclusively	 run	 by	 China	Mobile	 with	 high	 price	 in	 a	 long	 term,	 which	 severely	 affected	 consumers’	interests.	 Then	 introducing	 Unicom	 and	 other	 operators	 into	 communication	market	broke	up	 this	 structural	monopoly.	The	petrol	 industry	has	 the	 similar	situation,	 in	which	Petro	China,	Sinopec	and	the	CNOOC	compete	each	other	 to	some	 degree.	 However,	 the	 problem	 is	 the	 structural	 monopoly	 in	 such	industries	 has	 not	 been	broken	up	 totally,	 they	 are	 dominated	by	 state-owned	enterprises	 and	 it	 is	 hard	 for	 private	 enterprises	 to	 enter,	 and	 the	 monopoly	profits	still	exist	in	these	industries.	 		
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5.1.2	Monopoly	would	harm	consumers’	interests		Protecting	 consumers’	 interests	 is	 one	 of	 the	 core	 tasks	 of	 anti-monopoly	 law,	and	some	scholars	even	believed	it	is	the	only	purpose	of	anti-monopoly	law.	For	instance,	Japanese	scholars	thought	the	direct	purpose	of	the	antimonopoly	act	is	to	achieve	free	and	fair	competition,	but	its	ultimate	task	is	to	protect	consumers’	interests542 .	 In	 the	 United	 States,	 both	 Sherman	 Antitrust	 Act	 and	 Clayton	
Antitrust	 Act	 clearly	 aim	 at	 increasing	 consumers’	welfare,	 and	 Chicago	 School	also	stated	that	increasing	consumers’	welfare	is	the	only	task	of	antitrust	law543.	Besides,	 all	 of	Germany,	 Sweden,	 Finland	 and	Poland’s	 anti-monopoly	 law	give	priority	 to	 protecting	 consumers’	 interests544.	 The	 reason	 monopoly	 activities	such	as	predatory	pricing,	 concentration	of	 enterprises	 and	abuse	of	dominant	position	 should	 be	 regulated	 is	 because	 they	 distort	 price	 goods	 under	 free	market	and	damage	the	interests	of	consumers.	Therefore,	the	ultimate	purpose	of	 anti-monopoly	 law	 is	 to	 protect	 consumers’	 interests545.	 The	Anti-monopoly	
Law	of	China	also	takes	it	as	its	main	purpose	and	value	goal.	 		In	 practice,	 monopoly	 activities	 force	 consumers	 to	 increase	 expenditures	 by	making	predatory	and	unfair	price,	 or	 reducing	 the	 service	 level,	which	 causes	the	 decline	 of	 consumers’	 living	 standard	 and	 decreases	 in	 their	 earnings.	 For	example,	 the	 electricity	 company	 forces	 their	 customers	 to	 buy	 high-priced	electric	meter	from	appointed	supplier,	gas	supplier	increases	gas	price	without	authorization,	and	identity	photos	must	be	taken	at	appointed	photo	studios,	all	of	these	activities	would	directly	damage	consumers’	interests	and	reduce	their	incomes.	 In	 addition,	 monopoly	 enterprises	 could	 add	 excessive	 salary	 as	 a	make-up	to	cost	price	by	using	their	dominant	position	to	increase	the	prices	of	
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goods	and	services	and	obtain	excessive	monopoly	profits.	Therefore,	monopoly	profit	 is	not	 the	 result	of	 creating	value	but	 consumers’	 losses.	 In	 fact,	 it	 is	 the	deprivation	of	consumers’	interests.	 		Anti-monopoly	 law	 has	 positive	 impacts	 on	 changing	 this	 situation.	 It	 could	ensure	diversification	of	market	players	and	protect	free	competition	of	market.	Market	mechanism	with	free	competition	would	break	monopoly,	and	introduce	price	 competition	 mechanism	 to	 give	 consumers	 more	 choices.	 Thus,	 by	protecting	consumers’	 interests,	anti-monopoly	law	increases	consumers’	 living	standard,	 increases	 their	 income	 relatively	 and	 achieves	 equity	 between	consumers	and	business	operators.	Furthermore,	 in	a	 free	competition	market,	competitors	 would	 provide	 goods	 and	 services	 with	 lower	 price	 and	 better	quality	 by	 all	 manner	 of	 means	 to	meet	 consumers’	 requirements,	 which	 also	benefit	consumers.	 		Competition	brings	more	choices	and	higher	service	quality	to	consumers,	which	changes	 the	 demand-supply	 relationship	 between	 consumers	 and	 business	operators,	and	also	increases	their	living	standard	and	income	level	relatively.	In	fact,	protecting	consumers’	interests	of	antimonopoly	law	is	the	readjustment	of	the	 income	 relations	 among	 business	 operators,	 and	 between	 consumers	 and	business	operators.	 		
5.1.3	Monopoly	would	affect	the	efficiency	of	social	resources	allocation		Economic	activities	are	closely	related	to	social	resources	allocation.	The	process	of	 economic	 activities	 is	 a	 process	 of	 continuously	 consuming	 all	 sorts	 of	resources,	 and	 the	 total	quantity	of	 resources	 is	 limited,	 thus	how	 to	use	 them	efficiently	 and	 get	 them	 to	 where	 they	 could	make	most	 impact	 is	 a	 common	concern	 issue.	 So	 far,	 among	 divers	 resources	 allocation	 models,	 market	economy	is	proved	to	be	the	most	economic	and	efficient	system.	As	mentioned	earlier,	 the	 quintessence	 of	 market	 economy	 is	 free	 competition,	 and	 it	 could	ensure	market	mechanism	is	given	full	play,	regulate	price	by	invisible	hand,	and	promote	 rational	allocation	of	 resources.	Through	restoring	competition	order,	
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protecting	 public	 interests,	 and	 promoting	 rational	 allocation	 of	 social	 sources	and	factors	of	production,	anti-monopoly	law	could	increase	economic	efficiency	and	balance	national	income	distribution.		Divers	 resources	 are	 allocated	 efficiently	 and	 rationally	 through	 competition.	However,	as	competition	under	market	economy	 is	a	process	of	survival	of	 the	fittest,	and	is	a	survival	competition	among	market	players,	every	competitor	in	market	 faces	 to	 be	 eliminated	 at	 any	 time.	 Thus,	 to	 survive	 and	 develop	 in	competition	 and	 protect	 their	 own	 interests,	 market	 players	 certainly	 will	exclude	 rivals	 by	 all	 means,	 and	 anti	 competition	 activities	 such	 as	 restrictive	competition	and	unfair	competition	behaviours	emerges.	 		These	anti	competition	activities	damage	the	interests	of	other	competitors	and	consumers	 and	 cause	 inequity	 income	 distribution,	 more	 seriously,	 it	 also	distorts	 the	 law	 of	 value,	 harms	 regular	 competition	 mechanism,	 affects	allocation	of	 social	 and	economical	 resources,	 and	 reduces	 income	distribution	efficiency.	Since	the	market	does	not	have	self-adjustment	function,	the	principle	of	good	faith	and	tortious	liability	system	of	civil	and	commercial	law	could	not	regulate	 these	 anti	 competition	 activities,	 and	 the	 individual-based	 value	orientation	 of	 civil	 and	 commercial	 law	 could	 not	 maintain	 economic	 and	distribution	 efficiency,	 anti-monopoly	 law	 is	 the	 only	 force	 that	 could	 regulate	and	 restrict	 such	 activities.	 Regulating	 market	 and	 distributing	 income	 by	anti-monopoly	 law,	not	only	aims	at	balancing	 interests	among	market	players	and	maintaining	equity	of	 income	distribution	system,	but	also	to	promote	and	protect	competition	order,	increase	social	economic	efficiency,	and	maximize	the	efficiency	of	resources	allocation	and	income	distribution.	 		
5.2	Shortcomings	of	China’s	current	anti-monopoly	legal	system		Current	 China’s	 anti-monopoly	 legal	 system	 mainly	 includes	 three	 aspects:	comprehensive	 legislations,	 such	 as	 the	 Anti-monopoly	 Law,	 the	 Anti-unfair	
Competition	Law,	the	Consumer	Protection	Law	and	the	Price	Law;	some	industry	rules	 and	 regulations	 that	 contain	 anti-monopoly	 contents,	 such	 as	 the	
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Telecommunications	 Regulations	 and	 the	 Pharmaceutical	 Administration	 Law;	some	 specific	 legal	 documents	 aims	 at	 prohibiting	 regional	 blockades,	 such	 as	the	 Notice	 on	 Breaking	 Regional	 Market	 Blockades	 and	 Further	 Promoting	
Commodity	 Circulation	 issued	 by	 the	 State	 Council,	 and	 the	 Regulations	 on	
Prohibiting	 Regional	 Blockades	 in	 Market	 Economic	 Activities.	 Although	 a	 basic	anti-monopoly	 legal	system	has	been	established,	 it	has	 limited	effectiveness	 in	practice	due	to	its	shortcomings.	 		
5.2.1	Shortage	of	efficient	regulations	on	administrative	monopoly		By	 comparing	with	 western	 countries,	 the	main	 type	 of	monopoly	 in	 China	 is	administrative	monopoly	because	of	its	institutional	causes.	The	transformation	from	 planned	 economy	 to	 market	 economy	 of	 China	 is	 a	 gradual	 process.	 In	order	 to	 protect	 national	 security,	 China	 insists	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 steadily	promoting	 economic	 and	 social	 reform:	 on	 one	 hand,	 it	 encourages	 the	development	 of	 private	 sector;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 it	 maintains	 the	 control	 of	some	industries	that	relate	to	national	security	and	major	interests.	After	Reform	and	 Opening	 Up,	 the	 government	 reduces	 control	 and	 intervention	 in	 certain	industries	but	not	industries	involving	in	national	security	and	major	interests.	 		The	main	features	of	administrative	monopoly	is	that	the	administrative	subjects	(such	 as	 the	 government)	 exclude	 and	 restrict	 competition	 by	 abusing	 their	administrative	power,	to	protect	certain	interest	and	obtain	excessive	profits;	in	other	words,	 the	 formation	of	monopoly	 results	 from	not	 economic	power	but	administrative	 power.	 Administrative	 monopoly	 includes	 industry	 monopoly	and	regional	monopoly,	which	are	widely	found	in	current	China.	For	examples,	in	Jilin	Province,	a	local	government	appoints	only	one	enterprise	to	establish	its	information	 network,	 and	 all	 others	 are	 excluded546;	 in	 Hubei	 Province,	 the	government	 appoints	 a	 local	 wine	 the	 official	 appointed	 wine	 to	 increase	 its	share	 in	 local	 market547;	 driving	 test	 can	 only	 be	 applying	 through	 driving	
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schools	after	attending	driving	course	in	such	schools548.	 		Administrative	monopoly	 in	China	not	only	severely	harms	 free	competition	 in	market,	but	also	has	positive	impacts	on	political	and	economic	reform.	In	order	to	 obtain	 excessive	 profits	 and	 protect	 local	 interests,	 some	 administrative	subjects	and	enterprises	rig	the	market	and	price	by	abusing	their	administrative	power,	which	harm	consumers’	 interests	 and	 lead	 to	 the	widening	 income	gap	among	 industries,	 between	 monopoly	 and	 regular	 enterprises,	 and	 between	staffs	in	monopoly	and	regular	enterprises.	 		Since	 administrative	 monopoly	 results	 from	 control	 and	 intervention	 of	administrative	subjects	to	economy,	it	is	always	wrapped	by	lawful	appearance,	and	 it	 could	 be	 regulated	 only	 by	 rules	 and	 regulations.	 China’s	 current	
Anti-monopoly	 Law,	 however,	 still	 remains	 on	 paper.	 First	 of	 all,	 there	 is	 no	completed	 legal	 system	 to	 specifically	 regulate	 administrative	monopoly,	 rules	and	 regulations	 in	 this	 area	 are	 divided	 into	 numerous	 temporary	 regulations,	notices,	 decisions	 and	 anti-monopoly	 legislations;	 second,	 most	 of	 rules	 and	regulations	on	administrative	monopoly	are	created	by	government	department	in	both	central	and	local	level,	and	they	are	precisely	the	source	of	administrative	monopoly;	 third,	 most	 of	 current	 rules	 and	 regulations	 adopt	 the	 method	 of	enumeration	 to	stipulate	which	activity	should	be	regulated,	and	 there	are	still	many	 administrative	 monopoly	 activities	 outside	 the	 law.	 Therefore,	 current	China’s	monopoly	legal	system	is	powerless	to	regulate	administrative	monopoly	in	practice.	 		
5.2.2	Failure	to	regulate	monopoly	activities	of	state-owned	enterprises		Essentially,	 state-owned	 enterprises’	 monopoly	 activities	 in	 China	 are	 indirect	administrative	monopoly,	they	obtain	dominant	market	position	by	government	intervention	rather	than	free	competition.	 		Under	 planned	 economy,	 the	 government	 controlled	 every	 aspect	 of	 economy,	
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and	the	proportion	of	state-owned	sector	was	dominant.	After	several	reforms,	the	proportion	of	state	sector	in	whole	national	economy	has	greatly	decreased,	but	 some	 industries	 relate	 to	 national	 security	 and	 major	 interests	 are	 still	controlled	by	the	government,	in	which	the	problem	of	state-owned	enterprises	monopoly	 is	 severe	 in	 recent	 years.	 For	 instance,	 in	 2006,	 the	 State-owned	Assets	 Supervision	 and	 Management	 Committee	 issued	 the	 Guiding	 Opinions	
about	 Promoting	 Adjustment	 of	 State-owned	 Capital	 and	 Reorganization	 of	
State-owned	 Enterprises549,	 which	 specifically	 stated	 that	 state	 sector	 should	maintain	 “absolute	 control”	 of	 seven	 industries	 including	 war	 industry,	electricity,	oil,	telecommunication,	coal,	civil	aviation	and	shipping,	and	“strongly	control”	 nine	 industries	 including	 equipment	 manufacturing,	 automobile,	electronic	 information,	 construction,	 steel,	 nonferrous	metals,	 chemical,	 survey	and	 design	 service	 and	 technology550.	 So	 called	 “absolute	 control”	means	 such	industries	should	be	 totally	controlled	by	 the	State,	and	exclude	private	sector;	although	“strongly	control”	means	certain	industries	open	to	private	sector,	the	entry	 requirement	 is	 so	high	 that	 it	 is	 impossible	 for	 any	 enterprise	 in	private	sector	 to	 enter	 the	 market.	 Therefore,	 above	 industries	 are	 monopolized	 by	state-owned	enterprises	essentially.	 		No	 doubt	 that	 there	 are	 some	 industries	 that	 should	 be	 in	 the	 hand	 of	 the	government	 to	 protect	 national	 security,	 provided	 they	 have	 sufficient	 reason	and	 meet	 the	 exceptions	 of	 anti-monopoly	 law.	 Thus	 the	 range	 of	 industries	needs	to	be	absolute	and	strongly	controlled	by	the	state	is	widely	doubted.	For	instance,	when	there	is	a	natural	monopoly,	the	government	tends	to	have	total	control	 not	 only	 on	 that	 industry	 but	 all	 relating	 industries.	 This	 is	 highly	inefficient	and	such	relating	industries	should	be	open	to	the	private	sector,	such	as	 infrastructure	 construction	 in	 electricity	 and	 telecommunication	 industries,	and	 sale	 in	 oil	 industry.	 Thus	 it	 can	 be	 seen	 this	 scope	 is	 too	 wide,	 and	 new	market	barriers	are	built.	 		
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The	regulations	of	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	on	state-owned	enterprises	monopoly	is	useless	due	to	its	vague	language.	For	example,	the	scope	of	“major	industries	and	key	fields	relating	to	national	security	and	national	economic	lifelines”	is	too	general	 to	 define	 exactly	 what	 they	 are.	 Besides,	 even	 though	 some	 countries	allow	exceptions	in	their	anti-trust	law,	they	are	strictly	restricted	to	industries	relating	 to	 public	 interest.	 There	 is	 rarely	 any	 country	 like	 China	 that	 permits	monopoly	 to	 operate	 in	 a	 whole	 industry.	 This	 is	 unjustified.	 Thus,	 not	 only	current	China’s	anti-monopoly	legal	system	cannot	regulate	monopoly	activities	of	state-owned	enterprises,	but	it	also	legalizes	them	objectively.		
5.2.3	Failure	to	efficiently	regulate	monopoly	profits	
	Due	to	lack	of	efficient	mechanism	to	regulate	monopoly	profits	that	are	made	by	state-owned	monopoly	enterprises,	 these	profits	are	 transferred	 to	 their	 staff’s	salary	and	welfare	rather	than	delivering	to	the	state.	According	to	statistics,	the	average	 income	 of	 some	 monopoly	 industries	 such	 as	 electricity,	telecommunication	 and	 tobacco	 are	 twice	 even	 triple	 as	 much	 as	 that	 in	competitive	industry.	In	2008,	even	though	the	proportion	of	the	people	working	in	monopoly	industries	is	only	8%	of	the	total	workforce,	their	salary	amounts	to	approximately	 50%	 of	 the	 total	 salary551.	 The	 income	 gap	 is	 huge	 even	 in	 the	same	 industry,	 for	 example,	 in	 some	 industries	 such	 as	 oil	 and	telecommunication,	the	salary	of	top-paid	is	100	times	as	much	as	that	of	lowest	paid552 .	 Thus,	 some	 scholars	 believed	 that	 excessive	 income	 of	 monopoly	industries	 is	 the	 main	 factor	 that	 contributes	 to	 the	 widening	 income	 gap	 in	China553.	 		The	 reason	 why	monopoly	 profits	 cannot	 be	 regulated	 is,	 on	 one	 hand,	 these	monopoly	 enterprises	who	 have	 been	 granted	market	 dominant	 position	 from	the	 government	 are	 either	 state-owned	 enterprises	 or	 leading	 enterprises	 in	local	area,	their	performances	are	closely	related	to	economic	development	and	
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government	 revenue;	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 the	 income	 distribution	 within	monopoly	enterprises	lacks	of	supervision	and	regulation.	Although	salary	is	tied	to	 performance	 in	 current	 salary	 management	 system,	 the	 characteristics	monopoly	 industries	 do	 not	 separate	 from	 that	 of	 competitive	 industries--the	performance	of	monopoly	industries	include	benefits	which	result	from	market	dominant	position	 and	preferential	 policy	 of	 the	 state,	 thus	 staffs	 in	monopoly	industries	could	earn	more	salary	because	their	enterprises	have	more	profits.	In	addition,	decision	makers	always	 created	distribution	plan	based	on	 their	own	interest,	such	as	the	Oil	Law,	the	Gas	Law	and	the	Telecommunication	Law	which	are	 heavily	 influenced	 by	 relevant	 industries	 when	 they	 were	 creating.	 These	legislations	 strengthen	 the	 protection	 of	 such	 monopoly	 industries	 instead	 of	breaking	up	them	to	some	degree.	 		State-owned	monopoly	 enterprises	 not	 only	 obtain	 excessive	 income	 by	 using	their	market	dominance,	but	also	do	not	need	to	deliver	them	to	the	state.	After	the	tax	system	reform	in	1994,	state-owned	enterprises	did	not	need	to	deliver	profits	 to	 the	 state	 for	13	 years,	 and	most	 of	 these	profits	were	 transferred	 to	their	staffs’	salary	and	welfare.	This	situation	was	ended	with	the	publication	of	the	 Managing	 Methods	 of	 Collection	 Capital	 Dividend	 of	 Central	 State-owned	
Enterprises554	 in	 2007.	 Even	 though,	 there	 is	 upper-limit	 to	 the	 profits	 the	state-owned	 enterprise	 delivered:	 10%	 to	 state-owned	 monopoly	 enterprises	such	 as	 tobacco,	 oil,	 electricity	 and	 telecommunication	 enterprises,	 and	 5%	 to	those	enterprises	in	competitive	market	such	as	steel	and	transportation555.	 		As	 a	 conclusion,	 these	 shortcomings	 of	 current	 China’s	 anti-monopoly	 legal	system	could	regulate	neither	administrative	monopoly	that	is	the	main	problem	in	China	market,	nor	monopoly	profits	that	is	the	main	factor	contributing	to	the	widening	 income	 gap.	 To	 protect	 free	 competition,	 restore	 market	 order	 and	balance	 income	 distribution,	 current	 anti-monopoly	 legal	 system	 must	 be	modified	and	improved.	 	
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5.3	 Improving	 the	 income	 distribution	 function	 of	 China’s	 anti-monopoly	
legal	system		Currently,	 the	 widening	 income	 gap	 in	 China	 mainly	 results	 from	 excessive	monopoly	 profits	 that	 are	 made	 by	 administrative	 monopoly	 activities.	 To	achieve	equity	of	 income	distribution,	 restricting	administrative	monopoly	and	establishing	 a	 monopoly	 profits	 distribution	 system	 must	 improve	 the	distribution	function	of	China’s	anti-monopoly	legal	system.	 		
5.3.1	Restrict	administrative	monopoly		By	comparing	with	private	enterprises	monopoly	and	transnational	enterprises	monopoly,	administrative	monopoly	is	the	major	problem	in	China’s	transitional	period.	 It	 destroys	 the	 order	 of	 free	 competition,	 hinders	 the	 social	 resources	allocation	 and	 created	 massive	 monopoly	 profits.	 To	 restrict	 administrative	monopoly,	 relevant	 issues	 were	 taken	 into	 account	 and	 reflected	 in	 current	
Anti-monopoly	 Law.	 The	 current	 Anti-monopoly	 Law	 has	 8	 chapters	 and	 57	articles,	 and	 chapter	 5	 is	 specific	 on	 administrative	 monopoly,	 which	 set	 a	principle	 regulation	 on	 administrative	 monopoly	 in	 general,	 enumerates	concrete	forms	of	administrative	in	specific,	and	provides	anti-trust	commission	and	the	legal	 liability	of	administrative	monopoly	activities.	However,	there	are	also	 some	 deficiencies	 on	 these	 regulations,	 such	 as	 the	 definition	 of	administrative	 monopoly	 is	 not	 provided,	 the	 universal	 existing	 problem	 of	reverse	 discrimination	 is	 ignored,	 and	 the	 regulation	 of	 authority	 for	enforcement	and	the	legal	liabilities	are	imperfect.	 		To	compensate	these	deficiencies,	the	Anti-monopoly	Law	should	be	modified	as:	making	 detailed	 rules	 for	 implementation	 of	 Anti-monopoly	 Law;	 defining	 the	conception	 of	 administrative	 monopoly;	 defining	 the	 scope	 of	 ‘the	 industries	concerning	 the	 state	 economic	 lifeline	 and	 state	 security’;	 clarifying	 that	prohibiting	reverse	discrimination;	improving	the	regulations	on	Anti-monopoly	committee	 and	 implementation	 agency;	 improving	 the	 liability	 system	 of	
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administrative	 monopoly;	 and	 establishing	 a	 judicial	 remedy	 system	 for	anti-administrative	monopoly.	 		
5.3.2	Set	up	a	monopoly	profits	distribution	mechanism		There	are	two	major	measures	to	regulate	excessive	monopoly	profits	in	current	China:	restricting	and	eliminating	administrative	monopoly	to	reduce	monopoly	profits;	 redistributing	 monopoly	 profits,	 standardizing	 internal	 distribution	within	monopoly	enterprises,	and	strengthening	supervision	and	management	of	dividend	 and	 salary	 delivery	 system.	 In	 transitional	 period,	 as	 breaking	 up	administrative	monopoly	is	a	long-term	process,	the	most	efficient	measure	is	to	set	up	a	monopoly	profits	distribution	mechanism	at	first.	 		This	 mechanism	 should,	 firstly,	 set	 up	 an	 effective	 performance	 evaluation	system.	This	system	could	effectively	reflect	 the	real	performance	of	monopoly	enterprises,	not	only	could	arouse	the	enthusiasm	of	production	but	also	benefit	to	 equity	 income	 distribution.	 Secondly,	 improving	 the	 state-owned	 capital	management	 budget	 system.	 Due	 to	 the	 inertness	 of	 the	 income	 distribution	system	under	 planned	 economy,	most	monopoly	 profits	 are	 distributed	within	state-owned	 enterprises,	 and	 the	 state	 –	 the	 real	 owner	 of	 state-owned	 assets	could	 not	 share	 these	 profits.	 This	 system	 would	 balance	 the	 distribution	relations	 between	 the	 state	 and	 state-owned	 enterprises,	 and	 prohibit	 staffs	from	earning	excessive	salary.	Thirdly,	improving	the	resource	tax	system.	For	a	long	time,	the	low	resource	tax	level	increased	monopoly	profits	of	state-owned	enterprises	 objectively,	 and	 lead	 to	 the	 imbalanced	 incomes	between	 the	 state	and	 state-owned	 enterprises.	 A	 scientific	 and	 reasonable	 system	 that	 could	reflect	the	scarcity	of	resources	would	benefit	to	evaluate	the	real	performance	of	 state-owned	 enterprises.	 Fourthly,	 allocating	 social	 resources	 equally,	strengthening	supervision	on	monopoly	industries,	and	promoting	transparency	of	 the	 processes	 of	 decision-making,	 legislation,	 supervision,	 enforcement,	auditing	 and	 hearing	 of	 monopoly	 industries.	 Fifthly,	 eliminating	 welfare	corruption	of	state-owned	enterprises,	such	as	abolishing	massive	allowances	of	transportation,	 living	and	housing	 that	 result	 from	excessive	monopoly	profits.	
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Sixthly,	applying	the	total	control	to	wage	system,	improving	regulations	on	the	total	 quantity	 of	 salary	 and	 average	 salary	 level	 of	monopoly	 enterprises,	 and	strictly	 prohibiting	 excessive	 incomes	 of	 their	 staffs	 especially	 senior	executors556.	 		
5.3.3	Limit	the	scope	of	State	monopoly		Although	 the	 proportion	 of	 State	 sector	 in	 whole	 national	 economy	 has	decreased	greatly	 since	Reform	and	Opening	Up,	 there	are	about	17	 industries	are	totally	controlled	by	the	State,	which	result	in	the	excessive	monopoly	profits	and	 the	 huge	 income	 gap	 between	 monopoly	 enterprises	 and	 competitive	enterprises.	 		The	 scope	 of	 state	 monopoly	 is	 defined	 according	 to	 Article	 7	 of	 the	
Anti-monopoly	 Law,	 which	 states	 “With	 respect	 to	 the	 industries	 controlled	 by	the	State-owned	economy	and	 concerning	 the	 lifeline	of	national	 economy	and	national	 security	 or	 the	 industries	 implementing	 exclusive	 operation	 and	 sales	according	to	law,	the	state	protects	the	lawful	business	operations	conducted	by	the	 business	 operators	 therein”557.	 This	 provision	 does	 not	 limit	 the	 scope	 of	state	monopoly	but	actually	is	a	protection	of	that.		To	restrict	and	ultimately	eliminate	monopoly	profits,	this	scope	must	be	limited.	It	is	necessary	to	put	some	industries	into	the	scope	of	state	monopoly	because	they	have	certain	characteristics	of	natural	monopoly	initially.	However,	with	the	development	of	economy,	these	characteristics	have	disappeared	gradually	and	the	State	should	not	control	these	industries	any	more.	In	fact,	currently	only	the	war	 industry	 belongs	 to	 ‘the	 industries	 concerning	 the	 state	 economic	 lifeline	and	state	security’,	whose	administrative	monopoly	should	be	protected,	and	all	others	 should	open	 to	 the	private	 sector.	Therefore,	 the	State	 sector	 should	be	strictly	 limited	 to	 public	 interests	 industries,	 and	 the	 competitive	 mechanism	
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should	also	be	introduced	to	the	infrastructure	construction	of	an	industry	even	though	it	belongs	state	monopoly.	 		To	 those	 industries	 that	 open	 to	 private	 sector,	 the	 requirements	 for	 access	should	 be	 reasonable	 and	 practical.	 Although	 the	 government	 issued	 some	decisions	and	notices	to	encourage	private	sector	to	enter	some	industries	such	as	 electricity,	 telecommunication,	 railway,	 civil	 aviation	 and	 oil,	 it	 is	 still	impossible	for	them	to	enter	in	practice	due	to	the	high	access	requirements	and	other	 barriers.	 Therefore,	 the	 “open”	 is	meaningless	without	 a	 reasonable	 and	practical	access	mechanism	for	the	private	sector.	
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CHAPTER	SEVEN:	CONCLUSION		
1. The	Nature	of	SOE:	An	Economic	Perspective		
1.1	The	Nature	of	Enterprise		As	Professor	Ronald	H.	Coase	argued,	an	enterprise	is	by	its	nature	an	alternative	to	 the	market	 system558.	 Its	 function	 is	 to	 organize	 and	 allocate	 resources	 for	productive	activities.	In	market	practice,	people	negotiate	on	an	equal	basis	and	reach	 agreements	 at	 will	 to	 transfer	 and	 allocate	 resources	 for	 productive	activities.	 But	 within	 an	 enterprise,	 these	 resource	 allocation	 activities	 are	replaced	 by	 the	 command	 and	 obedience	 relations	 between	 managers	 and	workers.		From	a	wider	perspective,	Coase's	definition	of	 the	nature	of	an	enterprise	has	another	 meaning:	 enterprises	 are	 alternatives	 to	 market	 systems	 but	 are	 not	replacements	for	government	systems.	Yet	generally	speaking,	the	market	is	an	effective	 system	 for	 resource	 allocation	 in	 the	 area	 of	 private	 goods,	while	 the	government	 is	an	effective	system	for	the	allocation	of	public	goods.	Therefore,	the	enterprise	 is	an	alternative	system	to	 the	market	 for	resource	allocation	 in	the	area	of	private	goods.		Several	systems	can	be	used	for	the	efficient	allocation	of	resources	 for	private	and	public	 goods.	The	market,	 enterprises	and	 families	 can	be	used	 to	allocate	private	goods.	Public	goods	can	be	allocated	by	governments,	 religious	groups,	NGOs,	etc.	As	such,	the	role	of	enterprises	should	not	move	beyond	the	provision	of	private	goods.		As	Coase	argues,	the	boundary	between	enterprises	and	the	market	is	located	at	the	point	where	the	marginal	costs	of	market	transactions	are	equal	to	those	of	inner-enterprise	management	transactions559.	
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1.2 The	Nature	of	the	State		The	 state	 is	 a	 political	 system	 that	 has	 spatial	 and	 temporal	 dimensions.	 In	 its	spatial	 dimension,	 the	 state	 refers	 to	 a	 group	 of	 people	 and	 the	 territory	 they	inhabit.	 In	 its	 temporal	 dimension,	 it	 refers	 to	 the	 trans-individual	 social	 body	that	is	formed	by	successive	generations.	It	 involves	not	only	common	ancestry	but	 also	 common	 history,	 culture	 and	 traditions.	 Irrespective	 of	 how	 these	people	form	a	society,	they	are	the	origin	of	the	state's	power.	Indeed,	in	modern	times,	 the	 concept	 of	 popular	 sovereignty	 has	 been	 accepted	 by	 almost	 all	countries	in	the	world.		In	this	kind	of	society	(formed	by	successive	generations	of	people),	there	must	be	 an	 area	 of	 public	 goods	 provided	 through	 a	 government	 system.	 The	government	system	refers	 to	a	system	that	collects	some	resources	 from	social	output	 in	 the	 form	 of	 mandatory	 taxes	 and	 provides	 public	 goods	 through	legislative,	judicial	and	executive	means.	Some	of	these	public	goods	need	to	be	provided	in	the	form	of	organized	violence,	such	as	defense,	public	security	and	execution	of	court	decisions.		The	 government	 is	 different	 from	 the	 state.	 The	 state	 is	 comprehensive,	cross-generational	 and	 conceptual.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 government	 is	 a	 concrete	system	through	which	the	state	carries	out	governance	in	the	public	arena.	The	concept	of	popular	sovereignty	indicates	that	the	government	is	an	agent	of	the	state,	and	also	an	agent	of	the	people.		As	 a	 trans-generational	 system,	 the	 state	 mainly	 provides	 public	 services	 for	society.	 For	 its	 part,	 the	 government	 is	 mainly	 engaged	 in	 the	 area	 of	 public	goods.		
1.3 The	Nature	of	SOE		If	we	accept	these	definitions	of	the	enterprise	and	the	state,	we	may	feel	that	the	
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concept	 of	 the	 SOE	 is	 a	 strange	 one.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	 word	 “enterprise”	suggests	that	SOEs	should	be	engaged	in	the	provision	of	some	private	goods.	On	the	other	hand,	the	word	“state”	suggests	that	they	should	be	engaged	in	the	area	of	public	goods.	This	gives	rise	to	two	questions:	(a)	does	a	society	need	SOEs?	and	if	so	(b)	how	can	SOEs	reconcile	the	differences	between	enterprises	and	the	state?		First,	 there	 is	 no	 “either–	 or”	 border	 between	 the	 areas	 of	 private	 goods	 and	public	 goods.	 Instead,	 there	 is	 a	 transitional	 zone	 in	 which	 there	 are	 private	goods	 for	 which	 the	 market	 cannot	 provide,	 including	 (1)	 private	 goods	 for	which	 there	 are	 natural	 monopolies,	 such	 as	 public	 utilities,	 tap	 water	 and	pipeline	gas;	due	to	the	inherent	monopolistic	nature	of	these	goods,	the	market	pricing	 system	 does	 not	 work,	 and	 no	 competition	mechanism	 is	 present;	 (2)	private	goods	that	have	very	low	price	elasticity	and	are	necessary	for	people's	daily	lives.	The	fluctuation	of	supply	will	result	in	dramatic	price	changes,	and	in	some	cases	panic,	as	seen	in	the	two	oil	crises;	and	(3)	private	goods	that,	due	to	emergency	 or	 geographic	monopolies,	 plunge	 demand	 into	 a	 very	 unfavorable	position,	 causing	 the	 malfunction	 of	 market	 pricing	 mechanisms	 (such	 as	emergency	treatment	services	for	critically	ill	patients).		Second,	there	are	private	goods	that	have	some	public	qualities	and	public	goods	that	 have	 some	 private	 qualities,	 including	 (1)	 public	 goods	 with	 limited	 use,	such	as	roads	in	villages	and	public	facilities	that	benefit	specific	communities;	(2)	goods	 that	 are	 of	 both	 public	 and	 private	 nature,	 such	 as	 reservoirs	 that	 can	serve	 the	 purposes	 of	 irrigation	 (private	 goods)	 and	 flood	 protection	 (public	goods);	(3)	goods	that	are	public	to	some	people	and	private	to	others,	such	as	primary	education.	For	families	that	can	afford	to	pay	for	private	education,	it	is	a	private	good.	But	for	families	that	cannot	afford	private	education,	compulsory	education	 is	 provided;	 in	 this	 case,	 it	 is	 a	 public	 good;	 (4)	 goods	 which	individuals	or	enterprises	are	unwilling	to	undertake	risks	to	obtain;	in	this	case,	these	 goods	 become	 public	 in	 nature;	 (5)	 goods	which	 are	 not	 really	 valuable	from	 the	 perspective	 of	 the	 limited	 lifespan	 of	 individuals	 (positive	 discount	rate),	 but	 very	 valuable	 from	 a	 trans-generational	 perspective	 (zero	 discount	
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rate).	In	the	former	case,	they	are	private	goods,	but	in	the	latter	case,	they	are	public	goods.	There	is	a	transitional	zone	between	them.		Due	 to	 the	presence	of	 such	a	 transitional	 zone,	 it	 is	not	appropriate	 to	 simply	adopt	 an	 “enterprise”	 system	 or	 “government”	 system.	 Instead,	 different	combinations	of	 the	two	systems	should	be	applied.	Such	combinations	 include	(1)	enterprises	that	carry	out	joint	sales	or	expansion;	(2)	enterprises	regulated	by	 the	 government;	 (3)	 non-governmental	 non-profit	 organizations;	 (4)	enterprises	 that	 receive	 government	 subsidies	 for	 production;	 (5)	 enterprises	that	receive	orders	from	the	government	for	production;	and	(6)	SOEs.	For	most	cases	 in	 this	 transitional	 zone,	 the	 first	 five	 combinations	 can	 be	 applied,	 and	there	are	very	few	cases	in	which	the	“SOE”	model	can	be	applied.		
1.4 The	Relationship	between	Enterprise	and	the	State		To	 sum	up,	 SOEs	 and	 the	 government	 share	 common	public	 goals.	 It	 is	 simply	that	they	take	different	forms	and	have	different	responsibilities.	If	this	were	not	the	case,	upon	entering	competitive	markets	(including	competitive	government	procurement)	or	even	the	area	of	private	goods,	SOEs	would	compete	with	other	enterprises	in	the	market.	When	the	government	acts	as	the	agent	of	the	state,	it	will	strive	to	maximize	the	profits	of	SOEs.	The	profits	of	SOEs	are	affected	not	only	 by	 their	 competitiveness	 but	 also	 by	 relevant	 systems,	 policies	 and	regulations	that	are	formulated	by	the	government.		Once	this	is	the	case,	as	the	provider	of	public	goods,	the	government's	role	will	conflict	with	 its	 identity	as	an	agent	of	 SOEs.	The	most	 important	 for	 so-called	“public	 goods”	 include	 the	 protection	 of	 property	 rights,	 the	 maintenance	 of	market	order	and	fair	judgment.	If	public	power	is	used	to	maximize	the	profits	of	SOEs,	it	is	impossible	for	other	market	subjects	to	be	treated	equally	and	the	government	 will	 be	 hindered	 from	 providing	 just	 and	 effective	 public	 goods.	Moreover,	the	property	rights	will	be	infringed,	the	market	order	destroyed	and	one	 party	 will	 be	 favored	 in	 the	 judicial	 process.	 This	 will	 fundamentally	overturn	 the	public	nature	of	 the	government	and	derail	 government	behavior	
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from	its	original	purposes.		The	 constitutional	 principles	 defining	 the	 government	 should	 be	 that	 “the	government	should	not	compete	for	profit	with	the	people”	and	that	“in	a	state,	pecuniary	gain	is	not	to	be	considered	to	be	prosperity,	but	its	prosperity	will	be	found	 in	righteousness”560	 (Sheng	Hong,	2010).	That	 is	 to	say,	 the	government	and	SOEs	 it	 sets	up	should	not	be	engaged	 in	 for-profit	 sectors	 to	ensure	 their	fairness	 when	 providing	 public	 goods.	 The	 legitimate	 and	 normal	 source	 of	government	 revenues	 should	 be	 the	 taxes	 it	 levies	 on	 the	 condition	 that	 it	provides	public	goods.		
2. The	Nature	of	SOE:	A	Legal	Perspective		
2.1	SOE	is	Special	Public	Organization		In	the	sense	of	form,	SOEs	refer	to	joint	ventures	or	organizations	wholly	funded,	controlled	or	dominated	by	the	state.	Indeed,	only	in	the	sense	of	form	and	name	do	 SOEs	 have	 many	 common	 characteristics	 with	 regular	 enterprises,	 which	clearly	 distinguish	 them	 from	 regular	 bureaucratic	 bodies	 and	 organizations.	Specifically,	they	have	the	following	characteristics:	(1)	They	differ	from	regular	government	 organizations	 in	 terms	 of	 organizational	 structure.	 SOEs	 normally	have	organizations	similar	to	the	board	of	directors	in	other	enterprises	and	are	relatively	 independent;	 (2)	 They	 are	 more	 flexible	 than	 regular	 bureaucratic	departments	 in	 terms	 of	 personnel	 and	 finance.	 Particularly,	 the	 budget	 of	government	 organizations	 is	 strictly	 controlled	 in	 constitutional	 democracies.	But	SOEs	are	not	subject	to	strict	financial	systems;	(3)	SOEs	are	more	engaged	in	civil	and	commercial	activities,	and	subject	to	private	laws.	They	can	possess	and	dispose	of	assets,	execute	contracts	and	 institute	proceedings	 in	 their	own	names	rather	than	in	the	name	of	the	government.	In	this	sense,	SOEs	are	similar	to	 private	 companies,	 and	 more	 flexible	 than	 regular	 administrative	organizations;	 (4)	 They	possess,	 control	 and	manage	more	 assets	 than	 regular	
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bureaucratic	 organizations	 and	 are	 generally	 profit-making	 enterprises.	Compared	with	regular	administrative	organizations,	SOEs	possess	more	assets,	especially	 operational	 assets.	 Most	 SOEs	 rely	 less	 on	 funds	 allocated	 by	 the	congress	and	more	on	government	procurement,	lending,	fees	or	revenues	from	the	 services	 they	 provide,	 or	 other	 means	 by	 which	 they	 can	 be	 financially	independent.	 		The	 typical	 form	of	government	organization	 is	bureaucracy	but	 this	 is	not	 the	unique	form.	It	is	quite	normal	that	different	administrative	organizations	adopt	different	 structures.	 Essentially,	 the	 structure	 decides	 their	 functions.	 What	structure	 and	 operational	 mode	 a	 public	 institution	 adopts	 depends	 on	 the	nature	of	public	 functions	 it	 assumes.	This	 is	an	 issue	concerning	management	science	 and	 utility	 analysis.	 For	 instance,	 although	 independent	 regulatory	agencies	 were	 first	 denounced	 for	 violating	 the	 principle	 of	 the	 separation	 of	powers	 and	 the	 principle	 of	 responsible	 government,	 they	 still	 existed	 and	developed.	The	reason	is	that	the	public	responsibilities	they	assumed	required	professional	 knowledge	 and	 expertise.	 Based	 on	 the	 concept	 and	 need	 of	autonomy,	public	universities	are	more	autonomous.		Similarly,	 SOEs	 adopt	 the	 form	 of	 companies	 rather	 than	 regular	 government	organizations	 because	 their	 relative	 independence	 in	 organizational	 structure	and	relative	flexibility	in	operation	aim	to	better	fulfill	public	functions.	That	is	to	say,	when	 fulfilling	 tasks	 that	are	of	a	corporate	nature,	 the	 traditional	 form	of	bureaucratic	 organization	 is	 no	 longer	 applicable.	 Instead,	 greater	 flexibility	 is	required	for	higher	efficiency.	Therefore,	the	organization	of	private	companies	is	used	as	the	reference	for	SOEs.		Also,	the	public	nature	of	SOEs	cannot	be	denied	because	they	take	part	in	civil	activities.	 Even	 the	 most	 typical	 bureaucratic	 organizations	 that	 use	 coercive	power	 frequently	 need	 to	 take	 part	 in	 purely	 civil	 activities.	 Moreover,	 some	large	 bureaucratic	 organizations	 possess	 and	 manage	 considerable	 assets.	 In	addition,	 regular	bureaucratic	 organizations	 can	benefit	 from	 the	 fulfillment	 of	official	 duties,	 such	 as	 fines,	 charges	 and	 income	 from	 asset	 auctions.	 In	
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particular,	some	regular	bureaucratic	organizations	charge	some	service	fees	for	the	specific	administrative	services	they	provide,	although	the	charge	items	may	take	up	a	 tiny	 fraction	of	 their	duties.	However,	we	cannot	 for	 this	reason	take	bureaucratic	 organizations	 to	 be	 private	 and	 independent	 market	 subjects.	Instead,	they	are	first	and	foremost	public	institutions	that	are	bound	by	relevant	public	laws.		To	sum	up,	SOEs	have	some	features	in	common	with	government	organizations	as	 well	 as	 some	 features	 distinct	 from	 them.	 Government	 organizations	 of	different	types	are	not	well	differentiated	from	each	other.	In	addition,	the	New	Public	 Management	 movement	 has	 become	 widespread	 since	 the	 1980s.	According	to	the	New	Public	Management	theory,	the	public	and	private	sectors	have	no	essential	differences	 in	management	style.	The	management	strategies	of	the	private	sector	are	also	applicable	to	the	public	sector.	This	makes	it	more	difficult	 to	 distinguish	 between	 different	 government	 organizations,	 especially	between	regular	bureaucratic	organizations	and	SOEs.		With	 regard	 to	 the	 circumstances	 under	 which	 enterprises	 rather	 than	traditional	administrative	organizations	should	be	established,	there	is	no	clear	definition.	 Notably,	 the	 four	 fundamental	 principles	 are	 drawn	 from	 President	Truman's	 1949	 budget	 message	 about	 the	 use	 of	 corporate	 methods	 in	administration	 of	 governmental	 programs:	 (1)	 governmental	 programs	 are	predominantly	 of	 a	 commercial	 character;	 (2)	 such	 programs	 are	 revenue	producing	 and	 are	 at	 least	 potentially	 self-sustaining;	 (3)	 they	 involve	 a	 large	number	of	business-type	transactions	with	the	public;	and	(4)	in	their	business	operations	such	programs	require	greater	flexibility	than	the	customary	type	of	appropriation	budget	ordinarily	permits.		
2.2 The	Normative	Significance	of	SOE	as	Special	Public	Organization		In	view	of	what	has	been	said	earlier,	SOEs	are	an	extension	of	the	government.	The	nature	and	 functions	of	 the	 state	decide	 the	nature	and	 functions	of	 SOEs.	Modern	 states	 are	 essentially	 organizations	 that	 implement	 public	 functions.	
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SOEs	 are	 only	 one	 of	 the	 many	 government	 forms	 that	 facilitate	 the	implementation	of	public	functions.	They	adopt	an	organizational	form	similar	to	that	of	enterprises.	They	must	primarily	implement	public	functions	rather	than	seek	profits	because	profits	can	be	contributed	by	the	private	sector.	The	word	enterprise	 has	 many	 other	 definitions	 than	 a	 profit-seeking	 economic	organization.	This	is	also	why	in	other	Chinese-speaking	countries/	regions,	such	as	Taiwan,	SOEs	are	called	state-run	“undertakings”	and	in	Hong	Kong	SOEs	are	called	public-run	“organizations.”	In	addition,	government	functions	do	not	have	to	be	fulfilled	by	bureaucratic	organizations,	or	in	a	traditional	manner	through	the	exercising	of	public	power	characterized	by	coercion	and	obedience.		In	sum,	we	take	SOEs	to	be	a	special	type	of	bureaucratic	organization.	They	are	just	 public	 agencies	 in	 corporate	 form.	 They	 are	 different	 from	 regular	government	 organizations,	 which	 are	 established	 to	 facilitate	 the	implementation	 of	 safeguarding	 necessary	 and	 important	 public	 interests.	Moreover,	 some	 Japanese	 scholars	 have	 made	 a	 thorough	 and	 insightful	summary	about	the	public	attributes	of	SOEs	as	follows:	(1)	public	ownership	i.e.	owned	 by	 the	 government;	 (2)	 public	 subject	 i.e.	 all	 the	 ultimate	 subjects	 are	nationals;	 (3)	public	purpose	 i.e.	 substantive	 improvement	 in	 the	 life	 structure	and	economic	welfare	of	nationals;	(4)	public	use	i.e.	provision	of	public	utilities;	and	 (5)	 public	 regulation	 i.e.	 public	 regulation	 on	 condition	 of	 national	participation.		
2.3 The	 Strategic	 Significance	 to	 China’s	 SOE	 Reform	 of	 Reaffirming	 the	
Public	Nature	of	SOEs		As	 SOEs	 become	more	 like	 regular	 enterprises	 and	 adopt	 a	 flexible	 corporate	form,	 people	 often	 see	 their	 private	 law	 attributes	 and	 stress	 their	 status	 as	autonomous	 and	 independent	 market	 subjects	 but	 ignore	 their	 public	 law	attributes	and	the	due	public	 law	restraints	they	should	be	subject	to.	This	will	cause	 SOEs	 to	 dissimilate	 into	 interest	 groups	which	 authorize,	 reproduce	 and	propagate	by	themselves	and	seek	gains	for	themselves,	which	in	turn	will	harm	public	welfare.	Even	under	the	mature	framework	of	constitutional	democracy	in	
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some	countries,	such	cases	are	not	rare.		The	 famous	catchphrase	 in	German	 law	“	Flucht	 in	das	Privatrecht	or	Flucht	 in	die	öffentlichteStiftung”	describes	such	a	phenomenon	and	malpractice.	Only	the	private	 law	 attributes	 and	 status	 of	 independent	 legal	 entities	 are	 stressed	 for	SOEs	and	other	private	economic	administrative	organizations.	As	a	result,	SOEs	evade	and	extricate	themselves	from	public	law	attributes	and	the	due	restraints	they	 should	 be	 subject	 to.	 Specifically,	 this	 phenomenon	 results	 in	 negligence	toward	 public	 tasks,	 waste	 and	 the	 loss	 of	 public	 resources	 because	administrative	 organizations	 evade	 supervision	 by	 adopting	 a	 corporate	 form.	Consequently,	SOEs	including	public	institutions	become	a	back	garden	in	which	officials	 can	 enjoy	 a	 life	 after	 retirement,	 hire	 relatives	 and	 even	 seek	 private	gain.	The	financial	obligations	shouldered	by	the	public	treasury	are	not	relieved	much.	 The	 strict	 discipline,	 ethical	 requirements	 and	 severe	 criminal	punishments	 for	 civil	 servants	 are	 no	 longer	 applicable	 to	 the	 employees	who	are	 legally	 relieved	 of	 the	 identity	 of	 civil	 servants.	 If	 the	 legislature	 fails	 to	supervise	them	properly,	and	the	political	atmosphere	for	the	collusion	between	government	officials	and	business	people	is	not	eliminated,	public	functions	are	bound	to	fail	and	treasury	resources	to	be	misused.		Furthermore,	 SOEs	 shun	 government	 budgeting,	 accounting,	 remuneration,	personnel,	procurement	and	other	public	law	regulations	they	should	be	subject	to	 by	way	 of	 private	 laws,	 and	 turn	 a	 blind	 eye	 to	 individuals	 encroaching	 on	state	assets	and	the	over-issue	of	remuneration	and	benefits.	As	a	result,	public	undertakings	 become	 syndicated	 and	 privatized,	 which	 only	 benefit	 certain	individuals.	 		In	the	final	analysis,	this	research	simply	wants	to	reiterate	the	fact	that	SOEs	are	subject	to	public	law	as	special	agents	responsible	for	fulfilling	public	tasks.	The	establishment	 and	 management	 of	 SOEs	 must	 comply	 with	 the	 general	constraints	 that	 public	 institutions	 are	 subject	 to,	 and	 SOEs	 should	 never	completely	 enjoy	 the	 autonomy	 of	 private	 law.	 The	 key	 points	 are:	 (1)	 the	establishment	 of	 SOEs	 must	 comply	 with	 the	 basic	 principle	 of	 limited	 and	
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effective	government;	and	(2)	the	establishment	and	management	of	SOEs	must	comply	 with	 the	 principles	 of	 democratic	 legitimacy,	 the	 rule	 of	 law	 and	responsible	government.		
3. Continued	SOE	Reform		
3.1	Reflection	and	Comments	on	SOE	Reform		Since	 the	onset	of	 reform	and	opening	up	of	China,	SOE	reform	has	undergone	several	phases,	including	power	decentralization	and	profit	transfer,	the	contract	system,	 the	 substitution	 of	 tax	 payment	 for	 profit	 delivery	 and	 the	 modern	enterprise	system.	These	reforms	represented	part	of	China's	 transition	 from	a	planned	 economy	 to	 a	 market	 economy.	 In	 the	 planned	 economic	 system,	“	state-run	enterprises”	only	received	and	 implemented	government	plans.	The	government	 directly	 controlled	 production,	 exchange,	 allocation	 and	 even	consumption.	In	short,	in	the	planned	economic	system,	the	main	function	of	the	government	was	to	“produce	for	the	public”	by	making	and	implementing	plans.		When	the	development	of	a	market	economy	was	established	as	a	goal	for	China,	the	 rules	 of	 the	 economic	 game	 were	 changed	 dramatically.	 SOEs	 became	independent	 corporations.	 This	 fundamentally	 ensured	 that	 SOEs	 could	 exist,	develop	and	make	profits	in	all	economic	areas.	In	addition,	SOE	managers	were	endowed	with	the	same	decision-making	and	managerial	powers	as	managers	in	market	 economies.	 For	 its	 part,	 the	 government	 was	 transformed	 from	 the	original	 plan	 maker	 to	 SOEs'	 capital	 contributor,	 which	 thereby	 enjoys	 the	statutory	rights	and	interests	of	a	shareholder.	 In	this	way,	as	SOEs	are	further	defined	 as	 “state-funded	 enterprises,”	 one	 of	 the	 main	 functions	 of	 the	government	is	changed	from	“producing	for	the	public”	to	“making	money	for	the	public”	 1	 This	 process	 was,	 then,	 a	 process	 of	 commercialization	 and	 a	 move	toward	what	we	might	call	a	“	revenue-oriented	government,”	which	maximizes	its	fiscal	revenue	by	controlling	and	using	social	resources	(state-owned	assets,	factors	of	production,	rare	resources	and	public	power).		
	 287	
So	far,	the	nature	of	China's	SOE	reform	is	the	commercialization	of	state-owned	assets	 i.e.	 making	 profits	 through	 the	 operation	 of	 state-owned	 assets.	 When	state-owned	assets	begin	to	take	on	capitalist	attributes,	the	government	slowly	becomes	 a	 representative	 for	 their	 corporate	 interests.	 In	 this	 sense,	 the	government	 is	 virtually	 the	 same	 as	 a	 businessman,	 and	 it	 also	needs	 to	make	SOEs	“larger	and	stronger.”	When	there	is	fierce	competition	in	industries	where	SOEs	are	engaged,	which	makes	SOEs	suffer	losses	and	heavy	fiscal	burdens,	the	government	will	flatly	choose	to	withdraw	SOEs.	On	the	contrary,	when	there	is	a	structural	 condition	 for	 monopoly	 in	 industries	 where	 SOEs	 are	 engaged,	 the	government	will	 establish	 institutional	 access	 barriers	 and	 impose	monopolies	for	SOEs,	 allowing	 them	 to	make	huge	profits.	This	 is	 the	nature	of	 the	 reform	entitled	 “hold	 on	 to	 the	 big	 and	 let	 go	 of	 the	 small”.	 More	 importantly,	 when	combining	 the	 motive	 to	 make	 money	 with	 the	 public	 power	 it	 has,	 the	government	 will	 control	 rare	 resources	 such	 as	 land,	 minerals	 and	 finance	through	laws,	regulations	and	even	by	administrative	means,	so	as	to	make	huge	profits	 for	 SOEs	 or	 directly	 for	 itself.	 This	 explains	 why	 after	 a	 large-scale	“	private	advance	and	state	retreat”	in	the	1990s,	we	have	seen	structural	“state	advance	and	private	retreat”	in	recent	years.		In	this	way,	as	state-owned	assets	are	commercialized,	the	government	take	on	two	roles,	one	as	a	provider	of	public	goods	(regular	government)	and	another	as	institutionalized	 capital	 (profit-oriented	 government).	 Such	 dual	 nature	 is	 also	reflected	by	the	aims	and	actions	of	SOEs.	First,	as	carriers	or	platforms	for	the	operation	of	state-owned	assets,	SOEs	need	to	maximize	their	profits	in	the	form	of	 independent	corporations,	 just	 like	regular	enterprises.	Yet	SOEs	also	aim	to	address	issues	in	the	interest	of	the	public	such	as	employment,	social	stability,	macrocontrol,	the	stability	of	the	government	and	national	security	under	some	circumstances.	Second,	as	assets	managers,	SOE	managers	are	virtually	the	same	as	 regular	 agents,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 as	 government	 goal	 implementers,	they	belong	to	the	government	and	can	partake	in	the	“revolving	door”	between	enterprise	managers	and	government	officials.	Third,	in	market	operations,	SOEs	(managers)	will	emphasize	the	public	nature	SOEs	are	endowed	with	and	obtain	some	 special	 privileges	 through	 “in-house	 lobbying”	 in	 order	 to	 pursue	
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illegitimate	interests.		The	 government's	 aim	 of	 making	 money	 through	 SOEs	 is	 delegated	 to	 SOE	managers	and,	 as	a	 result,	 there	 is	 a	principal–	agent	 relationship	between	 the	government	 and	 SOE	 managers,	 which	 is	 characterized	 by	 asymmetric	information	 (the	managers	have	more	detailed	and	specialist	knowledge	about	the	 operations	 of	 the	 enterprise	 than	 government	 officials,	 whose	 duties	 are	much	wider).	When	the	information	is	asymmetric,	interest	groups	consisting	of	SOE	managers	and	some	government	officials	that	claim	to	“make	money	for	the	public	 (the	state)”	but	actually	seek	personal	gains	 through	state-owned	assets	will	emerge.	Such	interest	groups	will	not	only	make	the	wish	of	“making	money	for	 the	 public”	 come	 to	 nothing	 but	 also	 control	 important	 social	 resources	through	 their	 public	 power	 to	 constitute	 the	 socio-economic	 characteristics	 of	bureaucratic	capitalism	or	crony	capitalism.		Because	of	these	multiple	principal–	agent	 links,	 the	 low	efficiency	of	SOEs	will	not	 be	 fundamentally	 improved	 with	 changes	 in	 the	 competitiveness	 of	industries,	 where	 SOEs	 are	 engaged.	 Although	 in	 recent	 years,	 the	 impressive	paper	 results	of	 SOEs	have	been	used	by	 some	people	 to	emphasize	 their	high	efficiency,	the	real	performance	of	SOEs	is	seen	to	be	far	worse	than	that	of	other	firms	 in	 the	market	 after	 deducting	 resource	 rents,	 land	 rent,	 underestimated	financial	 costs,	 government	 subsidies	 and	 administrative	 monopoly	 profits.	Therefore,	 as	 long	 as	 SOEs	 do	 not	 meaningfully	 withdraw,	 even	 if	 their	performance	 is	 improved	 after	 restructuring,	 they	 are	 still	 in	 an	 unfavorable	position	 as	 compared	 with	 private	 enterprises	 in	 all	 but	 a	 few	 cases.	 More	importantly,	due	to	the	inherently	low	efficiency	of	SOEs	and	their	presence	and	expansion	 in	 fundamental	 or	 resource	 areas,	 the	 operation	 of	 China's	 macro	economy	is	still	quite	“fragile”	i.e.	the	inflation	cost	for	per	unit	economic	growth	is	quite	high.		The	 privatization	 of	 state-owned	 assets,	 especially	 at	 the	 beginning	 of	 China's	economic	 transformation,	 was	 not	 only	 logically	 inevitable	 but	 also	 promoted	meaningful	 market	 reforms.	 SOE	 reforms	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 market	
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mechanisms	 promoted	 the	 development	 of	 a	market	 economy	 represented	 by	private	enterprises.	The	large-scale	withdrawal	of	SOEs	from	many	competitive	areas	also	improved	production	factors	and	created	space	for	the	emergence	of	a	market	 economy.	 As	 a	 result,	 China	 was	 able	 to	 improve	 the	 structure	 and	efficiency	 of	 its	 national	 economy	 and	 achieve	 long-term	 stable	 and	 rapid	economic	growth.	However,	along	with	the	establishment	of	a	market	economy	in	China,	the	historical	mission	of	privatizing	state-owned	assets	is	about	to	come	to	 an	 end.	 The	 reason	 is	 that	 SOEs	 are	 relatively	 less	 efficient,	 and	 more	importantly,	the	continuous	existence	of	state-owned	capital	in	for-profit	factors	(i.e.	 private	 goods	 areas,	 including	 competitive	 and	 monopolistic	 sectors)	 has	constituted	 and	 continues	 to	 constitute	 a	 severe	 threat	 to	 the	 driving	 force	 of	China's	economic	growth	–	adequate	and	fair	competition	–	and	social	justice.	In	short,	 state-owned	 capital	 is	 detracting	 from	 the	 health	 of	 China's	 overall	economy	and	society.		Therefore,	 the	 end	 of	 the	 reform	 characterized	 by	 the	 commercialization	 of	state-owned	assets	does	not	mean	 that	 the	SOE	reform	 is	 finally	accomplished.	On	the	contrary,	it	only	marks	a	new	historical	beginning.		
3.2 Short-term	Plan		Short-term	SOE	reform	plans	should	be	designed	around	 two	major	objectives,	namely,	 breaking	 the	 administrative	 monopoly	 of	 SOEs	 and	 regulating	 the	income	 distribution	 system	 of	 SOEs.	 The	 significance	 is	 that	 this	will	 promote	adequate	 and	 fair	 competition	 between	 different	 economic	 actors	 and	 thus	better	facilitate	social	justice	and	improve	economic	efficiency.		3.2.1 Administrative	monopoly		In	short,	 the	"administrative	monopoly"	 is	a	kind	of	monopolies	established	by	the	 administrative	 departments.	 The	 definition	 of	 Administrative	 monopoly	 is	that	 an	 administrative	 department,	 through	 issuing	 administrative	 documents	(such	as	regulations,	statutes	or	suggestions),	grants	the	monopolistic	power(s)	
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to	 business	 agents--enterprises	 or	 profit-making	 administrative	 bodies,	 which	are	 realized	 as	 accessing	 to	 exceptional	 facilities	 and	 advantages,	 forming	different	degrees	of	monopolistic	forces	and	the	status	of	the	situation	by	setting	of	barriers	to	entry	and	regulating	prices.	 		Granting	 the	 monopolistic	 powers	 to	 enterprises	 is	 important	 economic	decisions	 and	 a	 change	 of	 basic	 economic	 institutions	 (the	 "socialist	 market	economy").	Under	the	Law	of	Legislation,	monopolies	shall	be	established	by	the	legislature.	 According	 to	 the	 principle	 of	 law	 reservation,	monopolies,	without	establishments	of	legislature,	are	the	damages	to	economic	freedoms	of	potential	competitors	 and	 choosing	 rights	 of	 consumers.	 In	 practice	 in	 China,	 most	 of	administrative	 monopolies	 are	 established	 by	 formal	 files	 of	 administrations.	This	situation	is	a	kind	of	self-granted.	The	monopolistic	powers	established	by	the	administrative	public	powers	are	unconstitutional	and	 illegal	at	some	level.	Broadly,	 the	 Administrative	 departments	 use	 their	 superiority	 over	 drafting	legislative	 acts	 to	 establish	 monopolistic	 powers	 in	 favor	 of	 some	 enterprises	through	 a	 weak	 legislature,	 also	 regarded	 as	 administrative	 monopoly.	 Since	reform	 and	 openness,	 China’s	 constitution	 has	 been	 amending	 several	 times.	There	are	great	changes	in	its	fundamental	principles,	such	as	adding	principle	of	“socialist	market	economy”,	and	that	of	“that	the	state	encourages,	supports	and	conducts	 non-public	 economy”.	 The	 laws	 including	 content	 of	 administrative	monopolies	are	violated	from	the	principles	of	constitutions.		Almost	 all	 of	 the	 main	 administrative	 monopoly	 industries	 discussed	 in	 this	study	 is	 evolved	 from	 the	 complete	 planned	 economy.	 After	 years	 of	 fiscal	system	reform,	the	Central	Government's	main	sources	of	revenue	have	become	taxable	 income.	 Central	 Government	 has	 incentive	 to	 reform	 state-owned	enterprises	 but	 no	 incentive	 to	 abolish	 the	 monopolistic	 powers.	 Instead,	granting	 administrative	 monopolies	 as	 preferential	 policies	 to	 State-owned	enterprises	 could	 be	 a	 way	 to	 reduce	 the	 fiscal	 burden	 from	 State-owned	enterprises.		With	the	success	of	China's	economic	reform,	huge	domestic	markets	came	to	the	
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fore,	 which	 in	 turn	 highlighted	 the	 value	 of	 monopolies	 on	 these	 markets.	Because	the	enterprises	with	monopolistic	powers	do	not	need	to	hand	in	profits,	and	have	no	ceilings	on	the	level	of	wages	and	bonuses,	they	keep	all	the	profit	due	 to	 administrative	 monopolies.	 As	 interest	 groups,	 they	 have	 sufficient	motivation	to	strive	for	greater	administrative	monopolies.		Because	 public	 powers	 are	 integral	 factor	 of	 administrative	 monopolies,	 and	impetus	 of	 governmental	 departments	 in	 the	 formation,	 maintenance	 and	strengthening	 of	 administrative	 monopolies,	 credibility	 and	 authority	 of	 the	relevant	 administrative	 departments	 were	 considerably	 weaken	 and	undermined,	while	administrative	monopolies	damage	economic	efficiency	and	social	 justice.	 Therefore,	 state-owned	 enterprises	 and	 their	 control	 over	 the	national	economy	(in	fact,	is	the	administrative	monopolies)	is	the	real	"threat	to	ruling"	rather	than	"ruling	basis".		Although	 there	are	some	shortcomings	 in	current	Anti-Unfair	Competition	Law	and	 Anti-monopoly	 Law,	 there	 are	 still	 some	 normal	 content	 to	 constraint	behaviors	 of	 administrative	 monopoly.	 The	 monopolistic	 behaviors	 the	Anti-monopoly	Law	defines	include	achieving	monopolistic	agreements	between	business	agents,	abusing	monopolistic	positions,	concentrating	firms	for	purpose	of	excluding,	 limiting	competitors.	There	is	a	certain	chapter	in	the	law	to	state	forbidding	“abuse	of	administrative	powers	to	exclude	and	to	limit	competition.”		It	 should	 establish	 "legislation	 evaded	 rule"	 for	 drafts	 of	making	 or	 amending	laws	 to	 establish	 specific	 monopolies.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 administrative	departments	that	related	to	specific	monopolies	should	not	draft	Bills.	At	least	it	should	be	drafted	by	a	neutral	agent(s)	that	authorized	by	legislature.	Moreover,	the	 legislature	 should	 organize	 the	 Committee	 of	 experts	 to	 consult	 about	 the	drafts	 establishing	 of	 monopolies	 for	 specific	 industries.	 Furthermore,	 the	establishing	of	a	specific	monopoly	should	be	treated	as	a	single	monopoly,	that	is,	we	 cannot	 use	 "category"	 as	 the	 unit	 to	 create	 a	monopoly.	 For	 instance,	 it	cannot	set	"national	economy	related"	as	a	category.		
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Administrative	 departments	 do	 not	 have	 the	 power	 to	 establish	 specific	monopolies.	 Any	 administrative	 department	 establishes	 monopoly	 through	regulations	or	statutes	is	illegal.	Setting	up	the	rules	that	related	administrative	departments	 should	 evade	 the	 drafting	 of	 related	 "implementation	 details"	 or	"regulations";	or	strengthen	the	reviewing	on	drafting	of	"implementation	rules"	of	 specific	 laws	 to	 prevent	 adding	 the	 articles	 related	 to	 establishing	 or	expanding	of	specific	monopolies.		The	 Constitutional	 resource	 of	 public-owned	 economy	 and	 state-owned	 sector	could	 be	 used	 to	 monitor	 and	 constraint	 the	 managements	 of	 state-owned	companies	 more	 effectively.	 Because	 public	 resources	 and	 assets	 should	 be	owned	 by	 all	 people,	 the	 supervision	 of	 these	 resources	 and	 assets	 should	 be	strengthened.	 It	must	be	assured	 that	 these	assets	 should	not	be	 controlled	by	managements	of	state-owned	companies.	Because	it	is	difficult	to	monitor	public	resources	 and	 assets	 on	 institutional	 and	 technological	 term,	 it	 should	 be	emphasized	 in	Constitution,	 and	 establish	 corresponding	 institutions	 and	 rules	in	laws.	 		3.2.2 Income	distribution		In	 terms	 of	 China’s	 SOE	 income	 distribution,	 it	 neither	 embodies	 equality	 nor	fixes	 important	 social	 injustice	 problems.	 It	 has	 actually	 infringed	 upon	 the	principle	 of	 equality	 severely.	 China’s	 SOEs	 play	 a	 negative	 role	 in	 income	distribution:	 through	 paying	 fewer	 or	 not	 resource	 rents,	 such	 as	 land	 rents,	natural	resource	rents	and	other	resource	rents,	a	significant	portion	of	resource	owners'	 income	 is	 are	 transferred	 to	 SOEs;	 through	 obtaining	 below-market	interest	rates,	incomes	of	loan	owners	have	been	transferred	to	SOEs;	under	the	guise	of	huge	ostensible	profits,	public	finance	resources	are	transferred	to	SOEs;	SOEs	 have	 obtained	 unjust	 monopoly	 profits	 through	 bureaucratic	 monopoly;	through	price	control,	usually	 set	higher,	 consumers	benefits	are	compromised	by	 SOEs;	 the	 obvious	 preferential	 treatments	 in	 tax	 reduction	 and	 exemption	damage	the	interests	of	public	finance	and	which	is	transferred	to	shareholders	at	 home	 and	 abroad;	 for	 a	 long	 time,	 SOEs	 did	 not	 give	 back	 profits	 to	 their	
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owners	to	let	them	decide	on	dividend	distribution	.	They	also	barely	distributed	any	dividend;	even	after	adopting	an	operating	budget,	the	profits	turned	over	by	central	SOEs	are	spent	mostly	on	central	SOEs.	The	public	has	not	benefited	from	state-owned	 capital;	 based	 on	 the	 aforementioned	 factors,	 SOEs	 record	ostensibly	larger	profits	and	use	them	for	internal	rewards,	thus	transferring	the	benefits	 that	 should	 have	 belong	 to	 other	 factor	 owners	 and	 the	 public	 to	 the	management	and	employees	of	SOEs;	higher	nominal	profits,	and	fewer	income	taxes	to	a	 large	extent	mean	that	SOEs'	nominal	net	profits	are	also	higher	and	that	SOE	owners	receive	higher	returns	on	investment.		To	 improve	 China’s	 SOE	 income	 distribution	 system,	 first,	 the	 deficiencies	 of	current	Anti-monopoly	 Law	 should	 be	 compensated:	making	detailed	 rules	 for	implementation	 of	 Anti-monopoly	 Law;	 defining	 the	 concept	 of	 administrative	monopoly;	 defining	 the	 scope	 of	 ‘the	 industries	 concerning	 the	 state	 economic	lifeline	 and	 state	 security’;	 clarifying	 the	prohibition	 of	 reverse	 discrimination;	improving	the	regulations	on	the	Anti-monopoly	committee	and	implementation	agency;	 improving	 the	 liability	 system	 of	 administrative	 monopoly;	 and	establishing	a	judicial	remedy	system	for	anti-administrative	monopoly.	 		Second,	a	monopoly	profits	distribution	mechanism	should	be	set	up,	specifically:	 	an	 effective	 performance	 evaluation	 system	 should	 be	 established;	 the	state-owned	 capital	 management	 budget	 system	 should	 be	 improved;	 the	resource	 tax	 system	 should	 be	 improved;	 allocating	 social	 resources	 equally,	strengthening	supervision	on	monopoly	industries,	and	promoting	transparency	of	 the	 processes	 of	 decision-making,	 legislation,	 supervision,	 enforcement,	auditing	 and	 hearing	 of	 monopoly	 industries;	 the	 welfare	 corruption	 of	state-owned	 enterprises	 should	 be	 eliminated,	 such	 as	 the	 abolishing	massive	allowances	 of	 transportation,	 living	 and	 housing	 that	 result	 from	 excessive	monopoly	 profits;	 and	 applying	 total	 control	 to	 the	 wage	 system,	 improving	regulations	on	the	total	quantity	of	salary	and	average	salary	level	of	monopoly	enterprises,	 and	 strictly	 prohibiting	 excessive	 incomes	 of	 their	 staff	 especially	senior	executives.	 		
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Third,	 limit	 the	 scope	 of	 State	 monopoly.	 The	 State	 sector	 should	 be	 strictly	limited	 to	 public	 interests	 industries,	 and	 the	 competitive	 mechanism	 should	also	 be	 introduced	 into	 the	 infrastructure	 construction	 of	 an	 industry	 even	though	 it	 belongs	 to	 a	 state	 monopoly.	 Furthermore,	 to	 those	 industries	 that	open	 to	 private	 sector,	 the	 requirements	 for	 access	 should	 be	 reasonable	 and	practical.	 		
3.3 Ultimate	Goals	of	SOE	Reform		There	are	two	ultimate	goals	for	the	reform	of	SOEs.	The	first	goal	 is	to	change	SOEs	into	non-profit	public	law	enterprises,	and	the	second	one	is	to	establish	a	constitutional	governance	framework	for	state-owned	assets.		In	terms	of	changing	SOEs	into	non-profit	public	enterprise,	SOEs	will	not	aim	to	make	 profits	 but	 to	 serve	 the	 public's	 interest.	 This	 defines	 the	 scope	 and	boundary	of	SOEs	and	establishes	the	nature	of	SOEs	as	public	enterprises.	They	must	be	 founded,	managed,	operated	and	withdrawn	under	public	oversight	 in	accordancewith	specific	legal	procedures.	Accordingly,	SOE	managers	should	be	deprived	 of	 their	 function	 as	 assets	 managers	 and	 should	 work	 purely	 to	implement	the	public	interest.	If	SOEs	need	to	enter	for-profit	sectors	(or	exist	in	for-profit	 sectors)	 for	 special	 reasons,	 they	 must	 first	 seek	 approval	 from	 the	People's	Congress.		In	terms	of	establishing	a	constitutional	governance	framework	for	state-owned	assets,	State-owned	assets	belong	to	the	public.	Therefore,	the	People's	Congress	(rather	 than	 bureaucratic	 organizations)	 should	 exercise	 the	 ownership	 of	state-owned	 assets	 on	 behalf	 of	 the	 public.	 When	 this	 is	 accomplished,	 the	governance	of	 state-owned	assets	will	 fall	 into	 the	 scope	of	public	 governance.	The	People's	Congress	should	legislate	regarding	the	governance	of	state-owned	assets	 to	 regulate	 the	 establishment,	 expansion	 and	 withdrawal	 of	 public	enterprises,	 approve	 the	 budget	 of	 SOEs	 and	 also	 instruct	 regulators	 of	state-owned	assets	to	perform	the	functions	of	public	enterprise	regulators	in	a	legal	and	effective	way;	hence	the	structure	consisting	of	the	People's	Congress,	
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regulators	 of	 state-owned	 assets	 and	 public	 enterprises	 for	 the	 governance	 of	state-owned	assets.		To	 achieve	 these	 ultimate	 goals,	 first,	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 government	 need	 be	changed	 from	 a	 “revenue-oriented	 government”	 into	 a	 “	 service-oriented	government”.	 SOE	 reform	 cannot	 be	 continued	 without	 this	 governmental	transition.	 Specifically,	 the	 current	 “revenue-oriented	 government”	 should	 be	changed	 into	 a	 “service-oriented	 government.”	 In	 terms	 of	 targets,	revenue-oriented	governments	will	emphasize	the	maximization	of	GDP	growth	and	 fiscal	 revenue,	 while	 service-oriented	 governments	 pay	more	 attention	 to	improving	 public	 welfare.	 In	 terms	 of	 paths	 to	 economic	 development,	revenue-oriented	 governments	 often	 directly	 participate	 in	 the	 economy	 by	controlling	 or	 monopolizing	 social	 resources,	 while	 service-oriented	governments	 pay	 more	 attention	 to	 promoting	 economic	 development	 by	improving	 the	general	environment	and	 improving	economic	goods.	Therefore,	the	nature	of	the	transition	is	to	change	the	current	dual	role	of	the	government,	eradicating	(or	weakening)	its	role	as	a	representative	of	the	interests	of	capital,	and	 to	 build	 it	 into	 a	 government	 that	 serves	 the	 people	 and	 provides	 public	goods	to	maximize	social	welfare	rather	than	fiscal	revenues.		Second,	 withdraw	 SOEs	 from	 for-profit	 sectors.	 In	 order	 to	 change	 SOEs	 into	non-profit	public	enterprises,	state-owned	capital	must	withdraw	from	for-profit	sectors.	This	will	be	conducive	to	economic	development	in	China	and	will	create	conditions	for	fair	competition.		 		 	
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